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Cross-sectional surveys ofadult participants (conducted via the WWW and via the
traditional pencil-and-paper technique) plus structural equation modelling techniques
were used to test competing models, based upon those of Irwin (1992, 1993a) and
Lawrence (1998), in order to establish whether anomalous beliefs should best be
modelled as an outcome of anomalous experiences (experiential source, ES, model),
as an antecedent of anomalous experiences (cognitive source, CS, model), or whether
the relationship is reciprocal (reciprocal causation, RC, model). Irwin and Lawrence
disagree about the nature of this relationship; Irwin considers it to be reciprocal but
Lawrence favours the experiential source explanation.
Irwin's and Lawrence's models both postulate that fantasy proneness is a
positive predictor of anomalous experiences which in turn are a positive predictor of
the level of anomalous beliefs. It has been suggested that fantasy proneness
characteristics might be conducive to the operation of genuine anomalous processes
and/or that they might lead to the misinterpretation ofnormal experiences. A second
aim of this thesis was to establish whether, in addition to childhood fantasy
proneness, the childhood incidence ofhypnagogic/hypnopompic (HG/HP) and sleep-
related experiences can also predict measures of the frequency of anomalous
experiences throughout one's lifetime. Reasons for the inclusion of these additional
variables were (1) Wilson and Barber's (1983) finding that people with fantasy-prone
personalities often report HG/HP imagery, many since childhood, as well as a range
ofanomalous experiences, (2) Wilson and Barber suspected that such experiences
are closely tied to reports ofanomalous experiences, and (3) that the HG/HP and
sleep states are often associated with reports of anomalous experiences and beliefs.
A final aim of this thesis was to compare the results of survey data collected
electronically via the WWW with that collected via traditional pencil-and-paper
methods to see whether the data collection method affected the results.
Two world-wide web (WWW) surveys (involving 108 and 130 adults,
respectively) found that the level of childhood fantasy proneness and the incidences
of a number of childhood HG/HP and sleep experiences had significant positive
correlations with measures of childhood and adulthood anomalous experiences. The
incidences of childhood and adulthood anomalous experiences were also
significantly positively correlated with the current level of anomalous beliefs. These
results provided some preliminary support for the paths in the proposed models. A
further non-WWW version of the survey, with more traditional pencil and paper
completion of the same questionnaire by a sample consisting mainly ofuniversity
college staff and students (N=T39), was also conducted.
Intercorrelations within and between the childhood incidences of the
hypnagogic/hypnopompic and sleep-related experiences suggested possible
underlying factors. Subsequent factor analyses of the WWW and traditional pencil-
and-paper survey data identified and confirmed three factors (HG/HP experiences,
dream experiences, sleep disorder symptoms) within the sleep-related items and two
factors (non-UFO-related, UFO-related) within both the anomalous experiences and
beliefs measures.
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These findings were incorporated into revised models that proposed that these
childhood factors, plus fantasy proneness, would be significantly intercorrelated and
that each would also be a significant positive predictor ofglobal measures of
anomalous experiences. The models also proposed that the anomalous experience
measures would be significant predictors of the levels of their respective beliefs.
SEM analyses of data from both the WWW and the traditional pencil-and-
paper surveys found that revised versions of the ES, CS and RC models provided a
good fit to the data, although the RC model was considered to be the best of those
tested for both empirical and theoretical reasons. These findings support Irwin's
rather than Lawrence's model of the childhood antecedents of anomalous
experiences and beliefs.
The SEM analyses also suggested that, as Lawrence has argued, fantasy
proneness is best modelled as only having an indirect relationship with anomalous
beliefs via its relationship with measures of anomalous experiences. This finding
does not support Irwin (1992, 1993a) who argues for an additional direct relationship
between fantasy proneness and measures ofanomalous beliefs. However, although
these models fit the data, childhood fantasy proneness is not a significant positive
predictor ofmeasures of anomalous experiences when the effects of other predictors
in the model are taken into account. Measures ofchildhood HG/HP experiences, in
particular, and also sleep disorder symptoms were found to be significant positive
predictors of the measure of non-UFO-related anomalous experiences.
The measures of childhood fantasy proneness, HG/HP experiences, dream
experiences and sleep disorder symptoms, as predicted, were found to be
significantly correlated. This suggests that these people may have a tendency to
experience imagery and an enhanced capacity to enter and become absorbed in
altered states of consciousness (ASCs) and to be able to recall associated
experiences. This thesis has also noted that this provides some support for the
concepts of transliminality (Thalbourne & Delin, 1994) and boundary structure
(Hartmann, 1991).
This thesis has also discussed evidence that the HG/HP and sleep states might
be conducive to anomalous processes or the misinterpretation of normal sleep-related
experiences. Evidence which suggests that temporal lobe brain activity might play a
role in the production ofboth normal sleep-related experiences and anomalous
experiences and that such experiences might also be the result of interactions with
the earth's geomagnetic field was also discussed. It is argued that the notion of
temporal lobe lability (Neppe, 1990; Persinger, 1989) and intercalation of the
hemispheres also fit in with the theories behind transliminality and boundary
structure.
The finding that the factor structure of the measures and the fit of the models
and the proportion of variance accounted for were all generally replicated across two
samples of data collected via WWW and traditional pencil-and-paper survey
techniques suggests that the validity of the results is not adversely affected by the use
of the WWW. It is argued that the differences in the descriptive statistics associated
with the measures for the two samples are likely to be due to differences in the
heterogeneity and demographics of the samples. The limitations of the SEM findings
and the survey methodology were also discussed.
2
Overview & rationale
Surveys have found that many people claim to have experienced, and an even greater
proportion believe in, a variety of anomalous phenomena, such as extrasensory
perception (ESP), psychokinesis (PK), ghosts, out-of-the-body experiences (OBEs),
communication with the dead and so on (see reviews by Irwin, 1993a, 1994c; also,
Gallup & Newport, 1991; Grimmer & White, 1990; Haraldsson, 1985; Haraldsson &
Houtkooper, 1991; McClenon, 1994a; Palmer, 1979). From a psychological
perspective, it is important to establish whether or not these experiences are caused by
processes that are beyond our current scientific understanding and, if so, how they
operate and also their limitations. If such experiences are not genuine, then it is
important to establish what causes people to make such misattributions. In some
cases, experiences that are perceived to be beyond our current understanding can be a
source of anxiety or distress; in these and other cases, those involved may be keen to
find out more information and possible explanations for their experiences and may
seek professional advice, e.g., from medical practitioners and psychologists. We need
a better understanding of the mechanisms underlying these reports and the effects that
they can have ifwe are to be able to provide the necessary information and support.
It is hoped that this thesis will contribute to this understanding, particularly as far as
reports ofanomalous sleep-related experiences are concerned.
The aforementioned experiences and beliefs are often described as being
'paranormal' or 'parapsychologicaf. Broadly speaking, these terms tend to refer to
phenomena whose explanations appear to be beyond our current scientific
understanding. However, there are a variety of views, held by researchers and the
general public, regarding the meaning of these terms and the criteria which determine
the kinds of experiences/phenomena that should be subsumed by them (see Chapter
1). In this thesis measures of'anomalous' experience and beliefs will be taken. The
term 'anomalous' is preferred because it is more neutral and because it allows the
inclusion of additional phenomena, such as UFOs, which are not considered by most
researchers to be within the scope of parapsychology but which are often reported
around the time of sleep. The sleep state and the borderline states that surround it,
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i.e., the hypnagogic and hypnopompic states, have been associated with reports of a
variety of anomalous experiences and there is evidence to suggest that they might be
conducive to the operation of genuine anomalous processes but also that features of
these states might lead to misinterpretations ofnormal sleep-related experiences (see
Chapter 5). Note that this thesis will not be attempting to test for evidence of genuine
anomalous processes.
Regardless ofwhether or not genuine paranormal processes do exist, there has
been increasing interest in the characteristics ofpeople who believe that genuine
anomalous processes are involved with these kinds ofphenomena and also in what
causes people to develop such beliefs (see review by Irwin, 1993a).
Although very few surveys have directly asked people what factors have
influenced their beliefs (except Blackmore, 1984; Clarke, 1995, for example), it is
clear that both internal and external/social factors seem to be involved. Naturally,
psychological research has tended to focus on the internal factors. Personal
experience is the reason for holding anomalous beliefs that is most often cited in the
literature (e.g., Blackmore, 1984; Clarke, 1995; Milton, 1992; Roe, 1998; Schmeidler,
1985; Zusne & Jones, 1989); individual characteristics are also considered to be
important.
Researchers have investigated a whole range ofpotential correlates of
paranormal beliefs, such as demographic, attitudinal, cognitive and personality factors
(see Chapter 2). As we shall see later, fantasy proneness appears to be a particularly
important correlate as it has been consistently related to a variety of anomalous beliefs
and experiences, unlike most of the other correlates (see Irwin, 1993a). Much of this
research has been survey-based and cross-sectional in design and has suffered from a
lack of theory or guiding principles. Such a lack of theory and explanation has also
been one of the major criticisms ofparapsycho logical research in general. Although
many theories have been proposed (Chari, 1977; Irwin, 1999; Radin, 1996; Stokes,
1987) to account for a variety ofparanormal phenomena, few can be said to be well-
known and none are generally accepted.
In my opinion, there are a number of problems with previous research into the
correlates of paranormal belief. Firstly, much of the research has only looked for a
4
series of bivariate relationships between variables and this obviously does not take
into account other variables that might also be influential. As Zusne and Jones (1989)
also noted, "many of the variables that correlate with belief in the paranormal are
themselves correlated, so that it is difficult to determine which is responsible for the
basic relationship." This problem can be addressed by the use ofmultivariate analysis,
which can also minimise the number of tests that need to be conducted (Tabachnik &
Fidell, 1996). Secondly, the cross-sectional nature ofmany of the surveys makes it
difficult to predict the direction of the relationships (if they are indeed causal) and to
establish how relationships might change over time. For example, one important
question to consider is the nature of the relationship between anomalous experience
and beliefs; does experience cause changes in belief, does belief cause a greater
frequency of anomalous experiences and/or reports thereof, or do both variables
affect each other? Thirdly, this issue highlights another problem with correlational
data; one cannot establish causality from correlational data alone. An experimental
approach would be the best way of establishing a causal relationship between two or
more variables but it is somewhat difficult to use this method when investigating
anomalous experiences and beliefs. A final criticism ofprevious research into the
correlates ofparanormal beliefs is that, although there have been some hypotheses and
common trends regarding research in this area (see review by Irwin, 1993a), there has
been very little attempt to develop models and theories to explain how and why these
various correlates are related to paranormal beliefs (Lawrence, 1998).
However, recently, researchers, such as Irwin (1992, 1993a) and Lawrence
(1998; Lawrence, Edwards, Barraclough, Church, & Heatherington, 1995), whose
work was based upon Irwin's, have begun to take stock of the research to date and
have begun to develop models that attempt to predict and explain the relationships
between some of these correlates (see Chapter 3). Both Irwin and Lawrence have
begun to focus on the developmental process and both have devised models that
include childhood antecedents ofparanormal experiences and beliefs (Irwin, 1992,
1993a; Lawrence, 1998; Lawrence et al., 1995). Within both of these researchers'
models, fantasy proneness (Wilson & Barber, 1983) is a key variable.
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Fantasy-proneness is a personality construct that was identified as a result of
interviews with a group ofwomen who responded extremely well to hypnotic
suggestion (Wilson & Barber, 1983). Although such fantasy prone personalities are
fairly rare, many people share some of the fantasy prone characteristics. Fantasy
prone individuals typically demonstrate high imaginative ability, a tendency to become
absorbed in real and imagined events (which can occasionally lead to difficulties with
reality distinction). They also report frequent hypnagogic/hypnopompic imagery, a
vivid recall ofpersonal experiences, and physical concomitants associated with
memories and fantasies (e.g., Lynn & Rhue, 1988; Rhue & Lynn, 1991; Wilson &
Barber, 1983). Ofparticular interest is that people with fantasy prone characteristics
often report a whole range ofanomalous experiences (e.g., Alvarado & Zingrone,
1994; Council & Huff, 1990; Wilson & Barber, 1983) and beliefs (Allison, 1996;
Council & Huff, 1990; Irwin, 1990, 1991a; Lawrence et al., 1995; Lawrence, 1998).
There are at least two, not necessarily mutually exclusive explanations for this
relationship. Perhaps their ability to enter, become absorbed in and recall experiences
from the hypnagogic/hypnopompic states facilitates the operation, recognition and/or
recall ofanomalous processes or agencies. Alternatively, perhaps these abilities,
coupled with a tendency to fantasise plus the occasional difficulties experienced in
distinguishing reality from imagination, lead to the invention of reports of anomalous
experiences or the misinterpretation ofnormal (imaginary) experiences.
The relationship between fantasy proneness and paranormal beliefs
Although both Irwin and Lawrence agree that fantasy proneness is an important
contributing factor to the development ofparanormal beliefs, they disagree as to
whether fantasy proneness can have a direct effect on paranormal belief. Irwin
(1993a) proposes that, in addition to an indirect relationship via paranormal
experience, fantasy proneness can lead directly to the development ofparanormal
beliefs because the latter can provide a sense ofcontrol over one's environment,
though he does not really explain how such beliefs are developed. Lawrence (1998;
Lawrence et al., 1995) proposes that fantasy proneness causes a person to report
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more paranormal experiences and that these experiences cause a person to develop or
strengthen their paranormal beliefs. Lawrence (1998) found that tests of a simplified
version of Irwin's model, which contained the aforementioned direct and indirect
paths between fantasy proneness and paranormal beliefs, did not fit the data in two
out of three samples but a version of the model without the direct path provided a
good fit with all three samples.
The relationship between paranormal experiences and paranormal beliefs
Irwin and Lawrence also disagree about the nature of the relationship between
experience and beliefs; Irwin considers the relationship to be reciprocal whereas
Lawrence considers experience to be the cause ofbelief (Irwin, 1992, 1993a;
Lawrence, 1998; Lawrence et al., 1995). Irwin argues that paranormal beliefs can
encourage the interpretation of unusual experiences as being paranormal and that
experiences perceived to be paranormal can also strengthen paranormal beliefs.
Lawrence found that a modified version of Irwin's model containing a path from
paranormal experiences to paranormal beliefs provided a good fit to data from three
separate samples. However, he did not test an alternative version containing a path
from paranormal beliefs to paranormal experiences nor a version containing reciprocal
paths.
The relationship between childhood sleep-related experiences and anomalous
experiences
Apart from conducting surveys to test out and try to resolve Irwin's (1992, 1993a)
and Lawrence's (1998; Lawrence et al., 1995) contrasting views of the nature of the
relationship between fantasy proneness and measures ofanomalous/paranormal
experience and beliefs using structural equation modelling (SEM) techniques, this
thesis also aims to test whether measures of the childhood incidence of
hypnagogic/hypnopompic and sleep-related experiences will also be useful predictors
ofmeasures ofanomalous experiences.
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There are a number of reasons for including these additional variables: (1) in
the original study by Wilson and Barber (1982, 1983), in which fantasy proneness was
'discovered,' it was noted that their fantasy-prone participants tended to report
hypnagogic/hypnopompic imagery much more frequently than controls, and many had
done so since childhood; (2) Wilson and Barber (1983) suspected that these
hypnagogic/hypnopompic experiences might be closely tied to reports ofparanormal
experience and beliefs; (3) previous surveys (e.g., Gurney, Myers & Podmore, 1886;
Rhine, 1981; Rose, Hogan, & Blackmore, 1997) and experimental work (e.g., Braud,
1977; Ullman & Krippner with Vaughan, 1989) have established that the
hypnagogic/hypnopompic and sleep states are often associated with reports of
anomalous experiences and beliefs.
These childhood variables are not already part of the models proposed by
Irwin and Lawrence and may be able to explain some additional variance. The
rationale is that people who report more of these childhood sleep-related experiences
may be people who find it easier to enter, become absorbed in and recall sleep-related
altered states of consciousness, including dissociated states that are a mixture of sleep
and wakefulness. Perhaps this capacity increases the likelihood that they will
recognise, recall and report genuine anomalous experiences, which are often
associated with ASCs or perhaps the characteristics of the these sleep-related ASCs
lead them to misinterpret normal experiences? The focus is on childhood sleep-
related because childhood antecedents are the emphasis of Irwin's and Lawrence's
models but also because such experiences are more common during childhood and
they might have a greater impact on the reporting of anomalous experiences and the
development of anomalous beliefs during this period. Also, ifone excludes childhood
variables then one might also exclude factors associated with the origins of beliefs. In
summary, this thesis is proposing that, in addition to childhood fantasy proneness,
models specifying that childhood sleep-related experiences will be positive predictors
of a measure ofanomalous experiences will provide a good fit to empirical data.
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Structural equation modelling (SEM)
Further progress in the study of the development of paranormal beliefs has been made
by Lawrence (1998; Lawrence et al, 1995) who has begun to use structural equation
modelling (SEM) (Hoyle, 1995; Maruyama, 1998; Schumacker & Lomax, 1996) to
analyse the structure of relationships between potential correlates ofparanormal
experience and beliefs. SEM is basically a statistical technique for testing whether a
hypothesised model(s) of the linear relationships among a number of variables (either
observed and/or latent) fits a sample of data to an acceptable extent. A model is
simply a representation or description of the structure or system of relationships
between the components.
One of the advantages of SEM is that one can take into account the influence
of several predictors simultaneously rather than looking at a whole series of bivariate
relationships and it allows for intercorrelations among predictors. Secondly, it is
possible to test competing models using the same data in order to see which one fits
the data best. Nevertheless, although a given model may fit the data, it is important to
point out that there may be other models which might fit the data equally well (or
perhaps even better) as there may be a potentially infinite number of possible models
(Breckler, 1990; Bullock, Harlow, & Mulaik, 1994). Thus, the finding that a
proposed model fits the data simply means that it provides a good description of the
relationships among the variables (Bullock et al., 1994; MacCallum, 1995). Although
SEM methods alone cannot establish causality, they do force the researcher to
produce clear and precise models of the structure of the relationships. The results of
testing various models can give useful suggestions regarding the plausibility of
hypothesised causal relationships (Maruyama, 1998, pp.35) that can then be validated
using other methods.
One of the disadvantages ofmultivariate techniques is that they generally
require larger sample sizes than univariate techniques. With traditional survey data
collection methods, gaining sufficiently large samples suitable for multivariate analysis
can be problematic due to the difficulty of accessing a sufficiently large target
9
population(s) and securing a sufficiently large number of responses.1 The costs
involved with the production, distribution and return ofquestionnaires can also be
high.
World-wide web surveys
In order to circumvent some of the problems associated with the use of traditional
postal pencil-and-paper survey methods in a multivariate context, this thesis aims to
collect data via the relatively new medium of the world-wide web (WWW). The
advantages of this are that there is ready access to a large population of potential
respondents, the method provides a greater degree of anonymity for participants,
there are savings in terms of research time and money, the data collection is relatively
maintenance-free, data entry is carried out by the participant and is stored in
electronic format ready for analysis, and the use ofmore dynamic techniques may
increase participant motivation (Davis, 1999; Hewson, Laurent, & Vogel, 1996;
Pettit, 1999; Reips, 1999; Schmidt, 1997). However, the potential disadvantages are
that the participation requires access to and knowledge ofhow to use the internet,
respondents tend to be self-selected, are members of a specific population and there
are concerns over the validity and security of the results using this technique (Pettit,
1999; Reips, 1999; Schmidt, 1997) as opposed to more traditional pencil-and-paper
methods. For example, there is evidence that computer anxiety can affect
performance on computerised versions of some assessments (see Brosnan, 1999 for
an overview). Unfortunately, WWW survey research is still in its infancy so there is
very little psychological literature available on its use (Pettit, 1999). In order to
address some of these concerns regarding the validity of the results, data collected via
WWW surveys will be compared with that collected via the more traditional pencil-
and-paper method.
1 A typical response rate for a postal survey is 30% (Oppenheim, 1992).
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Aims of the thesis
Cross-sectional surveys of adult participants (conducted via the WWW and via the
traditional pencil-and-paper technique) plus structural equation modelling techniques
will be used:
1. To test competing models, based upon those of Irwin (1992, 1993a) and
Lawrence (1998; Lawrence et al., 1995), in order to establish whether anomalous
beliefs should best be modelled as an outcome ofanomalous experiences, as an
antecedent of anomalous experiences, or whether the relationship is reciprocal.
2. To establish whether, in addition to childhood fantasy proneness, the childhood
incidence ofhypnagogic/hypnopompic and sleep-related experiences can predict
measures of the frequency of anomalous experiences throughout one's lifetime.
Post hoc
3. To compare the results of survey data collected electronically via the WWW with
that collected via traditional pencil-and-paper methods to see whether the data
collection method may affect the results.
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Chapter 1
An introduction to the terminology used in this
thesis
Some of the terms used in this thesis may be unfamiliar to the reader or their meaning
in this context may differ from the meaning in other contexts. In order to familiarise
the reader and to try to ensure a shared understanding, this chapter will begin by
considering what we mean by 'paranormal' or 'anomalous' and will describe some of
the experiences/beliefs that are commonly associated with these terms.
Normal, abnormal and paranormal phenomena
Anecdotal evidence suggests that many people share a consensus regarding what is
meant by the term 'paranormal' and which kinds ofphenomena are associated with it.
Terms that seem to be often used in relation to such phenomena, include, for example,
'paranormal,' 'parapsychological,' 'psychical,' 'anomalous,' 'anomalistic,' 'psi,'
'supernatural,' 'mystical,' 'occult,' and so on. However, unfortunately, many of these
terms seem to have become synonymous to some extent. In my opinion, Braude's
(1979) view of how people classify different phenomena seems to be quite apt:
Most people operate with a rather vague, tripartite, pretheoretic distinction between
ordinary phenomena, unusual or rare phenomena, and finally, phenomena (whether
rare or not) that are downright weird, bizarre, or other-worldly. To some extent, this
pre-theoretic distinction matches another distinction of interest to us—namely, the not-
so-pre-theoretic distinction between normal, abnormal, and paranormal phenomena.
(p.243).
In deciding whether something is paranormal, my feeling is that people do make
judgements, albeit potentially erroneous ones, about the likelihood of an event
occurring, whether such events are known about, and what the possible explanations
for them might be.
One of the difficulties with research in this area is that lay perceptions of terms
such as paranormal, and the phenomena associated with them, may differ from the
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(often-stricter) scientific definitions. This point is well-made by Irwin (1994a) who
noted that:
Again, there may be other phenomena interpreted as paranormal by the general public
and yet excluded from study by parapsychoiogists. The considerable majority of
scientific parapsychoiogists would not concede as legitimate issues in their field such
things as witchcraft, popular astrology, fairies, the Bermuda triangle, numerology, and
Tarot readings, despite the common image of these matters as paranormal in the mind
of the public and indeed for many skeptics (e.g., see Frazier, 1981)...Regardless of the
rationale for such demarcation of parapsychological endeavor, the fact remains that the
average citizen's notion of paranormal phenomena is evidently far broader than that of
the academic parapsychologist. (pp.5-6).
This makes things difficult for the researcher who is wanting to investigate this area of
human experience; should one's definition and scope for these categories of
experience/belief be guided entirely by one's scientific peers, should one be guided by
the consensus of the general public to whom one is presumably wanting to generalise
one's findings, or does one try to find some middle ground? If one takes a more
academically-oriented position then this might be more clearly-defined and more
exclusive but it might lack ecological validity; if one is guided by the lay views then
there may be too much diversity and the boundaries may be too fuzzy. It is not until
one actually stops to consider the terminology used to refer to these kinds of
experiences and beliefs that the difficulty in determining strict defining criteria for
inclusion becomes apparent.
We will begin by looking at the meaning of two of the most commonly used
terms used to refer to these phenomena: 'paranormal' and 'parapsychological.'
Before this can be done, it is necessary to consider what is meant by 'normal' and
'abnormal' phenomena. According to Braude's view, normal phenomena tend to be
those that occur relatively frequently (ordinary) whereas abnormal phenomena tend to
be relatively infrequent (unusual, rare) (Braude, 1979, p.245). A phenomenon may be
considered to be extraordinary if its frequency deviates from a statistical norm or if it
deviates from what is regarded as normal (Zusne & Jones, 1989, p.l). However, as
Braude (1979) points out, "the class of abnormal phenomena is not the same as the
class of unusual or infrequent phenomena, although these classes overlap." (p.243).
With both normal and abnormal phenomena there tends to be a current understanding
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of the underlying cause and mechanism, although with abnormal phenomena it seems
that their occurrence goes against what is usually expected to happen. Paranormal
phenomena may or may not be relatively frequent but they differ from normal and
abnormal phenomena in that they are inexplicable in terms of current understanding
and are therefore negatively defined.
One definition of'paranormal,' provided by Dale and White (1977, p. 929), that
appears in a book entitled 'Handbook ofParapsychology' illustrates the point about
synonymity:
Paranormal. A synonym for psychic or parapsychological; beyond ("para") what
should occur if only the known laws of cause and effect are operating.
Another definition also confirms the synonymity. This appears in 'A Glossary of
Terms Used in Parapsychology' by Thalbourne (1982):
Paranormal Term applied to any phenomena which in one or more respects
exceeds the limits ofwhat is deemed physically possible on current scientific
assumptions; often used as a synonym for 'psychic', 'parapsychological'attributable
topsi\ or even 'miraculous' (though shorn of religious overtones), [fin. Gk. Para,
'beside', beyond', + normal] (p.50).
Both of these definitions imply that what is deemed to be paranormal at the present
time may be deemed to be normal in the future ifappropriate changes in scientific
understanding have taken place (Braude, 1979; Radin, 1997, p. 18).
Definitions of 'parapsychology' that have appeared in well-respected sources
within the field include the following two examples: the first is taken from a Dale and
White (1977) and the second is taken from the 1986 volume of the Journal of
Parapsychology.
Parapsychology. The branch of psychology which deals with behavior which cannot
now be explained or described in terms of known physical principles; modern term for
psychical research, (p. 929).
PARAPSYCHOLOGY: The branch of science that deals with psi communication, i.e.,
behavioral or personal exchanges with the environment which are extrasensorimotor—
not dependent on the senses and muscles.
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These definitions, particularly the latter, associate these phenomena with an organism
of some description. This raises the issue ofwhether parapsychological phenomena
should be restricted to humans or whether other organisms may experience or may
cause parapsychological phenomena too. Some writers (e.g. Irwin, 1994a;
Lawrence, 1995a) believe that 'paranormal' and 'parapsychology' should refer to
phenomena that relate only to human capabilities. Irwin (1994a) gives the following
definition:
Parapsychology is the scientific study of experiences which, if they are as they seem to
be, are in principle outside the realm of human capabilities as presently conceived by
conventional scientists. Thus parapsychological phenomena ostensibly indicate the
operation of factors unknown to or unrecognized by orthodox science, so-called
paranormal factors, (p. 1).
So should 'parapsychological' exclude animals other than humans? There is certainly
plenty of anecdotal evidence that suggests that other animals are believed to have
paranormal experiences too. Some parapsychological research has also been carried
out with animals and other organisms (e.g. bacteria, insects, fish, rodents, cats, dogs)
(e.g., Braud, 1994; Davis, 1979; Morris, 1977; Sheldrake, 1994; Wiseman, Smith, &
Milton, 1998) though their findings are equivocal.
Another point to note is that, if the definition of parapsychology is restricted
to the study of (ostensible) paranormal phenomena that relate to human capabilities,
then phenomena that may not require any agency as such (e.g., astrology, the
Bermuda triangle) or that may involve non-human agencies (e.g., UFO's, angels, the
Loch Ness monster) would be excluded. Although this is a tighter definition, it may
lack ecological validity in that it may not fully take account of the domain of
phenomena associated with the term by the general public.
In summary, what I am suggesting is that a number ofdifferent terms used to
describe experiences or events that seem to be beyond current scientific
understanding, such as 'paranormal', and 'parapsychological' have become
synonymous in many people's minds even though closer scrutiny suggests that there
are differences between them. The following section will consider possible
alternative terminology.
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Experience-focused versus explanation-focused terminology
To me at least, the terms 'paranormal' and 'parapsychology' seem often to be
associated with an assumption that genuine paranormal or parapsychological
processes actually exist. These terms also seem to refer more to the underlying
explanations than to the phenomena/experiences themselves and thus can carry certain
theoretical or explanatory baggage. In recent years, attempts have been made to use
more neutral terminology which shifts the focus away from implicit assumptions about
underlying explanations and towards the phenomena/experiences themselves (e.g.,
Irwin, 1994a; White, 1990). However, White (1990) warns of the possible dangers of
using terms that are too simplistic; she says:
It seems to me that ifwe hope to understand the phenomena of parapsychology, it is
wrong to call them anomalous because that places them in a context devoid of
meaning! When the practice was first adopted, I heralded it because we could think
and talk about the phenomena without prejudicing their origins, but upon further
reflection, I think that each experience, each significant finding, is an opportunity—a
chance for us to speculate as to its meaning, (p. 16).
I can see where White is coming from but I disagree with her. It is wrong to assume
that anomalous experiences will always be meaningful for those concerned. People
react in different ways; some may be indifferent, some may be slightly puzzled, others
may find that their life and their worldview is changed as a result. Nevertheless the
experience could still be considered anomalous. My opinion is that the experience
should be separated from the meaning because the same phenomenology could be
attributed different meanings by different people.
Other writers also dislike the use of the term 'anomalous'. Iping Petterson and
Roll (1994) argue that:
Furthermore, to call psychic occurrences and experiences anomalous is no
improvement over calling them parapsychological. In science, anomalous is usually
reserved for events and objects that do not fit any category and whose investigation is
considered unlikely to lead to general principles or practical application. To call
psychic occurrences anomalous is to suggest that they are marginal and will play no
significant role in our understanding of the psyche, (p. 80).
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I disagree with Iping Petterson and Roll's objections too. It is not fair to say that
science considers anomalous events unworthy of investigation; I would argue that the
opposite is true. In fact, broadly speaking in the current climate, scientists might be
more willing to investigate and accept investigations ofanomalous phenomena than
phenomena described as psychic or parapsycho logical.
I agree with the proposal for using more neutral and more general terminology
that does not carry such implicit assumptions and, despite the above objections, I have
decided to use the term 'anomalous experiences' during the course ofmy research.
One of the main reasons why I chose to use the term 'anomalous' is that it allows the
inclusion of experiences, such as unidentified flying objects (UFOs), which are not
strictly considered to be paranormal. Why is the inclusion of such phenomena
important in the context of this thesis? One of the aims is to consider links between
sleep-related experiences and reports of anomalous phenomena. Interestingly, some
alien abduction experiences have been reported around the time of sleep (Gallagher,
Kumar, & Pekala, 1994; Spanos, Cross, Dickson, & DuBreuil, 1993), and one
possible explanation for such nocturnal experiences is that they are misinterpretations
of normal sleep-related experiences (see Chapters 4 and 5).
Experiences
As there are different interpretations of the terms 'paranormal' and
'parapsychological,' it is not surprising that there are different opinions regarding
which types of phenomena should be included under such headings. As we have seen
earlier, the issue of scope is relatively difficult to resolve given the difference between
lay and academic perspectives. Nevertheless, there is a broad consensus that
parapsychological research consists of three main domains (Irwin, 1994a, p.6):
extrasensory perception (ESP), psychokinesis (PK) and survival research.
ESP
An extrasensory experience is one in which it appears that the experient's mind has
acquired information directly, that is, seemingly without either the mediation of the
recognized human senses or the processes of logical inference. (Irwin, 1994a, p.6).
18
ESP can be subdivided into three main categories: (1) telepathy - accessing
information directly from another person; (2) clairvoyance - accessing information
about objective events or objects; (3) precognition - accessing information about the
future. Sometimes 'retrocognition' is used to refer to the process of accessing
information about the past via ESP (Irwin, 1994a; Dale & White, 1977).
PK
A PK experience entails an apparent mind-over-matter effect, that is, a case where an
individual's thoughts or preferences appear to have had a direct influence upon the
structure of the physical environment. The influence seemingly occurs without the
mediation of recognized physical energies or mechanisms, particularly those
compromising the human motor system. (Irwin, 1994a, p.8).
PK tends to be divided into two categories according to the magnitude of the effect
and its ease ofdetection. Micro-PK effects are relatively weak, are rarely visible to
the naked eye and usually require the use of statistics to detect the effects; macro-PK
effects are stronger, visible to the naked eye and do not require the use of statistics to
detect the effect (Palmer & Rush, 1986, p. 224).
PK phenomena may include the movement or distortion ofobjects, physical
mediumship, influencing dice or random event generators (REGs), or making
impressions on photographic film (see Irwin, 1994a, 1999). Psychic healing or direct
mental interaction with living systems (DMILS) (see Irwin, 1994a, 1999; Radin,
1997) are also considered to be micro- or macro-PK effects in some instances.
Poltergeist phenomena are sometimes referred to as 'recurrent spontaneous
psychokinesis' in order to reflect one possible explanation for them, which is that they
are caused by the PK ability of a human agent (Roll, 1977). One definition of
poltergeists compiled by Dale and White (1977, p. 930) is as follows:
Poltergeist phenomena involve the unexplained movement or breakage of objects, etc.,
and often seem to center around the presence of an adolescent; they differ from
hauntings in that apparitions are rarely seen.
In order to try to circumvent the problem of implicit theoretical connotations,
Thouless and Wiesner (1948) proposed the term 'psi phenomena' as a generic term
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for both extrasensory perception (ESP) and psychokinesis (PK) phenomena, which
are the two main areas of experimental parapsychology.
Survival of bodily death
This domain is concerned with whether part of a person is able to survive bodily
death. Phenomena included under this category would include communication with
the dead, e.g., physical and mental mediumship, apparitions of the deceased, hauntings
(e.g., Green & McCreery, 1975; MacKenzie, 1982; Tyrrell, 1943/1973), and
reincarnation (e.g., Stevenson, 1977, 1987). Poltergeist phenomena might also be
classified under this heading if they were found to be caused by deceased spirits (e.g.,
Gauld & Cornell, 1979; Roll, 1977). Out-of-body (OBEs) (e.g., Blackmore, 1982a;
Green, 1968; Irwin, 1985b) and near-death experiences (NDEs) (e.g., Ring, 1980)
may also be associated with this domain because they might constitute evidence for a
separate consciousness or a soul.
Other anomalous experiences
Other additional anomalous experiences were included as part of the anomalous
experiences and beliefs items used in this thesis because they were reported by Wilson
and Barber's (1983) original fantasy-prone participants (e.g., spiritual and religious
experiences, seeing auras) or because they have been correlated with fantasy
proneness, e.g., feelings of deja vu (Myers & Austrin, 1985) or seeing with eyes
closed (Alvarado & Zingrone, 1994). Unidentified flying objects (UFO) experiences
were included because some contact and abduction experiences often occur around
the time of sleep (see Spanos et al., 1993) and because some researchers have argued
that such abductees sometimes exhibit fantasy-prone characteristics (Bartholomew,
Basterfield, & Howard, 1991).
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Beliefs
Beliefs form part of a broader concept ofattitudes with an attitude being defined as:
a psychological tendency that is expressed by evaluating a particular entity with some
degree of favor or disfavor. (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993 p. 1).
As Eagly and Chaiken (1993) pointed out, traditionally attitudes have been
conceptualised as being made up of three components: cognitive (e.g., thoughts and
beliefs), affective, and behavioural. However, it should be pointed out that, as yet,
there is no universally agreed definition of attitudes (Olson & Zanna, 1993) and some
researchers have questioned such tripartite definitions (see Tesser & Shaffer, 1990).
One question, which we might raise, is whether we should simply focus on what
people think about paranormal phenomena without also considering how they feel or
how they behave in relation to them? Certainly when paranormal phenomena are
mentioned as a topic of conversation one can witness extremes in terms ofemotion,
and also behaviour, which are closely tied to individuals' beliefs. As part of a recent
discussion ofmeasurement issues relating to paranormal beliefs, both Lawrence
(1995a, 1995b) and Tobacyk (1995a, 1995b) have called for future measures to take
account ofadditional factors such as the causes (Lawrence, 1995a) or the structural
characteristics or personal significance of the beliefs (Tobacyk, 1995a, 1995b).
However, although I agree with these suggestions, this thesis will focus only on
beliefs in terms of their role as a cognitive component, as this is how they are treated
by Irwin (1992, 1993a) and Lawrence (1998) and this thesis will be attempting to test
parts of their proposed models.
One important question, which has yet to be fully resolved, is the question of
whether paranormal/anomalous belief is a uni- or multi-dimensional concept. If
paranormal belief is a uni-dimensional concept then a person who has a high degree of
belief in one phenomenon will have a tendency to believe in most phenomena; if it is a
multi-dimensional concept then a person with a high degree ofbeliefon one particular
dimension may not necessarily have a similar level of belief on another dimension
(obviously, this would depend on the orthogonality of the dimensions).
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Although some researchers seem to have assumed that the concept of
paranormal belief is uni-dimensional, there does seem to be a growing consensus that
it is, in fact, multi-dimensional (e.g., Clarke, 1991; Gallagher et al., 1994; Grimmer &
White, 1990; Irwin, 1993a; Lawrence, 1995a, 1998; Sparks, Nelson, & Campbell,
1997; Thalbourne & Delin, 1993; Tobacyk, 1995a). There is also evidence to suggest
that paranormal experience is a multi-dimensional construct too (Kohr, 1980;
Richards, 1990; Ross & Joshi, 1992).
Ifparanormal belief and experience are multi-dimensional concepts, then it is
possible that there might be qualitative as well as quantitative differences between
believers/experiencers (Irwin, 1997). The results of a cluster analysis of Tobacyk's
(1988) Revised Paranormal Belief Scale (PBS) have suggested four possible types of
paranormal believer which were named 'Traditional Religious believers', 'Tentative
believers', 'Skeptics', and 'New agers' (Irwin, 1997).
It is unlikely that these questions regarding the dimensionality and typology of
paranormal belief can be fully resolved until agreement has been reached regarding the
definition ofparanormal or anomalous (or whatever) and a measure which adequately
covers the domain of relevant phenomena has been developed (Irwin, 1997). For
example, the number of possible factors elicited is likely to depend on the range of
items included in the scales (Irwin, 1993a). As pointed out earlier, there is a lack of
agreement over the definition ofparanormal and this is reflected in the variation in the
scope ofmeasures designed to assess paranormal belief (Irwin, 1993a; Kennedy,
Kanthamani, & Palmer, 1994). Measures range from narrower assessments of belief
in ESP (often referred to as 'sheep-goat scales') to broader assessments (Lawrence,
1998, p.40) which include "not only parapsychological claims but all manner of
magical, superstitious, religious, supernatural, occult, and other notions..." (Irwin,
1993a, p.2). Although some broad measures, such as the Revised Paranormal Belief
Scale (Tobacyk, 1988), do reinforce the multi-dimensional nature ofparanormal belief
(Lawrence, 1998), there is some disagreement over the actual number ofdimensions,
even within the same measure (see Lawrence, 1995a, 1995b; Lawrence & De Cicco,
1997; Lawrence, Roe, & Williams, 1997, 1998; Tobacyk, 1995a, 1995b).
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If paranormal/anomalous belief is a multi-dimensional concept and/or if there
are different types of believers then these must be borne in mind when comparing the
results ofdifferent studies and when trying to make generalisations (Irwin, 1993a).
Chapter Summary
This chapter has considered how people may categorise 'normal', 'abnormal' and
'paranormal' phenomena and the problems with defining and differentiating between
various terms which have become synonymous with the term 'paranormal'. Some of
these terms have implicit assumptions regarding explanations for the phenomena and
moves have been made towards the use ofmore neutral and more descriptive
terminology.
This thesis will use the terms 'anomalous experiences' and 'anomalous beliefs'
rather than 'paranormal experiences' and 'paranormal beliefs' because they are
considered to be more neutral, because they will allow the inclusion of experiences
not usually considered to be paranormal, such as those involving UFOs, and because
they refer more to the features of the experience rather than to whether or not the
experience can be explained by current scientific knowledge. It is important to
include UFO experiences because they are often reported around the time of sleep and
it has been argued that some alleged abduction experiences might be
misinterpretations of normal HG/HP experiences.
Regardless of the actual nature of these experiences, surveys have found that a
large number of people believe they have experienced genuine anomalous/paranormal
experiences of various kinds and these experiences can have significant effects on
their lives. Many people also believe in the possibility of these phenomena even if
they have not personally encountered them. It is not yet clear whether there are
distinct types of believers and, if so, how many distinct types ofparanormal belief
there are. The difficulties, which arise in trying to answer these questions, reflect the
lack of consensus regarding the definition and scope of the concept of 'paranormal
belief.




Correlates of anomalous or paranormal beliefs
The aim of this chapter is to describe some of the factors that are reported to have
influenced people's beliefor disbelief in anomalous/paranormal phenomena and then
to review evidence that suggests that specific individual attributes are related to the
strength of belief in these phenomena. As part of this review, the possible nature of
the relationship between anomalous/paranormal experience and beliefs will be
considered. Finally, this chapter will consider some of the problems with research
into the correlates of anomalous/paranormal beliefs.
What factors influence people's belief/disbelief in anomalous or
paranormal phenomena?
There are a number of factors that are thought to influence a person's beliefor
disbelief in anomalous or paranormal phenomena. These are similar to the factors
associated with the formation ofattitudes and opinions in general (e.g., see overview
by Oskamp, 1977). It is surprising that, although there have been numerous surveys
trying to establish what proportion of people have experienced or believe in such
phenomena, very few surveys have directly asked people what factors have actually
influenced their beliefs. I have broadly divided these factors into internal and external
factors (see Table 1).
Internal factors
The reason for having paranormal beliefs that appears most frequently in the literature
is personal experience (e.g., Blackmore, 1984; Clarke, 1995; Milton, 1992; Roe,
1998; Schmeidler, 1985; Zusne & Jones, 1989), i.e., you have an experience that you
consider to be paranormal and this leads you to develop and/or strengthen your belief
in the existence of such phenomena. However, one should note that such experiences
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may not necessarily be genuine; the important thing is that they are perceived as such
by the individuals concerned.
Although personal experience does not appear to be a frequently cited reason
for disbelief in these kinds ofphenomena (Roe, 1998), a lack ofpersonal experience
has been cited as a reason for disbelief (Clarke, 1995). It also appears that certain
individual characteristics, such as demographic, attitudinal, cognitive, and personality
factors, are thought to influence belief in paranormal phenomena (see review by Irwin,
1993a). These will be discussed later in this chapter.
Table 1 Factors that are thought to influence belief or disbelief in
anomalous or paranormal phenomena.
Internal factors External factors
Personal experience Experiences of other people
Views of family, peers, groups to which
one is a member






The experiences and views ofpeople that we know personally (Blackmore, 1984;
Clarke, 1995), such as our family and our peers (Irwin, 1999; Oskamp, 1977; Zusne
& Jones, 1989), are likely to be quite persuasive in encouraging or confirming our
own beliefs in anomalous phenomena. Our beliefs can also be influenced by
information portrayed in the media (Blackmore, 1984; Clarke, 1995; Irwin, 1999;
Oskamp, 1977; Sparks, 1998) or via other forms of formal persuasion (Zusne &
Jones, 1989). We may also be swayed by our own investigation and evaluation of the
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amount and quality of available evidence and/or our knowledge of fraud (Clarke,
1995; Schmeidler, 1985). The interpretation of this kind of information is likely to be
affected by our individual characteristics, particularly our cognitive abilities. It is
possible that our beliefs in paranormal phenomena might be influenced by other pre¬
existing beliefs/worldviews too (Clarke, 1995; Schmeidler, 1985; Zusne & Jones,
1989). Schmeidler (1985) has argued that one of the reasons why some people may
be somewhat indecisive, with regard to their paranormal beliefs, is that they have
received conflicting messages from the media, different people, and/or different
doctrines.
While I do recognise the relevance of these external factors, T wish to focus on
the internal factors because I feel that they play a greater role in the development of
anomalous/paranormal beliefs than the external factors and because personal
experience seems to have one of the strongest influences, in my opinion. I am in
agreement with Irwin (1993a) and Schumaker (1990) who argue that culture may
shape one's paranormal beliefs but ultimately the likelihood that one will hold such
beliefs is dependent upon one's individual make-up.
The reiationship between personal experience and anomalous/paranormal
beliefs
Although personal experience is the most common reason cited for holding
paranormal beliefs, is there any evidence to suggest that the amount ofpersonal
experience is related to the strength of belief in anomalous/paranormal phenomena?
A number of studies, using a variety ofmeasures, have found small to medium
correlations between global measures ofexperience and belief (i.e., those based upon
a range ofdifferent types ofphenomena) ranging from r = .32 to r = .69 (Atkinson,
1994; Gallagher et al., 1994; Glicksohn, 1990; Irwin, 1985a; Lawrence, 1998;
Lawrence et al., 1995; Pekala, Kumar, & Marcano, 1995) with the mean correlation
across these studies being r = .52.
Studies have also found relationships between global experience measures and
specific beliefs (ranging from r = . 12 to .34), such as ESP (McClenon, 1994a; Murphy
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& Lester, 1976) or belief in life after death (Willging & Lester, 1997). Relationships
have also been found between specific experiences, such as deja vu (r = . 18), having
detected being stared at (r = .32), having seen auras (r = .38), OBEs (r = .38),
experience ofpsychic healing (r = .41), memories of a past life (r = .39), possession of
mediumistic abilities (r = .51) and a global measure of paranormal belief (ranging from
r = .18 to .51) (Thalbourne, 1994b). On average then, there is only about 20-25% (at
best 48%) common variance between experience and beliefmeasures. Even if
personal experience is one of the major reasons for the development ofparanormal or
anomalous beliefs, it is clearly not the only possible reason and may not apply to
everyone. The fact that more people seem to believe in these phenomena than have
experienced them also supports this conclusion (e.g., Haraldsson, 1985; Schouten,
1983).
Many of the measures used in the aforementioned studies have used measures
with different items and differ in the types ofphenomena included. This makes it
difficult to make direct comparisons of their findings but clearly there is a fairly well-
established small to medium relationship between measures of anomalous/paranormal
experiences and related beliefs. The question is what are the causes of such a
relationship? There are three main theories/explanations for this relationship: (1) the
experiential source explanation which proposes that personal experience of purported
anomalous phenomena (either genuine or misinterpreted) causes a person to develop
or strengthen their belief in that specific phenomenon (and/or possibly anomalous
phenomena in general); (2) the cognitive source explanation which proposes that our
beliefs in such phenomena cause us to report more experiences and/or to perform
better in experimental psi tasks. It is also possible that our beliefs might moderate or
shape our experience rather than causing it; (3) the reciprocal causality explanation
which proposes that the effects of these two variables are reciprocal. We will see in
Chapter 3 that the authors of two recent models of the childhood antecedents of
paranormal belief disagree as to which of these explanations they favour; Lawrence
(1998; Lawrence et al., 1995) favours the experiential source explanation whereas
Irwin (1992, 1993a) favours the reciprocal causality explanation.
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1. The experiential source explanation
This seems to be one of the most popular explanations, which is perhaps not
surprisingly given its popularity as a reason for belief, as we have seen already.
However, it has been argued that personal experience (or lack of it) might be an
attribution for one's paranormal belief (disbelief) rather than an actual cause (Alcock,
1981; Roe, 1998; Schouten, 1983), i.e., we might not be certain why we hold such
beliefs but we might rationalise that it is likely to be due to personal experience (or the
lack of it).
The experiential source hypothesis (Hufford, 1982) predicts that certain
phenomena have universal elements and will therefore occur in different cultures. If
these experiences have universal characteristics, which might be deemed anomalous or
supernatural, then similar experiences in different cultures should be associated with
similar beliefs. The main idea is that "[s]uch experiences are instrumental in causing
changes in belief, rather than merely being caused by belief." (McClenon, 1994b, p.
8).
Much evidence in support of the ES hypothesis has been obtained from cross-
cultural surveys of anomalous experiences and there does indeed seem to be a great
deal ofuniformity in the features of anomalous experience and beliefs (McClenon,
1991, 1994a, 1994b; Sheils, 1978). My view is that some of the best evidence for the
ES hypothesis comes from hypnagogic/hypnopompic experiences that have been
associated with paranormal/supernatural interpretations and beliefs. Surveys have
shown that such experiences often have very similar features and interpretations and
have been reported in various countries, regions and cultures (Blackmore & Rose,
1996; Dahlitz & Parkes, 1993; Firestone, 1985; Hopkins, Jacobs, & Westrum, 1992;
Hufford, 1982; Liddon, 1967; Ness, 1978; Ohaeri, Adelekan, Odejide & Ikuesan,
1992; Roper Starch Worldwide, 1998; Spanos, McNulty, DuBreuil, Pires, & Burgess,
1995). The features of the hypnagogic/hypnopompic and sleep states and these cross-
cultural experiences with anomalous interpretations will be discussed in Chapter 4.
29
2. The cognitive source explanation
Alternative explanations for the correlation between experience and beliefs are that
beliefs cause a person to experience and/or report anomalous phenomena, or at least
misinterpret normal phenomena. The main basis for this argument seems to be the
assumption that beliefs are associated with, or caused by, what Irwin (1993a) has
termed "cognitive deficits'. The basic idea is that believers are more likely to
misinterpret normal experience or information and that these errors lead them to
report more anomalous experiences.
Another reason why believers might report more paranormal experiences is
that they might actively seek out situations in which they could experience or witness
such experiences, such as visiting a psychic or an alleged haunted house, whereas
disbelievers might actively avoid such situations.
Perhaps some of the best evidence for the cognitive source explanation comes
from experimental studies of the sheep-goat effect. Gertrude Schmeidler (Schmeidler
& McC'onnell, 1958) investigated whether believers and sceptics would show
differential performance in forced-choice ESP card-guessing tests. The results
showed that overall believers in ESP (who were termed 'sheep') and sceptics (who
were termed 'goats') did differ; sheep tended to perform better than chance whereas
goats tended to perform worse than chance. Although the sheep-goat effect has been
confirmed by numerous researchers (see review by Palmer, 1971; Lawrence, 1998),
Palmer's (1971) review of the research concluded that the effect size seemed quite
small, and therefore difficult to detect with small samples, and that it might be
influenced by the experimental context.
In order to obtain an overall estimate of the effect size for the sheep-goat effect,
and to see if this was also dependent on methodological factors, Lawrence (1993,
1998) conducted a meta-analysis of 73 sheep-goat studies that were published
between 1947 and 1993. The results confirmed that the overall effect size was small
(r = 0.029) but highly significant (combined z = 8.17, p= 1.33 x 10"16) and would
require an additional 1726 null studies to cancel out this effect. There was no
significant relationship between study quality and effect size nor between the type of
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beliefmeasure and the effect size. This latter finding is reassuring given the problems
with the measures ofparanormal belief that have already been described. Thus,
Lawrence (1998) concluded, quite rightly, that the sheep-goat effect is consistent and
robust (at least for forced-choice ESP tests), though the effect size is small.
Nevertheless, Lawrence (1998) questioned whether one should interpret the
sheep-goat effect as an indication that belief in ESP directly affects ESP performance.
Lawrence argued that sheep-goat studies are really only quasi-experimental because
the experimenter does not actually manipulate belief in ESP nor randomly allocate
participants to the belief conditions; participants are simply grouped together
according to their existing beliefs. Thus, the two groups may differ on some other
important variables that affect ESP performance. This makes it more difficult to
establish whether any sheep-goat effects are entirely due to the differences in beliefs
and not due to other variables. This is a valid design point but in practice it might be
difficult for the experimenter to induce a sufficiently large change in beliefs in the
experimental context and to be certain that the manipulation itself has been successful.
This problem ofpotential confounding variables also extends to the cognitive
source explanation in general, i.e. it is difficult to establish whether it is beliefs per se,
or cognitive deficits that are associated with them, that are responsible for the
misinterpretation ofnormal experiences.
Even ifparanormal beliefs do not actually cause anomalous/paranormal
experiences directly, there is evidence to suggest that one's beliefs (or knowledge)
may shape one's experience. There is evidence from spontaneous case reports to
suggest that knowledge, beliefs and expectations may influence the content of
hypnagogic/hypnopompic experiences. For example, in one case that I have
collected, an individual, who experiences hypnagogic/hypnopompic imagery and sleep
paralysis quite regularly, reported that:
After seeing Whitley Streiber's film 'Communion' 1 did have an hallucination of one
of the little blue aliens inserting [a] metal probe into my forehead.
To someone with beliefs in alien abductions, and/or a lack of knowledge about
hypnagogic/hypnopompic experiences, this could have been interpreted as a real
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abduction attempt. I would also argue that some psychomanteum experiences, in
which people report reunions with deceased relatives, involve
hypnagogic/hypnopompic-like imagery and that the content of such imagery could be
influenced by the beliefs and expectations of those participants too (Sherwood, 2000;
see Chapter 5). Comparisons of accounts ofNDEs have also found evidence of
different features appearing in reports from different groups that seemed to be linked
to their religious beliefs (see Greyson, 2000, p. 321).
3. The reciprocal causality explanation
This final explanation is a simply a combination of the two previous explanations and
is based on the premise that experience causing belief and belief causing experience
are not necessarily mutually exclusive hypotheses. Irwin (1985a) concluded that both
possibilities are likely to occur and later proposed this in his model of the childhood
antecedents ofparanormal belief (Irwin, 1992, 1993a).
So, based upon the relatively small correlations obtained between measures of
anomalous/paranormal experiences and associated beliefs, it seems that personal
experience is not the only factor that might influence a person's paranormal beliefs.
Clearly, one should consider the circumstances in which these anomalous/paranormal
experiences seem to occur and the characteristics of those who report them in order
to see if there are moderating factors. Any given experience, and the interpretation of
it, will depend upon the circumstances and a person's individual characteristics, i.e.,
there is likely to be a state x trait interaction. It is also possible that people with
certain characteristics might be more likely to hold anomalous/paranormal beliefs,
regardless of any personal experience. With the ES hypothesis, the key factor is that a
particular event (or events) that is experienced by a particular individual at a particular
time(s) causes their beliefs to change in some way. With the cognitive source
explanation, the extent to which our beliefs can influence our experiences, or our
interpretation of them, may also depend upon the circumstances.
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In what circumstances are anomalous/paranormal experiences
reported?
Although anomalous/paranormal experiences have been reported in a variety of
different circumstances, there do seem to be some common trends across different
experiences which suggest that some circumstances may be particularly conducive to
reports of these kinds ofexperiences.
Many experiences, such as ESP, some auditory PK, healing, apparitions,
psychomanteum experiences, mediumship, OBEs, autoscopic experiences and alien
abduction experiences, have been reported when the individual concerned was
physically relaxed, in a calm mental state and/or involved in minimal physical activity
or engaged in some repetitive highly-practised activities that might be almost
automatic (Alvarado, 2000; Dening & Berrios, 1994; Glicksohn, 1986; Green, 1968,
p. 50; Green & McCreery, 1989; see Irwin, 1994c; Mack, 1994; Moody with Perry,
1993; Rhine, 1962, 1963; Sannwald, 1963; Spanos et al., 1993). Nevertheless, this is
not always the case as, with NDEs (and some OBEs) and some healing rituals, the
individual concerned may be under some kind of threat or stress, or may be highly
aroused at the time of the experience (e.g., Irwin, 1985b, 1994c; Krippner &
Achterberg, 2000, p. 358).
Some experiences, such as ESP, OBEs, apparitions and psychomanteum
experiences and healing experiences, may occur in circumstances in which there is
minimal sensory input and possible sensory deprivation and/or the person's attention
is internally-focused or the circumstances allow one to become easily absorbed in
one's own mentation (e.g., Gurney et al., 1886; see Irwin, 1994c, 1999, p. 229;
Moody with Perry, 1993).
Many of these circumstantial features occur during altered states of
consciousness (ASCs), such as meditation, hypnosis, sleep and the
hypnagogic/hypnopompic states (e.g., Honorton, 1977). It is not surprising then to
find that a variety ofanomalous experiences, such as ESP, healing, apparitions and
psychomanteum experiences, mediumship, memories of previous lives, OBEs and
autoscopic experiences and alien abduction experiences, have been reported during
such ASCs (e.g., Dening & Berrios, 1994; Green, 1968; Green & McCreery, 1989;
33
Gurney et al., 1886; Irwin, 1994c; Krippner & Achterberg, 2000; Leaning, 1925;
Mack, 1994; Moody with Perry, 1993; Palmer, 1978b; Rhine, 1981; Sheils, 1978;
Spanos et al., 1993).
Experimental studies have also found that ASCs are conducive to anomalous
experiences or performance. In a review of experimental studies of psi performance
during meditation, hypnosis, induced relaxation, and ganzfeld stimulation, Honorton
(1977) concluded that:
These findings provide strong support for the following empirical generalization: Psi
functioning is enhanced (i.e., is more easily detected and recognized) when the
receiver is in a state ofsensory relaxation and is minimally influenced by ordinary
perception andproprioception, (p. 466).
Honorton (1977) further concluded that there are four major features of psi-enhancing
internal states: "(a) a sufficient level ofcortical arousal to maintain conscious
awareness; (b) muscular relaxation; (c) reduction of exteroceptive input from
peripheral receptors; and (d) deployment of attention toward internal mentation
processes." (p. 466). Features (b) to (d) would be true of the
hypnagogic/hypnopompic and sleep states, though (a) might only be true of the
hypnagogic/hypnopompic states and some sleep states, such as lucid dreaming. Braud
and Braud's (1975) proposed psi-conducive syndrome also included the
aforementioned features plus a reduction in left-hemisphere functioning and a
concomitant increase in right-hemisphere functioning, an altered worldview and a
temporary importance of psi. However, although these studies have suggested that
the presence of these features is associated with successful psi performance, it is not
clear whether they are all necessary or which are the most important.
In summary, people who find themselves in these circumstances, and who may
find it easier to enter and become absorbed in these purportedly psi-conducive
circumstances, particularly ASCs, may be more likely to report anomalous/paranormal
experiences and beliefs.
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What kinds of people report anomalous/paranormal beliefs?
In his review of the empirical literature on paranormal beliefs, Irwin (1993a, 1999) has
summarised four basic approaches to the study of individual differences in why people
hold paranormal beliefs:
1) Demographic correlates and the social marginality hypothesis
2) Attitudinal correlates and the worldview hypothesis
3) Cognitive correlates and the cognitive deficits hypothesis
4) Personality correlates and the psychodynamic functions hypothesis
1) Demographic correlates and the social marginality hypothesis
This hypothesis is based on the idea that people who hold paranormal beliefs will be
those who are members of socially-marginal groups within society. Thus it is
predicted that members of society who are old, female, of low socio-economic status,
members of ethnic groups and/or divorced or separated should be more likely to hold
paranormal beliefs (see Irwin, 1999, pp. 282-283). Holding paranormal beliefs is
thought to offer some form of compensation for one's marginal status. However, this
hypothesis is fairly weak in that it fails to explain exactly what compensations are
gained from holding specific beliefs. I suspect that there is also an implicit assumption
that paranormal belief is unidimensional. However, there is a growing consensus,
based upon factor analyses, that paranormal belief is multi-dimensional (e.g., Clarke,
1991; Gallagher et al., 1994; Grimmer & White, 1990; Irwin, 1993a; Lawrence,
1995a, 1998; Lawrence et al., 1997, 1998; Sparks, 1998; Sparks et al., 1997;
Thalbourne & Delin, 1993; Tobacyk, 1995a).
Having reviewed the empirical literature, Irwin (1993a, 1999) concluded that,
contrary to the social marginality hypothesis, most paranormal beliefs (with the
exception of traditional religious beliefs) seem to be stronger among young people.
However, as noted by Irwin (1993a) and Lawrence (1998), one of the problems with
these studies is that they are cross-sectional and there may be cohort or maturational
effects. Longitudinal studies, or at least qualitative investigations of how people's
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beliefs have developed and changed over their lifetime, are needed to satisfactorily
address this question; cross-sectional studies are too blunt a tool in this instance.
In terms of gender, there is evidence that certain paranormal beliefs are more
frequent and stronger among women than men (see review by Irwin, 1993a), although
some studies have found no differences (see Zusne & Jones, 1989). There is also
evidence that women are more likely to believe in phenomena associated with human
capabilities, such as psi, whereas men seem to have stronger beliefs in extraordinary
life-forms, such as UFOs or the Loch Ness monster (Lawrence, 1998). As Lawrence
(1998) correctly noted, it is difficult to see how the social marginality hypothesis
could account for this gender x type ofbelief interaction. Even if gender differences
do exist, there is a lack ofexplanation as to why men and women differ.
There has been relatively little research into the relationship between socio¬
economic status and paranormal belief. One of the difficulties with such research is
that, although many people may agree on some of the indicators of socio-economic
status, the construct is difficult to define and measure directly and participants may
not take too kindly to being asked about their employment status, occupation and
income etc. (Irwin, 1999). The social marginality hypothesis would predict a negative
correlation between socio-economic status and strength of paranormal belief, i.e., the
worse off you are, the stronger your paranormal beliefs. One study, by Emmons and
Sobal (1981), found that those who were unemployed tended to have lower levels of
paranormal belief, which is contrary to the social marginality hypothesis.
Another social marginality variable that has been investigated is marital status.
Although there has not been very much research into this area (Irwin, 1993a, 1999),
there is some evidence that married people have lower beliefs in certain phenomena,
such as ESP, astrology, witchcraft and extraordinary life forms (Emmons & Sobal,
1981) and those who are divorced or separated have a greater belief in astrology
(Wuthnow, 1976). However, many of these phenomena would not be considered to
be paranormal by many researchers because they do not involve human capabilities.
One explanation for these findings might be that having a partner provides a sense of
support and control over one's life but losing a partner, particularly if apparently
through no fault ofyour own, may lead to the development of a need for control,
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which might be provided by the endorsement of certain paranormal beliefs. A better
test of this particular hypothesis would be to measure paranormal beliefs before and
after a separation and see if there's a change in the predicted direction; however, such
research is likely to be difficult in practice.
In summary, although there is some support for a relationship between some
social marginality indicators and certain paranormal beliefs, there does not appear to
be any consistent relationship with the same dimensions of belief (Irwin, 1993a,
1999). If the true picture is more complex then the social marginality hypothesis has
difficulty in accommodating this complexity. In my opinion, the social marginality
hypothesis is too broad and too general and fails to specify exactly how the
paranormal beliefs develop as a result of the particular marginalities or what benefits
are gained from them.
2) Attitudinal correlates and the worldview hypothesis
The attitudinal correlates hypothesis seems to be reasonable given the predictions of
the Cognitive Dissonance theory (see Oskamp, 1977). This theory argues that people
attempt to maintain consistency between the components of attitudes and also
between related attitudes. Inconsistencies cause psychological discomfort that
motivates the person to make appropriate adjustments to their attitudes in order to
achieve consistency again. Thus, we might expect emotions, beliefs and behaviours
towards the paranormal and related issues to be fairly consistent. However, with
attitudes in general, researchers have begun to question whether all three components
are required to form an attitude. This is partly due to the finding that there are
varying degrees of consistency between components of various attitudes (see Eagly &
Chaiken, 1993, pp. 16-17).
Zusne and Jones (1989) proposed that those most likely to develop
paranormal beliefs are those who already hold particular attitudes and views that
could easily accommodate, or at least would not seriously contradict, such beliefs.
More specifically, Zusne and Jones (1989) predicted that people who believe in and/or
engage in activities associated with a subjective and esoteric orientation should also
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tend to belief in the paranormal. There is some evidence to support this hypothesis;
for example, global paranormal belief has been positively correlated with subjective
views of the universe and human behaviour (Zusne & Jones, 1982) and dualist
philosophies (Stanovich, 1989; Svenson, White, & Caird, 1992). Those who devote
more attention to subjective experience, or who engage in interpretation of their
dreams, are also more likely to hold paranormal beliefs (e.g., Davies, 1985;
Glicksohn, 1990; Haraldsson, 1981; Irwin, 1985a; Thalbourne, 1984, 1994b). There
is also evidence that paranormal believers are more likely to think that events are
beyond their control, i.e., they are more likely to have an external locus of control
(e.g., Irwin, 1986b; Thalbourne, Dunbar, & Delin, 1995).
The worldview hypothesis would also predict that people who hold traditional
religious beliefs are likely to hold paranormal beliefs. However, research has found
that some dimensions of paranormal belief correlate in the predicted direction, some in
the opposite direction and some do not correlate at all (Clarke, 1991; Tobacyk &
Milford. 1983). The worldview hypothesis is unable to account for these findings.
There is also evidence that believers, not surprisingly, are more likely engage
in related activities, such as reading about (Irwin, 1985a) or taking courses about the
paranormal (e.g., McGarry & Newberry. 1981).
In conclusion, with regard to the worldview hypothesis there has been little
research looking at correlations with specific dimensions ofparanormal belief.
Another problem with these findings is that, again, they do not indicate causality. It
may be that strong pre-existing attitudes towards the world may shape our attitudes
towards the paranormal, the latter may shape the former, or both sets of attitudes may
be influenced by some other variable(s). If pre-existing attitudes do influence our
paranormal beliefs, one naturally wants to ask the question ofwhat causes people to
develop a subjective worldview (Lawrence, 1998).
3) Cognitive correlates and the cognitive deficits hypothesis
The 'cognitive deficits hypothesis' was coined by Irwin (1993a, 1999) who pointed
out that, "Under this collective view the believer in the paranormal variously is held to
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be illogical, irrational, credulous, uncritical, and foolish." (1999, p. 287). The general
idea, then, is that a person becomes a believer because their cognitive abilities are not
up to scratch; for example, they may have poor reasoning or critical thinking skills
that lead them to draw inappropriate conclusions from information presented to them
or they may misperceive or misinterpret particular events as being paranormal. There
is often an implicit assumption that no genuine anomalous processes or agencies are
involved. Under this hypothesis, cognitive deficits could lead directly to the formation
ofparanormal beliefs and/or indirectly via the misinterpretation ofnormal experiences.
Irwin (1993a) noted that there are four main correlates that have been investigated:
educational attainment, scientific education, intelligence and reasoning skills, and
creativity and imagination.
The findings with regard to educational attainment have been somewhat
mixed. Some research has found that stronger paranormal belief is associated with a
lower grade point average (Messer & Griggs, 1989; Tobacyk, 1984) for some aspects
ofparanormal beliefwhereas other research has found that stronger beliefs in psi or
traditional religious beliefs are associated with higher grade point averages (Tobacyk,
Miller, & Jones, 1984). It may be that the relationship is dependent upon the
educational level of the students (Irwin, 1993a) and/or the particular dimension of
paranormal belief under investigation (Lawrence, 1998). Apart from looking for
relationships with performance at a given level ofeducation, research has also
investigated the relationship between paranormal belief and the level of educational
attainment ultimately reached. Again there have been mixed findings. Some research
has found a positive relationship between belief in psi and the level ofeducation
reached (Emmons & Sobal, 1981; Haraldsson, 1985; Tobayck et al., 1984); other
research has found a negative relationship (Haraldsson, 1985; Otis & Alcock, 1982).
Lawrence (1998) noted that the only dimension ofparanormal belief that seems to
have a consistent negative relationship with the level of educational attainment is that
concerning spiritualist beliefs.
One of the reasons for the mixed findings may be that educational attainment
is a very broad construct (Lawrence, 1998) and there are numerous possible
confounding variables that might affect its relationship with paranormal belief (Irwin,
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1993a). There are bound to be a myriad of reasons that influence one's level of
attainment and these will not necessarily relate to one's abilities or beliefs. Even if
this relationship is causal, there do not appear to be any specific suggestions as to
how paranormal belief actually affects level ofattainment. Again this is likely to be
difficult given the general nature of the indices used to assess performance/attainment.
In terms of specific educational experience, there is some evidence to suggest
that those who have had a scientific background tend to report lower paranormal
beliefs (Otis & Alcock, 1982). But, if this relationship is causal, it is not clear whether
this is due to changes in reasoning or a culture that generally discourages acceptance
of such beliefs.
There has also been research that has looked at more specific measures of
cognitive capacity/abilities, such as intelligence and reasoning skills. Although it
would seem to be a fairly obvious variable to investigate from a cognitive deficits
perspective, reviews of the literature on paranormal belief have noted the lack of
research into the relationship between intelligence and paranormal belief (Irwin,
1993a; Lawrence, 1998). However, a number of studies have found a negative
relationship between IQ and measures of superstitious beliefs (see Zusne & Jones,
1989, p. 238). In terms of paranormal beliefs, Smith, Foster & Stovin (1998) found a
negative relationship in two out of three context conditions.
Some studies have found that paranormal believers have poorer critical
thinking or reasoning abilities (e.g., Alcock & Otis, 1980; Tobacyk & Milford, 1983;
Wierzbicki, 1985) though other studies have not confirmed such a negative
relationship between paranormal belief and reasoning skills (Irwin, 1991b; Roe,
1999). Irwin (1993a) and Roe (1999) have noted that much of this research has been
carried out by researchers who are sceptical about the paranormal and this may have
influenced the participants' responses. In addition, Tobacyk and Milford (1983)
pointed out that poor critical thinking might not be associated with all dimensions of
paranormal belief; for example, they found that traditional religious believers tended
to be relatively critical whereas those who believed in spiritualism were not. There is
also evidence that believers tend to underestimate the probability of chance
occurrences and perform worse than disbelievers at probability tasks (Blackmore &
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Troscianko, 1985).
In summary, although the findings with regard to educational attainment are
equivocal, there is some indication that believers might be deficient in some cognitive
abilities, such as assessing the probabilities of events. However, a clear picture of
exactly which dimensions of belief are associated with such deficits is yet to emerge.
Much of the research into the cognitive correlates of paranormal belief has
tended to associate believers with negative characteristics or deficits (Lawrence,
1998). However, research has also investigated relationships with more positive
variables.
For example, paranormal belief has been positively correlated with measures
of creativity (Davis, Peterson, & Farley, 1974; Thalbourne & Delin, 1994). Some
research has also found a positive correlation between hypnotic susceptibility and
paranormal belief (Atkinson, 1994; Nadon, Laurence, & Perry, 1987; Pekala, Kumar,
& Cummings, 1992) or attitude towards parapsychology and the supernatural
(Wagner & Ratzeburg, 1987); others have failed to confirm such a relationship
(Saucer, Cahoon, & Edmonds, 1992). Linked to hypnotic susceptibility, is the
construct of fantasy proneness which, although it is deemed to be a personality
variable (Wilson & Barber, 1983), also has links with cognitive variables.
Fantasy prone personalities, as characterised by Wilson & Barber (1983), are
fairly rare (estimated 4% ofpopulation) but many people may share some fantasy
prone characteristics. Fantasy prone individuals typically demonstrate high
imaginative ability, frequent episodes of hypnagogic/hypnopompic (HG/HP) imagery,
a tendency to become absorbed in real and imagined events (which can occasionally
lead to difficulties with reality distinction), a vivid recall ofpersonal experiences,
physical concomitants associated with memories and fantasies, and often report a
number ofpsychic experiences (e.g., Lynn & Rhue, 1988; Rhue & Lynn, 1991;
Wilson & Barber, 1983). As children, lantasy-prone individuals often lived in a make-
believe world for much of the time, played with imaginary companions and felt that
their dolls and toys were alive (Lynn & Rhue, 1987,1988; Rauschenberger & Lynn,
1995; Wilson & Barber, 1982, 1983).
41
Fantasy proneness has also been correlated with paranormal beliefs (Allison.
1996; Council & Huff, 1990; Irwin, 1990, 1991a; Lawrence et al, 1995; Lawrence,
1998); the average correlation is approximately r = 0.35 (range . 10-.58). Fantasy
proneness is considered to be a key variable in the development ofparanormal beliefs,
not least because it is one of the few variables that seems to correlate with the
majority of the dimensions of belief (see Irwin. 1993a). Fantasy proneness will be
considered in more detail in Chapter 3 where a number of proposed models for the
development ofparanormal beliefs will be introduced. Fantasy proneness, creativity
and hypnotizability are also associated with, or are components of, two fairly new
psychological constructs: boundary structure (Hartmann, 1991) and transliminality
(Thalbourne & Delin, 1994). These will also be considered in Chapter 3.
Lawrence (1998) has suggested that paranormal experiences and beliefs are
related to individual characteristics such as the tendency to introspect and the ability
to enter into and become absorbed in internal imagery-based experiences. I agree that
this is a key point; we have already noted that many anomalous experiences seem to
occur when the experient is relaxed, or when cognitive and motor functioning are
somewhat dissociated (such as when performing fairly automatic actions), and when
attention is focused inwardly. Such experiences are often reported during the
hypnagogic/hypnopompic and sleep states, which share some of these features. The
relationship between anomalous experiences/beliefs, ASCs and variables associated
with the capacity to enter them will be considered in more depth in Chapter 3.
4) Personality correlates and the psychodynamic functions hypothesis
The idea behind this hypothesis is that people hold paranormal beliefs because they
meet certain psychodynamic needs (Irwin, 1999, p. 290). For example, Irwin's
(1993a) theory suggests that paranormal beliefs provide an illusion ofcontrol and a
belief that we can cope with, or at least understand, uncontrollable life events.
Although paranormal believers do not seem to be socially withdrawn
individuals (Windholz & Diamant, 1974), there is evidence to suggest that they are
not particularly interested in other people (Irwin, 1993a). This may support the
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notion that paranormal believers are people whose attention tends to be more oriented
towards their own subjective experience (Irwin, 1993a). This self-concern is also
supported by the finding that some dimensions of paranormal belief have been found
to be positively correlated with narcissism (Tobacyk & Milford, 1983).
There has not been much research to date on personality dimensions such as
extraversion, neuroticism and psychoticism (Lawrence, 1998) but there is some
evidence of a small positive relationship between extraversion and global measures of
paranormal belief (see unpublished study cited by Lawrence, 1998) and, more
specifically, belief in ESP (Thalbourne, 1981; Thalbourne & Haraldsson, 1980). High
sensation seekers have also been found to report stronger paranormal beliefs (Kumar,
Pekala, & Cummings, 1993). The relationship between neuroticism and paranormal
belief is unclear; Windholz and Diamant (1974) found a positive relationship with
global paranormal belief but Polzella et al. (1975), cited by Lawrence (1998), did not
find a similar relationship. One study by Lester (1993) found that psychoticism was
negatively related to some beliefs, such as beliefs in god, life-after-death and the
existence ofother beings in the universe. Again, with these studies there appears to be
little theoretical justification for these predicted differences in personality.
One prediction made by the psychodynamic hypothesis is that those who
believe in the paranormal are psychologically maladjusted. As noted by Lawrence
(1998), although studies in the 1930s and 1940s found negative relationships between
psychological adjustment and superstitiousness, more recent studies have failed to
confirm such a relationship. In fact, Schumaker (1987) claimed to have found a
positive relationship between psychological adjustment and paranormal beliefbut it
turned out that he had scored the adjustment measure incorrectly and the relationship
was in fact negative (Irwin, 1991a).
Studies have also found that paranormal belief is associated with higher
magical ideation (e.g., Thalbourne, 1985, 1994a), which is a measure ofmagical
thinking (Eckblad & Chapman, 1983). However, although magical ideation is an
indicator of schizotypy or proneness to psychosis one should not automatically
assume that paranormal believers are suffering from some form ofmental illness. The
relationship may not actually be causal and, even if it is, it may only be certain types of
43
believer who show such strong magical thinking (Irwin, 1993a). In my opinion, this
relationship between paranormal beliefs and magical ideation and other measures of
psychological adjustment may be caused by a more general factor, such as
transliminality. The concept of transliminality was introduced by Thalbourne and
Delin (1994) and was initially empirically defined as being made up of a number of
core components including measures ofpsychopathology proneness, such as magical
ideation, creativity, measures ofmystical experience, and paranormal
experience/belief. The theory is that highly transliminal people have brains that allow
them access, or easier access, to unconscious or subliminal information that may
appear in the form of imagery, ideas or emotion. Thus, the relationship between
psychological adjustment variables and paranormal beliefs may not be causal but may
be a reflection of transliminality.
Drawbacks of research into the correlates of paranormal beliefs
One of the main problems with research into the correlates of paranormal beliefs is
that it is difficult to establish causality; correlation alone does not allow us to do so.
In order to demonstrate a causal relation between two variables, the following
conditions need to be met: association, isolation and directionality (Bullock et al.,
1994; Hoyle, 1995). This means that the variables must be correlated, extraneous
variables must be ruled out. and the cause must be shown to precede an effect. It is
difficult to meet these conditions with correlational data, especially with cross-
sectional designs (Bullock et al., 1994). Ideally, longitudinal studies are required, or at
least some form ofqualitative analysis, such as narrative analysis, that can gain more
depth and can take into account the context of events, perhaps in relation to a
person's life history.
Apart from causality, it is also difficult to establish whether the correlates are
consequent or antecedent ofparanormal belief. Another problem is that much of the
research for correlates has only looked for bivariate relationships. There are clearly
several correlates of paranormal beliefs, some ofwhich might be related to each other.
Bivariate analysis cannot take this complexity into account and cannot control for the
influence of other variables.
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In addition, the proposed explanations behind some of the hypothesised
relationships with paranormal belief tend to be rather vague and superficial and do not
explain what the specific causal processes are or how they work. Prediction is of only
limited value without an underlying explanation. One of the reasons for this lack of
explanation is that there has tended to be very little theory guiding research into
correlates ofparanormal belief. However, the situation is changing and researchers
have begun to build and test out specific models of the development ofparanormal
beliefs using multivariate analysis techniques that can assess the extent to which the
proposed models provide an acceptable description of the relationships among the
variables (Irwin, 1992, 1993a; Lawrence, 1998; Lawrence et al., 1995). This model-
building and testing approach will be discussed in Chapter 3.
Another problem is that researchers have used a variety of different measures;
some have looked for correlates ofglobal measures of belief, some have looked for
correlates of specific beliefs and some have looked for both. On the one hand,
researchers should be looking at relationships with specific dimensions of belief as the
construct is clearly multidimensional. On the other hand, attempting to do so with the
current lack of agreement over the scope and dimensionality ofmeasures can
potentially complicate matters even further. In my opinion, there is sufficient overlap
across many of these measures to allow relationships to be detected for the time being
but the differences between the measures will cloud the issue and the full true picture
is unlikely to emerge until a more ecologically valid measure of anomalous beliefs that
fully samples the domain, according to the general public's view, has been developed
and accepted and utilised by researchers interested in this area.
Chapter Summary
This chapter has outlined some of the internal and external factors that are reported to
have influenced people's beliefor disbelief in the paranormal. The most frequently
cited factor is personal experience and a number of studies have found significant
small to medium positive correlations between global and/or specific measures of
anomalous experiences and beliefs that suggest that the more personal experience one
has of anomalous phenomena, the stronger one's beliefs in such phenomena.
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Assuming that these correlations might reflect a causal relationship, a number of
explanations have been proposed for them: (1) the experiential source explanation
proposes that personal experience ofpurported anomalous phenomena causes a
person to develop or strengthen their belief in anomalous phenomena; (2) the
cognitive source explanation proposes that our beliefs in such phenomena cause us to
report more experiences and/or to perform better in experimental psi tasks; (3) the
reciprocal causality explanation proposes that the effects of these two variables are
reciprocal.
Even if personal experience can alter a person's beliefs, the magnitude of the
correlations between measures of these variables indicate that experience is not the
only factor involved. The interpretation of personal experience may depend upon
other factors, such as the circumstances in which particular events occur and the
characteristics of the individual concerned. Many spontaneous anomalous
experiences seem to occur when the person concerned is physically relaxed, calm and
involved in minimal physical activity or a highly-practised activity. Anomalous
experiences also occur in circumstances in which there is minimal sensory input,
possible sensory deprivation, and/or the person's attention is focused inward or the
circumstances allow one to become absorbed in one's own mentation. Many of these
circumstantial features occur during ASCs, such as meditation, hypnosis, the HG/HP
state and sleep. Thus, people who find themselves in these circumstances and who
may find it easier to enter and become absorbed in ASCs may be more likely to report
anomalous experiences and beliefs.
Research has attempted to identify a range of individual characteristics that are
associated with paranormal beliefs, such as demographic, attitudinal, cognitive, and
personality correlates. Linked to each of these sets of correlates is a hypothesis for
why people with these characteristics hold such beliefs: the social marginality
hypothesis, the worldview hypothesis, the cognitive deficits hypothesis and the
psychodynamic functions hypothesis.
Ofall these correlates, fantasy proneness is considered to be a key variable
associated with the development ofparanormal belief, not least because it is one of
the few variables that seems to correlate with the majority of the dimensions of belief.
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In addition, people with fantasy-prone characteristics are likely to have high
imaginative abilities, frequent episodes ofHG/HP imagery, a high capacity for
absorption, and also report a range of anomalous experiences.
There are a number ofproblems with the research into correlates of
paranormal belief: the correlational and cross-sectional nature ofmost of the studies
makes it difficult to establish causality; most of the research has only looked for
bivariate relationships and does not control for the effects of other variables; there has
been little theory guiding this research or specific explanations for the findings;
researchers have used a variety of different measures of experience and beliefs.
However, researchers have recently begun to test specific models containing variables
that are believed to contribute to the development of anomalous beliefs and these
models have been tested using multivariate techniques. These models, and others that
are to be tested as part of this thesis, plus the rationale behind them will be discussed
in the following chapter.
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Chapter 3
Models of the development of
anomalous/paranormal beliefs
Recent research has begun to focus on possible childhood antecedents of anomalous
beliefs and experiences, such as childhood trauma and fantasy proneness (Irwin, 1992,
1993a; Lawrence et al., 1995; Lawrence, 1998; Lynn & Rhue, 1987; Wilson &
Barber, 1983). In order to try to make more sense ofwhat these relationships mean
and what their exact nature is, possible models of the structure of these relationships
have been developed.
Basically, two main models of the relationship between individual
characteristics and paranormal experience and beliefmeasures have been proposed
(Irwin, 1992, 1993a; Lawrence et al., 1995; Lawrence, 1998). Fantasy proneness is a
key component of both models but the models differ in their prediction ofwhether
fantasy proneness has a direct relationship with paranormal beliefs, in addition to its
indirect relationship via paranormal experience. Irwin's model (1992, 1993a) predicts
that there is such a direct relationship but Lawrence's model (Lawrence et al., 1995;
Lawrence, 1998) predicts that fantasy proneness can only influence beliefs indirectly
via its influence on paranormal experience. Irwin's model (1992, 1993a) also differs
from Lawrence's in that it proposes a mutually reinforcing relationship between
paranormal experience and beliefwhereas Lawrence's model proposes that only
experience influences beliefs. Chapter 2 has already shown that the nature of the
relationship between anomalous experiences and beliefs continues to be a source of
much debate and different explanations have been proposed to account for it. More
information concerning the nature of these models will be presented in the following
section. This chapter will then introduce the competing models that are to be tested
as part of this thesis and will explain the rationale behind the addition ofmeasures of
the childhood incidence ofhypnagogic/hypnopompic and sleep-related experiences.
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Irwin's model of the origins and functions of paranormal belief
Irwin's diagram (1993a) ofhis model of the origins and functions ofparanormal belief
(see Figure 1) shows that the concept of fantasy proneness is clearly a central
component.
Irwin's model proposes that the development of fantasy proneness is
influenced by both positive and negative childhood experiences. This proposal is
supported by previous research, based upon interviews and surveys, that has indicated
that creative or artistic pursuits at an early age (Irwin, 1992, 1993a; Lynn & Rhue,
1987, 1988; Wilson & Barber, 1983), encouragement to fantasise from significant
others, childhood isolation and loneliness, and traumatic experiences (e.g., emotional,
physical or sexual abuse) can all contribute to the development of fantasy-prone
characteristics (Bryant, 1995; Irwin, 1992, 1993a; Lynn & Rhue, 1987; McClenon,
1994b; Rhue & Lynn, 1991; Rhue, Lynn, Henry, & Buhk, 1991; Wilson & Barber,
1983).
Why should such childhood experiences lead to the development of fantasy
proneness? Irwin (1992, 1993a) proposes that traumatic childhood experiences,
particularly physical abuse, lead to a need for a sense ofcontrol over what happens in
one's life, which in turn leads to the development of fantasy prone characteristics. In
support of this, research has found that people who have experienced a lot of
childhood trauma, such as emotional, physical or sexual abuse, can have a higher need
for a sense of control (Irwin, 1993a) and tend to report higher levels of fantasy
proneness (Bryant, 1995; French & Kerman, 1996; Rhue et al., 1991; but not
Rauschenberger & Lynn, 1995).
Irwin argues that fantasy proneness leads to the development of paranormal
beliefs because they may provide the individual with an illusion of control over, and a
sense ofbeing able to cope with, various life events, particularly anomalous ones. My
suspicion is that fantasy proneness does not lead directly to the development of
paranormal beliefs but it may influence them indirectly via its relationship with other






































The possible existence of anomalous processes and agencies may threaten a
person's sense ofunderstanding and serve as a reminder that the world can sometimes
be uncertain and beyond individual control (Irwin, 1993a). Other commentators
agree that humans have a basic need for a sense of understanding of life events (e.g.,
Alcock, 1981; Schumaker, 1990; Zusne & Jones, 1982) so Irwin's proposal does
seem plausible.
Other researchers also concur with the suggestion that fantasy proneness
develops as a coping mechanism (either adaptive and/or defensive) for dealing with
unpleasant childhood circumstances (Lynn & Rhue, 1987,1988; Rhue & Lynn, 1991;
Rhue et al., 1991; Wilson & Barber, 1983), and that this coping mechanism is also
linked to a need for a sense of control. One way ofdealing with trauma is to
withdraw into one's self and either pretend that the unpleasant events are not
happening and/or immerse one's self in an alternative fantasy life that is much more
pleasant and diverts attention away from real-life. It is easy to see how this could lead
to the development of a fantasy prone personality. However, one should not forget
that positive factors, such as spending a lot of time engaging in artistic and creative
activities and being encouraged to do this and also to fantasise, can also lead to the
development of fantasy proneness (e.g., Irwin, 1992, 1993a; Lynn & Rhue, 1987,
1988; Wilson & Barber, 1983).
Irwin (1993a) cited a couple of studies that are supportive ofhis proposal that
paranormal beliefprovides a sense of control. Using a computerised coin-tossing
task, Blackmore and Troscianko (1985) found that, regardless of actual degree of
control, believers in ESP thought they had a greater control over the outcome of the
coin tosses than disbelievers. Obviously, this finding may not necessarily generalise to
other dimensions ofbelief. However, Irwin (1992) also found that measures of the
need for interpersonal control were positively correlated with global paranormal belief
scores.
Apart from a direct positive relationship between fantasy proneness and
paranormal belief, Irwin's model also predicts a direct positive relationship between
fantasy proneness and a measure ofparapsychological experiences. These
parapsychological experiences may or may not involve genuine paranormal processes;
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the engagement in vivid fantasising and occasional difficulties with reality
discrimination may lead to misinterpretations of imaginary experience or perhaps the
enhanced imaginary and absorption abilities associated with fantasy proneness are
somehow conducive to anomalous processes or allow access to anomalous agencies.
In addition, Irwin's model proposes that the extent to which parapsychological
experiences and paranormal beliefs are reported may be mediated by the social
context in which a person finds him/herself.
There is a great deal of empirical evidence for the positive relationship
between fantasy proneness and global measures of paranormal experiences (Alvarado
& Zingrone, 1994; Council & Huff, 1990; Lawrence et al., 1995; Lawrence, 1998;
Rao, 1992) or measures of specific experiences, such as out-of-body experiences
(Alvarado & Zingrone, 1994; Hunt, Gervais, Shearing Johns, & Travis, 1992; Myers,
Austrin, Grisso, & Nickeson, 1983; Myers & Austrin, 1985; Wilson & Barber, 1983),
ESP and healing abilities (Wilson & Barber, 1983), apparitional experiences
(Cameron & Roll, 1983; Campbell, 1987, 1992; Myers & Austrin, 1985; Osis, 1986)
and UFO experiences (Bartholomew et al., 1991; Powers, 1991; Wilson & Barber,
1983). The typical correlation is r = 0.3-0.5 (range .21-.57). However, it should also
be noted that individuals who report anomalous experiences, such as UFOs and
NDEs, have not always been found to be more fantasy prone than controls (Ring &
Rosing, 1990; Rodeghier, 1994; Rodeghier et al., 1991; Spanos et al., 1993).
Nevertheless, Appelle, Lynn & Newman (2000) concluded that it's too early to rule
out a relationship between fantasy proneness and alien abduction experiences because
studies in this area to date have methodological limitations, and participants may be
tempted to give socially desirable responses and to avoid endorsing some fantasy
proneness items because they associate them with abnormality.
There is also biographical evidence to suggest that at least three well-known
mediums, Leonore Piper, Gladys Leonard, Eileen Garrett, and a number ofUFO
abductees and contactees, all possessed typical fantasy-prone characteristics (Rhue &
Lynn, 1991; Roll, 1982; Wilson & Barber, 1983).
Although it is not specified in Irwin's model, it is possible that traumatic
experiences might also be directly related to reports of anomalous experiences, either
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instead ofor in addition to its relationship via fantasy proneness. Evidence from a
number of different studies suggests that people who report certain anomalous
experiences, such as UFOs, NDEs, OBEs, and deja vu, also demonstrate a slight
tendency to report higher levels of childhood trauma, such as intra- or extra-familial
sexual abuse, death or serious illness relating to a friend, physical abuse and/or
periods of isolation from friends (Irwin, 1993b, 1994b, 1996; Lawrence et al., 1995;
Ring & Rosing, 1990; Ross & Joshi, 1992). However, contrary to Ring and Rosing
(1990), Irwin (1993b) found that only certain types of trauma—such as, assault by a
stranger, extrafamilial sexual abuse, separation by injury, illness, or death of a close
personal friend—strongly discriminated between NDE experients and non-experients.
There is also some evidence that adolescents and adults who have experienced a
difficult and/or traumatic childhood report higher levels ofparanormal beliefs (French
& Kerman, 1996; Irwin, 1994b). However, the magnitude of the effect sizes in these
studies shows that not everyone who believes in anomalous phenomena or who
reports a personal anomalous experience has necessarily had a traumatic childhood.
As noted in Chapter 2, a number of studies, using a variety ofmeasures, have
found small to medium correlations between global and/or specific measures of
experience and belief ranging from r = .32 to r = .69 (Atkinson, 1994; Gallagher, et
al., 1994; Glicksohn, 1990; Irwin, 1985a; Lawrence, 1998; Lawrence et al., 1995;
McClenon, 1994a; Murphy & Lester, 1976; Pekala et al., 1995; Thalbourne, 1994b;
Willging & Lester, 1997). Irwin hypothesises a mutually-supportive interaction
between paranormal beliefs and parapsychological experiences; beliefs may lead to an
increased likelihood of attributing experiences to paranormal processes or agencies,
and experiences interpreted as being paranormal may lead to the development or
reinforcement ofparanormal beliefs. However, alternatively, it could be that
paranormal beliefs are best modelled as a consequence (experiential source
explanation) or as an antecedent (cognitive source explanation) of anomalous
experiences, as outlined in Chapter 2.
Finally, Irwin's model proposes that if paranormal beliefs do provide a sense
of being able to control and cope with unpredictable or uncontrollable life events, then
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this may reinforce the fantasy prone characteristics and also the strength of
paranormal beliefs.
However, there is a problem with Irwin's (1993a) model; although he cited a
number of studies that supported various component parts of his model, he did not
provide any evidence to support the model as a whole. For example, the various
bivariate relationships cited may not necessarily hold once the effects of other
variables are taken into account. Fortunately, multivariate statistical techniques do
allow models to be tested to see if they can provide an acceptable fit to empirical data.
The use of structural equation modelling to test models of the
structure of relationships between variables
Lawrence et al. (1995) set out to test a simplified version oflrwin's model using a
relatively new statistical analysis technique known as "structural equation modelling
(SEM), or 'covariance structure modelling'. SEM techniques are often referred to as
'causal modelling' techniques but this term should be avoided as it may encourage
incorrect inferences of causality (Bullock et al., 1994; Hoyle, 1995). Before we can
consider Lawrence's findings, it is necessary to give a brief introduction to structural
equation modelling.
A model is simply a representation or description of the structure or system of
relationships between component variables and/or factors. Structural equation
modelling is a useful tool for testing competing models and theories (Hair et al., 1998,
p. 578; Neill et al., 1999, p. 167) and can determine whether hypothesised models of
the linear relationships among a number of variables (either observed and/or latent) fit
a sample of data to an acceptable extent (e.g., Hoyle, 1995; Maruyama, 1998;
Schumacker & Lomax, 1996).
SEM essentially combines factor analysis, multiple regression, and path
analysis techniques. However, SEM differs from the aforementioned techniques in
that a precise model must be formally stated before the analysis can be run (Hoyle,
1995, p. 13; Hair et al., 1998, p. 590; Neill et al., 1999).
One of the advantages ofSEM is that it can take into account the influence of
several predictors simultaneously. Secondly, it is possible to test competing models
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using the same data in order to see which one fits the data best. Nevertheless,
although a given model may fit the data, it is important to note that there may be
other models which might fit the data equally well, or perhaps even better, (Breckler,
1990; Bullock et al., 1994). Thus, the finding that a proposed model fits the data
simply means that it provides a good description of the relationships among the
variables (Bullock et al., 1994; MacCallum, 1995). Although SEM methods cannot
establish causality, they do force the researcher to produce clear and precise models
of the structure of the relationships; the results of testing these models can give useful
suggestions regarding the plausibility of causal relationships and competing models
(Maruyama, 1998, pp.35), and these can then be validated using other methods.
SEM procedure
In terms of sample sizes, approximately 100-150 cases are considered to be a
minimum for SEM (see Schumacker & Lomax, 1996) and 200 cases is considered by
some researchers (e.g., Neill et al., 1999) to be an optimal sample size.
Most SEM analyses consist of five different steps: 1) model specification, 2)
identification, 3) estimation, 4) testing fit, and 5) respecification (Bollen & Long,
1993).
1. Model specification
Ideally, the specified model should be based on a thorough review of the empirical
literature (Schumacker & Lomax, 1996) or should be derived from practical
experience (Neill et al., 1999, p. 168). Such models are expressed in terms of
independent variables (IVs) and dependent variables (DVs). Hypothesised
relationships between a number of IVs and each DV are expressed in the form of
linear structural equations, for example:
DVi = b, IV, + b2 IV2... + bn IVn + error
DV2 = b, IV, + b4 IV4... + bn IV„ + error
etc.
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b = a regression coefficient which indicates the direction and extent to which the DV
changes as a function of this IV, whilst the influences of all other IVs in the equation
are taken into account.
DVs, either observed or latent, are not expected to be perfectly accounted for
by the IVs and so an error term is included in the equations (MacCallum, 1995;
Ullman, 1996). The error may be due to random or systematic error or may be
variance explained by other variables which are not specified in the model
(MacCallum, 1995). Within the EQS software, an 'E' is used to denote an error term
for an observed DV whereas a 'D' (for 'disturbance') is used to denote an error term
for a latent variable. The variances and covariances among the IVs must also be
specified.
Parameters stated in the model may either be 'fixed' or 'free'. Fixed
parameters are not estimated from the data and are often believed to be zero; free
parameters are estimated from the data and are believed to be non-zero (Hoyle,
1995). Initial start values for these free parameters can be specified by the researcher
or can be provided by the computer software (Hoyle, 1995; Ullman, 1996). Within
the specified models, straight arrows are used to denote potential 'causal'
relationships; curved arrows denote correlations (Neill et al., 1999, p. 169).
2. Model identification
SEM attempts to solve for the linear equations, using a sample of data, and provide an
optimal solution plus estimates of the various free parameters (i.e., regression
coefficients, covariances and variances). In order to do this, there must be more data
points than parameters to be estimated (see Ullman, 1996, p. 743). If this is true then
the model is 'overidentified;' if there are fewer data points than parameters, the model
is 'underidentified'; if there are the same number, the model is 'just identified' (Chou
& Bentler, 1995). Identification problems can occur when there are large numbers of
parameters to be estimated in the model relative to the number of covariances or
correlations (Neill et al., 1999).
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3. Estimation of parameters
The estimation process begins with the substitution of a set of initial start values into
the structural equations. The SEM process calculates one or more possible solutions
to the structural equations until it reaches a solution with the smallest possible
difference between the variance-covariance matrix implied by the model and the actual
sample variance-covariance matrix2. This estimation process may require a number of
different attempts, or iterations, before it converges on an optimal solution.
A number ofestimation techniques are available: e.g., Generalized Least
Squares (GLS), Maximum Likelihood (ML), Elliptical Distribution Theory (EDT),
and Asymptotically Distribution Free (ADF). The %2 test statistic obtained from the
various estimation techniques can be affected by a number of factors, such as sample
size, nonnormality of the distribution of factors and/or errors, and violation of the
assumption of independence. For information on the performance of various
estimation techniques under a variety of conditions, see Hu, Bentler, and Kano
(1992). The ML estimation technique, particularly the Scaled version, seems to be
one of the most reliable and the most widely used, partly because it has been found to
provide valid results even with small samples and when there may be nonnormality
and/or possible dependence among factors or error terms (Hair et al., 1998; Ullman,
1996).
4. Testing of model fit
The optimal solution produced by the estimation process provides a discrepancy or
fitting function, which is a measure of the discrepancy between the implied and the
actual sample covariance matrices. If the hypothesised model provided a perfect fit to
the data then the discrepancy function would be zero and the residual matrix (which
contains the differences between the variances and covariances in the implied and
sample matrices) would contain a series of zeros.
2 It is assumed that the sample variances and covariances are good estimators of the population
variances and covariances.
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The value of the discrepancy or fitting function is then used to calculate a y2
goodness-of-fit test statistic and other indices of fit (Hoyle, 1995). The critical value
of y2 with the appropriate degrees of freedom is then consulted. A y2 value greater
than the criterion value indicates that there is a significant difference between the
covariance matrix implied by the model and the sample covariance matrix, i.e., the
hypothesised model does not provide a good fit to the data. A nonsignificant y2
goodness-of-fit statistic suggests that the model does provide an acceptable fit to the
sample ofdata; a value ofzero would indicate a perfect fit (Hoyle, 1995).
Because y2 values depend on sample sizes, differences between the implied
and the sample matrices are more likely to be significant with large sample sizes
(Ullman, 1996). For this reason, other more descriptive indices of fit have been
devised. There are three main types of fit indices: absolute, incremental, and
parsimonious (Hair et al., 1998, p. 611). Unfortunately, fit indices are not statistics
and so significance testing cannot be performed (Hoyle, 1995). The main fit indices
can be categorised as either absolute or relative/incremental (Flu & Bentler, 1995;
Maruyama, 1998). Absolute indices basically ask "Is the residual or unexplained
variance remaining after model fitting appreciable?" (Maruyama, 1998, p. 239).
Absolute indices (e.g., GFI) directly assess how well the model fits the data without
reference to a null model. Relative/incremental indices (e.g., NFI) consider the
improvement in fit obtained by using the proposed model rather than a null model.
The null model is usually one that assumes that none of the variables are correlated
(Maruyama, 1998). Relative indices basically ask "How well does a particular model
do in explaining a set ofobserved data compared with (a range of) other possible
models?" (Maruyama, 1998, p. 239). Finally, adjusted or parsimonious fit measures
can give an indication of parsimony because they make adjustments for the number of
estimated parameters in the model (Hair et al., 1998) and they value models with
relatively small numbers of free parameters (Maruyama, 1998).
Generally speaking, fit indices need to be greater than or equal to 0.9 in order
to conclude that the model provides a sufficiently good fit to the data (Hoyle &
Panter, 1995), although this criterion does not work equally well with all indices ,
sample sizes, estimators or distributions (Hu & Bentler, 1995). It is important to
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point out that smaller values of yf indicate a greater fit whereas larger values of fit
indices generally indicate a greater fit. Researchers are generally encouraged to use
more than one measure of fit, and preferably more than one type too (Hair et al.,
1998; Hoyle, 1995), because there is some ambiguity as to the potential effects of
certain sample and model characteristics on the different measures of fit.
Relationships among variables in SEM
As Hoyle (1995) points out, there are three types of relationship between variables
within SEM: 1) association, 2) direct 'effect', 3) indirect 'effect'.
The association is a relation between two variables treated within the model as
nondirectional....The direct effect..As a directional relation between two
variables....The indirect effect is the effect of an independent variable on an dependent
variable through one or more intervening, or mediating variables... (pp. 3-4).
Models in which all of the relationship arrows point in the same direction are known
as non-reciprocal or recursive models; models in which there are reciprocal
relationship arrows and/or feedback loops are known as reciprocal or non-recursive
(Maruyama, 1998; Schumacker & Lomax, 1996). Although useful, reciprocal models
can be more difficult to solve than non-reciprocal models (Maruyama, 1998).
Having established that a model provides an acceptable global fit to the data, it
is necessary to look at the specific elements within the model, i.e., the estimated free
parameters such as the regression coefficients, and to assess the extent to which they
are reliably different from zero (Hoyle, 1995). The ratio of an estimate to its standard
error provides a z statistic that can be evaluated for statistical significance.
Standardised regression coefficients are often interpreted, rather than the
unstandardised versions, because there are no differences in scales (Ullman, 1996).
5. Respecification of the model
Modification, or re-specification, of a model is a controversial aspect ofSEM (Hoyle,
1995, p. 8). Models are often modified either to improve the fit or to test hypotheses
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(Breckler, 1990; Ullman, 1996). In the former case, this is often done following an
inspection of the parameter estimates, the residual matrix, or statistical tests, such as
the Wald and the Lagrange Multiplier (Hoyle, 1995).
The danger ofmaking too many suggested modifications to a model is that the
model moves to fit the data rather than vice versa (Bullock et al., 1994). As Hair et
al. (1998, p. 611) quite rightly point out, "In developing any statistical model, the
researcher must guard against "overfitting" the model to the data." In addition, using
the same set of data to develop and evaluate a model undermines the confirmatory
logic ofSEM (Breckler, 1990). Any post hoc adjustments to a model should be
replicated and/or cross-validated on other data samples (Bullock et al., 1994;
MacCallum, 1995; Neill et al., 1999). Post hoc modifications on samples of 100-400
should not be taken seriously unless they are replicated in another sample (Hoyle &
Panter, 1995). It is further recommended that researchers should deliberately
consider (Hair et al., 1998) the plausibility ofpost hoc modifications, avoid those that
make no sense and offer explanations for those that do (Hoyle & Panter, 1995).
Test of Irwin's model of the development of paranormal belief
Lawrence et al. (1995) set out to test a simplified version of Irwin's model (see Figure
2) that focused on two childhood factors: childhood trauma and childhood fantasy
proneness.
A questionnaire, including Council and Edwards (1987) Survey of Traumatic
Childhood Experiences (STCE) scale, the Australian Sheep-Goat Scale (ASGS,
Thalbourne & Delin, 1993) and a measure ofchildhood fantasy based on Myers
(1983) version of ICMI, was administered to students (and their friends) at the
University of Edinburgh. The resulting sample of 80 participants was analysed using
structural equation modelling (SEM) techniques.
The results of the SEM analysis indicated that the simplified model did not
provide a good fit to the data (x2 = 5.54, df= 2,p = 0.0625, Bentler-Bonnett non-
normed fit index = 0.77). The EQS software (Bentler, 1989) suggested that
excluding a direct link between childhood fantasy and paranormal beliefand adding a
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direct link between childhood trauma and paranormal experience would provide a
better fit to the data. This revised model (see Figure 3) did provide an excellent, and
statistically acceptable, fit to the data (x2 = 1.31, df= 2,p - 0.520, Bentler-Bonnett
non-normed fit index = 1.05) (Lawrence et al., 1995).
The results ofLawrence et al.'s analysis suggested that a model that proposes
that childhood fantasy proneness does not have a direct influence on the development
ofparanormal beliefs provided a better fit to the data. Lawrence et al.'s (1995)
revised model also suggests that childhood trauma may have a direct influence on
paranormal experiences, regardless of its association with the development of fantasy
proneness. Following a post hoc examination of the data, Lawrence (1998) suggested
that one possible explanation for this direct link might be that, in some cases,
bereavement-related trauma leads to a strong desire for the return of the deceased,
which may lead to hallucinations of their presence.












Figure 3 Revised model proposed by Lawrence et al. (1995)
following SEM analysis of version of Irwin's model
The magnitude of the standardised path coefficients was generally quite small,
with the exception of the path coefficient for the relationship between paranormal
experience and paranormal belief (0.534). This, coupled with the magnitude of the
error terms, suggests that the model can only account for relatively small proportions
of variance in the predicted variables. For example, Lawrence's model accounted for
only 16% of the variance3 in the paranormal experience measure and 29% of the
variance in the paranormal beliefmeasure. Clearly other variables not specified in the
model must also be involved. However, Lawrence was only testing a simplified
version of Irwin's model that did not include measures of control, coping or
encouragement to fantasise.
This finding with regard to the relationship between paranormal experience
and beliefmay be a key one, as Lawrence et al. (1995) pointed out:
Also, our new model shows that PB [paranormal belief] is best modelled as a
consequence, rather than a cause, of PE [paranormal experience]. This is an important
result, if it can be substantiated by further research on larger samples, precisely because
Irwin's original model is equivocal with respect to the effects of fantasy on PB and PE,
and PB and PE themselves are supposed to show reciprocal causation with one another.
If, as our model suggests, PE experience is more the result of fantasy proneness, and
PB is more the result of PE, then this suggests a more phenomenological explanation
for PB, over a more attributional one (i.e. that one has PB and then attributes
paranormality to hallucinatory experiences). In short, where PE has previously been
considered the younger brother to PB, our research suggests that it is more the
'paternal cause' of PB. (p. 214).
'
For non-reciprocal models such as this one, the proportion of variance in any given dependent
variable equals 1-E2 where E is the error term in the structural equation for that dependent variable.
63
There is no disputing the tact that Lawrence et al.'s (1995) model supports the
experiential source explanation for the relationship between paranormal experience
and beliefs but alternative models with different paths between the experiences and
beliefs measures might also have fitted their data. It is not clear why they did not test
a version of Irwin's model that included the mutually reinforcing relationship between
paranormal experience and paranormal belief given that it is possible to test such
reciprocal or nonrecursive models using SEM (Maruyama, 1998, pp. 100-105;
Schumacker & Lomax, 1996, pp. 162-164) and, more specifically, with the EQS
software that they used. It is important to note too that Lawrence et al.'s (1995) was
based on a relatively small sample for this kind of analysis technique and that the
results do not suggest that this is the only acceptable model.
Lawrence (1998) conducted two further surveys on different samples in order
to try to replicate and extend his findings and to confirm his proposed model as he
was concerned that his revised model may have capitalised on chance relationships.
The first replication attempt was based on a sample of 58 members of the Society for
Psychical Research (SPR); the second on a random sample of 129 Edinburgh
residents. These surveys differed from the initial study in that paranormal beliefwas
analysed as a latent variable, i.e., a general factor based on scores from two separate
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Figure 5 Revised model proposed by Lawrence (1998) -
Edinburgh sample
paranormal beliefmeasures (items from ASGS-B, Thalbourne & Delin, 1994;
Edinburgh Paranormal Belief Scale (EPBS), Lawrence, 1998).
Lawrence's revised model provided a good fit to the data in both samples
(SPR—x2 = 6.86, df= 5,p = 0.2309, Bentler-Bonnett non-normed fit index = 0.968;
Edinburgh~x2 = 5.07, df= 5,p = 0.4075, Bentler-Bonnett non-normed fit index =
0.999), though if one compares Figures 4 and 5 with Figure 3 one can see that not all
of the predicted pathways (i.e., those omitted from Figures 4 and 5) were of a
statistically significant magnitude. Another criticism of Lawrence's (1998) analyses is
that these nonsignificant paths are not shown on his final path diagrams and this may
mislead the reader into thinking that these paths were not part of the model that was
tested. It is better to show all of the paths in the model in the final path diagram and
to differentiate between those that are of a statistically significant magnitude and those
that are not.
The simplified version of Irwin's model did not provide an acceptable fit to the
data from the SPR sample (yj = 15.65, df= 4,p = 0.0035, Bentler-Bonnett non-
normed fit index - 0.372) but did for the Edinburgh sample (x2 - 5.03, df= 4,p =
0.2844, Bentler-Bonnett non-normed fit index = 0.988), though Lawrence's model
was the more parsimonious of the two.
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With the SPR sample (see Figure 4), the significant direct path between
childhood trauma and paranormal experience was supported, although the significant
path between childhood trauma and childhood fantasy proneness was not. With the
Edinburgh residents sample (see Figure 5), the reverse was true; the significant direct
path between childhood trauma and paranormal experience was not supported but the
significant path between childhood trauma and childhood fantasy proneness was.
Overall, leaving childhood trauma to one side, the three tests of Lawrence's
model support a direct path between childhood fantasy proneness and paranormal
experience and between paranormal experience and paranormal belief. Some path
coefficients, most notably that between paranormal experience and paranormal belief,
were much larger in the SPR and Edinburgh replication samples. The reason for the
larger experience-belief coefficient may be that combining more than one measure to
form a latent factor minimises the overall measurement error thus leading to a more
accurate measure; this may have provided a greater proportion of 'true' variance to be
explained.
Thus, tests of the simplified version of Irwin's model and Lawrence's
proposed model support the proposed direct relationships between fantasy proneness
and paranormal experiences and between paranormal experience and paranormal
beliefs. Contrary to Irwin's model, there was no support for a direct relationship
between fantasy proneness and paranormal beliefs. However, as noted earlier,
Lawrence did not actually test a version of Irwin's model that included Irwin's
predicted reciprocal direct relationship, so it is not clear whether this would also fit,
nor did he test another alternative model that would test out the cognitive source
explanation, i.e., that paranormal belief causes more frequent reports of paranormal
experiences. There is also evidence from two of the three samples that suggests an
additional direct relationship between childhood trauma and paranormal experience.
Thus, a main aim of this thesis is to test more fully the competing models of
the relationships between childhood fantasy proneness, anomalous experience and
anomalous beliefs. Tests of these models will attempt to confirm whether childhood
fantasy proneness can be better modelled as having a direct relationship with a
measure of anomalous beliefs as well as an indirect relationship via its relationship
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with anomalous experiences or whether it can be better modelled as only having the
latter indirect relationship (see Figure 6).
Figure 6 Competing models of the relationship between childhood
fantasy proneness and anomalous beliefs
The tests will also establish whether anomalous experiences can be better modelled
(see Figure 7) as having a direct antecedent relationship with anomalous beliefs
(experiential source explanation), as having a direct consequent relationship (cognitive
source explanation) or whether there should be a direct reciprocal relationship
between them (reciprocal causality explanation).
In addition, the competing models to be tested will also include measures of
the childhood incidence of hypnagogic/hypnopompic experiences, sleep experiences,
and symptoms of selected sleep disorders. It is predicted that these variables will have
a direct positive relationship with a measure of anomalous experiences.











Figure 7 Competing explanations for the relationship between
reports of anomalous experiences and anomalous beliefs
Relationship between fantasy proneness and experiences reported
during altered states of consciousness
The proposition is that people with fantasy prone characteristics may find it easier to
enter altered states of consciousness (ASCs) and once in these ASCs they may
become very absorbed in the experiences associated with them and are more likely to
have a vivid recall of such experiences at a later date. More specifically, it is
proposed that childhood fantasy proneness will be positively correlated with the
frequency of childhood experiences associated with sleep-related states of
consciousness. It is also proposed that adults who report that they had a higher
frequency of these sleep-related experiences during childhood will tend to report a
higher frequency of anomalous experiences throughout their lifetime.
The finding that stimulated my interest in this area was Wilson and Barber's
(1983) discovery that 64% of their fantasy-prone group reported that they
experienced hypnagogic/hypnopompic imagery on a regular basis (possibly since early
childhood) compared with only 8% of the control group. Wilson and Barber (1983)
also reported that many of these individuals felt as if they were seeing something
external that really existed or that they were looking into another dimension. Wilson
and Barber (1983, p. 365) concluded that:
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[T]here may be a close relationship between fantasy proneness; ability to fantasize with
hallucinatory vividness equally well with eyes open or closed; frequently experiencing
vivid hypnagogic images; and perceiving spirits, ghosts, or apparitions. We believe
that research that probes much more intensively into the relationships among these
variables will go far toward explaining what kinds of individuals report perceiving
ghosts or apparitions and what conditions are most conducive to such experiences.
In my opinion, the relationship between fantasy proneness, hypnagogic/hypnopompic
experiences and reports of anomalous experience is an important one and warrants
further investigation because it suggests that ASCs, and the ability to experience,
generate and become absorbed in internal events, might facilitate the operation of
anomalous processes and/or lead to misinterpretation of normal experiences.
However, although there has been much research into the relationship between
fantasy proneness and anomalous experiences, and there is an increasing amount of
research into the relationship between hypnagogic/hypnopompic and anomalous
experiences, very few studies have considered both fantasy proneness and
hypnagogic/hypnopompic experiences together. Interestingly, in one of the few
studies that has empirically considered fantasy proneness and hypnagogic/
hypnopompic imagery together, a cluster analysis ofRodeghier's (1994) sample of
alien abductees revealed two groups of cases, one ofwhich reported much higher
fantasy proneness and was much more likely to have experienced
hypnagogic/hypnopompic imagery.
In my opinion, hypnagogic/hypnopompic experiences provide some of the best
evidence for the experiential source explanation for anomalous beliefs. Evidence and
possible explanations for the link between the HG/HP and sleep states and reports of
anomalous experiences and beliefs will be discussed in Chapter 5.
Further evidence to suggest that people with fantasy prone characteristics may
fmd it easier to enter ASCs, and to become highly absorbed in them, comes from
research that has found that fantasy proneness, hypnotic susceptibility, dissociative
tendencies and absorption are all related to each other to some extent (Barrett, 1992;
Council & Huff, 1990; Kihlstrom, Glisky, & Angiulo, 1994; Lynn & Neufeld, 1996;
Lynn & Rhue, 1988; Myers & Austrin, 1985; Rauschenberger & Lynn, 1995; Rhue &
Lynn, 1989, 1991; Rhue, Lynn, & Sandberg, 1995; Siuta, 1990; Spanos et al., 1995).
People who score highly on one or more of these aforementioned variables are also
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more likely to report anomalous experiences, such as ESP (see Irwin, 1999, pp. 106-
107), apparitions (see Irwin, 1994c, p. 60), OBEs (see Alvarado, 2000, Hunt et al.,
1992; Myers et al., 1983; Wilson & Barber, 1983), NDEs (Greyson, 2000, pp. 320-
321; Irwin, 1994c, p. 49, 1999, p. 212), memories of previous lives (see Mills &
Lynn, 2000, p. 287), alien abduction experiences (see Appelle et al., 2000, p. 262;
Bartholomew et al. 1991), and mystical experiences (see Wulff, 2000, p. 408).
There is also some suggestion that dissociative tendencies might be related to
some specific sleep-related experiences. For example, it has recently been argued that
dissociated states of consciousness can occur in and around the time of sleep; such
states can be a mixture ofwakefulness and REM or NREM sleep (Mahowald &
Schenck, 1991). Examples ofREM intrusions into wakefulness might include
narcolepsy, episodes ofhypnagogic/hypnopompic imagery and sleep paralysis.
Examples ofwakefulness intruding into REM sleep might include episodes ofREM
sleep behaviour disorder and lucid dreaming (Mahowald & Schenck, 1991). Examples
ofwakefulness intrusions into NREM sleep might include episodes of night terrors
and sleepwalking. If fantasy proneness is positively correlated with dissociative
tendencies then we would expect fantasy proneness to be correlated with the
frequency of experiences that occur during these mixed sleep-wakefulness states as
well. Thus, it is possible that people with fantasy prone characteristics will report
more hypnagogic/hypnopompic imagery, sleep paralysis, lucid dreaming, and
symptoms ofnarcolepsy, REM sleep behaviour disorder, sleep terrors and
sleepwalking. There may also be relationships with other dream experiences and
symptoms of other sleep disorders. Such relationships are more likely to be apparent
when considering childhood measures as there is evidence that
hypnagogic/hypnopompic experiences (Leaning, 1925; Ohayon, Priest, Caulet &
Guilleminault, 1996; Richardson, Mavromatis, Mindel, & Owens, 1981; Schacter,
1976) and certain sleep experiences and disorders may be more common during
childhood and adolescence (e.g., Empson, 1993; Mindell, 1993). More details about
the HG/HP and sleep states, and the experiences associated with them, will be
provided in Chapter 4.
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Apart from their association with the development of fantasy proneness,
traumatic experiences have also been associated with a number of sleep disorders.
Unresolved conflicts, stress, trauma, major life events, and post-traumatic stress
disorder have been associated with a number of sleep disorders: nightmares, sleep
terrors, sleep paralysis, sleep starts, bruxism, insomnia, and exploding head syndrome
(American Sleep Disorders Association, ASDA, 1990; Bell, Dixie Bell, & Thompson.
1986a; Empson, 1993; Hartmann, 1984; Martinovic, 1993; Mills, 1994; Murray,
1991; Partinen, 1994; Sachs & Svanborg, 1991). This provides additional
justification for the inclusion ofmeasures of sleep-related experiences in models of the
development of anomalous beliefs.
So, it seems that childhood trauma can lead to the development of fantasy
proneness, dissociative tendencies, a capacity for absorption and also certain sleep-
related experiences (some ofwhich may be associated with dissociated states of
consciousness). All of these variables have also been associated with reports of
anomalous experiences. I am in agreement with Targ, Schlitz, & Irwin (2000, p. 228)
who concluded that "Collectively, these findings [i.e., relationships among dissociative
tendencies, hypnotic susceptibility, fantasy proneness, absorption] might be
interpreted as suggesting that a capacity to enter altered states of consciousness is a
factor in the predisposition to PREs [psi-related experiences]." The fact that all of
these variables seem to be inter-related to some extent suggests that there might be a
broader, more general factor that encompasses these variables. Indeed, two recently
proposed constructs, boundary structure (Hartmann, 1991) and transliminality
(Thalbourne & Delin, 1994), seem to encompass many of these characteristics.
My understanding of the constructs of boundary structure (Hartmann, 1991)
and transliminality (Thalbourne & Delin, 1994), both ofwhich encompass fantasy
prone characteristics, suggests that people with thin boundaries and/or who are highly
transliminal are likely to report more frequent hypnagogic/hypnopompic experiences
(Thalbourne & Houran, 2000), dream experiences, and sleep disorder symptoms. The




Boundary structure is a fairly new dimension of personality that encompasses fantasy
proneness, absorption, hypnotizability, openness and defensiveness (Hartmann, 1991).
The following quotation from Hartmann's (1991) book 'Boundaries in the Mind: A
New Psychology of Personality' provides a useful overview of the basis for this new
dimension:
When we consider the contents of our minds...we are speaking ofparts, of regions,
functions, or processes that are separate from one another and yet connected with one
another. The boundaries between them are not absolute separations: they can be
relatively thick or solid on the one hand or relatively thin or permeable on the other.
(p. 4).
The concept of boundary structure arose out of a series of interviews with participants
who reported lifelong histories of nightmares (but no other sleep-related problems).
Hartmann (1991) discovered that this group shared a number of unusual
characteristics that were not apparent in the control groups. For example, they were
particularly open, sensitive, vulnerable and artistic, and had been so since early
childhood; they also seemed to have flexible identities and relationships. Ofparticular
interest, in relation to this thesis, is the finding that the nightmare sufferers reported
that they often experienced periods in which they were half-asleep or half-awake. So
it seems that these participants were prone to experiencing mixed states of
consciousness involving sleep and wakefulness (Mahowald & Schenck, 1991). From
these interviews with nightmare sufferers, Hartmann (1991) concluded that:
The term that seemed best to encompass all this was that they had "thin boundaries" in
many different senses. Everything in their minds seemed to flow together. They did
not separate things out, nor did they have barriers or walls to separate themselves from
the world, (p. 16).
Thus, people at one extreme would have boundaries that are thick and relatively
impermeable, those in the middle would have some thick and some thin boundaries,
and those at the other extreme would have thin and relatively permeable boundaries.
For example, people with thick boundaries tend to focus on one thing at a time, can
clearly differentiate between reality and fantasy, have a clear sense of self in relation to
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their environment whereas the reverse may be true for those with thick boundaries
(Hartmann, Rosen, & Rand, 1998). Thin boundary individuals often have rich fantasy
lives too and thus may share characteristics of fantasy-prone personalities.
Hartmann (1991, pp. 22-23) identified a number ofdifferent types of
boundaries relating to perceptual boundaries, thoughts and feelings, states of
awareness or states of consciousness, sleep-dream-wake boundaries, play, memory,
one's physical body, interpersonal boundaries, boundaries between the conscious and
unconscious, defense mechanisms, identity, group boundaries, organisation ofone's
life, environmental preferences, opinions and judgements, and decision making and
action. Hartmann (1991) went on to develop the Boundary Questionnaire in an
attempt to measure boundary structure.
Unfortunately, to date, very little independent work has been conducted to test
out the validity of this theory. Research that has been conducted has tended to focus
on the sleep-dream-wake boundaries (e.g., Cowen & Levin, 1995; Hartmann et al.,
1998; Hicks, Bautista, & Hicks, 1999; Kunzendorf, Hartmann, Cohen, & Cutler,
1997; Schredl, Kleinferchner, & Gell, 1996).
I want to focus on two of the above types of boundaries: those related to
altered states ofawareness/consciousness and sleep-dream-wake boundaries. People
with thin boundaries spend a lot of time daydreaming and fantasising, they find it easy
to become absorbed in such activities and, in some circumstances, they find it difficult
to distinguish between imagination and reality (there are definite parallels with fantasy
proneness and absorption here) (Hartmann, 1991). People with thin boundaries also
report relatively slow and gradual transitions between sleep and wakefulness,
hypnagogic/hypnopompic imagery, dreams and lucid dreams. In addition, their
dreams recall tends to be better (Cowen & Levin, 1995; Schredl et al., 1996), and
their dreams tend to be more vivid, detailed, emotional and bizarre (Hartmann, 1991;
Hartmann, Rosen, & Rand, 1998). Although Hartmann (1991) found that dream
frequency was significantly correlated with thin boundaries (r = 0.37), nightmare
frequency was surprisingly not correlated with it (r = 0.04). This may seem strange,
considering that the concept of boundary structure emerged from interviews with
chronic nightmare sufferers, but it is not given that this latter survey used items which
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would seem to have asked about the current number of nightmare episodes per year.
Very few people experience nightmares beyond adolescence (ASDA, 1990), which
could explain the lack of correlation. Research with adolescents has found that those
with thin boundaries do, as expected, report more frequent nightmares and a greater
nightmare disturbance than those with thick boundaries; other research has confirmed
that people with thin boundaries are more likely to report nightmares, especially
recurrent ones, during their childhood (Schredl et al., 1996).
In another study, 300 patients at a sleep disorder center were asked to
complete the Boundary Questionnaire. Patients with sleep apnea, periodic limb
movements, bruxism or night terrors scored thicker than average whilst other patients
who suffered from nightmares scored thinner than average. There is also
physiological evidence to suggest that people with thin boundaries experience far
more sleep states that are difficult to classify as being either waking, REM or NREM
sleep (Hartmann, 1991, p. 234).
Although there has been no attempt to confirm many of the boundary types
devised by Hartmann (1991), research that has investigated the sleep-dream-wake
boundary type has validated a number ofHartmann's predictions.
However, one should note that recent research suggests that people with
thinner boundaries tend to report more psychic experiences (r = 0.42, p < .001)
(Richards, 1996). In addition, it has been proposed that alien abductees probably
have thin boundary personalities, or a boundary deficit as Kottmeyer (1988) describes
it.
In summary, based on my analysis of the evidence and my own speculations, I
would predict that children who have developed thin boundaries are likely to be
fantasy-prone and to report HG/HP imagery, dream experiences and a number of
sleep disorders, such as nightmares, and particularly those sleep disorders that involve
dissociated states of sleep and wakefulness. These characteristics are likely to lead to
more reports of anomalous experiences, either because they enable the operation or
recognition ofanomalous processes or because they lead to the misinterpretation of
normal experiences. Thus, boundary structure might be a useful variable to include in
future models of the development of anomalous beliefs. However, it will not be
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included in this thesis because part of its aim is to test versions of Irwin's and
Lawrence's models, both ofwhich include an observed measure of fantasy proneness
rather than a latent variable ofwhich fantasy proneness is a component.
This notion of boundaries and differing degrees ofpermeability and transfer
across them is remarkably similar to another new psychological construct,
transliminality.
Transliminality
The concept of transliminality was first introduced by Thalbourne and Delin (1994).
The term is derived from the Latin 'trans' meaning 'across' and 'limen' meaning
'theshold' and it is purported to measure:
the extent to which the contents of some preconscious (or "unconscious" or
"subliminal") region of the mind are able to cross the threshold into consciousness (or
its sense of "awareness"), (p. 3).
This concept was 'discovered' during an investigation of the relationship between
paranormal belief/experience and creativity, mystical experience and aspects of
psychopathology (i.e., magical ideation and symptoms ofmania and depression) in
university students, manic-depressives and schizophrenics. Analysis of the data from
the student sample revealed that these six variables were all significantly
intercorrelated; most of these relationships were also apparent in the clinical samples
(though the strength of the relationships with depression varied). A subsequent factor
analysis identified a single factor that was tentatively labelled 'transliminality.' This
factor was later replicated, although the depressive experience variable was dropped
(Thalbourne, Bartemucci, Delin, Fox, & Nofi, 1997). Thalbourne et al. (1997) then
conducted five further studies that attempted to look for correlates of this revised
transliminality measure and concluded that schizotypy, fantasy proneness, absorption
and hyperaesthesia (i.e., extreme sensitivity to external stimulation) are also core
components of transliminality. Thalbourne and Houran (2000) also cited a study by
Thalbourne (in press) whose factor analysis confirmed an expanded solution that
included absorption, fantasy-proneness, hyperaesthesia, plus attitude towards dream
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interpretation. Interestingly, this latter study also included measures ofdissociative
experiences, which were not found to be core components. As a result of these
subsequent findings, Thalbourne et al. (1997) also redefined transliminality as:
Susceptibility to, and awareness of, large volumes of imagery, ideation and affect—
these phenomena being generated by subliminal, supraliminal and/or external input.
(p. 305).
A person who scores highly on transliminality would be someone who tends to be
susceptible to the occurrence of large amounts of imagery, thought and emotion that
may be largely involuntary (Thalbourne & Delin, 1994). Thalbourne and Delin (1994)
also discovered that highly transliminal people tend to pay more attention to their
inner processes and are more likely to attribute meaning to them. It is perhaps not
surprising then to find that participants who reported precognitive or clairvoyance
experiences, visions of deceased people or unusual healing powers had significantly
higher transliminality scores than those who did not and that they tended to have
stronger paranormal beliefs (Thalbourne & Delin, 1994). A more recent study of
samples of the general population in Australia and the USA found that, in both
countries, transliminality was positively correlated with paranormal experiences and
beliefs, the sense ofbeing high, daydreaming, the sense ofmental potency, the
tendency to introspect, and to experience altered consciousness (Thalbourne &
Houran, 2000). Thus, a transliminal person is likely to be fantasy-prone, is likely to
experience large amounts of imagery and emotion and can become easily absorbed in
it. 1 would also predict that a transliminal person is more likely to experience
hypnagogic/hypnopompic imagery, is more likely to pay attention to it and also to
attribute meaning to it. Such an interest might also lead to reports of anomalous
experiences and/or beliefs.
Thus, the available evidence suggests that people who have thin boundary or
high transliminality personalities find it easy to enter and to become absorbed in
ASCs, they experience a lot of imagery and dreams and may spend a lot of time
fantasising and daydreaming, they pay a lot of attention to their internal state and
often attempt to make sense of it, they can move fairly easily from one state of
consciousness to another and may often experience mixed states of consciousness,
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which they can later recall. These characteristics may facilitate the operation or
detection of anomalous processes, may encourage the misinterpretation of normal
experiences, or the creation of imaginary anomalous experiences that are contused
with reality. The theory behind boundary structure and transliminality would seem to
predict that people who report higher fantasy proneness, more frequent dream
experiences, HG/HP experiences and certain sleep disorders (e.g., nightmares) should
be more likely to report anomalous experiences.
There is also some empirical evidence that imaginative ability and some of these
hypnagogic/hypnopompic, sleep experiences and sleep disorder symptoms may be
related to each other.
Relationships among fantasy proneness, hypnagogic/
hypnopompic experiences, dream experiences and sleep disorders
A number of studies have found links between measures of imaginative abilities and
reports of sleep-related experiences. For example, people who score highly on
measures of fantasy proneness (Myers & Austrin, 1985; Tonay, 1993), imaginal life
(Martinetti, 1985) or on an imaginativeness dimension (upon which fantasy proneness
loads strongly) (Spanos et al., 1995) also tend to report more frequent episodes of
various sleep-related experiences, such as dream recall, night imagery, sleep paralysis,
lucid dreaming, sleep talking, sleepwalking, nightmares and night terrors.
The frequencies ofHG/HP experiences also seem to be related to each other
and to reports of other sleep-related experiences. For example, the frequencies of
hypnagogic and hypnopompic imagery are related to each other and also to false
awakenings, lucid dreams and attention to subjective experience (Blackmore, 1983;
Glicksohn, 1989, 1990; Spanos et al., 1995); hypnagogic imagery has also been found
to be related to dream recall and dream control (Glicksohn, 1989, 1990), and the
frequency ofnightmares (Ohayon et al., 1996). There have also been a couple of
reported cases ofhypnagogic/hypnopompic-like imagery occurring during
sleepwalking episodes (Kavey & Whyte, 1993). Finally, sleep paralysis sufferers have
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also been found to report higher incidences of false awakenings (Rose & Blackmore,
1996).
Previous research has also found that the frequencies of dream experiences,
such as false awakenings, lucid dreams, dreams which one can control or create, and
falling dreams, are all related to each other (Blackmore, 1983; Glicksohn, 1989; van
Eeden, 1913).
In terms of arousal sleep disorders, episodes of confusional arousal have been
reported by sufferers of sleep terrors and sleepwalking and vice versa (ASDA, 1990).
Previous studies have also found relationships between sleepwalking and sleep talking
(Fisher & Wilson, 1987; Spanos et al., 1995) and among sleepwalking, sleep terrors
and nightmares (Spanos et ah, 1995; Thorpy & Glovinsky, 1987). The sleep-wake
transition sleep disorder, sleep talking, may also be precipitated by other sleep
disorders, such as sleep terrors, confusional arousals and REM sleep behaviour
disorder (ASDA, 1990). Further evidence for a relationship among sleep disorders
comes from the Spanos et al. (1995) survey that found that nightmare/night terror,
sleep talking/sleepwalking, night imagery (dream recall, vividness, HG/HP imagery)
dimensions and a measure of lucid dreaming were all significantly intercorrelated with
each other but not with the frequency of sleep paralysis. However, the intensity of
sleep paralysis was significantly correlated with the night terror/nightmare and sleep
talking/sleepwalking dimensions. Childhood frequencies ofnightmares, night terrors,
and to a lesser extent lucid dreams, have also been found to load on the same factor
(Hunt et al., 1992).
Thus, there is evidence to suggest that a variety ofHG/HP, dream and sleep
disorder experiences are related to each other and also to measures of imaginative
abilities and fantasy proneness. These relationships also suggest that more general
factors may exist.
Models to be tested as part of this thesis
This chapter has attempted to establish that there is a need to test a number of
competing models in order to determine the nature of the relationship between
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measures ofanomalous experiences and beliefs, i.e., whether experience leads to
belief, belief to experience or whether the relationship is reciprocal. There is also a
need to determine whether there are both direct and indirect relationships between
measures of fantasy proneness and anomalous beliefs.
Based partly upon the theories of boundary structure and transliminality and
Wilson and Barber's finding that fantasy-prone people report much more HG/HP
imagery, this chapter has also attempted to justify the addition ofmeasures of the
childhood frequencies of a number ofHG/HP, dream and sleep disorder experiences
to the aforementioned models. People who report these childhood experiences may
find it easier to enter and become absorbed in altered states of consciousness and may
also report vivid imagery. These characteristics may facilitate the operation or
recognition of anomalous processes or they may facilitate the misinterpretation of
normal experiences; both of these could lead to more frequent reports ofanomalous
experiences, regardless ofwhether or not they are genuine. In order to try to
establish whether these characteristics only facilitate reports of anomalous experiences
during childhood, when these sleep-related experiences are most prevalent, or
whether they can continue to do so during adulthood, two measures of anomalous
experiences will be included in the models to be tested.
Figure 8 Sherwood's experiential source model of childhood














Figure 9 Sherwood's cognitive source model of childhood












Figure 10 Sherwood's reciprocal causation model of childhood
antecedents of anomalous experiences and beliefs
Tests of these proposed models will also help to establish whether the addition of a
direct path from the childhood fantasy proneness measure to the measure of
anomalous beliefs will improve the fit of the model and therefore whether models of
the development of anomalous beliefs should include this extra path or not.
Data to test these models will be collected via cross-sectional surveys of
adults, which will be conducted electronically via the world-wide web (WWW) and
also via the more traditional pencil-and-paper method. More details concerning the
rationale for these data collection methods will be provided in Chapter 6.
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Chapter 4
Normal and anomalous experiences reported
during the hypnagogic/hypnopompic and sleep
states
The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the normal and anomalous experiences that
are reported during the HG/HP and sleep states. In order to be able to make accurate
and well-informed judgements regarding the nature of sleep-related experiences, it is
necessary to have an understanding of the normal features; in order to classify an
experience as involving anomalous processes, it is necessary to rule out known normal
explanations first. This chapter will also consider why these states might be
conducive to reports ofgenuine anomalous experiences and why they might also be
conducive to misinterpretations of normal experiences.
Normal experiential features of the hypnagogic/hypnopompic
states
Most research, both experimental and survey-based, seems to have focused on the
hypnagogic state (i.e., the period between wakefulness and sleep) with comparatively
little research having been carried out on the hypnopompic state (i.e., the period
between sleep and wakefulness). The hypnagogic state, like the sleep state, is fairly
complex and contains a number of steps and stages (Mavromatis, 1983;
Rechtschaffen, 1994; Tanaka, Hayashi, & Hori, 1996, 1997). Although the
hypnagogic state has unique behavioural, electrophysiological and subjective
characteristics (Hori, Hayashi, & Morikawa, 1994), it is also highly variable and there
are large individual differences (Rechtschaffen, 1994).
As a person relaxes or becomes drowsy, there is an increase in alpha activity
(8-12 Hz) and eye movements become slower and less frequent (Parker, 1975;
Rechtschaffen, 1994). As a person passes through the hypnagogic period into the
early stages ofNREM sleep, there is a decline in alpha activity (8-13 Hz) and a
concomitant increase in slower theta activity (4-7 Hz) (Baddia et al., 1994; Bray,
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Cragg, Macknight, Mills, & Taylor, 1992; Rechtschaffen, 1994). During the
transition from wakefulness to sleep there is also a decrease in muscle tone, a slowing
of the heart and respiration rates, a reduction in blood pressure, and an increase in
skin temperature (Mavromatis, 1983; Mavromatis & Richardson, 1984; Schacter,
1976). Upon awakening, these changes go in the opposite direction (Mavromatis,
1983).
The two main experiential features of the HG/HP states are HG/HP imagery
and sleep paralysis.4 Allied to the HG/HP states are a number of other specific
experiences: for example, exploding head symptoms, a sense ofpresence, falling
sensations, sleep starts and the HG/HP speech phenomenon.
This chapter will place more emphasis on the HG/HP phenomena than sleep
phenomena for a number of reasons: based upon my knowledge of the literature and
contact with a number of individuals puzzled by their own experiences, it seems to me
that (1) people are less familiar and know less about normal HG/HP experiences, (2)
generally-speaking, anomalous experiences ofone sort or another are reported more
frequently during the HG/HP states than during sleep, and (3) the characteristics of
the HG/HP states are more likely to be misinterpreted than those of the sleep states.
Hypnagogic/hypnopompic imagery
Definition
The term 'hypnagogic imagery' was provided by Maury (1848) and was defined in
Warren's Dictionary ofPsychology (1934) as:
Imagery of any sense modality, frequently of almost hallucinatory character, which is
experienced in the drowsy state preceding deep sleep.
The term 'hypnopompic imagery' was introduced by F. W. H. Myers (1904) who
defined it as:
4 It is important to note that although hypnagogic/hypnopompic imagery and sleep paralysis may
occur as auxiliary features of the narcolepsy sleep disorder, they can also occur independently in
'healthy' individuals (ASDA, 1990).
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pictures consisting generally in the persistence of some dream-image into the first
moments ofwaking, (p. 125).
Some writers distinguish between imagery which occurs in the hypnagogic and
hypnopompic states (e.g., Glicksohn, 1989; McKellar, 1989) but others do not (e.g.,
Mavromatis, 1987; Mavromatis & Richardson, 1984). It is fair to say that they are
similar and so many features will apply to both. However, certain features or
experiences seem to be more common in the hypnagogic than in the hypnopompic
state, and vice versa (e.g., Noyes, 1998). For this reason, I think it is useful to
maintain the distinction.
It is not easy to distinguish hypnagogic and hypnopompic imagery from dream
imagery. Any qualitative distinctions made will depend on the defining characteristics
ofHG/HP imagery and dreams (Mavromatis & Richardson, 1984), both ofwhich
would benefit from stricter definitions. However, there is some evidence that
hypnagogic (and also hypnopompic) imagery tend to be more vivid and realistic,
shorter, more passive, have less emotion, and also tend to be more disorganised and
irrelevant (Foulkes & Vogel, 1965; McKellar, 1989; McKellar & Simpson, 1954;
Mavromatis & Richardson, 1984). McKellar (1989) describes how:
To use an analogy, dreaming resembles a lecture illustrated by slides which form part
of it; hypnagogic imagery is more like a display of slides meant to illustrate some other
lecture. Moreover, the slides have been mixed up, and follow one another in random.
(p. 103).
With hypnagogic experiences, there also seems to be a greater awareness of the true
situation and more reality testing compared with dream experiences (Mavromatis &
Richardson, 1984). It has also been suggested that, unlike dreams, hypnagogic
imagery is something that is watched rather than taken part in (McKellar, 1989;
McKellar & Simpson, 1954; Schachter, 1976). Some people also claim to be able to




It seems that episodes ofHG/HP imagery often occur fairly sporadically although
concentrated series of episodes can also occur (Mavromatis, 1987). Hypnagogic and
hypnopompic images are typically very brief and dynamic and may last no more than a
second or two (Nielsen, 1992).
Frequency
Generally speaking, hypnagogic imagery seems to be more common than
hypnopompic imagery. Early surveys (e.g. Galton, 1883; Miiller, 1848 cited by
Mavromatis, 1987) estimated that about 2% of adults had experienced hypnagogic
imagery of some form. More recent surveys have estimated that c. one-third
(Leaning, 1925), 61-63% (McKellar & Simpson, 1954; McKellar, 1957) or c.75%
(Glicksohn, 1989; Richardson et al., 1981) ofpeople have experienced it on at least
one occasion compared with 21.4% (McKellar, 1957) to 67.6% for hypnopompic
imagery (Richardson et al., 1981). One recent survey estimated that 37% (12.5%) of
the UK population had experienced some form ofhypnagogic (hypnopompic) imagery
at least twice a week during the preceding year (Ohayon et al., 1996). These different
estimates may reflect the different survey techniques and different terminology used in
these studies.
Hypnagogic imagery seems to be more frequent in children (Leaning, 1925;
Schacter, 1976) and less frequent in older adults (Ohayon et al., 1996; Richardson et
al., 1981). The incidence ofhypnopompic imagery also seems to decrease with age
(Ohayon et al., 1996; Richardson et al., 1981).
Hypnagogic and hypnopompic imagery seem to be more common in people
who suffer from sleep problems, such as insomnia or nightmares, or who suffer from
depression or anxiety disorders (Ohayon et al., 1996).
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Sensory modalities
Although visual and auditory seem to be the most common forms ofboth hypnagogic
and hypnopompic imagery (Foulkes & Vogel, 1965; Hori et al., 1994; McKellar &
Simpson, 1954), olfactory (smell), gustatory (taste), tactile, thermal, bodily,
movement, and synesthetic sensations (where imagery in one modality triggers
modality in a different modality) may also occur (e.g., Leaning, 1925; Mavromatis,
1987; Schacter, 1976). However, researchers and writers have tended to say very
little about the content ofexperiences that occur in modalities other than visual and
auditory.
Visual
Studies have shown that as one moves through the sleep-onset period, the amount of
visual hypnagogic imagery tends to increase (Hori et al., 1994), it becomes more
dream-like (Foulkes & Vogel, 1965; Stickgold & Hobson, 1994) and the image
quality, vividness, luminosity and intensity of colour also increase (Mavromatis, 1987;
Nielsen, 1992).
Visual imagery typically occurs with the eyes closed though it can occur with
eyes open (Gurney et al., 1886; Leaning, 1925; McKellar, 1989; McKellar &
Simpson, 1954). It often begins with reports of clouds or mists ofbright colours or a
circle of light. Images may quickly change from one to another and may develop into
progressively more complex images or mini-plays (Gurney et al., 1886; Leaning,
1925; McKellar, 1989; Mavromatis, 1987; Parco Zuliani, 1986). Scenes involving
people are characterised by life and movement (Leaning, 1925) and have been likened
to film trailers since they often seem to have no beginning or ending (Leaning, 1925;
Mavromatis, 1987).
Occasionally the images may be in black and white rather than in colour
(McKellar, 1957; McKellar & Simpson, 1954). Sometimes these visual images can
contain more detail than is usually observed when looking at things during more usual
circumstances (Leaning, 1925). The images may sometimes be very small
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(micropsias) or gigantic (megalopsias), though changes in size and shape are possible
(Leaning, 1925; McKellar, 1957; McKellar & Simpson, 1954; Mavromatis, 1987). A
series of continuous repetitions (polyopsias) of the same image may also be
experienced. Sometimes the images appear to be strangely illuminated or may be seen
from a peculiar angle (Leaning, 1925; Mavromatis, 1987; McKellar, 1957).
Visual HG/HP imagery is often pleasant, even humorous, but it can also be
terrifying (McKellar & Simpson, 1954; Mavromatis, 1987). Although hypnagogic
and hypnopompic imagery are characterised by variety, Mavromatis (1987) has
modified Leaning's (1925) classification scheme and identified six recurrent themes:
(1) Formless, e.g. waves, clouds ofcolour,
(2) Designs, e.g. geometric and symmetrical patterns and shapes,
(3) Faces, figures, animals, objects,
(4) Nature scenes, e.g. landscapes, seascapes, gardens,
(5) Scenes with people,
(6) Print and writing, e.g. in real or imaginary languages.
It should perhaps be pointed out though that, although some regularities do occur,
both hypnagogic and hypnopompic imagery are characterised by variety both within
and outwith these categories (Leaning, 1925; Mavromatis, 1987).
Auditory
Mavromatis (1987) provided a summary ofauditory HG/HP phenomena:
Auditory hypnagogic [and also hypnopompic] phenomena include the hearing of
crashing noises, one's name being called, a doorbell ringing, neologisms [new words
or expressions], irrelevant sentences containing unrecognizable names, pompous
nonsense, quotations, references to spoken conversations, remarks directed to oneself,
meaningful responses to one's thought of the moment, (p.81).
Other reported imagery includes music, bangs and explosions. Sometimes auditory
hypnopompic imagery can take the form of a warning of impending danger or an
important event; other times it may just be a feeling of foreboding (Mavromatis,
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1987). A related experience is the HG/HP speech phenomenon that occurs when a
person hears him/herself uttering words, which can be nonsensical or irrelevant
(McKellar, 1989; Mavromatis, 1987).
One hypnagogic experience, which involves both visual and auditory imagery,
has become known as 'the exploding head syndrome'. The exploding head syndrome
was probably first described by Mitchell (1890) and later by Armstrong-Jones (1920).
The exploding head syndrome is:
characterised by a sense of explosion in the head, confined to the hours of sleep, which
is harmless but very frightening for the sufferer. (Pearce, 1989, p.907).
Sometimes there is a musical 'twang' rather than an explosion and the sounds can also
be accompanied by a flash of light (Mitchell, 1890; Oswald, 1988). Reported
symptoms may also include a sense of fear, heart palpitations and sweating, a strange
sensation moving up the body (often from the feet or chest up to the head), a
sensation as ifbreathing has stopped, and in one case a sense of falling was also
reported (Mitchell, 1890; Pearce, 1989). Occasionally the shock may be preceded by
a humming or buzzing sensation in the head (Mitchell, 1890).
This syndrome mainly occurs in the hypnagogic state, although some
individuals report that it awakens them from their sleep (Mitchell, 1890; Pearce,
1989). Pearce (1989) suggests that "As a symptom it is probably fairly
common.. .But, as a source of complaint it is rare..." (p.909). Whilst the syndrome
can occur for the first time anywhere between childhood and old age, the most
frequent onset (at least for chronic complaints) seems to be after the age of 51
(Pearce, 1989).
Olfactory, gustatory, tactile and bodily sensations
Sensations of smell (e.g., cigars, roses), taste (e.g., sweet), sensations ofactively
touching or being passively touched by someone or something, and hot or cold
sensations, sometimes moving along the body, have also been reported during the
hypnagogic and hypnopompic states (Mavromatis, 1987). Bodily sensations may also
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include, for example, a feeling ofenergy flowing through the body, weightlessness,
heaviness, tingling, numbness, shaking/vibrating, or elongation of the body.
Sensations ofmovement
A sensation of falling seems to be the most commonly reported sensation of
movement and is considered to be a characteristic hypnagogic phenomenon
(Mavromatis, 1984; Schacter, 1976). The experience seems to be relatively common;
McKellar (1957) and McKellar and Simpson (1954) found that 79-80% of their
student samples reported the experience. The falling experience also often involves
more than one sensory modality; it is often associated with a bodily jerk and visual
imagery, such as falling off a cliff" (Oswald, 1959; Mavromatis, 1987). In a recent
survey, 25.3% of the sample reported that they had 'the feeling that you will soon fall
into an abyss' at least twice a week (Ohayon et al., 1996).
Sleep starts
These bodily jerks, also known as 'sleep starts', may involve the whole or just part of
the body and can be frightening experiences (ASDA, 1990; Mitchell, 1890; Oswald,
1959). According to the International Classification of Sleep Disorders (ICSD)
(ASDA, 1990):
Sleep starts are sudden, briefcontractions ofthe legs, sometimes also involving the
arms and head, which occur at sleep onset, (p. 155).
The legs are affected more frequently than the arms though both the right and left
limbs are usually affected together (Parkes, 1986).
The jerks can have a variety of accompanying sensations: e.g. visual imagery
such as horrid faces or a flash of light, something passing or flowing through the
body, a feeling of heat flowing down the legs, a feeling of swelling, or a sharp cry
(ASDA, 1990; Oswald, 1959). In a self-observational study of his own hypnagogic
imagery, Nielsen (1992) found that phasic (i.e., occasional) neuromuscular events
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(NMEs) occurred in just over halfof the hypnagogic images which involved illusory
movement. Head nods were most frequent followed by leg, arm or whole body jerks.
The prevalence of sleep starts is about 60-80% of the population with no
apparent sex differences (ASDA, 1990; Oswald, 1959, 1962; Mavromatis, 1987).
Sleep starts can occur at any age (ASDA, 1990); they can occur en masse for a period
of time and then disappear only to reappear at a later date (Mavromatis, 1987).
It is not clear what causes sleep starts. It has been suggested that they may be
the result of an intrusion of a REM sleep event into wakefulness of early NREM sleep
(Mahowald & Thorpy, 1995).
A sense of presence
A sense ofpresence is sometimes reported during the hypnagogic and hypnopompic
periods (Ohayon et al., 1996) and may coincide with both imagery and sleep paralysis
in both normal subjects and narcoleptics (Blackmore, 1996; Conesa, 1995; Hufford,
1982; Moorcroft, 1993; Rose & Blackmore, 1996; Siegel, 1992; Spanos et al., 1993,
1995; Wing, Lee & Chen, 1994). Feelings of foreboding or being under threat, or
more general feelings of confusion and disorientation, have also been reported.
Recent surveys have found that 56-68% of children and adults have
experienced a sense ofpresence (Rose & Blackmore, 1996) and that 10% ofmales
and 15% of females in a large UK sample reported this experience at least twice a
week for a year (Ohayon et al., 1996).
Another hypnagogic or hypnopompic experience, which can sometimes be





According to the American Sleep Disorders Association (ASDA) (1990):
Sleep paralysis consists ofan inability to perform voluntary movements either at sleep
onset (hypnagogic orpre-dormitalform) or upon awakening either during the night or
in the morning (hypnopompic orpost-dormitalform), (p. 166).
Timing
The sleep paralysis episode usually lasts from a few seconds to a few minutes
although a duration as long as 70 minutes has been reported (Goode, 1962; Schneck,
1960; Spanos et al., 1995). The experience is sometimes preceded by and/or
accompanied by visual imagery which can be terrifying (Blackmore, 1996; Conesa,
1995; Goode, 1962; Penn et al., 1981; Spanos et al., 1995; Takeuchi et al., 1992).
The experience may end due to efforts to overcome it by the experient, may be
terminated by someone else either by touch or by verbal communication, the
experience may move into a dream (possibly lucid) or the episode may simply
terminate spontaneously (ASDA, 1990; Firestone, 1985; Goode, 1962; Schneck,
1960; Snyder, 1983). Sometimes a person may experience several episodes during
the same night (Terrillon & Marques-Bonham, 1998).
Frequency
It seems that sleep paralysis can be classified as one of three or four types:
narcoleptic, isolated, familial (ASDA, 1990) or as part of other sleep disturbances
(Parkes, 1986). The familial form seems to be transmitted genetically (Bell, Dixie Bell
& Thompson, 1986b; Dahlitz & Parkes, 1993).
The hypnagogic form of sleep paralysis seems to be more frequent than the
hypnopompic form (Conesa, 1995; Goode, 1962; Spanos et al., 1995) although the
opposite has also been reported (Penn et al., 1981). The International Classification
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of Sleep Disorders (ASDA, 1990) estimates that isolated sleep paralysis (i.e. that
which occurs independently of narcolepsy) occurs at least once in a lifetime in 40-
50% ofnormal people. Surveys have found that between 4.7% to 49% ofpeople
have reported sleep paralysis (of one or other or both forms) though the most
frequent estimates range between 30-45% (Goode, 1962; Everett, 1962; Fukuda,
Ogilvie, Chilcott, Venditelli, & Takeuchi, 1998; Penn et al., 1981; Spanos et al., 1995;
Blackmore, 1996; Rose & Blackmore, 1996). However, a recent large scale survey
of the general population in Germany and Italy suggested that only 6.2% of the
sample had experienced at least one episode of sleep paralysis during their lifetime
(Ohayon, Zulley, Guilleminault, & Smirne, 1999).
The variation of these frequency estimates may be partly be a function of the
research method and the wording of the questions (Fukuda, 1993; Fukuda et al.,
1998; Green & McCreery, 1994), different survey methods (Ohayon et al., 1999),
factors which influence participants' willingness to report it and the salience of the
experience (Spanos et al., 1995).
Sleep paralysis often occurs for the first time during adolescence or early
adulthood (Fukuda, Miyasita, Inugami, & Ishihara, 1987; Goode, 1962; Penn et al.,
1981; Spanos et al., 1995) athough onset during childhood, middle and later
adulthood has also been reported (ASDA, 1990).
Features
Accompanying features of sleep paralysis may include: acute anxiety or terror,
awareness of the surroundings, HG/HP imagery, a sense ofpresence, difficulty
breathing or a sense of suffocation, pressure on the chest, a tendency to mentally or
physically struggle to overcome it, a feeling of time distortion, and sometimes sexual
arousal (Blackmore, 1996; Conesa, 1995, 1997; Fukuda et al., 1998; Goode, 1962;
Hufford, 1982; Liddon, 1967; Penn et al., 1981; Rose et al., 1997; Schneck, 1960,
1977; Snyder, 1983; Spanos et al., 1995; Takeuchi et al., 1992; Terrillon & Marques-
Bonham, 1998). The paralysis mainly affects the skeletal muscles although the
respiratory muscles can be affected to some extent; eye muscles are not usually
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affected (Mahowald & Thorpy, 1995; Parkes, 1985). It is likely that minor paralysis
of the respiratory muscles may account for the difficulty in breathing and suffocation
sensations.
Summary of experiential features of hypnagogic/hypnopompic
states
• Visual imagery
• Auditory imagery (including exploding head syndrome and
hypnagogic/hypnopompic speech phenomenon)
• Olfactory, gustatory, tactile and bodily sensations
• Sensations ofmovement (including the falling experience)
• A sense ofpresence
• Sleep starts
• Sleep paralysis
Experiential features of the sleep state
During a typical night, an adult will pass through 4-5 cycles of sleep, with each one
comprising ofperiods ofboth non-rapid-eye-movement (NREM) and rapid-eye-
movement (REM) sleep; each cycle lasts about 90 minutes (Rechtschafifen, 1973).
The first part of the sleep cycle, the period ofNREM sleep, can be divided
into four separate stages (Rechtschafifen & Kales, 1968). During NREM sleep, heart
and respiration rates decrease, there are virtually no eye movements, and there is an
increase in muscular relaxation (Lavie, 1996, chap. 2). During NREM sleep, the brain
is relatively inactive and the body is relaxed but able to move (Symons, 1993).
Having progressed through the hypnagogic state/Stage 1 sleep, an individual
enters Stage 2 sleep at which point they are generally considered to be 'asleep'
(Lavie, 1996; Rechtschafifen, 1994). Stage 2 sleep is characterised by theta activity
(4-7 Hz) and the appearance of sleep spindles (short rhythmical bursts of 12-16 Hz)
and the presence ofK-complexes (occasional sharp changes in EEG amplitude)
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(Lavie, 1996; Rechtschaffen, 1973). It is fairly easy to be awakened during Stages 1
and 2 sleep (Lavie, 1996).
During Stages 3 (20-50%) and 4 (50%+) the EEG trace is increasingly
dominated by the presence ofdelta (1-3 Hz) EEG activity (Rechtschaffen, 1973). The
sleeper is relatively unresponsive to external stimuli during Stages 3 and 4 and is
therefore difficult to awaken, although personal stimuli, such as hearing a baby crying,
may produce awakening (Empson, 1993; Lavie, 1996; Rechtschaffen, 1973).
The sleeper then reverses back through Stages 3 and 2 before entering a
period ofREM sleep (Rechtschaffen, 1973). Note that in the later sleep cycles,
Stages 3 and 4 may be bypassed and the sleeper may alternate between REM and
NREM Stage 2 (Rechtschaffen, 1973). With each sleep cycle the proportion ofREM
increases and the proportion ofNREM decreases; REM periods can last from a few
minutes to over 30 minutes (Guyton, 1991; Rechtschaffen, 1973). When we awaken
in the morning, we tend to do so from a period ofREM sleep (Guyton, 1991).
REM sleep is characterised by the appearance ofphasic bursts of rapid jerky
eye movements, reports ofdreaming, a highly active brain similar to that in the
waking state, and muscular paralysis (Rechtschaffen, 1973). However, the heart,
diaphragm, eye muscles and smooth muscles are not paralysed. This explains why the
eyes are not affected by the muscle paralysis (Lavie, 1996, p. 24). However, during
REM sleep this paralysis is occasionally interrupted by phasic muscular twitches or
movements of the body (Mavromatis, 1983; Oswald, 1970).
The EEG during REM sleep comprises a tonic background of low voltage
nonsynchronised activity not unlike that of wakefulness; there is theta activity
(without K-complexes or sleep spindles) plus short bursts of alpha activity which
indicates a high level of alertness (Lavie, 1996). During REM sleep the brain activity
is similar to that during NREM Stage 1 except that the sleep is deep and the sleeper is
difficult to awaken (Lavie, 1996; Rechtschaffen, 1973).
Some features of sleep, such as dreams, are very common and usually do not
disrupt the sleep-wake cycle or cause problems for the sleeper. Frequent body
movements throughout the night are also normal and tend to accompany shifts in
sleep stages (Parkes, 1985, p. 191). Other possible features of sleep, such as
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sleepwalking, may be less common and may be classified as 'sleep disorders' because
they can cause problems for the sleeper in some instances.
The following sleep-related experiences included in this thesis were selected
because they have been associated with reports of anomalous experiences: dream
recall, flying and falling dreams, pre-lucid and lucid dreams, false awakenings and
narcolepsy symptoms (which can include hypnagogic imagery and sleep paralysis).
The following experiences were included because they are often frightening and could
be interpreted as being anomalous and/or could lead to the development of anomalous
beliefs: sleep terrors, nightmares, and the proposed sleep disorder5, sleep choking
syndrome. A number of other sleep disorders were also included because they were
of a similar type of disorder to those above and because they would be relatively
familiar to those who have experienced them: confusional arousal, sleepwalking,
rhythmic movement disorder, sleep starts, sleep talking, nocturnal leg cramps, REM
sleep behaviour disorder, sleep bruxism (teethgrinding), sleep enuresis (bedwetting)
and primary snoring.
Dreaming
Some form ofmentation seems to occur during sleep and this is generally referred to
as 'dreaming'. Dreams are most frequently recalled following awakenings from REM
sleep, although dream-like mentation is also recalled following awakenings from
NREM sleep (Dement & Kleitman, 1957; Rechtschaffen, 1973). More recent studies
have found that dreaming can occur during NREM Stages 2-4; the findings will
depend to some extent on the dream definition used (Empson, 1993; Lavie, 1996;
Pivik, 1991; Reinsel, Antrobus, & Wollman, 1992).
It has been suggested that REM dreams tend to be visually vivid and often
have bizarre and illogical features whereas NREM dreams tend to be less visual, less
vivid, less easily-recalled, less emotional, more pleasant, more plausible, more
3 According to the International Classification of Sleep Disorders (American Sleep Disorders
Association, 1990), proposed sleep disorders are "those disorders for which there is insufficient
information available to confirm the unequivocal existence of the disorder...Most newly described
sleep disorders fall under this category until replicated data are available in the literature, e.g., sleep
choking syndrome." (p. 20).
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concerned with what is happening in real life, and are more like normal thinking
(Moorcroft, 1993; Pivik, 1991; Symons, 1993). However, some have argued that the
REM-NREM mentation distinction is relative rather than absolute (see Symons,
1993).
As with HG/HP imagery, dreams can involve a variety of different sensory
modalities, often simultaneously. However, again, the evidence suggests that visual
and auditory tend to be the most common; sensations ofmovement and temperature
are relatively infrequent and tactile, olfactory and gustatory sensations are rare (see
Symons, 1993).
It has been argued that everyone dreams; it is just that there are large
individual differences in the extent to which people are able to recall them when they
awaken (Goodenough, 1991). To some extent, it will depend upon which stage of
sleep we awaken from; we are more likely to report dreams ifwe awaken from REM
sleep (e.g., Dement & Kleitman, 1957). Laboratory studies have shown that, on
average, dreams are reported on about 80% of awakenings from REM sleep (see
Goodenough, 1991).
Flying and falling dreams
Dreams in which the sleeper is actually flying or falling seem to be fairly common.
Survey estimates for the incidence of flying dreams range from 28% (Blackmore,
1984) to between 50-65% (e.g., Blackmore, 1982b, 1983, 1986); estimates for falling
dreams include 62% (Blackmore, 1983) and 85% (Blackmore, 1986). An early paper
by Harriman (1939) suggested that, with falling dreams, "The dream seems to have a
content peculiar to each individual... [and] [t]he content of the dream appears to be
closely related to some waking experience." (pp. 230-231).
The incidence of flying and falling dreams has been found to be related to each
other and also to false awakenings (Glicksohn, 1989). There is also evidence to
suggest that the incidence of flying and falling dreams is related to the incidence of
lucid dreams (Blackmore, 1982b, 1983), pre-lucid dreams and false awakenings
(Barrett, 1991); in some instances it appears that a flying dream may be a precursor,
or a feature, ofpre-lucid or lucid dreams (van Eeden, 1913; Green, 1968).
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Pre-iucid and lucid dreams
Occasionally, an unusual feature of a dream may cause the dreamer to begin to
consider their status quo or they may simply begin to test whether or not they are
awake or dreaming (Green & McCreery, 1994). As Green (1968, p. 23) points out:
Before going on to consider lucid dreams proper, it is interesting to consider the type of
dream in which the subject adopts a critical attitude towards what he is experiencing,
even to the point of asking himself the question 'Am I dreaming?' but without
realizing that he is in fact doing so. Such dreams will be called 'pre-lucid dreams'.
In some, but not all, cases a pre-lucid dream may end with a lucid dream (Green,
1968; Green & McCreery, 1994). In fact, there seems to be a close relationship
between pre-lucid dreams, lucid dreams, and false awakenings (Green & McCreery,
1994).
During lucid dreams, a term introduced by van Eeden (1913), the dreamer
becomes aware that he/she is dreaming; the dreamer may have a simultaneous
awareness of their dream and reality; attempts to control or influence the dream may
also be made with varying degrees of success. However, there is some disagreement
over the definition of lucid dreaming and the extent to which the two latter features
are necessary (Gackenbach, 1991). LaBerge and Gackenbach (2000) have recently
estimated that most people will have at least one lucid dream during their lifetime.
This is supported by survey estimates that range from 56% to 100% (e.g., Blackmore,
1982b, 1983, 1986; Glicksohn, 1989; Kohr, 1980; Palmer, 1979; Rose & Blackmore,
1996; Snyder & Gackenbach, 1988).
Lucid dreams may be extremely realistic; though they tend to be mainly visual,
auditory and bodily sensations and sensations of smell and taste (though fairly rare)
can also occur (Green, 1968, p. 23). Pain and physical damage seem to be rare in
lucid dreams (Green, 1968).
Hearne (1978; see Hearne, 1990), LaBerge, Nagel, Dement, & Zarcone
(1981) and Ogilvie, Hunt, Sawicki, & McGowan, (1978) were some of the first
researchers to provide experimental evidence that lucid dreams tend to occur during
REM sleep and that dreamers are able to signal that they are aware that they are
dreaming (see also LaBerge, 1990; LaBerge & Gackenbach, 2000).
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There appear to be a number ofways in which a lucid dream can be initiated
from either the waking or the dream state (see Green, 1968, pp. 30-44; LaBerge,
1990, p. 115). A person may sometimes be able to enter a lucid dream by monitoring
their mental processes as they are falling sleep. Alternatively, a person may awaken
briefly from a dream but then fall asleep again and immediately enter a dream but with
little or no loss of conscious awareness (LaBerge, 1990). Non-lucid dreams may also
become lucid as a result of emotional stress within the dreams (e.g., recurrent
nightmare), a recognition of incongruity or the dreamlike quality of the dream, or as a
result of analytical or critical thought (Green, 1968).
Dream control
Although lucid dreamers sometimes have some degree of control over the contents of
their dreams, this control is often fairly limited and unreliable and control attempts
may result in a loss of lucidity or awakening (Green, 1968). A survey by Blackmore
(1983) found that 59% of the respondents had been able to stop a dream and 44% had
been able to control or create a dream. Unpleasant lucid dreams or nightmares are
episodes where dream control can sometimes be used to terminate a dream and
awaken the dreamer (Green, 1968, pp. 45-50). People who have a recurrent dream
which is unpleasant may learn to recognise it as a being a dream which may then
enable them to exert some degree of control over it.
False awakenings
Van Eeden (1913, p. 456) was probably one of the first writers to describe false
awakenings, dreams which he referred to as "wrong waking up." Recent surveys by
Rose and Blackmore (1996) found that 83% of adults and 57% of children (aged 8-
13) had experienced a false awakening; a second survey with a sample aged 8-79
years found that the estimate was 74%. During a (Type 1) false awakening a person
basically tends to dream that they have woken up but it is only later, when they
actually wake up, that they realise that they were dreaming. False awakenings tend to
97
resemble lucid dreams in many ways apart from the awareness ofbeing in a dream
(Green & McCreery, 1994).
Green (1968) distinguishes between Type 1 and Type 2 false awakenings.
Type 2 false awakenings are less common and the dreamer tends to 'wake up' to a
tense stormy atmosphere or else he/she may begin to feel that there is something
wrong or that something is about to happen. Ominous noises and/or strange figures
may sometimes be seen too (Green & McCreery, 1994). Paralysis is sometimes
associated with (Type 2) false awakenings too (Rose & Blackmore, 1996; Green &
McCreery, 1994). One notable difference between Type 1 and Type 2 experiences is
that during Type 2 the individual tends to remain in bed in the dream scenario whereas
during Type 1 experiences the individual tends to get up out of bed and move about
(Green, 1968, p. 124). False awakenings may be very convincing; the dreamer may
examine his/her dream environment in great detail without concluding that it is any
different from waking reality (Green, 1968, p. 73).
Sleep disorders
According to the American Sleep Disorders Association (ASDA) (1990), there are
two main categories of sleep disorders: dyssomnias and parasomnias. Dyssomnias are
sleep disorders which produce either a difficulty in initiating or maintaining sleep or
excessive sleepiness (e.g. insomnia, narcolepsy); parasomnias are disorders that
intrude into the sleep process.
Symptoms ofnarcolepsy (excessive sleepiness, cataplexy, hypnagogic/
hypnopompic, sleep paralysis) were considered as part of this thesis, as were
parasomnias from five different subcategories: arousal disorders (e.g., sleepwalking),
sleep-wake transition disorders (e.g., sleep starts), parasomnias usually associated





According to the International Classification of Sleep Disorders (ASDA, 1990):
Narcolepsy is a disorder ofunknown etiology, which is characterized by excessive
sleepiness that is typically associated with cataplexy and other REM sleep phenomena
such as sleep paralysis and hypnagogic hallucinations, (p.38).
Cataplexy and/or excessive sleep attacks are the main diagnostic criteria for
narcolepsy, although hypnagogic imagery and sleep paralysis are defined as auxiliary
symptoms which make up the narcolepsy tetrad (ASDA, 1990). Cataplexy is a unique
feature and involves a sudden loss ofmuscle tone that tends to follow strong emotion,
such as anger or surprise. The cataplexy may affect certain areas or all of the skeletal
muscles. Excessive sleepiness may result in sudden sleep attacks during which the
sufferer falls asleep, often in the middle ofnormal activities (ASDA, 1990).
Narcolepsy is quite rare and is estimated to affect only 0.03-0.16% of the
general population (ASDA, 1990). Narcolepsy often begins during adolescence or
early adulthood.
Parasomnias
Parasomnias occur more often in children than in adults (Parkes, 1985). The most
common parasomnias in children are arousal disorders (Mahowald & Thorpy, 1995).
a) Arousal disorders (confusional arousals, sleepwalking, sleep terrors)
Confusional arousals
Confusional arousals consist ofconfusion during andfollowing arousals from sleep,
most typicallyfrom deep sleep in the firstpart ofthe night. (ASDA, 1990, p. 142).
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During confusional arousals the eyes may be open or closed (Rosen et al., 1995) and
the individual may be disoriented in terms of the time and/or where they are (ASDA,
1990). The individual may also demonstrate inappropriate behaviour such as picking
up a lamp when s/he believed that the telephone had rung (ASDA, 1990). Memory
for events surrounding episodes may be impaired.
Confusional arousals are almost universal before the age of 5 years (ASDA,
1990) and the incidence tends to peak during the toddler/pre-school years (Rosen et
al., 1995). The incidence of confusional arousals tends to decrease with age and is
relatively rare in adulthood (ASDA, 1990).
Sleepwalking
Sleepwalking consists ofa series ofcomplex behaviors that are initiated during slow
wave sleep and result in walking during sleep. (ASDA, 1990, p. 145).
Sleepwalking can involve a range ofdifferent behaviours such as sitting up or walking
around the room (ASDA, 1990). Sleepwalking may be a bit of a misnomer as most
children sit up in bed, perhaps making repetitive, purposeless movements, rather than
actually walking (Parkes, 1985).
Sleepwalking episodes do not usually last for more than 10 minutes, and rarely
as long as an hour (Murray, 1991; Parkes, 1985; Rosen et al., 1995). Episodes may
end spontaneously or the sleeper may return to bed and resume their sleep. The
sufferer may be difficult to awaken during an episode and may be confused upon
awakening (ASDA, 1990; Parkes, 1985). There is usually no memory of the
sleepwalking either when they awaken or the following day (ASDA, 1990; Home,
1992; Murray, 1991; Parkes, 1985) though there may be some awareness ofhaving
had a poor night's sleep (Parkes, 1985).
It is estimated that 1-15% of the general population have experienced
sleepwalking which tends to peak between the ages of4-8 years or pre-adolescence




Sleep terrors are characterized by a sudden arousalfrom slow wave sleep with a
piercing scream or cry, accompanied by autonomic and behavioral manifestations of
intense fear. (ASDA, 1990, p. 148).
The sufferer may also sit up in bed and exhibit automatic behaviour and be
unresponsive to external stimuli. If they awaken, they may be confused and
disoriented and may take a while to recover (ASDA, 1990; Home, 1992; Parkes,
1985). The sufferer may also have widely-dilated pupils, and experience tachycardia
and sweating (Parkes, 1985; Rosen et al., 1995). People do not tend to remember the
episodes, although they may recall brief fragments of dreamlike mentation (ASDA,
1985; Home, 1992; Parkes, 1985).
It is estimated that sleep terrors are reported by 3% of children and less than
1% of adults (ASDA, 1990); episodes are typically experienced between the ages of
4-12 and peak during adolescence after which they tend to decline spontaneously
(ASDA, 1990; Rosen et al., 1995).
b) Sleep-wake transition disorders (e.g., rhythmic movement disorder, sleep starts,
sleep talking, nocturnal leg cramps)
Rhythmic movement disorder
Rhythmic movement disorder comprises a group ofstereotyped, repetitive movements
involving large muscles, usually of the head and neck, which typically occur
immediatelyprior to sleep onset and are sustained into light sleep. (ASDA, 1990,
p. 152).
Rhythmic movement disorder is most common in infants and toddlers and rarely
persists beyond the age of4 years, though it can persist into adolescence and
adulthood (Mahowald & Thorpy, 1995). Episodes tend to last for less than 15
minutes but may last up to several hours (Mahowald & Thorpy, 1995).
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Sleep talking
Sleep talking is the utterance ofspeech or sounds during sleep without simultaneous
subjective detailed awareness ofthe event. (ASDA, 1990, p. 157).
The content is usually highly variable, brief and lacking in emotional stress, although
most speeches contain a few words or single words (Arkin, 1991; ASDA, 1990).
Sleep speeches tend to only last for a few seconds but a duration of over a minute is
possible (Arkin, 1991). Sleep talking is very common, perhaps more so than is
realised because sleep talkers themselves tend not to remember the events (Arkin,
1991; ASDA, 1990).
Nocturnal leg cramps
Nocturnal leg cramps arepainful sensations ofmuscular tightness or tension, usually
in the calf but occasionally in the foot that occur during the sleep episode. (ASDA,
1990, p. 159).
These cramps may arouse or awaken the sleeper but may only last for a few seconds.
More than one episode ofnocturnal leg cramps can be experienced in a given night
(ASDA, 1990). No definitive data exists regarding the incidence ofnocturnal leg
cramps or the relative sex ratio but it seems to be more prevalent among the elderly
(ASDA, 1990).
c) Parasomnias usually associated with REM sleep (e.g., nightmares, sleep paralysis,
REM sleep behaviour disorder)
Nightmares
Nightmares are frightening dreams that usually awaken the sleeperfrom REM sleep.
(ASDA, 1990, p. 163).
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The recall of dream mentation and the fright or anxiety are key aspects to the
nightmare (ASDA, 1990). It is estimated that approximately 75% ofpeople will
recall one or more nightmares during their childhood (ASDA, 1990).
Of particular interest is the finding that those who are frequent nightmare
sufferers often report a difficult childhood and may have had relationship difficulties
during adolescence and early adulthood; they may also be particularly open
personalities and may be quite artistic or creative (ASDA, 1990). These are both
factors that have been associated with fantasy proneness (Wilson & Barber, 1983).
Stress and trauma are also known to increase nightmare frequency and severity
(ASDA, 1990).
Nightmares should be differentiated from sleep terrors; nightmares are
associated with recall of dream mentation, occur during REM sleep and are not
associated with such a marked increase in heart and respiration rates (ASDA, 1990;
Parkes, 1985). In addition, nightmares are usually followed by full alertness (Parkes,
1985).
REM sleep behaviour disorder
REM sleep behavior disorder is characterized by the intermittent loss ofREM sleep
electromyographic (EMG) atonia and by the appearance ofelaborate motor activity
associated with dream mentation. (ASDA, 1990, p. 177).
During normal REM sleep skeletal muscles are paralysed but this is not always the
case for sufferers ofREM sleep behaviour disorder and they may punch, kick, jump
up or run away in response to their dream mentation (ASDA, 1990). Although REM
sleep disorder usually begins in late adulthood (ASDA, 1990), it has been reported in
children (Mahowald & Thorpy, 1995). It is quite rare and many apparent cases are
probably more accurately diagnosed as other types ofparasomnia (ASDA, 1990).
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d) Other parasomnias (e.g., sleep bruxism, sleep enuresis, primary snoring)
Sleep bruxism
Sleep bruxism is a stereotypedmovement disorder characterized by grinding or
clenching ofthe teeth during sleep. (ASDA, 1990, p. 182).
It is estimated that 85-90% of the population will suffer from sleep bruxism at some
point in their lifetimes (ASDA, 1990); it usually occurs between age 2-15 or 10-20
years or in the elderly (ASDA, 1990; Parkes, 1985). Estimates of the prevalence in
children vary widely from 7-88% (Mahowald & Thorpy, 1995).
Sleep enuresis
Sleep enuresis is characterized by recurrent involuntary micturition that occurs
during sleep. (ASDA, 1990, p. 185).
Sleep enuresis, or bedwetting, is common in children below the age of 5 years but is
considered to be problematic if it occurs beyond this age (ASDA, 1990). Children
may sometimes report dreams in association with the bedwetting, such as being in the
bathroom (ASDA, 1990). It is estimated that up to 15% of children will suffer from
sleep enuresis (Parkes, 1985).
Primary snoring
Primary snoring is characterized by loud upper airway breathing sounds in sleep,
without episodes ofapnea or hypoventilation. (ASDA, 1990, p. 195).
Snoring tends to be continuous and appear with each breath. It may occur at any age




Sleep choking syndrome is a disorder of unknown etiology characterized byfrequent
episodes ofawakening with a choking sensation. (ASDA, 1990, p.307).
Sleep choking is a proposed sleep disorder which is characterised by a sudden
awakening from sleep accompanied by a choking sensation and a feeling of being
unable to breathe (ASDA, 1990). The sleeper becomes fully awake and may be very
frightened and concerned that they are going to die (ASDA, 1990). It seems to be
most common (the incidence is unknown) in early to middle adulthood but is not
believed to occur during childhood (ASDA, 1990). However, this experience was
still included because of its frightening nature and because of limited clinical
knowledge of its occurrence and features.




• Flying and falling dreams








• Arousal disorders (e.g., confiisional arousals, sleepwalking, sleep terrors)
• Sleep-wake transition disorders (e.g., rhythmic movement disorder, sleep
starts, sleep talking, nocturnal leg cramps)
• Parasomnias usually associated with REM sleep (e.g., nightmares, sleep
paralysis, REM sleep behaviour disorder)
• Other parasomnias (e.g., sleep bruxism, sleep enuresis, primary snoring)
• Proposed sleep disorder (sleep choking syndrome)
What kinds of anomalous experiences and beliefs have been
associated with the hypnagogic/hypnopompic and sleep states?
Certainly, there is evidence that some people may attach a paranormal or supernatural
interpretation to sleep-related experiences (e.g., Blackmore, 1996; Hufford, 1982;
Leaning, 1925;Liddon, 1967; McKellar, 1957, 1989; Ness, 1978; Nielsen, 1991;
Spanos et al., 1993; Wing et al., 1994) and, in some cases, they may hold such beliefs
even though they have not had such experiences themselves.
Much of the evidence suggesting that the naturally-occurring HG/HP and
sleep states are conducive to reports ofanomalous experiences comes from surveys
and spontaneous case collections. Unfortunately, few surveys and case collections
have attempted to establish whether or not the reports ofanomalous experiences are
genuine by seeking corroborative evidence. One notable exception is the case
collection reported in 'Phantasms of the Living' (Gurney et al., 1886). The
investigators did attempt to corroborate the reports they received and they only
selected cases that they felt were particularly strong. Nevertheless, it is generally
quite difficult to establish the veracity of spontaneous reports and cases collected as
part of surveys because of the subjective nature of such accounts, the dependence on
memory, the unreliability of human testimony, possible deception and fraud, and the
difficulties in obtaining corroborating evidence (Irwin, 1999; Rhine, 1977; Rush,
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1986b). A better way of trying to establish evidence for anomalous processes or
agencies is to try to induce and/or study them under controlled conditions, such as in
a laboratory. However, this is not always possible, or ethical, for some anomalous
experiences, such as alien abduction experiences and NDEs. Nevertheless, attempts
have been made to study ESP, OBEs and apparition experiences in conditions that
resemble the HG/HP and/or sleep states and an evaluation of this evidence will
constitute the major part ofChapter 5.
The hypnagogic/hypnopompic states
The literature suggests that a variety of anomalous experiences have been reported
during the HG/HP states, including ESP (e.g., Gurney et al., 1886), PK (Rose et al.,
1997), apparitions of the living and the dead (e.g., Campbell, 1992; Green &
McCreery, 1989; Gurney et al., 1886; Moody with Perry, 1993), past life experiences
(e.g., Leaning, 1925; Rose et al., 1997), OBEs (e.g., Palmer, 1978b; Sheils, 1978),
NDEs (Rose et al., 1997), and extra-terrestrial experiences (e.g., Mack, 1994; Spanos
et al., 1993).
There is also some evidence to suggest that people who report more normal
HG/HP experiences also tend to report more anomalous experiences. For example,
McCreery (1993) found a positive relationship between the number of reported
hypnagogic imagery episodes and the number of reported OBEs; Glicksohn (1989)
found a small positive correlation between OBEs and hypnopompic but not
hypnagogic imagery. Turning to sleep paralysis, McClenon (1994a) found a
significant positive correlation between the frequency of sleep paralysis and a psi
index in five different cross-cultural student samples. Rose and Blackmore (1996)
also found that adults who reported OBEs tended to report sleep paralysis. Wilson
and Barber's (1983) fantasy prone participants also reported a higher frequency of
HG/HP imagery as well as a range of anomalous experiences including ESP,
OBEs/NDEs, encounters with spirits and apparitions, the perceived ability to heal and
religious visions.
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IfHG/HP imagery and sleep paralysis do not directly cause or facilitate
anomalous experiences (and we cannot draw any causal conclusions from
correlational data alone), it may be that the capacity that allows these HG/HP
experiences also allows anomalous experiences to occur.
The sleep state
A variety of anomalous experiences have also been reported during the sleep state,
including ESP (e.g., Gurney et al., 1886; Rhine, 1981), past life memories (e.g., Mills,
1994), communication with the dead (e.g., Green, 1968; Green & McCreery, 1994;
Gurney et al., 1886; Van Eeden, 1913), OBEs (e.g., Irwin, 1985b; Salley, 1982;
Sheils, 1978), and extra-terrestrial experiences (e.g., Mack, 1994; Spanos et al.,
1993).
Again, there is evidence that people who report more normal sleep-related
experiences, such as various types of dreams and some sleep disorders, also tend to
report more anomalous experiences. For example, Alvarado (1998b) found that
sleepwalkers scored higher on a measure ofparapsychological experiences (ESP,
apparition, OBE and seeing auras items); Spanos et al. (1995) found significant
positive correlations between sleeptalking/walking, night terror/nightmare dimensions
and the frequency ofOBEs. A number ofprevious surveys have also found a
relationship between anomalous experiences and a number of sleep-related variables:
dream recall, dream interpretation, dream control, dream vividness, flying and falling
dreams, lucid dreams, and false awakenings (e.g., Alvarado & Zingrone, 1994;
Blackmore, 1982b, 1983, 1986; Glicksohn, 1989, 1990; Haraldsson, 1975;
Haraldsson, Gudmundsdottir, Ragnarsson, Loftsson & Jonsson, 1977; Irwin, 1985b,
1986a; Kohr, 1980; McCreery, 1993; Palmer, 1979; Rose & Blackmore, 1996).
Green and McCreery (1994) have also noted that type 2 false awakenings seem to be
particularly versatile and may develop into other experiences, such as lucid dreams,
OBEs and apparitional experiences.
Although survey and spontaneous case collections are useful for establishing
the phenomenology and incidence of experiences and the circumstances in which they
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occur, as well as generating hypotheses for experimental investigation, they alone are
quite limited in terms of establishing definitively that anomalous processes are
involved (e.g., Irwin, 1999; Watt, 1990). The question is do these experiences
involve genuine anomalous processes or agencies or are they normal experiences that
have been misinterpreted?
Why might the HG/HP and sleep states be conducive to the
operation of anomalous processes?
The hypnagogic/hypnopompic states
First ofall, the hypnagogic state is considered to be 'unusually receptive' (Schacter,
1976, p. 468) and shares features ofwhat is considered to be a psi-conducive state,
such as conscious awareness, physical relaxation, a reduction in sensory distraction
and increased internal attention (Braud & Braud, 1975; Honorton, 1977; Mavromatis,
1987). During the HG/HP states awareness of the surroundings may be reduced
(Foulkes & Vogel, 1965; Rechtschaffen, 1994) but it is still apparent and people still
feel very much awake (McKellar & Simpson, 1954).
Perhaps it is particular levels of brain activity during the hypnagogic/
hypnopompic and sleep states that facilitates the operation ofanomalous processes or
perhaps it is not actually the ASC itself but the degree or the rapidity of the transition
from one state to another (see Parker, 1975). Perhaps the initial increase in alpha
activity or the later increase in theta activity is important or, alternatively, it may be
the transition or the mixture of states that is important.
It is becoming increasingly apparent that the waking-sleeping-waking
transition is not as clear-cut and straightforward as was once thought (e.g., Dement &
Kleitman, 1957; Hori et al., 1994; Rechtschaffen & Kales, 1968; Mahowald &
Schenck, 1991). In addition, recent evidence from clinical cases and laboratory
investigations suggests that dissociated states can occur which consist of a mixture of
wakefulness and REM or NREM sleep (Hishikawa, 1976; Mahowald & Schenck,
1991; Takeuchi, Miyasita, Sasaki, Inugami, & Fukuda, 1992; Takeuchi, Miyasita,
Inugami, Sasaki, & Fukuda, 1994).
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Perhaps these dissociated states, involving some degree ofwakefulness that is
not usually present, allow access to information or anomalous processes that we are
not usually aware of. Unfortunately, this is difficult to actually test out. Clearly not
everyone experiences these dissociated states on a regular basis, or if they do they do
not remember them; if they did then surely many more people would be reporting
anomalous experiences during the HG/HP states. Perhaps the state itself is necessary
but not sufficient. For example, sleep-onset REM periods (SOREMPs) might be a
necessary but not a sufficient requirement for sleep paralysis (Takeuchi et al., 1992).
Perhaps only people with certain personality characteristics or cognitive abilities, such
as people who are highly transliminal (Thalbourne & Delin, 1994) or who have thin
boundaries (Hartmann, 1991), can operate, or gain access to, anomalous processes
during these states. Perhaps only certain people are able to recall the experiences.
For example, fantasy-prone people have a good and vivid recall ofpast personal
experiences and they also appear to report a much higher frequency ofHG/HP
experiences (Wilson & Barber, 1983). This provides further justification for the
inclusion of fantasy proneness in addition to measures of various HG/HP and sleep-
related experiences in the models to be tested as part of this thesis.
The sleep state
As with the HG/HP states, it could be that certain brain activity is somehow
conducive to the operation of anomalous processes. During NREM sleep, the EEG
trace is characterised by fneta and delta activity and during REM sleep brain activity,
paradoxically, resembles that during the normal waking state (Lavie, 1996;
Rechtschaffen, 1973). It could also be the transition from one sleep state to another
that is conducive; it is known, for example, that a person can oscillate rapidly between
states ofwakefulness, NREM and REM sleep and that these states can also occur
simultaneously (Mahowald & Ettinger, 1990).
Some writers (e.g., Symons, 1993; Tolaas, 1986; Ullman, 1966, 1986, 1990)
believe that sleep and dreaming have an internal and/or external vigilance mechanism
and that such a mechanism may have a psi component attached to it (Ullman, 1986).
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Some writers (e.g., Ullman, 1986, 1990; Tolaas, 1986) believe that we scan our
environment for relevant information, particularly novelty, during both waking and
sleeping, but point out that a sleeping person is likely to be under a greater risk of
harm in some respects. Ullman (1966,1990) considers REM sleep to be periods of
increased vigilance which are mainly oriented to the present and the future and which
prepare the sleeper for possible adaptive responses. The dream vigilance can result in
awakening, if a potential threat is considered to be sufficiently great, or a continuation
of the sleep cycle and a return to NREM sleep ifno significant threats have been
identified (Symons, 1993; Ullman, 1986). Symons (1993) believes that natural
selection has disfavoured dreams containing sensory modalities that might
compromise the vigilance mechanism. Because a sleeping person is virtually blind and
immobile there is no point in monitoring visual and movement inputs and so dreams
that include these modalities are not going to be confused with real external inputs.
Symons (1993) argues that modalities that are monitored during sleep, such as pain,
touch, temperature, smell and hearing, are less common in dreams because they might
compromise the external vigilance mechanism. There is also evidence to suggest that
this vigilance mechanism is not necessarily restricted to REM sleep; for example,
although a person is relatively unresponsive to external stimuli during stages 3 and 4
ofNREM sleep, personal stimuli, such as a baby crying, may still produce awakening
(Empson, 1993; Lavie, 1996; Rechtschaffen, 1973). Ullman (1986) believes that a psi
component to the vigilance mechanism would allow the sleeper to identify (and
perhaps react to) significant events which may be distant in terms of space and/or
time.
Ullman (1986, 1990) believes that dreaming consciousness serves to maintain
species-connectedness and survival. Reports ofESP involving known, emotionally-
close persons, who may be in danger, or the appearance of deceased persons in many
reports ofanomalous dreams would seem to support these proposed functions.
However, it has been argued that individual organisms are not primarily concerned
with the survival of their species but with the survival of their own genes (Dawkins,
1989); this would contradict Ullman's theory about the maintenance of species-
connectedness.
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The noise reduction model proposes that, because psi processes seem to be
very weak, and therefore difficult to detect, circumstances in which distractions (i.e.,
external environmental noise and internal somatic noise) are minimised and attention
is focused internally will increase the likelihood that anomalous processes can be
detected (e.g., see Honorton, 1977). If this model is correct then one might expect
that during the HG/HP or sleep states people might be better able to detect
extrasensory information or attempted communications from other living or deceased
persons, for example.
Why might normal HG/HP and sleep experiences be
misinterpreted as involving anomalous processes?
The hypnagogic/hypnopompic states
It has been argued that HG/HP experiences may have been misinterpreted as ESP,
apparitions, OBEs/NDEs, visions ofprevious lives or other worlds, alien abductions,
witchcraft or attacks by evil spirits or demons etc. (Baker, 1992; Blackmore, 1996,
1998; Dahlitz & Parkes, 1993; Green & McCreery, 1994; Hufford, 1982; Leaning,
1925; Liddon, 1967; McKellar, 1957, 1989; Mahowald & Ettinger, 1990; Spanos et
al., 1993, 1995; Wilson & Barber, 1983; Wing et al., 1994; Zusne & Jones, 1989).
Some writers believe that sleep-related experiences may initiate or sustain beliefs in
the paranormal and the supernatural and may have contributed to mythology and
folklore (Fukuda et ah, 1987; Liddon, 1967; McKellar & Simpson, 1954;
Mavromatis, 1983; Ness, 1978; Nielsen, 1991). Although certainly some people do
attach paranormal, spiritual or supernatural significance to these kinds ofexperiences,
other people are either not very concerned by their experiences or attribute some kind
of a normal explanation to them. As McKellar (1957, p. 35) noted,
hypnagogic/hypnopompic experiences can mean very different things to different
people. Some people may struggle (Siegel, 1993, p. 87) or fail to find an explanation
(Rose & Blackmore, 1996) for their sleep paralysis experiences; others may see them
as some kind of a dream (Fukuda et ah, 1998). Blackmore and Rose (1996) found
that many people were scared by sleep paralysis and some were worried that they
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were going mad or being visited by supernatural entities. A few people may be
concerned that their HG/HP experiences may be an indication ofpossible physical or
mental abnormalities (McKellar, 1957, p. 35; Ohayon et al., 1999; Rose &
Blackmore, 1996). If such experiences do lead to the development or strengthening of
anomalous beliefs then this provides evidence for the experiential source hypothesis.
Assuming that the hypnagogic/hypnopompic and sleep experiences do not
reflect anomalous processes, are there any general characteristics of the hypnagogic/
hypnopompic states that might facilitate misinterpretations, regardless of individual
knowledge, beliefs and expectations? There may be reduced sensory input from the
environment and some ambiguity of external stimuli, especially if the person is in bed
and it is dark. This may interfere with accurate reality-testing (Spanos et ah, 1993)
which also tends to reduce during the sleep-onset period (Foulkes & Vogel, 1965).
The sleep onset period cannot be accurately categorised as either waking or sleeping
(Hori et al., 1994) and it is sometimes difficult, subjectively, to distinguish between
them (Rechtschaffen, 1994). Other features of the sleep onset period include a
decreasing awareness ofobserving the contents of one's own mind, increased
absorption, a loss ofvolitional control over mentation, inaccurate time perception,
and a reduction of awareness of the environment (Foulkes & Vogel, 1965;
Mavromatis & Richardson, 1984; Rechtschaffen, 1994). Thus, these features of the
FIG state could lead a person to confuse reality and imagination, particularly if they
have become absorbed in their experience, which could in some cases be based upon a
mixture of real and imaginary inputs. One of the features ofHG/HP imagery that may
lead people into believing in their reality and veracity may be that they feel awake
throughout. In their survey ofhypnagogic experiences, McKellar & Simpson (1954)
found that
Among the reasons given for believing oneself to be awake were: being able to have
ordinary perception at the same time (the commonest reason given); being able to have
separate thoughts; being able to engage in conversation; being able to open eyes, close
them, and continue with the image, etc. (p. 270).
Mavromatis (1987) points out that 'The 'sense of reality, of life-likeness' pointed out
by many subjects in reference to their hypnagogic imagery often expands into 'feelings
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ofheightened reality(p. 30). Visual imagery can sometimes contain more detail
than one might observe in more usual circumstances (Leaning, 1925). Thus, a person
might consider an HG/HP experience to be real rather than imaginary because they
feel awake and aware of their surroundings, and because the imagery might be very
realistic and detailed. The unfamiliarity and involuntary nature of the imagery might
also facilitate external attributions. The content ofHG/HP imagery (see earlier
section) can also be similar to aspects of alleged anomalous experiences and this may
facilitate misinterpretations.
Some of the best evidence for the misinterpretation of normal HG/HP
experiences comes from the fact that experiences with a paranormal or supernatural
interpretation, which are similar ifnot identical to sleep paralysis with/without
accompanying hypnagogic/hypnopompic imagery (Fukuda et al., 1987; Hufford,
1982; Wing et al., 1994), have been reported and are widely known in various
countries, regions and cultures: e.g. Canada, USA, Mexico, UK, Germany, Thailand,
Korea, China, Japan, India, The Philippines, St. Lucia and the Eskimo regions
(Blackmore & Rose, 1996; Dahlitz & Parkes, 1993; Firestone, 1985; Fukuda et al.,
1987; Hufford, 1982; Liddon, 1967; Ness, 1978; Ohaeri et al., 1992; Spanos et al.,
1995; Wing et al., 1994). Cultural beliefs relating to anomalous agencies seem to be
strongly tied to experiences in these different cultures, which supports the experiential
source hypothesis (Hufford, 1982).
Old Hag, kanashibari and ghost oppression attacks
Perhaps the most widely-known example of these experiences is the 'Old Hag attack'
which is well-known in the Canadian province ofNewfoundland and is believed to be
caused by a supernatural creature, by a human in spirit form (e.g. a witch) or a
combination of the two (Firestone, 1985; Hufford, 1982; Kettlewell, Lipscomb &
Evans, 1993; Ness, 1978). The main features of an Old Hag attack are an impression
ofwakefulness and an accurate perception of the real environment, paralysis and fear;
secondary features, which may be experienced with eyes open or closed, include a
sense of presence, imagined sounds, visual images of a human (e.g. an old woman) or
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non-human attacker or other events, a sense ofmotion, pressure (e.g., on the chest),
difficulty breathing, odours and other bodily sensations (Hufford, 1982, pp. 267-270).
These are all features that have been reported in conjunction with sleep paralysis and
HG/HP imagery (Cheyne, 1998; Cheyne, Newby-Clark, & Rueffer, 1999; Cheyne,
Rueffer, & Newby-Clark, 1999; Conesa, 1995, 1997; Fukuda et al., 1998; Goode,
1962; Hishikawa & Shimizu, 1995; Hufford, 1982; Liddon, 1967; Mavromatis, 1987;
Penn et al., 1981; Schneck, 1960; Snyder, 1983; Spanos et al., 1995; Takeuchi et al.,
1992; Terrillon & Marques-Bonham, 1998). An example of an Old Hag experience is
as follows:
And I had the impression that I could hear someone coming behind me. But I said,
"Well, 1 don't—" You know, "They'll pass by." And I could hear the footsteps, and I
said, "Well, they're going to pass on by me, and I hope they don't mess with me,
whoever they are. I hope it's not somebody who comes by and messes with me." And
the next thing 1 know 1 heard a female voice and—The voice wasn't really familiar to
me. But the voice addressed me like she knew me. Or it knew me. And it said, "You
knew that I would come." Something like that. And—then there was a lot of talk
about her—her face. Or her appearance. And she didn't want me to look at her or
something, because of her face. And all this time I remember I had my eyes closed,
and I kept thinking, "Well, who is this? Who's playing this—Who's who's talking?"
And the next thing I know, my—The pressure—on my arms. And I couldn't move. I
couldn't move anything... (Hufford, 1982, pp. 81-82).
Experiences with similar phenomenology have also been reported in Japan and China
(see below).
1 suddenly woke up from sleep and found that 1 couldn't move a bit. I couldn't speak,
either. I saw a figure, which resembled a Buddhist image, on my stomach. I was very
frightened. (Fukuda et al., 1987, p. 282).
She suddenly woke up in the middle of the night and felt a heavy sensation ofweight
over her chest during which time she was unable to move and shout. She saw a dark
shadow that appeared to be a lady holding a baby in her arms. She felt fearful and
exhausted and then fell asleep. (Wing et al., 1994, p. 610).
These experiences are known as 'kanashibari' (Fukuda et al., 1987) and 'ghost
oppression attacks' (Wing et al., 1994), respectively, and are believed by some to be
caused by evil spirits or possession by a ghost. However, there is evidence to suggest
that such beliefs may be more common among people who have not had the
experiences themselves (Wing et al., 1994).
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Alien abduction experiences
In alleged alien abduction experiences, individuals typically report that they have been
abducted by extra-terrestrial beings who took them on board some kind of a
spacecraft; here they may be studied or experimented upon, or they may be given
information (Bartholomew et al., 1991; Blackmore, 1998; Mack, 1994; Ring &
Rosing, 1990; Spanos et al., 1993). Many UFO sightings occur at night and one
survey by Spanos et al. (1993) has found that 58% of intense UFO experiences (i.e.,
those involving contact with aliens and/or features of abduction experiences) occurred
around the time of sleep, either during the night or in the early hours of the morning
(Mack, 1994). Abduction experiences often begin in a person's home, for example in
their bedroom, or when they are out driving; some experiences occur when the person
is out walking (Mack, 1994). Flopkins et al. (1992) also noted that:
A variety of abduction locations have been described, with the encounters taking place
at all hours of the day and night. In a majority, however, the abductees awake in bed,
fully aware of their surroundings, but physically paralyzed to such a degree that they
may not even be able to move their eyes. This state of paralysis often continues for
several minutes. The abductees usually sense a presence in the room but very often
actually see one or more diminutive large-eyed figures standing beside the
bed....Abductees may then be walked or floated towards a landed UFO, but very often
they recall rising up in mid-air towards the bottom of a hovering UFO. (p. 12).
The fact that many abduction experiences are sleep-related and include features that
are very similar to sleep paralysis and FIG/HP experiences has led a number of
researchers (e.g., Baker, 1992; Blackmore, 1998; Spanos et ai., 1995) to conclude
that the latter are more likely explanations for many of these nocturnal abduction
experiences. Obviously it is more difficult to see how the FIG/HP experience
explanation could account for abduction experiences that take place during the day
when the abductee is engaged in some form ofphysical activity but it is a strong
candidate for many of the nocturnal experiences.
Features common to both abduction and HG/HP experiences include paralysis,
awareness of one's surroundings, visual imagery (e.g., moving balls of light,
humanoid figures standing near the bed, complex scenes), auditory imagery (e.g.,
footsteps, humming, beeping, buzzing, whirring, whispering), a sense ofpresence,
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sensations of floating and flying and fear (Baker, 1992; Conesa, 1995; Mack, 1994;
Rose & Blackmore, 1996; Spanos et al., 1995). Also of interest is the fact that some
abductees report a (childhood) history ofHG/HP experiences, such as seeing
shadowy figures walk out of their closet (Mack, 1994, p. 77). Others may report a
history of sleep paralysis plus bodily vibrations, electrical sensations, a feeling like
someone or something was controlling their body or pressure on the chest and a sense
ofpresence (Mack, 1994, pp. 70-71, 122, 221). Thus, it is possible that some
abductees might be particularly prone to HG/HP imagery and sleep paralysis. It is
possible that the content of such experiences can be influenced by one's knowledge or
recent experience, resulting in an abduction scenario. For example, Baker (1992)
reported that:
One ofmy own clients, after reading both Streiber's Communion and Hopkins
Intruders a few days later woke up and saw a tattletale gray face glowing on the wall
over his dresser. A few minutes later, following a brief period of sleep, the image of
the face reappeared. In his words, "The face was a little bigger than mine. It glowed
and had large almond-shaped, jet black eyes bulging out of its forehead. The eyes had
no pupils and the face did not look at me straight-on, it was turned a little to the right.
I was so mesmerized by the eyes I don't recall any other feature other than vertical
wrinkles on its cheeks giving him a creepy crepey look." (p. 9)
Familiarity with abduction accounts seems to be increasing in Western society and
such knowledge may not only shape the content ofnormal HG/HP experiences but
may also provide a framework within which to interpret relatively normal sleep-
related experiences (Baker, 1992; Rose & Blackmore, 1996; Spanos et al., 1993),
In my view, the best evidence for the fact that normal sleep-related
experiences can be misinterpreted as being alien abduction experiences comes from
reports of a number of large surveys conducted in the USA by the Roper Organization
in 1991 and 1998 (Hopkins et al., 1992; Roper Starch, 1998). The three 1991
surveys involved a total of 5947 adult respondents; the three 1998 surveys, a total of
5955 respondents. In these Unusual Experience Surveys, respondents were asked to
indicate whether they had ever had a series of eleven different experiences. Five of
these experiences were considered to be "key "indicator" questions designed to elicit
experiences related to abduction." (Hopkins et al., 1992, p. 14).
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The authors concluded that:
When a respondent answers "yes" to at least four of these five indicator questions,
there is a strong possibility that individual is a UFO abductee. (p. 48).
They also concluded that:
The incidence of abduction experiences appears to be on the order of at least 2% of the
[American] population, (p. 9).
Table 2 Proportion of respondents that reported each of the
indicator experiences in the 1991 and 1998 Unusual Experiences
surveys
Indicator experiences 1991 1998
Waking up paralyzed with a sense of a strange person or
presence or something else in the room
18% 12%
Feeling that you were actually flying through the air although
you didn't know why or how
10% 5%
Experiencing a period of time of an hour or more, in which you
were apparently lost, but you could not remember why, or
where you had been
13% 6%
Seen unusual lights or balls of light in a room without knowing
what was causing them, or where they came from
8% 5%
Finding puzzling scars on your body and neither you nor anyone
else remembering how you received them or where you got
them
8% 5%
Although the sampling and the survey procedure were of a high standard, the
conclusions reached on the basis of these responses should not be considered to be
valid. Firstly, there does not appear to be a universal agreement regarding what
features define an alien abduction experience (Appelle et al., 2000) and so it would be
premature to conclude that these indicators definitely reflect abduction experiences
without giving a precise definition ofwhat features are crucial; at least four out of five
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experiences is too vague. Secondly, the validity has been questioned because the
survey does not apparently measure the frequency of real abduction experiences
(Donderi, 1994; Goertzel, 1994; Klass, 1993; Stires, 1993) and it is not clear whether
the proposed indicators are actually valid as indicators of true abduction experiences.
Although reports ofabduction experiences suggest that these indicators tend to occur
during the same episode (e.g., Mack. 1994), one cannot tell whether this is the case
from the Roper poll data; a given respondent deemed to be a potential abductee could
have had his or her four indicator experiences separately on different occasions. It is
not clear whether Hopkins et al. (1992) are assuming that these indicators must occur
during the same experience if they are to reflect genuine abductions or whether the
person just has a tendency to have the indicator experiences but not necessarily at the
same time. If the latter is true then the validity is even more questionable. Hopkins et
al. (1992) claimed that they did not directly ask the respondents if they had been
abducted for the following reason:
The major difficulty with such a survey was that the question "Are you a UFO
abductee?" would not necessarily reveal the extent of those with potential abduction
experiences. As has been pointed out, many such people do not have enough conscious
recollection of these events to answer affirmatively. Instead, Hopkins and Jacobs
decided to ask about particular "unusual experiences" which research indicated were
closely associated with abduction histories, (p. 14).
However, although the overall report (Hopkins et al., 1992) of the results of the three
1991 surveys claims that participants were not directly asked whether they had had an
abduction experience, a Roper document relating to one of the three 1991 surveys
reveals that respondents were in fact asked to indicate whether they had had the
following experience "Having been abducted by the occupants of a UFO." (this item
was also apparently used in the 1998 surveys too). Only 8 (0.4%) of the 1971
respondents indicated that they had had such an experience at least once. This is
clearly considerably less than the 2% estimate based upon those reporting 4/5
indicator experiences in the overall dataset and seems to contradict what Hopkins et
al. (1992) report.
Certainly at least three of the indicator experiences (paralysis, flying, unusual
lights) could be reported by a person who has normal HG/HP experiences. The only
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mention ofnormal HG/HP experiences comes in a section of the report in which
Hopkins and Jacobs describe how the survey was designed. They correctly noted that
"A fleeting sensation ofparalysis is not unusual in either hypnogogic or hypnopompic
states..."(p. 56) but then argued that "adding the phrase 'with a sense of a strange
person or presence or something else in the room' forcefully narrows the scope of the
question." It may narrow the number of respondents but a sense of presence is also a
common feature of sleep paralysis experiences. Changing the item in this way
certainly does not rule out normal HG/HP-related experiences. It is surprising that
Hopkins et al. (1992) drew the conclusions they did given that they are clearly aware
of the existence of normal HG/HP experiences. Hufford (1994) has also noted the
similarity between the Roper poll questions and features of sleep paralysis attacks and
he has registered his astonishment that the report does not really mention these nor his
book on assault traditions, which is a classic text. Thus, in my opinion, the Roper
Unusual Experiences surveys clearly illustrate how reports ofexperiences closely
resembling normal HG/HP experiences can be misinterpreted. The HG/HP-like
features ofmany abduction accounts and the fact that some abductees have a history
ofHG/HP experiences also suggest that normal HG/HP experiences are a more likely
explanation for many nocturnal abduction experiences that are reported around the
time of sleep in the home.
The sleep state
In relation to the sleep state, the existence of false awakenings, in which we think that
we are awake but later find out that we were only dreaming, is a good illustration of
the difficulty we may have in determining whether we are asleep or not (Green, 1968;
Green & McCreery, 1994). In addition, in pre-lucid dreams we may start to consider
whether or not we are dreaming and on some occasions we may reach the wrong
conclusion (Green, 1968). Thus, it is possible that ifwe think we are awake when we
are not, we may consider imaginary sleep experiences to be waking reality. There
may also be the possibility of some confusion during lucid dreams, particularly if one
has simultaneous awareness of dream reality and actual reality. Another possibility
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might be that flying or falling dreams, which are often closely related to lucid dreams,
are interpreted as OBEs.
Type 2 false awakenings might be prone to misinterpretation in some instances
where the sleeper apparently wakes up to a tense and stormy atmosphere or begins to
feel that some thing is wrong or that something is about to happen (Green, 1968;
Green & McCreery, 1994). Such experiences might be interpreted as being
precognitive. Ominous noises and/or strange figures may also be apparently seen
during such dreams and these might be interpreted as communications with the dead
or other beings, for example.
People who suffer from arousal sleep disorders, i.e., confusional arousals,
sleepwalking, sleep terrors, might be more likely to misinterpret sleep-related
experiences because features of these disorders include misperception of the
environment, possible automatic behaviour and varying degrees of recall for events
which precede these episodes (Rosen, Mahowald, & Ferber, 1995). Sleep terrors in
particular might lend themselves to paranormal interpretations; the person may
awaken with a scream and may be temporarily confused and disoriented, may feel
very frightened but may not remember what it was that caused them to awaken.
Children often report that something was going to get them or was after them, though
it may be that this is the result of their attempts to rationalise their fear (Rosen et al.,
1995). However, some fragments ofdreamlike imagery can be recalled, e.g., a face,
an animal or fire (Mahowald & Ettinger, 1990). This might facilitate interpretations
in terms of some form of visitation or perhaps seeing future events. Sleep choking
episodes also have features that might lend themselves to anomalous interpretations;
the choking might be attributed to some invisible nocturnal assailant.
Chapter Summary
This chapter has outlined some of the physiological and experiential features of the
HG/HP and sleep states and has noted some of the objective and subjective difficulties
that can sometimes occur when attempting to differentiate between sleep and
wakefulness. With particular emphasis on the HG/HP states, this chapter has also
121
described two of the main experiential features, which are HG/HP imagery and sleep
paralysis.
In terms of the sleep state, this chapter has described the features of a number
of fairly normal sleep experiences, such as normal and lucid dreams, flying and falling
dreams and false awakenings, as well as other experiences which can be described as
sleep disorders, such as sleepwalking, sleep terrors, sleep talking, and nightmares.
This chapter has also shown that the HG/HP states have been associated with
a range of anomalous experiences and beliefs and that there is also evidence to
suggest that people who report more frequent episodes of certain HG/HP and sleep-
related experiences may also report more episodes of anomalous experiences.
However, much of this evidence comes from surveys and spontaneous case
collections which makes it difficult to establish whether or not any genuine anomalous
processes or agencies are involved, given the subjective and often unreliable nature of
human testimony.
Why might the HG/HP and sleep states be conducive to anomalous processes?
These states share features ofwhat is considered to be a psi-conducive state, e.g.,
physical relaxation, a reduction in sensory distraction and increased internal attention.
It could be that certain levels of brain activity, the change from one state to another or
the mixture of sleep and waking states that is somehow conducive to anomalous
processes. However, it is also possible that such ASCs are a necessary but not a
sufficient requirement; perhaps only people with certain personality characteristics or
cognitive abilities, such as fantasy proneness and/or high transliminality or thin
boundaries, have the sufficient prerequisites. It has also been argued that the sleep
state has an internal or external vigilance mechanism that could monitor beyond
current space and time, but this is very difficult to test.
This chapter has also outlined evidence that normal HG/HP and sleep
experiences might be misinterpreted as involving anomalous processes and that they
may have contributed to the initiation or maintenance ofbeliefs in the paranormal and
the supernatural. During these sleep-related states, it may be difficult to distinguish
wakefulness from sleep, there may be reduced sensory input and reality-testing may be
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interfered with. There may also be vivid and realistic imagery that can be mistaken for
reality.
Some of the best evidence for the misinterpretation of normal HG/HP
experiences comes from experiences with a paranormal or supernatural interpretation
which are similar, ifnot identical, to sleep paralysis with or without HG/HP imagery.
Such experiences include Old Hag attacks, which are well-known in Newfoundland,
kanashibari, which are well-known in Japan, and ghost oppression attacks, which are
well-known in China.
Finally there is evidence to suggest that HG/HP and sleep paralysis
experiences might be mistaken for nocturnal alien abduction experiences. Many
abduction experiences are sleep-related and contain features that are similar to sleep
paralysis and HG/HP imagery. The best evidence for misinterpreting normal
experiences as being alien abduction experiences comes from the Unusual Experience
surveys conducted by the Roper Organization in the USA in 1991 and 1998. The
authors of reports based upon these surveys concluded that participants who had had
at least four out of five indicator experiences during their lifetime had probably been
abducted by aliens; on the basis of this they also concluded that at least 2% of the
American population have been abducted by aliens. There is little evidence that these
indicators are valid and reliable indicators ofabduction experiences and a person who




Investigation of sleep-related anomalous
experiences under controlled conditions
There have been relatively few experimental investigations of anomalous experiences
during true HG/HP states but many more investigations have attempted to induce, or
allow a person to induce, a state that is believed to resemble the naturally-occurring
HG state. Attempts have also been made to study anomalous experiences that are
reported during sleep, either in the laboratory or in participants' homes. The
experiments (or non-experimental inductions) involving HG/HP and sleep states have
mainly been concerned with ESP and OBEs. There have also been attempts to induce
apparitional experiences using a psychomanteum chamber, which may induce a state
resembling the HG state.
This chapter will examine the results of these investigations, plus the features
ofOBEs and psychomanteum experiences, in order to establish whether there is
evidence for genuine anomalous processes or whether there are normal explanations.
ESP
Although there have been numerous reports ofESP during the HG/HP states (e.g.,
Gurney et al., 1886), very few experimental studies have attempted to investigate this
during the naturally-occurring HG/HP states (Braud, 1977; White et al., 1971; Gertz,
1983).
Braud (1977) conducted three telepathy studies in order to investigate whether
dreams or HG mentation were more conducive to telepathy. The initial pilot dream
study involved 50 participants who participated in the same single trial. Participants
slept at their homes and tried to dream about a randomly selected target slide that was
being sent by the experimenter between 2.00-2.30am. In the morning the participants
coded their dream mentation according to whether 10 categories were present or
absent and then sent this information to the experimenter. The target slide was also
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coded for these same categories and each individual's coding was matched against it.
Taking all of the participants' information into account, the mean number ofmatches
was only 3.14 where 5 would be expected by chance. Thus, there was no evidence
that participants were able to correctly identify characteristics of the dream target
more than one would expect by chance; in fact their performance was almost
significantly worse than chance (p = 0.057, two-tailed). Braud felt that possible
reasons for these findings were that 40% of the participants were strangers (i.e.,
friends of friends) and the participation request had come as a surprise to them.
In the first of two confirmation experiments, Braud tried to rectify this and
selected 10 close friends whom he invited to participate via a personalised letter. In
order to compare HG versus dream mentation performance, participants attempted to
identify six different targets sent over three consecutive days. Three of the targets
were sent at 10pm when the participants would be likely to be entering a HG state;
the remaining three targets were sent at 5.30am when the participants would be likely
to be asleep. A similar binary coding procedure was employed to code the HG and
dream mentation. Unfortunately, only 5 of the 10 participants returned their protocol.
Strangely, Braud (1977) did not report the performance for dream versus HG
mentation but only reports the overall mean majority score of 6.84, which indicated
performance that was significantly greater than chance expectations (CR = 2.84, p —
0.0045, two-tailed). Braud's (1977) second confirmation study used the same
procedure except that the sending times were changed to 10.30pm and 6.00am.
Unfortunately, there were problems with these respondents too; only seven returned
their protocols and three of those received were incomplete. In both studies, it is
possible that participants who felt that they had not performed well decided not to
return their data, thus creating a small file drawer problem. However, the findings
from the previous study were replicated and performance was again significantly
better than chance expectations (mean score = 6.33, CR = 2.07, p = 0.019, one-
tailed). Having combined the data from the two confirmation studies together, Braud
(1977) found that overall performance was still significantly better than chance (mean
score = 6.58, CR = 3.47,p = 0.00052, two-tailed). It was also apparent that HG
performance (mean score = 7.33, CR = 3.62, p = 0.00015, one-tailed) was better than
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dream performance (mean score = 5.83, CR = 1.29, non-significant) but not
significantly so. So, in summary, Braud's studies suggested that, although both HG
and dream mentation might be conducive to telepathy, the naturally-occurring HG
state seems to be more conducive than the sleep state. However, one should
remember that there were relatively few participants and trials in these studies and this
problem was compounded by the large proportion ofparticipants who failed to return
complete protocols.
Another study that attempted to compare the conduciveness of the naturally-
occurring HG/HP and dream states to telepathy was conducted by White et al.
(1971). This study involved a comparison of transcripts taken from one of the single
participant (Erwin) Maimonides dream studies (see Ullman et al., 1989). Although
these states were not experimentally-induced, they may not have been entirely natural
because the study was carried out with the participant sleeping in a laboratory rather
than in their own home. The results indicated that HG/HP but not dream mentation
was associated with significant correspondences to the targets. Again, here is further
evidence to support the superiority ofHG/HP imagery over dream mentation in terms
ofalleged telepathy performance.
Two further studies are relevant in which participants attempted to self-induce
a HG state in laboratory conditions. In the first of these (Schacter & Kelly, 1975),
two participants participated in 16 and 20 trials, respectively. After an initial training
session, participants were required to try to induce a HG state using an EEG
biofeedback procedure. Whilst the receiver was in this self-induced state, the sender,
located in a room three floors above, attempted to send impressions of the target.
Participants then viewed eight possible slides compared them against their mentation
and then placed the slides in rank order according to the degree of correspondence.
Ranks of 1-4 given to the target were deemed a hit; 5-8, a miss. Participant one
obtained 10/16 hits (62.5% (MCE = 50%), p = 0.125) and participant two obtained
12/20 hits (60.0% (MCE = 50%), p < 0.005). These findings are suggestive of
possible HG telepathy but again only involve a small number ofparticipants. It is not
clear whether the state induced did in fact resemble the naturally-occurring HG state.
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In the second of these studies, Gertz (1983) measured the EEG of a single
participant as he or she tried to fall asleep. In all there were three sessions scheduled
over three consecutive days; each session lasted for about seven hours and began at
9.30am. The telepathy trials took place on day 2. There were 18 10-minute trials
interspersed with 10-minute recovery periods. During each trial a randomly-selected
slide show was viewed by a sender; however, it is important to note that the order of
presentation of the slides within each slide show was not randomised. As there were
only 12 possible slide shows, six shows were shown once and six were shown twice.
The mentation from trials with the same slide show were combined; on one trial there
was no reported mentation so this was excluded, resulting in a total of 11 mentation
transcripts. These transcripts were randomised and shown to a blind judge. There
were 5 direct hits, which indicated that the participant's mentation had apparently
identified target information more often than chance would predict (p < 0.005). Sum
of ranks for transcript-to-shows judging (p < 0.0005) and shows-to-transcripts
judging (p < 0.005) analyses also confirmed this performance. However, there are
two major problems with this study, both ofwhich are acknowledged by Gertz
(1983): (1) the nonrandom sequence of each slide show might have resulted in some
spurious hits, (2) although the EEG trace followed a pattern not unlike that of sleep-
onset, it is not clear whether a HG state was induced and, if so, whether it resembles
the naturally-occurring version. In my view, it is unlikely that the participant could
have easily fallen asleep during the daytime (especially given the intensive nature of
the study and the fact that they had only 10 minutes in which to enter the HG state),
unless they had not slept at ail the previous evening or the participant suffered from
fatigue/boredom. In actual fact the latter is a possibility as the experiment was
terminated prematurely on the third day due to the fatigue and irritation experienced
by the participant.
Overall, there is some evidence to suggest that the naturally-occurring, or self-
induced, HG state can be conducive to telepathy, perhaps even more so than
dreaming. However, these studies involve small numbers ofparticipants and/or trials
and seem to have been somewhat exploratory. There are problems with the design in
some studies too (e.g., Gertz, 1983).
128
Much of the research involving ASCs in parapsychology has been conducted
using the ganzfeld technique, a procedure that is believed to induce a HG-like state
(Bertini et al., 1969), to facilitate ESP. Some meta-analyses of ganzfeld studies have
concluded that they provide good evidence for ESP, albeit with small effect sizes
(Bern & Honorton, 1994; Honorton, 1985) but others have concluded that they do
not provide evidence for ESP (Hyman, 1985; Milton & Wiseman, 1999).
The ganzfeld technique was adopted from mainstream psychology; for
example, it had been used in the study ofHG imagery (e.g., Bertini et al., 1969). It
began to be used in parapsychology as part of free-response ESP investigations in the
1970s (Braud, Wood, & Braud, 1975; Honorton & Harper, 1974; Parker, 1975).
During a typical ganzfeld (meaning homogenous field) session (Honorton, 1977; but
see also Schmeidler & Edge, 1999), halved ping-pong balls are placed over the
reclining participant's eyes and a uniform light source (often red) is shone onto their
face. This produces a diffuse, unpatterned uniform visual input. The participant often
listens to a progressive relaxation tape via stereo headphones to relax them. During
the subsequent mentation period, which may last for about 15-35 minutes, a
homogenous auditory input is also provided by playing white noise to the participant
and he or she is required to give a continuous verbal commentary of any thoughts,
feelings or imagery that come to mind. The procedure is meant to induce a psi-
conducive state in which the participant is relaxed and has their attention focused
internally; the competing sensory noise is reduced and the constant unpatterned input
creates "stimulus hunger" (Honorton, 1977).
During the mentation period the participant is attempting to gain information
about a randomly-selected target via extrasensory means. In telepathy studies, a
remotely-located sender will be viewing and attempting to send information to the
participant, known as the receiver, during this time. At the end of the mentation
period, the participant removes the eyeshields, views a number ofpossible targets and
then judges the correspondence between their mentation and each of the target
possibilities. The experimenter, or the sender, then reveals the identity of the target
and the participant finds out whether they were able to identify the target correctly.
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Hyman (1985) and Honorton (1985) both critically evaluated 42 ganzfeld
studies that had been reported between 1974 and 1981 but came to different
conclusions. Hyman (1985) concluded that the database of studies did not provide
any evidence for a replicable effect, or any evidence ofESP, and also those studies in
the database contained a number of flaws, such as multiple testing, inadequate
randomisation, possible sensory leakage, and statistical errors. He also suggested that
many of the studies were meant to be exploratory rather than confirmatory. Hyman
found that flaws relating to inadequate randomisation and insufficient study
documentation were correlated with the significance and effect size ofoutcome
measures suggesting that poorly designed studies may have produced spuriously
better results. Although Honorton (1985) acknowledged that there were some
problems with the studies in the database, he had strong objections to the way that
Hyman had defined and coded some of the flaws in his meta-analysis and concluded
that Hyman's flaw analyses were uninterpretable as a result. Honorton (1985) meta-
analysed the 28 studies in the database that had provided a direct hits measure of
performance. Twelve (43%) of these studies were independently significant and the
Stouffer z overall was 6.60 (p < 10~9). In addition, 60% of the investigators had
reported significant findings, which Honorton interpreted as providing good evidence
for a replicable effect.
In summary, Hyman (1985) and Honorton (1985) disagreed about the flaws in
the database and whether the database provided evidence for replicable ESP.
Nevertheless, they both agreed that there was an overall significant effect that was not
due to multiple analysis or a file-drawer effect and that there was a need for better
study documentation (to minimise potential errors and/or disagreements during meta¬
analysis) and to try to identify specific moderators ofperformance. They also agreed
that more stringent studies conducted by a broader range of researchers would be
needed in order to resolve the question ofwhether the statistical effect was due to
ESP or not. They decided that a positive step towards this goal would be to join
forces and publish some recommendations regarding the standards that future
ganzfeld studies ought to reach (Hyman & Honorton, 1986). Hyman and Honorton
(1986) made recommendations on issues regarding the control of sensory leakage,
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randomisation of targets, judging and feedback, multiple analysis, the file drawer and
the nature of studies, statistics, documentation and the role ofmeta-analysis.
The next major development in the ganzfeld ESP debate was the publication
of a meta-analysis of 11 new ganzfeld studies (Bern & Honorton, 1994) that complied
with Hyman and Honorton's (1986) recommendations. These semi-automated
studies, known as autoganzfeld studies, had been conducted by Honorton and
colleagues between 1983 and 1989. A meta-analysis revealed a significant overall hit
rate of 32% (MCE = 25%, z = 2.89, p = 0.002, one-tailed), albeit one indicative of
only a small effect size (k = .59). Bern and Honorton (1994) concluded that these
more stringent studies had demonstrated a significant but small effect. Hyman (1994)
agreed that these studies were methodologically superior but argued that the tests
used to check the randomisation procedures were inadequate. Bern (1994) responded
by publishing new analyses of the randomisation tests to counter Hyman's inadequacy
claim. Nevertheless, all agreed that there was still a need for independent replication
of these findings by a broader range of investigators (Bern, 1994; Hyman, 1994; Bern
& Honorton, 1994).
Milton and Wiseman (1999) presented a meta-analysis of 30 ganzfeld studies
that also met the Hyman and Honorton (1986) guidelines but had also been conducted
at seven different laboratories by ten different main authors. Unfortunately, these
studies failed to confirm the earlier research and the overall performance was not
significantly better than chance expectations (Stouffer z = 0.70, p = 0.24, one-tailed,
effect size = 0.013). Milton and Wiseman (1999) suggested that this failure to
replicate could have been a result of better methodological controls employed in these
studies or that the autoganzfeld studies may have been conducted in psi-conducive
conditions that were not apparent in the later studies. Milton and Wiseman's (1999)
meta-analysis has been criticised for the inclusion of what some researchers consider
to be non-standard ganzfeld studies (e.g., those involving musical targets) but there
seems to be a lack of agreement over what the standard features of a ganzfeld study
actually are (Milton, 1999; Schmeidler & Edge, 1999). Milton (1999) later reported
an updated version of the Milton and Wiseman meta-analysis that included studies
published up until March 1999. The revised database did show a statistically
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significant small effect (Stouffer z = 2.28, p - 0.011, one-tailed) but this was
maintained only by the inclusion of one very successful study by Dalton (1997).
However, Milton (1999) pointed out that the effect size had still not been replicated
and in fact was significantly lower than that obtained in earlier meta-analyses. As with
the Hyman (1985) and Honorton (1985) meta-analyses there are disagreements over
the interpretation of the results (see Schmeidler & Edge, 1999) of the Milton and
Wiseman (1999; Milton, 1999) meta-analyses and these relate partly to the way the
meta-analysis itselfwas conducted. Milton (1999) suggested that future meta¬
analyses ought to be prospective and specific criteria for the inclusion/exclusion of
studies should be made in advance in the hope of establishing whether studies,
conducted by a broad range of investigators at different laboratories, that meet the
Hyman and Honorton (1986) guidelines can replicate the statistical effect and also the
effect size found in earlier meta-analyses.
The major problem with ganzfeld research as evidence for the psi-
conduciveness of the HG state is that it is not clear whether the ganzfeld technique
actually induces an ASC and, if so, how effectively (Alvarado, 1998a). Furthermore,
it is not certain whether the state induced does actually resemble the naturally-
occurring HG state (Braud et al., 1975; Schacter, 1976). There appear to be only two
published studies that have monitored the receiver's EEG during a ganzfeld ESP
study (McDonough, Don, & Warren, 1994; Wackermann, Piitz, Btichi, Strauch, &
Lehmann, 2000) and one (Gertz, 1983) that has monitored it during attempts to enter
the HG state naturally, albeit during the daytime in non-ideal circumstances.
Unfortunately, the McDonough et al., (1994) study only analysed and
reported the EEG findings prior to the mentation period (even though EEG was
monitored throughout). However, they did find that psi-hitters and psi-missers
showed different brain states just before the mentation period; hitters had more power
in the alpha and beta bands whereas missers had more power in the theta and delta
bands. They also found a marginally significant increase in alpha power and a possible
reduction in delta and theta activity following the relaxation period. Such an increase
in alpha activity is consistent with the situation at the very beginning of the HG state
when a person is relaxing (Parker, 1975; Rechtschaffen, 1994). Gertz (1983) found
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that psi-hitting mentation was significantly more dreamlike than psi-missing, found a
significant positive correlation between the dreamlike nature ofmentation and the
percentage of time spent in theta activity, and a significant negative correlation with
the mean frequency of the waveforms. So there is some physiological evidence to
suggest that, the relaxation procedure, at least, is associated with changes in EEG
output that are similar to those at the very beginning of the HG state.
In a recent study, Wackermann et al. (2000) compared the EEG activity of
participants in waking, ganzfeld, sleep onset and sleep stage 2 conditions to see if the
ganzfeld truly does induce a state resembling the HG state. They concluded that
"[CJontrary to the common belief, the ganzfeld does not necessarily induce a true
hypnagogic state, and will surely not do so in most ganzfeld settings." (p. 302). Brain
activity during the ganzfeld condition was more similar to the relaxed waking
condition and there was no evidence of a shift towards slower EEG frequencies, such
as theta and delta, which is characteristic of sleep onset. However, one should note
that in Wackermann et al.'s (2000) ganzfeld condition participants did not undergo
any form ofprogressive relaxation procedure and did not provide a continuous report
of their mentation. These are features ofmany ganzfeld ESP studies and it is not clear
whether these may be important in facilitating induction of a HG state. Although this
study requires replication, it does suggest that the ganzfeld technique does not induce
a HG state and therefore ganzfeld studies probably cannot provide experimental
support for the psi-conducive nature of the HG state.
A number ofexperiments have also been conducted in order to establish
whether there is any evidence for dream ESP. The rationale for such research is that a
large proportion, estimated to be 33-68% (Van de Castle, 1977), of spontaneous
cases ofextrasensory perception (ESP) have been reported during dreams (e.g.,
Gurney et al., 1886). Dream ESP has also been reported frequently by clients
undergoing psychoanalysis (see Van de Castle, 1977).
As with ESP research in general (Sargent & Harley, 1982), the majority of
experimental studies ofdream ESP have focused on telepathy or clairvoyance (e.g.,
Braud, 1977; Child, 1985; Child, Kanthamani, & Sweeney, 1977; Dalton, Utts,
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Novotny, Sickafoose, Burrone & Phillips, 2000; Dalton, Steinkamp, & Sherwood6, in
press; Kanthamani & Broughton, 1992; Sherwood, Dalton, Steinkamp, & Watt, 2000;
Ullman et al., 1989) rather than precognition (e.g., Besterman, 1933; Sargent &
Harley, 1982; Sherwood, Roe, Simmonds, & Biles, 1999).
The Maimonides dream studies (Ullman et al., 1989) are undoubtedly the most
well-known and most successful (Child, 1985). A dream laboratory was set up at the
Maimonides Medical Center in 1962 and research continued there until the lab closed
in 1978. The Maimonides dream ESP research program comprised of 12 formal
experimental studies and a number ofpilot studies (see Child, 1985; Ullman et al.,
1989; Van de Castle, 1977). The Maimonides studies were mainly set up to test for
dream telepathy or clairvoyance but there were two experimental sessions and two
experimental studies on precognition (see Child, 1985; Krippner, 1991).
During a typical Maimonides telepathy trial, the participant (receiver) would
be sleeping in a soundproof room in the laboratory and would be attached to EEG
monitoring equipment. Once the receiver was asleep, a target (typically an art print)
would be selected, using random number tables, and given to the sender who would
then go to another room in the building and be locked inside. The experimenter
would monitor the receiver's EEG all night and once the EEG indicated that the
receiver had entered REM sleep, the experimenter would signal the sender (via a
buzzer). This was to make sure that he or she was awake and to cue him or her to
begin their attempts to send information about the target picture to the sleeping
receiver. After 10-20 minutes in REM sleep, the experimenter would awaken the
receiver via an intercom and ask him or her to describe their dream(s) in as much
detail as possible. The receiver was then allowed to go back to sleep until the next
REM period when they were again awakened in a similar fashion. This process was
repeated throughout the night with the same target being sent on each occasion. In
the morning, the receiver was asked to report any associations to their dream
mentation and to report what they thought the target picture might be. They were
also shown eight or twelve pictures, one ofwhich was the target, and asked to give a
confidence rating for each picture and to place them in rank order according to their
6
Copies of the Dalton, Steinkamp, & Sherwood (in press) and the Sherwood, Dalton, Steinkamp, &
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correspondence with their dream mentation. Complete dream transcripts and target
sets were also sent to independent judges who were asked to give similar ratings and
rankings. Trials were considered to be a hit if the target picture had been ranked in
the top half of the target set (i.e., if there were 8 possible targets a rank of 1-4 would
be a hit).
Child (1985) encountered two main areas ofdifficulty when trying to evaluate
the Maimonides research findings: (1) the analysis had been passed to various
consultants, much of the analysis was not conducted at the time of the studies, and the
raw data are no longer available; (2) some of the blind judges' judgements may not
have been completely independent, even though they had been specifically instructed
not to let their judgement of one picture influence their judgement of others.
However, Krippner (1991) pointed out that the blind judging procedure was altered
once this had become apparent. Nevertheless, Child (1985) concluded that:
The outcome is clear. Several segments of the data, considered separately, yield
significant evidence that dreams (and associations to them) tended to resemble the
picture chosen randomly as target more than they resembled other pictures in the pool,
(p. 1223).
A recent meta-analysis of450 Maimonides dream ESP sessions found the
overall hit rate to be 63% (mean chance expectation (MCE) = 50%) with odds against
chance of 75 million to one (Radin, 1997). Attempted replications of the Maimonides
dream studies (Belvedere & Foulkes, 1971; Foulkes et al., 1972; Globus, Knapp,
Skinner, & Healy, 1968) have been few (Child, 1985) and have not been so
successful, though the conditions surrounding these attempts may not have been
particularly conducive (see Van de Castle, 1977). This lack of replication by other
investigators at other laboratories is perhaps the most serious criticism of the
Maimonides studies (Krippner, 1991). It has also been suggested that the
Maimonides results may have been due to inadvertent cues in the transcripts sent to
blind judges (Clemmer, 1986). In response to this criticism, Krippner (1991) noted
that the transcripts had been examined for such cues or mention ofprevious targets
Watt (2000) papers can be found in the Appendices.
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before they were sent to the judges and, in addition, that this would still not account
for the significant findings based upon the participants' judgements.
A number ofother studies have investigated dream telepathy (Braud, 1977;
Child et al., 1977; Hearne, 1987, 1989), dream clairvoyance (Dalton, Utts et al.,
2000; Dalton, Steinkamp, et al., in press; Harley, 1989; Kanthamani & Broughton,
1992; Kanthamani & Khilji, 1990; Kanthamani, Khilji, & Rustomji-Kerns, 1989;
Markwick & Beloff, 1988; Sherwood, Dalton, et al., 2000), or dream precognition
(Dunne, 1927/1958; Sargent & Harley, 1982; Sherwood, Roe, et al., 1999). These
studies differed from the Maimonides studies in that the participants slept at their own
homes rather than in the laboratory. Some of these studies obtained performances
based on dream mentation that were significantly better than chance (Child et al.,
1977; Kanthamani & Khilji, 1990; Dalton, Novotny et al., in press; Dalton, Steinkamp
et al., in press; Sherwood, Dalton et al., 2000), but others did not (Braud, 1977;
Hearne, 1987, 1989; Kanthamani et al., 1989; Sargent & Harley, 1982; Sherwood,
Roe et al., 1999); one study obtained significant psi-missing (Harley, 1982). Some
studies have compared ESP performance associated with dreaming with ganzfeld or
HG/HP mentation; the majority of these found that dreams seemed to be more
conducive than ganzfeld mentation (Kanthamani et al., 1989; Kanthamani &
Broughton, 1992; Kanthamani & Khilji, 1990) but other studies have found that
naturally-occurring HG/HP mentation is more conducive than dreams (Braud, 1977;
White et al., 1971).
However, although many of these other non-Maimonides studies have obtained
significant positive results, these studies do have some problems. Many of them rely
on few participants and a small number of trials. In addition, some studies conducted
multiple tests of significance using different types of analysis and, in some cases, only
reported the results of some of these analyses.
So, in my opinion, there is evidence to suggest that the HG/HP and dream states
are conducive to ESP although the effect size is small. Although the ganzfeld studies
provide evidence for a similar small effect, it is not clear whether the induction
procedure does induce a state that resembles the naturally-occurring HG state and so
cannot be taken as evidence for the psi-conducive nature of the HG state. There is a
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trend that suggests that the naturally-occurring HG/HP states might be more psi-
conducive than the sleep state which is in turn more conducive than the ganzfeld state.
However, more research involving repeated measures designs is needed to verify this
trend.
OBEs
Mavromatis (1987, p. 131) has argued that OBEs and HG/HP phenomena are similar
in terms of the psychophysical conditions in which they occur and also in terms of
their phenomenology. If this is true then a greater understanding of the HG/HP state
may lead to a greater understanding of the nature ofOBEs and vice versa.
Many OBE induction procedures tend to encourage HG-like states or use the
HG state as a starting point (Mavromatis, 1987; Palmer, 1978a). OBE induction
techniques often tend to promote physical relaxation, sensory restriction or
bombardment, as well as positive expectations and motivation (Blackmore, 1982a;
Irwin, 1994a, p. 228). Imagery generation and control is also used in some
techniques (see Blackmore, 1982a, pp. 94-106). Muldoon and Carrington
(1929/1974, p. 70) suggested that 'astral catalepsy' (which is similar to 'sleep
paralysis') is conducive to voluntary OBEs, particularly if it occurs in the HP state.
Green (1968, pp. 58-59) gives an example of a deliberate attempt to induce an OBE
by one ofher participants:
Each night in bed, lying on my back, I relaxed my body piece by piece, starting from the toes
until, finally reaching the eyes, one was supposed to concentrate on an imaginary void
between the eyebrows, then, filling it with a flower image, allow this to develop into full
flower.
For weeks 1 simply fell asleep at waist level, as it were, and gradually the idea of leaving
the physical body became neglected, although the ritual of relaxing had become a habit. . .
Then one night in the drowsy state before sleep I was aware of a small sensation which
might be likened to a tablet of soap slipping from one's grasp in the bath. I was awake ... I
turned to look at my husband and was vaguely surprised to find that 1 was looking down on
him and as I looked I rose higher and saw my sleeping form next to his.
These OBE induction techniques are similar to a technique for inducing HG images
described by Playfair (1985, p. 108):
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I soon found I could have a hypnagogic image almost every time i wanted one, and here is
what 1 do....I close my eyes and think 'blue' until my field of vision goes uniformly blue.
Then 1 go into a state of what Zen teachers call relaxed concentration, which is the same as
what the biofeedback scientists call passive volition. This involves doing absolutely nothing
except lie and wait for something to happen and—most importantly—assume that something
is going to happen. You must make no conscious effort, but you must have no doubts at all.
Just switch off your left mind and wait. You might find it helpful to visualise yourself going
round a large empty room turning off lights and pulling out plugs until the left mind is all
dark and silent.
Next I imagine 1 am the only spectator at a vast open-air drive-in cinema somewhere up
a mountain, waiting for the programme to begin, and not knowing (or caring) what the film is
to be. Then I usually notice small stars appearing here and there. I choose one and
concentrate on it in a vague and disinterested way. Sometimes it disappears, in which case 1
simply wait for the next one. Eventually, one of the stars explodes into a fully-formed
hypnagogic image. These images tend to wobble around a bit, but can be kept still with
practice.
Palmer (1978a) has attempted to develop experimental procedures for inducing OBEs
in participants who do not necessarily have a history ofOBEs or paranormal
experiences. If participants successfully had an OBE during a session, they were
required to try to visit another room and look at a randomly-selected target picture.
The procedures used included progressive relaxation, use of a rotating spiral disk,
monotonous tones, vibrations and ganzfeld techniques. Use of the spiral disk and the
vibrating bed were not found to be very conducive (Palmer, 1978a). Palmer (1978a)
reported that, over four studies, half of the participants reported at least one
experience that they believed to be an OBE. Most of these OBEs occurred
spontaneously and participants did not have much control over them. When the
induction procedure involved monotonous masking of sound and eyeshields or closed
eyes, participants who reported OBEs scored significantly better than chance at
correctly identifying the remote targets and also performed significantly better than
participants who did not report OBEs (Palmer, 1978a). This could be interpreted as
meaning that participants were actually able to leave the room to view the target or,
alternatively, perhaps the OBE state is simply conducive to ESP.
In a more recent study, McCreery and Claridge (1996a, 1996b) attempted to
induce OBEs experimentally in a group ofparticipants who had experienced at least
one OBE in the past and also in a control group. They used a method similar to that
developed by Palmer and colleagues. Imagery reported by participants in McCreery
and Claridge's (1996a) study included visual imagery, weightlessness, distortions of
body image and isolated cases of auditory and tactile imagery. Five of the 40
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participants reported feeling as if they had actually left their body; three were
uncertain or felt that they had almost succeeded. OBE induction procedures that
attempt to induce features of the psi-conducive state, one form ofwhich might be a
HG-like state, do seem to have had some success in inducing OBEs.
A small number ofexperimental studies have monitored the psychophysiology
of individuals who are able to induce OBEs voluntarily or who experience OBEs fairly
regularly (see Blackmore, 1982a, pp. 121-132; Krippner, 1996; Morris, Harary, Janis,
Hartwell, & Roll, 1978; Osis & Mitchell, 1977; Tart, 1967, 1968, 1969a; Twemlow,
1977). During these sessions, these individuals have either been in a state of relaxed
wakefulness or in a sleep-related state.
The results suggest that there may be some unusual EEG activity, perhaps
indicative ofmixed dissociated states, in some individuals as they are trying to induce
an OBE. For example, Miss Z experienced rapid eye movements (REMs) during
Stage 1 sleep (Tart, 1968); Robert Monroe's EEG activity showed unusually varied
alpha and high voltage theta waves and his sleep patterns seemed to be lacking in
Stages 3 and 4 (Tart, 1967); in a 1966 study involving an individual who reported
occasional OBEs, the EEG for the period of sleep in which an OBE was reported
showed "an unusual pattern of slow brain waves in the theta and delta frequencies,
interrupting REM sleep..." (Krippner, 1996, p. 90).
Research into the psychophysiology of the HG state has found some
similarities with that during OBEs, particularly if the OBEs are sleep-related. Studies
ofEEG activity during the transition to sleep have found that the shift can be quite
abrupt and that there are frequent fluctuations between wakefulness and sleep (Baddia
et al., 1994; Oswald, 1962, p. 100). The studies ofMiss Z and Robert Monroe, who
both went to sleep during their OBE sessions, tentatively suggested that their OBEs
may have occurred during Stage 1 sleep or the transition to Stage 2 (Tart, 1967,
1968, 1969a). Their EEG traces were also interrupted by periods ofdrowsy, relaxed
wakefulness and showed periods of alphoid and theta activity and few or no REMs
(Tart, 1967, 1968, 1969a; Twemlow, 1977). Although Tart (1968) suggests that
Miss Z's OBEs could have occurred during the E1G state, he notes that the level of
alphoid activity in her EEG was not typical of the HG state.
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It is also interesting to note that in McCreery and Claridge's (1996b) study,
the average median EEG frequency over time for both brain hemispheres tended to be
higher in the OBE group and in the alpha band (min. 8.8Hz, max. 9.7Hz) and the
EEG in the right hemisphere for the OBE group tended to increase across the task.
The median EEG frequency in the left hemisphere for the OBE group and in both
hemispheres in the control group decreased across the task. As Healy (1986) points
out, other participants such as Keith Harary and Ingo Swann have also reported
OBEs during non-theta states.
Some of the OBE studies were carried out with Ingo Swann and Blue Harary,
who did not sleep but were both relaxed and awake during the trials (Osis & Mitchell,
1977; Morris et al., 1978). As with Miss Z, Swann's results demonstrated flattened
EEG activity and a decrease in alpha during his OBE (Blackmore, 1982a; Mitchell,
1978; Osis & Mitchell, 1977). Osis and Mitchell (1977) also noted that Swann's eye
movements tended to stop whilst he was experiencing his OBEs. Blue Harary also
showed slightly fewer eye movements during his OBEs but no significant change in
alpha frequency or percentage alpha time, although there was a reduction in
percentage alpha time in the right hemisphere (Morris et al., 1978). Studies using
home-monitoring equipment have suggested that brief periods of eyelid quiescence
are correlated with a reduction in alpha and may precede the appearance ofHG
imagery (Rowley, Stickgold, & Hobson, 1998; Stickgold & Hobson, 1994).
In summary, it is clear that both OBEs and HG/HP phenomena can occur in
similar psychophysical conditions and that some people may have some degree of
control over when they occur and how the experience progresses. Physical
relaxation, sensory restriction or bombardment, emotional calm and positive
expectations or passive volition all seem to be conducive factors. The results of the
physiological studies ofOBEs suggest that there is no precise and discrete
physiological state associated with the OBE (Blackmore, 1982a). However, there is
some evidence that sleep-related OBEs may be associated with some unusual EEG
activity and may take place during the HG state (roughly equivalent to Stage 1 sleep)
or the transition to sleep Stage 2. These stages may contain alpha and theta activity
and fewer or no REMs and may be interrupted by periods ofwakefulness. There is
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also some evidence that flattening ofEEG activity may occur in both waking and
sleep-related OBEs.
There are also phenomenological similarities between HG/HP experiences and
OBEs. For example, various HG/HP features have also been reported before, during,
or just after OBEs (e.g., Green & McCreery, 1994; Mavromatis, 1983, 1987;
Muldoon & Carrington, 1929/1974). In the following section, some of the similarities
and differences between HG/HP and OBE features, with reference to selected
quotations from accounts ofboth kinds ofexperiences, will be outlined.
Both HG/HP imagery and OBEs may gradually develop or may suddenly
become apparent; some people may also be able to induce or control them in some
way. Some people have also reported being able to hold a conversation during these
experiences (Blackmore, 1982a, pp. 2-3; Mavromatis, 1987, p. 28).
Features common both to the HG/HP states and OBEs include imagery of
various modalities (especially body schema distortions, visual, auditory, movement,
bodily, thermal and tactile sensations). Experients may report heightened senses
(Arnold-Forster, 1921, p. 161; Green, 1968, p. 72; Mavromatis, 1987, p. 136) during
the experiences, which often tend to be mainly visual and auditory with some
sensations ofmovement. Sleep paralysis has been reported before, during or just after
OBEs (e.g., Green, 1968, p. 60-61; Green & McCreery, 1994, p. 78, 84; Harary,
1978, p. 268; Muldoon & Carrington, 1929/1974, p. 70; Salley, 1982). Bodily shocks
or jerks, which are similar to sleep starts, have also been reported towards the end of
OBEs (Alvarado & Zingrone, 1997; Irwin, 1994a, p. 229; Oswald, 1959). HG/HP
and OBE experiences can also be terminated by some form ofexcitement (Blackmore,
1982a; Mavromatis, 1987, p. 139).
I was jolted back into my body. I felt as if I had crash-landed into it. It was painful, jarring
my body, especiallymy head and neck, and I felt shocked. (Alvarado & Zingrone, 1997, p.
305). [OBE]
A sensation of falling or tripping, which caused me to jerk or move, waking myself up
[HG/HP]
The visual imagery experienced during OBEs and the HG/HP states may be
very detailed, colourful, detailed and may seem to be strangely illuminated. Percipients
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sometimes report that the imagery is viewed from an illusory perspective, such as
from above (Alvarado, 1997b; Mavromatis, 1987).
I remember turning my head and looking downwards at myself lying flat on my back in bed.
(Green, 1968, p. 43). [OBE]
Once as a child, 1 had the sensation of looking down upon my sleeping body. (This person
did not report that their centre of awareness seemed to be outside of their body). [HG/HP]
In terms of similarities between the visual imagery experienced, both HG/HP
imagery and OBE imagery may develop from mist or clouds or may be seen within a
circular opening (Gurney et al., 1886, p. 277; Leaning, 1925, p. 313; Purcell, 1997;
Whiteman, 1978, p.278):
Surroundings viewed may be similar to the actual surroundings or may involve
familiar or unfamiliar land- and sea-scapes (Blackmore, 1982a; Leaning, 1925;
Mavromatis, 1987).
From the ceiling I could apparently see the room quite clearly. I saw the desk, chairs,
window, my friends and myself all from above....! visited Paris and New York and flew over
South America....In the Mediterranean I visited 'a star-shaped island with 100 trees'.
(Blackmore, 1982a, pp. 3-4). [OBE]
Flying and seeing landscapes as if from an airborn perspective. [HG/HP]
The experient may also report seeing lights, faces, figures or entities or may
simply report a sense ofpresence (Alvarado, 1997b; McCreery & Claridge, 1996a;
Mavromatis, 1987; Ohayon et al., 1996).
I was aware of seeing a light to my left side, moving up beside me, perhaps slightly higher. It
was sort of ball shaped, whitish color. (Alvarado, 1997b, p. 280). [OBE]
I once saw a blue glowing ball about the size of a football, hov[er]ing in my room... [HG/HP]
In terms of auditory sensations, voices and clicking, snapping or buzzing sounds
have been reported (Alvarado, 1997b; Salley, 1982). Unusual sensations in the head
and cracking sounds resemble exploding head symptoms in some ways.
The energy surge comes on and I heard voices as usual, though couldn't make out what was
being said. A bit like listening to a radio in someone else's room. A bit like a disc jockey
rambling on but just a few seconds. (Alvarado, 1997b, p. 269). [OBE]
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[V]oices-many-crossed conversations- like listening to a hundred radio broadcasts
simultaneously, sometimes whispers or actual words spoken out loud and seemingly directly
to me. [HG/HP]
I felt roaring sounds in my ear and bright flashes around my head and thumping noises. My
body became lighter and lighter and I felt a strong floating sensation but due to my struggles I
was moving like a yoyo. I did not completely go out ofmy body, but while only with the top
half ofmy body, and then 1 was jolted back very unpleasantly and found myself panting and
aching all over and able to move my body again. (Alvarado, 1997b, p. 293). [OBE].
Felt sensations ofWind over my body and have experienced almost explosive sounds (bangs!)
occurring in my head. [HG/HP]
In terms ofbodily sensations, body distortions such as shrinking and expanding,
vibrations (Harary, 1978, p. 261; McCreery & Claridge, 1996a; Salley, 1982) and
shaking, the passage of energy and weightlessness and heaviness are common to both
states (Mavromatis, 1987; Oswald, 1962).
I realized I was rather small to fit inside a part ofmy own body, and so 1 tried to imagine
myself larger. This attempt overshot and I found myself steadily expanding, like something
out ofAlice in Wonderland. (Blackmore, 1982a, p. 4) [OBE]
Sometimes I feel like my body is growing or shrinking in reference to other things and even
itself! [HG/HP]
I occasionally experience vibrational waves which vary in intensity and which flow through
my body while in an out-of-body state. (Harary, 1978, p. 268) [OBE]
[B]uzzing vibration through my whole body. [HG/HP]
The "surge" is like energy, almost a bit like liquid, suddenly flowing from the top of the head
down the body. (Alvarado, 1997b, p. 269). [OBE]
A pulsating swirl of electrical energy surrounding and eminating (sic) from my entire body.
[HG/HP]
In terms of tactile sensations, people have reported both being touched and
touching objects or other beings (Alvarado, 1997b; Mavromatis, 1987).
[S]ome "thing" enveloped me like two arms clasping my out of body self from behind
(Alvarado, 1997b, p. 270). [OBE]
Sensations of trying to flee and being held back by pulling on my left arm. [HG/HP]
In terms ofmovement sensations, feelings of floating and drifting, falling,
passing through a tunnel, and swinging and rocking have all been reported (McCreery
& Claridge, 1996a).
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I can't remember if I had been asleep or not. I just remember feeling what I called my "puffy"
feeling which is hard to describe. It involved my head and also a spongy strange sensation
like biting or trying to with my gums as if I had no teeth, then sort of shrinking and being
sucked through something very very narrow and I think feeling a sort of pressure like a
balloon being blown up and then deflated. The next thing I remember is being aware with
some surprise of soaring up into the night sky. (Alvarado, 1997b, p. 280). [OBE]
Most common is the sensation of falling. The "pull" is always centered in the small ofmy
back, giving the sensation of being sucked into a hole. [HG/HP]
Falling up through the celling (sic)! Falling upward. Entering or passing through a tunnel.
Entering a state of greyness. [HG/HP]
Similar cognitive aspects of the two types ofexperience may also include a
sense of oneness with the surroundings or a feeling ofall-knowing and understanding
(Mavromatis, 1987, pp. 149-150).
One characteristic that may be common to both OBEs and HG/HP
experiences is that the phenomenology may be the result of the mixing and integration
of both internal and external input that may be from real or self-generated
information. What this means is that the imagery and sensations may be based upon
real sensory input from one's physical body or the environment (which may be
elaborated upon) plus internally-generated inputs. Some of the
psychological/neurophysiological theories ofHG imagery (see Mavromatis, 1987;
Mavromatis & Richardson, 1984) suggest that it is normal sensory data that has been
elaborated or that it is wholly (or perhaps partly) generated within the brain. Perhaps
the HG/HP imagery is the result of the brain trying to make sense of information
presented during states that are a mixture of sleep and wakefulness and/or it reflects a
shift in attention from the external to the internal and vice versa.
According to Blackmore's (1982a) psychological theory ofOBEs, vivid and
detailed imagery, low reality-testing and a reduction in sensory input from the body
(or a shift in attention away from it) are important prerequisites, plus a continuation of
awareness and logical thinking. Interestingly, one of the common features ofHG/HP
imagery is that people do feel awake throughout (McKellar & Simpson, 1954).
According to Blackmore's theory, the focus on internal mentation and away from the
body can lead to the creation of an alternative body image that is not located within
the physical body. So long as the imagery continues to be vivid and detailed, the OBE
will continue; if the quality of imagery declines and/or attention is drawn back to the
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normal body image then the OBE will end. An interesting point to note here is that
some OBEs end with a sudden jerk (Alvarado, 1997a; Alvarado & Zingrone, 1997);
we know too that during the HG state people may sometimes experience sleep starts
(ASDA, 1990; Oswald, 1959), which are basically sudden jerks of the body or limbs.
If a sleep start occurred during a HG OBE then this might draw attention back to the
physical body thus terminating the OBE with a shock or jerk.
A reduction in feedback from the body is also an important component of
Palmer's (1978b) theory ofOBEs. His theory postulates that the majority ofOBEs
evolve from the HG/HP states and that this lack of feedback constitutes a threat to a
person's sense of self. Palmer proposes that a person tries to re-establish the sense of
self; one way of doing this is via creation of an OBE. Palmer also believes that
HG/HP imagery forms the basis of the sensory aspects of the OBE. Although this has
been challenged by Irwin (1994a, p. 245), who argued that the features ofHG
imagery—e.g., bizarreness, disconnected, rapid change, lack of control, tendency not
to relate to self—are not typical ofOBEs, I would argue that HG/HP imagery could
perhaps form the basis of some OBEs. One of the problems with Palmer's theory is
that it is difficult to establish whether or not a person's self-concept is under threat
during OBEs because Palmer suggests that the person is unlikely to be aware of the
threat or change to their body image.
As with Blackmore's (1982a) theory, a shift ofattention away from somatic
sensory input towards internal mentation is also a feature of Irwin's (1985b)
synesthetic model ofOBEs. Irwin postulates that such a shift is caused by a person
becoming habituated to the somatic input. The reduction in awareness of the physical
body leads to an impression that awareness is no longer associated with it. The
somatic input still exists but becomes transformed by synesthetic processes into an
OBE experience. Again, as with the theory ofHG imagery mentioned earlier, it is
postulated that normal sensory input somehow becomes elaborated into a more
complex imaginary experience. Irwin's model seems to differ from those of
Blackmore (1982a) and Palmer (1978b) in that a reduction in somatic input does not
appear to be necessary; in both of these other theories, a reduction in such input is
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specifically mentioned. It also differs in that real sensory input, rather than imagery, is
the initial basis for the experience.
The common aspects of these psychological theories ofHG imagery and
OBEs are that normal sensory input may somehow be transformed, possibly
synesthetically, into more complex imagery and that there may be an accompanying
shift in attention from the external towards the internal (which may be partly due to a
reduction in sensory input). One of the merits of these psychological theories of
OBEs is that they are relatively parsimonious and do not involve astral bodies; they
also take account of the circumstances in which many OBEs occur (Blackmore,
1982a). Although there are great similarities between a number of specific features of
HG/HP imagery and OBEs, where they differ crucially is that in the latter there is a
definite change in body concept/sense of self. Thus E1G/HP OBEs may be a special
form ofHG/HP imagery.
One particular variable that warrants further attention in relation to OBEs and
HG/HP imagery is that of field dependence/independence (see Witkin, Dyk, Faterson,
Goodenough, & Karp, 1974). Field dependence/independence is essentially a measure
of cognitive style: field dependent people tend to perceive their environment globally
and may have difficulty in separating aspects out from the background environment;
field-independent people tend to be more analytical and are better able to separate out
discrete aspects from the background environment (Witkin et al., 1974, p. 35). Field-
dependent people, who may have some difficulty in separating internal and external
sensory cues, appear to be more likely to experience realistic imagery during sensory
deprivation and ganzfeld conditions (Bertini, Lewis, & Witkin, 1969; Reed, 1988) and
are more likely to attribute imagery to external sources (Reed, 1988).
Thus, it would seem that field-dependent (FD) people are probably more likely
to experience HG/HP imagery and that this might be influenced by external sensory
inputs. However, FD people are also reported to have relatively undifferentiated body
concepts and a relatively undifferentiated sense of separate identity and tend to
experience difficulty in differentiating between awareness of their own body and
awareness of their surroundings (Bertini et al., 1969; Reed, 1988). Although it seems
that FD people may be more likely to experience HG/HP imagery, it seems that they
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might be less likely to perceive a separate sense of self (unless this changes during
HG/HP imagery) and therefore might be less likely to experience an OBE. If this is
true then perhaps HG/HP imagery and OBEs may not be as closely linked after all? It
would be useful to conduct some research to test whether FD and FI people are
significantly different in the above directions in terms of their reports ofHG/HP
imagery and OBEs.
Nevertheless, even though these experimental studies support the
conduciveness of the HG/E1P and sleep states to OBEs, they do not indicate that any
anomalous processes are involved. Morris et al. (1978) did attempt to detect their
participant's out-of-body self at a remote location during his OBEs using a variety of
human, animal and physical detectors. The human detectors reported significantly
more impressions of a visit during OBE periods than during non-OBE periods and a
kitten was observed to be significantly less active and less vocal during OBE periods.
However, in two later studies, the kitten showed no definite orientation toward the
location visited by the participant during his OBEs. The physical detectors did not
detect any significant environmental changes either. Even if the human/animal
detectors were apparently able to identify the OBE periods, it does not necessarily
follow that some aspect of the selfwas actually present; the results could be due to
ESP or perhaps DMILS. Although the OBEs themselves are not caused by
anomalous processes, some OBE reports are indeed alleged to have involved some
form ofESP (see Alvarado, 1982, 1997b, 2000; Blackmore, 1982a; Palmer, 1978a).
If this turns out to have a normal explanation too, it remains a feature ofOBEs that
theories of such phenomena must be able to account for.
We will now consider another experimental procedure, designed to facilitate
apparitional experiences, which may involve the induction of a HG-like state.
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Psychomanteum experiences
In recent years, a number of researchers have been using psychomanteum7 chambers
to try to facilitate reunions between participants and their deceased loved ones
(Arcangel, 1997; Hastings et al., 1999; Moody, 1994; Moody with Perry, 1993; Radin
& Rebman, 1996; Roll & Braun, 1995). As Moody with Perry (1993, p. 147) noted,
"The word psychomanteum, taken literally, implies that the spirits of the dead are
summoned as a means of divination so that they can be asked questions about the
future or other hidden knowledge." However, the purpose of the modern
psychomanteum tends to be to facilitate reunions.
Studies have found that from 22% (Roll & Braun, 1995) to more than halfof
the participants (Hastings et al., 1999; Moody, 1994; Moody with Perry, 1993; Radin
& Rebman, 1996), or in one study 85% (Arcangel, 1997), have reported encounters
with deceased persons during their time in the psychomanteum or oracle chamber.
However, not all encounters occur during the session; some (or additional) encounters
are reported later when the participant has returned home (Moody with Perry, 1993).
Prior to a typical psychomanteum session, participants are asked to bring along
mementoes which remind them of the particular deceased person that they wish to
encounter. A facilitator then talks with the participant about the deceased and then
they examine and discuss the mementoes. However, note that the procedure followed
in Arcangel's research differs in that there is not so much in-depth preparation of this
type. Nevertheless, her participants are still allowed time to ask questions and are
invited to discuss their motivation for wanting to participate; in 80% of cases it was to
be reunited with departed loved ones. A unique aspect ofArcangel's sessions is that
all participants are asked "to approach the method with the intention ofacquiring
wisdom instead of seeking a reunion with a deceased loved one." (p. 93). Participants
are then escorted into the psychomanteum booth, which generally consists of a mirror
mounted on a wall in front of a comfortable chair. The booth itself is surrounded by a
black curtain or fabric and is lit by a low-voltage light. The mirror and chair are
angled so that the participant does not see their own reflection, only a reflection of
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darkness, as it were. Participants are then asked to relax and gaze into the mirror
with the hope that the deceased person will appear within it (but see Arcangel, 1997).
When they emerge from the booth, participants are asked to report and reflect upon
their experience.
Reunion experiences may range from a sense ofpresence to seeing vivid and
realistic visual images of a deceased person(s) who is either the designated person or
some other known or unknown person (or occasionally an animal) (Arcangel, 1997;
Hastings et al., 1999; Moody, 1994; Moody with Perry, 1993; Radin & Rebman,
1996; Roll & Braun, 1995). Such experiences can be accompanied by apparent
mental or verbal communication, tactile and bodily sensations, sensations of
movement and, occasionally, smells. A number ofparticipants report that they feel
wide-awake during the experience and they may be convinced that the deceased
person(s) was actually present.
There are a number of similarities and differences between psychomanteum
experiences and accounts ofHG/HP imagery. Quotations from published
psychomanteum accounts and from a recent survey ofHG/HP experiences
(Sherwood, 1999) will be used to illustrate some of these points. This survey was
conducted via a questionnaire posted on the world-wide web which was advertised on
the Koestler Parapsychology Unit webpages. Four hundred and ninety-two
respondents were asked about the content of their HG/HP experiences in a range of
different sensory modalities.
The reasons for considering these two types of experience are threefold: firstly,
there seems to be an implicit assumption in Moody with Perry's (1993) book
'Reunions: Visionary Encounters With Departed Loved Ones' that participants are
actually in a HG state during their psychomanteum experience; secondly, some
psychomanteum experiences have been reported after the session when the participant
is in either the HG or HP state; thirdly, the circumstances in which psychomanteum
and HG/HP imagery are reported are similar in a number ofways.
7 Whilst it is recognised that Arcangel (1997) prefers to use the term "oracle' rather than
'psychomanteum,' the latter will be used as a generic term in this paper.
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In a chapter entitled 'Creating Your Own Psychomanteum,' Moody with Perry
(1993, pp. 164-183) provide some guidelines on how to facilitate psychomanteum
experiences. Prior to the appearance ofany visual imagery, they report that:
Properly relaxed, your arms will feel very heavy and the tips of your fingers will tingle as
though charged slightly with electricity. This tingling feeling almost always signals the
beginning of the hypnagogic state, (p. 176, my underlining).
Later they advise against trying to control the imagery once it has begun:
Attempting to direct images after they have begun will usually cause them to fade away. Why
this happens 1 am not sure, but my guess is that conscious thought brings you out of the
hypnagogic state ofmind where these images occur, (p. 177, my underlining).
These are clear suggestions that the participant is in the HG state, at least
when the visual imagery occurs. However, it appears that Moody's position may
have changed with regard to links between the psychomanteum and HG experiences;
in an earlier publication (Moody, 1992) he seems certain that these two kinds of
experience are quite distinct:
When I began my research with crystal gazing, I assumed that the images were hypnogogic.
However, the results reported here would require a considerable expansion and reformulation
of the concept of hypnogogia before they could be accommodated within that framework, (p.
119, my underlining).
1 have experimented with several altered states of awareness including hypnogogia and lucid
dreams and have had hallucinations following surgery. What I experienced Tin the
psychomanteuml, whatever it was, was in no way related to these other experiences, (p. 113,
my underlining).
Unfortunately, Moody (Moody with Perry, 1993) does not expand upon these
views and state why he has changed his mind.
Another indication that the psychomanteum may induce a HG state (perhaps
too successfully) is that in Hastings et al.'s (1999) study, four participants actually fell
asleep briefly during their session. One of the surprising findings, that Moody with
Perry (1993) noted, is that about a quarter of their psychomanteum participants did
not have their encounter until later (usually within 24 hours). Some of these
encounters occurred during the naturally-occurring HG or HP states as the following
example will illustrate:
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Then I went home. That first night I started having the distinct feeling that someone
was around. I would go to sleep, and it was as though I felt someone in the room. I would
wake up still feeling that someone had been in there with me, but couldn't figure out who it
was.
On the second night 1 woke up and had a strong sense of the presence ofmy father in the
room. 1 could tell that he was trying to talk to me, but I couldn't tell what he was saying.
After waking up that time 1 couldn't go back to sleep.
The next night it happened again. This was the third night in a row in which I went to
sleep and woke up feeling a presence in the room. This time I woke up and smelled my
father's aftershave lotion. (Moody with Perry, 1993, pp. 137-138).
The circumstances in which the psychomanteum and HG/HP experiences occur
are also somewhat similar; one is likely to be in a relaxed state in a darkened dimly-lit
room which may be relatively quiet and free from distractions and external
stimulation. These circumstances share features of the psi-conducive state (Braud &
Braud, 1975; Honorton, 1975; Mavromatis, 1987). The similarities between the
psychomanteum procedure and the ganzfeld procedure have also been noted
(Hastings et al., 1999). In both the psychomanteum and the HG/HP states, one
usually has little or no control over the beginning and ending of the experiences,
though perhaps this might improve with experience (Kelly & Locke, 1981;
Mavromatis, 1987). In both cases an attitude ofpassive volition seems to be
conducive. Attempting direct control, as in some lucid dreams, can lead to
termination of the experience (Moody with Perry, 1993, p. 177). In both sets of
circumstances, the experiences can be extremely vivid and can be considered to be
real or even hyper-real (Mavromatis, 1987, p. 30; Radin & Rebman, 1996, p. 67).
Moody reported that he was quite surprised by how many participants thought their
experiences were real as opposed to imaginary events.
Individuals also tend to report feeling awake and aware of their surroundings
throughout the experience. Interestingly, research has found that one of the features
ofHG/HP imagery experiences that may lead people into believing them to be real is
that they feel awake throughout (McKellar & Simpson, 1954).
I was completely awake, and this was not a dream, it was very concrete, very here and
now. (Moody with Perry, 1993, p. 138).
I'm aware that I'm not really asleep, yet. I'm aware of the room or surroundings.
(hypnagogic imagery).
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There may also be some uncertainty concerning the source or the location of
the imagery; for example, one may not be sure whether the images are real or
imaginary. In psychomanteum experiences one may also not be sure whether the
deceased person (and also perhaps one's self) is actually inside or outside the mirror
(Moody, 1992). There is also a case ofHP imagery involving an apparition that came
out of the area of light in which it had first appeared (Purcell, 1997).
I was sitting in there, and ail of a sudden it seemed that these three people stepped right
into the room all around me. It looked as if they stepped out of the mirror, but 1 felt that such
a thing couldn't be, so I was shocked. I didn't know what was going on. (Moody with Perry,
1993, p. 135).
One night I awoke and looking down past the foot of the bed towards the built-in
wardrobes I saw a circle of light apparently projected on the doors. The circle grew until it
was about three feet in diameter at which point a face appeared in it and began to give a news
summary or similar kind of account; I received the distinct impression that this, whatever it
was the man was talking about, was merely the preamble to some unknown main business.
After a few moments the talking head announced that "the moment you've been waiting
for" had arrived and proceeded to introduce "the penguin". This turned out to be nothing less
than a giant (ie. adult-sized) bird which promptly climbed out of the frame on the wall and
waddled around the end of the bed on my mother's side, (hypnopompic imagery, Purcell,
1997, p. 54).
Although visual is the most common modality reported during both
psychomanteum (Arcangel, 1997; Moody with Perry, 1993) and HG/HP experiences
(Foulkes & Vogel, 1965; McKellar & Simpson, 1954), other modalities, such as
auditory, olfactory (smell), tactile, kinaesthetic (movement), and bodily sensations are
also reported. Psychomanteum (e.g., Arcangel, 1997) and HG/HP experiences (e.g.,
Leaning, 1925; Mavromatis, 1987) may also both involve more than one modality and
these may occur simultaneously. A sense ofpresence is also quite a common feature
ofboth experiences (Arcangel, 1997; Critchley, 1955; Hastings et al., 1999; Moody
with Perry, 1993; Ohayon et al., 1996; Radin & Rebman, 1996). Although a sense of
presence is common to both contexts, with the psychomanteum it seems that the
presence is more likely to be known and positive whereas with HG/HP senses of
presence it is often unknown and can be negative.
I couldn't see her, but 1 knew she was there. I could feel the love of her presence. (Moody
with Perry, 1993, p. 146).
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General awareness of presence/s in room/house with malevolent intent, (hypnagogic
imagery).
With regard to visual imagery, psychomanteum and HG/HP experiences are
similar in terms of the dynamic nature of the imagery and also in terms of the
progression from simple formless to more complex images (Gurney et al., 1886;
Leaning, 1925; McKellar, 1989; Mavromatis, 1987; Moody with Perry, 1993; Parco
Zuliani, 1986).
I saw this mist in there, and to tell you the truth, for just a minute 1 thought you were
going to have to call the fire department because it looked like smoke to me. I finally saw it
was in the mirror, but just for an instant I thought it was smoke. Then I saw colors all over
the mirror, patches of color, and I began to see scenes. Some were ofmy childhood. They
were very realistic. Three-dimensional scenes were all around me. Some of them I
recognized as things in my life, but others not. (Moody with Perry, 1993, p. 114).
Purple & gold nebulae, changing to vivid scenes of people, animals' places in varying historic
periods which flash by in a montage. The scenes usually last for only a few seconds to be
replaced by the next. Have also seen close-ups of faces, mouths, eyes. These vignettes are
extremely detailed and more "real" than life, (hypnagogic imagery).
There is clearly an overlap in terms of content too (Kelly & Locke, 1981).
Mavromatis (1987), based on an earlier classification by Leaning (1925), identified six
main categories of visual HG/HP imagery: (1) formless; (2) designs; (3) faces, figures,
animals, objects; (4) nature scenes; (5) scenes with people; (6) print and writing.
Formless imagery reported during psychomanteum experiences includes
changes in illumination levels (Hastings et al., 1999; Radin & Rebman, 1996), clouds,
smoke and mist (Moody with Perry, 1993), colours and flashing lights (Hastings et
al., 1999), bright flickers, flashing specks, coloured lights and patches of colour
(Moody with Perry, 1993). Patterns, shapes and geometric designs have also been
reported during psychomanteum experiences (Moody with Perry, 1993) and HG/HP
imagery (Gillespie, 1989; Leaning, 1925; Oswald, 1962; Parco Zuliani, 1986).
In terms ofMavromatis's (1987) third category, Moody (1994) reported that
35 ofhis 50 participants had experienced visionary encounters with deceased loved
ones; of these, 25% encountered someone other than the person that they wanted to
see. Interestingly, participants often report that the deceased looked different to how
they did prior to death; this difference is usually a positive one. Arcangel (1997) also
reported that some ofher participants reported apparitions of people whom they did
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not know. In contrast, some of her other participants reported well-known public,
historical or religious figures, such as Marilyn Monroe, Alexander the Great and
Buddha. Some figure(s) may not be identifiable; they may consist only ofan outline
or shadow of a human figure (Hastings et al., 1999; Moody, 1992; Radin & Rebman,
1996; Sherwood, 1999) or the figures may be robed or masked or obscured in some
other way (Hastings et al., 1999; Sherwood, 1999).
I felt so joyful. They looked a lot younger than when they died, more as they had in our
younger years when we were all good friends. Still, there was a difference. They looked a
little different, healthier you might say, or as though they had a lot of energy, a lot of life.
(Moody with Perry, 1993, p. 128).
People (often groups), both known & unknown, mainly females, (those I know aren't quite
who they really are, somehow a variation) many times they seem angelic/faery in nature,
(hypnagogic imagery).
Although figures are frequently reported, occasionally they may be incomplete
or in some cases only isolated body parts, such as a hand or foot or a face, may be
seen (Hastings et al., 1999; Moody, 1992). Such images may gradually emerge or
progressively develop (Moody with Perry, 1993). Other apparitions can also consist
of incomplete human figures, particularly heads and faces (Green & McCreery,
1975/1989).
1 knew someone was there with me, but I had no idea who. Then I saw this shape, a person
forming up in the mirror. I could see him a little bit at a time. (Moody with Perry, 1993, p.
115).
I just saw his head and chest and upper abdomen area. It was not his whole form, but this was
just as clear as looking at you. (Moody with Perry, 1993, p. 131).
Blackness: shadows forming and moving toward me... in the shape of human silhouettes,
usually, (hypnagogic imagery).
Perhaps an upper extremity or hand of a person, (hypnagogic imagery).
Faces ofpeople, who may be living or dead, have been reported during the
HG/HP states (Gurney et al., 1886; Leaning, 1925; McKellar, 1957; Mavromatis,
1987; Oswald, 1962); Leaning (1925) pointed out that one noteworthy characteristic
ofHG faces is that they may appear from mist or smoke or appear within a circle of
light (see also Purcell, 1997, example). HG faces may also appear to be talking to
you but no sound is heard (Leaning, 1925).
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First I saw her from a long distance away, and it was just her face. Then, as she came
closer and closer, she was more ghostly, but not in a haunting way. She was not as bright and
not as solid. Plus there was a kind of smokiness around her. (Moody with Perry, 1993, p.
133).
I saw an array of soft colored twinkles floating around and around. In the center was my
grandmother smiling and waving at me. (hypnagogic imagery).
Apparitions of animals have also been reported during psychomanteum
(Moody with Perry, 1993; Radin & Rebman, 1996) and HG/HP experiences (Leaning,
1925; Purcell, 1997).
Then I saw a peacock. It was facing away from me. Then it turned around, and I was
overwhelmed by the colors. It turned and spread its feathers out. It was huge!
It seemed to have a human face, although I couldn't see exactly what the face looked
like. (Moody with Perry, 1993, p. 154).
Birds flying very fast back and forth over me. (hypnopompic imagery).
Landscapes and other scenes are common to both types ofexperience
(Hastings et al., 1999; Leaning, 1925; Mavromatis, 1987; Moody, 1992; Moody with
Perry, 1993). Images of scenes involving people are also reported in the
psychomanteum (Moody, 1992; Moody with Perry, 1993) and HG/HP states
(Mavromatis, 1987); these may or may not relate to previous experiences from one's
own life.
Then 1 saw colors all over the mirror, patches of color, and I began to see scenes. Some were
ofmy childhood. They were very realistic. Three-dimensional scenes were all around me.
Some of them I recognized as things in my life, but others not....
There were scenes, too, ofplaces I have never been to or seen. Very pretty places. I
don't know where they were or what this was, but I got to thinking that the scenes were all
around me on the sides, so I was in the mirror. (Moody with Perry, 1993, p. 114).
Primarily images of places, whether unknown or familiar ones, (hypnagogic imagery).
Earlier life experiences, (hypnagogic imagery).
There do not appear to be any published accounts ofprint or writing
appearing during mirror gazing.
Although some form of communication with the deceased is usually reported
during psychomanteum sessions, participants often find this difficult to describe and it
is not always clear whether it is auditory or mental in nature (Moody with Perry,
1993). Moody estimated that complex communications took place in nearly half of
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the reported encounters in his sessions. Sometimes these communications can be
more one-sided than interactive. It seems that only in a minority of cases (c. 15%) do
participants feel that they actually heard what the deceased was saying; more
frequently the communication is reported to involve some form ofmental telepathy
(Moody with Perry, 1993). It is not clear whether the nearby facilitator has ever
heard anything during these purportedly auditory encounters.
Common forms ofauditory HG/HP imagery include hearing voices speaking
and calling one's name (e.g., McKellar & Simpson, 1954; McKellar, 1957;
Mavromatis, 1987; Schacter, 1976). However, HG/HP communications appear to be
shorter and more one-sided. In addition, HG/HP speech is not always intelligible and
may occasionally be nonsensical too (e.g., Isakower, 1938). Another potential
difference in auditory imagery is that during the HG/HP states the imagery often
includes non-verbal content, such as ringing and bells (Leaning, 1925; Mavromatis,
1987; Oswald, 1962; Schacter, 1976), percussive sounds (Critchley, 1955;
Mavromatis, 1987; Mitchell, 1890; Oswald, 1962; Pearce, 1989), music (Leaning,
1925; Schacter, 1976), footsteps, humming and buzzing, transport sounds, and
motors and machinery (Sherwood, 1999). These non-verbal images do not seem to
be a feature ofpsychomanteum experiences.
These psychomanteum communications usually involve some kind of
reassurance either relating to the well-being of the deceased or the way in which the
participant has been coping with the loss and getting on with their life. Answers to
problems or questions have also been reported during the HG/HP states (Sherwood,
1999).
"How are you?" I asked.
Her lips didn't move, but I got a mental communication from her in which she said,
"I'm fine and I love you."
I asked her another question: "Was there any pain when you died?"
"None at all," I could hear he say. "The transition to death was easy."
At first I verbalized my questions, just said them right out loud. But before I got a few of
the questions out, the answer would come back to me in a mental form. There was no sound
of her speaking, I just knew what she was saying. (Moody with Perry, 1993, p. 99).
I have heard people calling my name and trying very hard to tell me something....I have yet
to find out what they are trying to say though because my own fear tends to block it out.
(hypnagogic imagery).
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In terms of imagery in other sensory modalities, olfactory imagery is rare in
bothHG/HP (Leaning, 1925; Mavromatis, 1987; Mitchell, 1890) and psychomanteum
experiences, although a participant in Hastings et al.'s (1999) study did report the
smell of incense and fragrances associated with particular individuals have also been
reported (Arcangel, 1997; Moody with Perry, 1993). Sensations of being touched,
hugged or held have been reported in the psychomanteum (Arcangel, 1997; Hastings
et al., 1999; Moody with Perry, 1993) and during the HG/HP states (Sherwood,
1999). As with HG/HP examples (Sherwood, 1999), the tactile sensations reported
during the psychomanteum tend to be passive rather than active. This passivity seems
to apply to other apparitions too (Green & McCreery, 1975/1989; Tyrrell,
1943/1973).
I was so happy to see him that I began to cry. Through the tears I could still see him in the
mirror. Then he seemed to get closer and he must have come out of the mirror because the
next thing I knew he was holding me and hugging me. (Moody with Perry, 1993, p. 93).
So I tried to relax, but I could never physically see her. But I felt her! I felt her kiss me on
the cheek the way we always did when she was alive. (Moody with Perry, 1993, p. 146).
Someone kissing my neck, (hypnagogic imagery).
I can also sense love and someone hugging me...things like that, (hypnagogic imagery).
Bodily sensations ofenergy flowing through the body or inside the chamber,
warmth, tingling hands and bodily jerks have all been reported during the
psychomanteum (Arcangel, 1997; Moody with Perry, 1993; Radin & Rebman, 1996)
and during the HG/HP states (Leaning, 1925; McKellar, 1957; Oswald, 1959, 1962;
Sherwood, 1999). The tingling hands appear to be a feature that participants should
expect prior to their psychomanteum experience (Moody with Perry, 1993, p. 176).
Alternating waves of light and dark, silence and sound, and internal energy waves. (Hastings
et al., 1999, participant 37, p. 103).
There was an intense warmth (physically / spatially) around me. (Hastings et al., 1999,
participant 37, p. 103).
I stayed as relaxed as I could and just looked at her. My hands were tingling, and I
could feel my heartbeat pick up speed. (Moody with Perry, 1993, p. 89).
I felt a kind ofjerk or shudder, vertigo, like maybe I was going to get dizzy, but 1 didn't.
(Moody with Perry, 1993, p. 126).
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Something like an electric shock that passes through me very fast, (hypnagogic imagery).
Incredible heat, extreme cold, (hypnagogic imagery).
Tingling feeling in arms hands feet, and legs, although not at the same time, (hypnopompic
imagery).
Sometimes my arms and/or legs will involuntarily jerk really forcefully and very seldomly my
entire body will jerk, (hypnagogic state).
Participants have also reported sensations ofmovement, such as moving
forward or being drawn backward, walking or gliding, often apparently into or
through the mirror (Moody with Perry, 1993). Similar sensations have been reported
during the HG/HP states (Sherwood, 1999).
I moved forward, not with a lurch but smoothly, almost gliding. I went right into the
mirror, moved right on through....
All of a sudden I was walking, or felt that I was walking, out onto this platform, and as I
did so, they lit up and came toward me, but only so far....
I felt so happy, and I knew they did too. Then suddenly I was drawn backward, and I
saw them receding off into the distance again and 1 felt myself sitting in the chair again.
(Moody with Perry, 1993, pp. 126-128).
Going forward. Or being forced to go forward, (hypnagogic imagery).
Floating, rising, gliding, sometimes slow other times fast, (hypnagogic imagery).
Walking, running, (hypnagogic imagery).
The most apparent difference between psychomanteum and HG/HP
experiences is that during the psychomanteum the participant presumably has his/her
eyes open (Kelly & Locke, 1981) whereas in the majority ofHG/HP imagery
experiences the participants' eyes are closed (Leaning, 1925; McKellar, 1989;
McKellar & Simpson, 1954). Psychomanteum experiences also seem to be much
more interactive; during HG/HP experiences one tends to be much more of a
spectator. Perhaps this is a reflection of the differing motivation ofparticipants in
these differing situations.
Psychomanteum experiences also seem to be more emotional and have more
of a profound effect on people than HG/HP experiences. Perhaps this is not
surprising given the purpose of the psychomanteum. Nevertheless, HG/HP
experiences are often remembered for long periods of time, much more so than
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dreams. My impression is also that the visual images of faces and figures during the
psychomanteum seem to be more stable than similar HG/HP examples.
There is evidence to suggest that both psychomanteum and HG/ HP
experiences can be given paranormal interpretations (Hastings et al., 1999; Moody,
1994; Moody with Perry, 1993; Sherwood, 1998). One possible explanation is that
the apparitional experiences might be real encounters with deceased persons (e.g.,
Stevenson, 1982). However, evidence for such an explanation in the context of the
psychomanteum seems to be primarily based upon the reports of the participants
themselves, which has obvious limitations, especially given the fact that many of them
may still be undergoing the grieving process and have a strong desire/need for a
reunion with a particular loved one. Arcangel (1997) reported that two of her
participants saw unknown apparitions who asked them to pass on a message to a third
party who was able to identify the apparition; unfortunately no detail is given about
the nature of these messages.
Telepathic explanations have also been proposed, for example by Gurney,
Myers or Tyrrell (Gurney et al., 1886; see overview by Irwin, 1999; Tyrrell,
1943/1973). However, these theories are more successful at explaining living and
crisis rather than post-mortem apparitions. Post-mortem apparitions could perhaps be
explained by "the 'super-ESP' hypothesis, which attributes the phenomena to vast
extrasensory powers possessed by persons still alive." (Gauld, 1977, p. 578) but until
we are certain if and how ESP operates it is difficult to say whether or not such a
'super' form is plausible. Much of the information communicated in the
psychomanteum sessions seems to be quite general and/or is information that the
participant is likely to have known already. Useful future research could attempt to
obtain specific veridical information that the participant could not have known in an
effort to establish the possibility ofESP. One obvious suggestion would be to
conduct a psychomanteum study in which participants are asked to gain information
about a remote randomly-selected target. This may help to determine whether any
genuine anomalous processes, such as ESP, might be involved in psychomanteum
experiences.
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It has also been suggested that psychomanteum experiences might involve
some form ofpsychokinesis (PK) effect in which the participant's mental state has an
effect on their external environment (Radin & Rebman, 1996). In support of this PK
explanation, Radin and Rebman (1996) found an almost significant (p = 0.07) overall
positive correlation between a set ofphysiological variables associated with the
participants and a z-score measure taken from an RNG placed outside of the
psychomanteum chamber; in addition one of the seven participants obtained an
individually significant positive correlation (R = 0.288, p = 0.036).
One normal explanation for psychomanteum experiences is that some of them
may be cases ofHG-like imagery. The content is probably strongly influenced by the
context and the needs, motivations and expectations of the participants (which may be
linked also to a desire to reward the researcher for the significant amount of time that
some researchers invest in their sessions). In the psychomanteum context one is in
unfamiliar surroundings facing a mirror and is expecting to gain wisdom or encounter
deceased loved ones (which may foster paranormal and supernatural thoughts); in
spontaneous HG experiences one is usually in familiar surroundings and may not have
any particular expectations other than to fall asleep fairly soon. Research into HG/HP
imagery has found that one's thoughts and feelings at a given moment can be
translated into visual or auditory imagery (Silberer, 1965, cited in Schacter, 1976;
Sherwood, 1999). However, although participants' expectations of encountering a
deceased loved one are not deliberately encouraged by the facilitator in Arcangel's
sessions, her participants have the highest proportion of encounter experiences, which
may seem somewhat contrary to predictions. Nevertheless, although these
participants were asked to expect to acquire wisdom rather than a reunion, 80% had
admitted that this was their reason for participation. Thus, the potential influence of
the participants' mental set and expectations is something that definitely needs to be
investigated to see whether it can influence the content of subsequent experiences in a
psychomanteum chamber. However, for ethical reasons, such investigations should,
perhaps, be conducted with a more neutral purpose in mind. It would be useful to
conduct a psychomanteum study whose purpose was to study the experiences and
imagery reported but which had no connections whatsoever with contacting deceased
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loved ones. Certain suggestions or expectations could be induced and the resulting
experiences compared with a control group. One could then try to establish whether
or not the content ofpsychomanteum experiences is highly dependent upon the
participants' mental set and expectations.
A potentially interesting avenue of research would be to have more than one
person sitting in the psychomanteum chamber at a time. This is something that
Moody (1992) considers to be important; he was proposing to investigate potential
collective apparitions himself but now appears to have changed his mind (Moody with
Perry, 1993, p. 153). If both participants saw the same imagery at the same time then
this might lend some support to the possible objectivity of the phenomena, though of
course both parties could still be influenced by their expectations and possibly by
information provided earlier by the facilitator. There might also be potential
conformity issues too.
As it is, the similarities between psychomanteum experiences, HG/HP imagery
and other forms of imagery, such as ganzfeld (Bertini et al., 1964/1969), sensory
deprivation (Bexton, Heron, & Scott, 1954; McKellar, 1957; Reed, 1974), drug-
induced (Ardis & McKellar, 1956; Kluver, 1942; Schacter, 1976) and crystal gazing
imagery (Leaning, 1925) suggest that, in my opinion, the psychomanteum apparitional
experiences are subjective and imaginal rather than objective and in some sense
physically present. I think these psychomanteum experiences are more likely to be
normal HG/HP-like imagery than actual encounters with deceased persons.
However, perhaps these apparitions are neither completely subjective nor
completely objective? Based upon their discovery of an apparent link between
environmental and participants' physiological variables monitored during
psychomanteum sessions, Radin and Rebman (1996) "postulate that some
apparitions—metaphorically speaking—are short-term vortexes caused by
disturbances in a three-way equilibrium [between mind, body and environment].
When the disturbed state is allowed to rebalance, the apparition dissolves back to
where it came from." (pp. 81-82).
Although there is evidence to suggest that the psychomanteum chamber might
induce a HG-like state, and many participants believe that they have had genuine
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encounters with deceased persons, the evidence for the latter is weak at present and is
based upon the subjective reports of individuals who often have strong needs and high
expectations of genuine experiences. Tighter, more objective research is needed to
try to identify whether any anomalous processes are actually involved.
Chapter summary
A better way of trying to establish evidence for anomalous processes/agencies is to try
to induce and/or study then under controlled conditions, such as in a laboratory.
There have been relatively few experimental investigations of anomalous experiences
during true HG/HP states but many more investigations have attempted to induce, or
allow a person to induce, a state that is believed to resemble the naturally-occurring
HG state. Attempts have also been made to study anomalous experiences that are
reported during sleep, either in the laboratory or in participants' homes. The
experiments (or non-experimental induction) involving the HG/HP and sleep states
have mainly been concerned with ESP and OBEs. There have also been attempts to
induce apparitional experiences using a psychomanteum chamber, which may induce a
state resembling the HG state.
A small number of experiments have been conducted to investigate whether
the naturally-occurring or self-induced HG/HP states are conducive to ESP. Overall,
in my opinion, the evidence suggests that the states are conducive to ESP, perhaps
even more so than dreaming, although the effect sizes are small. Unfortunately these
studies involve small numbers ofparticipants and/or trials and seem to have been
somewhat exploratory. There are problems with the design of some studies too.
Much of the ESP research involving ASCs has been conducted using the ganzfeld
technique, a procedure that is believed to induce a HG-like state. Some meta¬
analyses ofganzfeld studies have concluded that they provide good evidence for ESP,
albeit with small effect sizes, but others have found or concluded that they do not
provide evidence for ESP. The major problem with ganzfeld research as evidence for
the psi-conduciveness of the HG state is that it is not clear whether the ganzfeld
actually induces an ASC; in addition recent research has suggested that brain activity
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under ganzfeld conditions does not resemble that during the HG state but is similar to
that during relaxed wakefulness.
A number of studies have also been conducted in order to establish whether
there is any evidence for dream ESP. The Maimonides dream studies are undoubtedly
the most well-known and most successful but attempts to replicate them have not
been so successful, which is perhaps the most serious criticism of the Maimonides
findings. Nevertheless, a recent met-analysis of the Maimonides dream ESP sessions
found the overall hit rate to be 63% (MCE = 50%) with odds against chance of 75
million to one. Some non-Maimonides studies have also obtained significant positive
results, although these studies are not without their own problems; many rely upon a
few participants and a small number of trials and some studies conducted multiple
tests of significance and did not report the results of all analyses. In conclusion, there
is experimental; evidence to suggest that the HG/HP and sleep states are conducive to
ESP but the effect sizes are small.
There is anecdotal and experimental evidence to suggest that sleep-related
states, particularly the HG state, are conducive to OBEs and that the psychophysical
conditions in which OBEs and normal HG/HP experiences are reported are similar.
OBEs and normal HG/HP experiences are also similar in terms ofphenomenology.
There are also similarities in aspects of a number ofpsychological theories ofHG
imagery and OBEs; for example, it has been argued that these experiences may be the
result of transformations of normal sensory input and that this might be accompanied
by a shift in attention from external towards internal inputs (which may partly be due
to a reduction in sensory input). Nevertheless, even though there is experimental
evidence to suggest the conduciveness of the HG/HP and sleep states to OBEs, this
does not mean that any anomalous processes are necessarily involved. However, some
OBEs are alleged to have involved some form ofESP; this could be due to the psi-
conducive nature of the HG/HP and sleep states rather than the OBE.
In recent years, a number of researchers have been using psychomanteum
chambers to try to facilitate reunions between participants and their deceased loved
ones. This chapter has pointed out the similarities between the features of normal
HG/HP experiences and psychomanteum experiences and also the circumstances in
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which both types ofexperience are reported. It is possible that the psychomanteum
might induce a HG-like state but this has not yet been tested. In addition, there is
evidence that some psychomanteum experiences are not reported whilst the
participant is in the chamber but they occur later when the participant is in the HG or
HP state. It is argued that one possible explanation for psychomanteum experiences
is that they are normal HG/HP imagery that has been shaped by the participants'
needs and expectations of a real encounter with a deceased loved one.
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Chapter 6
WWW versus traditional pencil-and-paper survey
administration
In recent years, psychologists have begun to harness the internet and the world-wide
web (WWW) as a medium for conducting research both in terms of online
experiments and surveys. For those who may be unfamiliar with this new medium, or
at least the difference between the internet and the WWW, "The Internet is a global
network of computers linked by a standard communications protocol. The World
Wide Web (WWW) is a graphical interface to the Internet..." (Clayton & Werking,
1998, p. 545). Information stored on any one computer in the network can
potentially be accessed by any other computer elsewhere in the network. Computers
whose main purpose is to act as a storage and output facility for WWW files are often
referred to as 'web servers'. Other client computers can contact these host computers
whose information is then sent to and displayed on the client machines. Special tags,
known as 'HyperText Markup Language' (HTML), are usually added to web
information files and provide instructions to the client computer regarding how the
contents should be displayed. Each host computer has an internet protocol (IP)
address. In order to access information stored on a particular computer, the client
computer needs to know the IP address (or host domain name) and the directory and
name of the information file. This information, along with the type of server that
holds the information, is known as the 'Universal Resource Locator' or 'URL'.
Computers need software, known as 'web-browsers,' which can contact other
computers, request the appropriate files and which can then receive, interpret and
display them in the appropriate format (see Nesbary, 2000 for a basic introduction to
survey research and the WWW).
With WWW surveys, the questionnaire is displayed on the client computer
screen and the respondent answers the questions by typing their responses into text
boxes or by using the mouse to point to and click on available responses via radio
buttons, checkboxes or pulldown menus. These different ways of recording responses
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are known as 'controls' and HTML documents that include such controls are known
as 'forms' (The World Wide Web Consortium (W3C), 1999). Once the respondent
has completed the questionnaire, he or she will be asked to click on a button in order
to submit their responses to a Common Gateway Interface (CGI) program located on
the host web server. The CGI script will save the data to a file(s) on the server; it can
also record details about the submission, can check for missing or invalid data, can
perform calculations on the data received and can provide messages or feedback to
the sender (Schmidt, 1997; Schmidt, Hoffman, & MacDonald, 1997).
Based upon my review of the relevant literature, I have attempted to
summarise the main advantages and disadvantages of using the WWW as a medium
for survey research (see Table 3).
Table 3 Possible advantages and disadvantages of WWW surveys
Advantages Disadvantages
Access to a large population ofpotential
respondents and it may be easier to
recruit participants from special groups.
Data may be more representative than
university students.
Difficult to determine the exact nature of
the WWW population. WWW samples
are unlikely to be representative of the
general population.
WWW surveys allow savings in terms of
research costs, e.g., time and money.
Respondents require appropriate
hardware/software access and knowledge
of how to use it.
WWW surveys can be more dynamic, can
utilise multimedia technology and can be
tailored to specific respondents.
There may be little or no control over
who participates. Self-selected
participants may have different
motivations and may be more proactive.
Electronic storage of the data minimises
data entry by the researcher and can
facilitate later analysis.
The researcher has no control over the
testing environment or the participants'
mental set.
WWW surveys can provide greater
reassurances concerning anonymity.
Participants' responses might be affected
by computer anxiety.
WWW surveys can enable more complete
sets of responses and respondents can be
alerted to missing and/or invalid data.
Participants may be responsible for the
costs associated with online participation.
Fast administration and return of data There are possible data security risks and
there may be multiple submissions.
It may be difficult to determine the
response rate
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In terms of surveys and psychometric tests, there have been understandable concerns
raised about the reliability and validity of computerised versions compared with more
traditional pencil-and-paper versions. Specifically, it seems to me that there are three
main areas of concern: (1) participants and sampling, (2) technology and the testing
environment, (3) data integrity and security.
1. Participants and sampling
Although the WWW provides access to a large population ofpotential respondents
and facilitates the targeting of special groups (Reips, 1999; Schmidt, 1997), the
constantly expanding number of users makes it difficult to determine the typical
characteristics of the WWW user population. This makes it difficult to establish the
extent to which WWW users are typical, and therefore representative, of the general
population and there are likely to be generalisability problems associated with WWW
samples (Pasveer & Ellard, 1998; Smith & Leigh, 1997). Clearly, any WWW survey
will exclude people who do not have access to it or do not know how to use it.
It has been estimated that two-thirds ofWWW users are male and that they
tend to be white, in their late teens to early thirties with above-average education and
socioeconomic status, and tend to be in educational, professional or managerial
contexts (Buchanan & Smith, 1999; The GVU Center, 1998; Schmidt, 1997; Stanton,
1998). However, this profile is changing and more people, particularly women, are
starting to use the Internet (Pasveer & Ellard, 1998). On the other hand, although
WWW samples may not be representative of the general population (Pasveer &
Ellard, 1998; Ramos, Sedivi, & Sweet, 1998; Reips, 1999; Schmidt, 1997; Stanton,
1998), it has been argued that they may be more heterogeneous and possibly more
representative (Buchanan & Smith, 1999) than samples of university (typically
psychology) students that are often used in psychological research.
Another issue to consider is participant recruitment and motivation. Web
questionnaires can be classified into three types: open, closed and hidden (Bradley,
1999). Open questionnaires are open to any visitor; closed questionnaires are only
open to those who have been invited to participate and participation is likely to be
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password-protected; hidden questionnaires may only appear to a visitor when certain
criteria have been met. Open and closed samples have also been referred to as
unrestricted and recruited samples, respectively (Watt, 1997). Although it is possible
to determine a sampling frame and to control access to a WWW survey, many studies
are open to any visitors. One reason for avoiding access controls is that it may affect
the candour ofparticipants' responses (Stanton, 1998). With open access it is
possible that participants may have been actively seeking out information relating to
the survey area and/or they may have a particular desire to participate in research
(Buchanan & Smith, 1999), whereas in more traditional pencil-and-paper postal
surveys potential participants are often determined by the researcher and participants
are more passive in that materials are sent out to them without their prior knowledge.
However, there is a middle ground where participants in pencil-and-paper surveys can
actively volunteer by responding to recruitment advertisements for example.
There are a number of different ways of advertising WWW surveys and the
choice ofmethod(s) will influence the sampling. For example, the URL for a WWW
survey can be registered with a number ofWWW search engines, which are tools for
locating information (Pasveer & Ellard, 1998; Pettit, 1999; Pitkow & Recker, 1995;
Schmidt, 1997). Details of the study and its location can also be e-mailed to a known
sampling frame or to online mailing lists or newsgroups (Bradley, 1999; Buchanan &
Smith, 1999; Pasveer & Ellard, 1998; Schillewaert, Langerak, & Duhamel, 1998;
Schmidt, 1997) or hypertext links to the survey can be placed on other WWW sites
that potential participants might visit (Bradley, 1999; Pasveer & Ellard, 1998;
Schillewaert et al., 1998). Davis (1999), Schillewaert et al. (1998), and Watt (1997)
have also noted that participants can be recruited via traditional methods, such as
personal, telephone or postal invitation, newspaper and magazine advertisements, or
posters .
Stanton (1998) has argued that participants' perception of the anonymity of
their responses may affect their motivation to participate in a survey and also the
honesty of their responses, particularly if the survey asks questions of a sensitive and
personal nature. The self-selected participation involved with many WWW surveys
may increase participants' confidence in the anonymity of their responses. With postal
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pencil-and-paper surveys, the researcher may know who questionnaires have been
sent out to and participants' confidence in the anonymity of their responses may be
reduced. In support of this potential advantage of computerised surveys, it has been
suggested that computers facilitate self-disclosure (Davis, 1999) and there is evidence
that respondents are likely to be more candid (see Ramos et al., 1998). This seems a
possibility; I noticed that the WWW participants in my survey provided many more
additional written comments than the non-WWW participants, though it is not
possible to tell whether this is due to the administration method or the differences in
the samples. There is also evidence to suggest that the greater the assurances of
anonymity, the lower the social desirability bias (see Lautenschlager & Flaherty, 1990)
and the lesser the effects ofdemand characteristics (see Hewson et al., 1996). So, in
summary, the greater potential anonymity of open WWW questionnaires may increase
participants' motivation and self-disclosure and may also reduce possible response
biases.
Research has also shown that administration modes can interact with
individual differences, such as computer anxiety (see Brosnan, 1999; Tseng, Tiplady,
MacLeod, & Wright, 1998; Webster & Compeau, 1996). What this means is that
individual characteristics may mean that some people may perform or answer
differently according to how the assessment is administered. It has been estimated
that 25-35% of the population suffer from computer anxiety (Brosnan & Davidson,
1994) and that these people will underperform, or at least perform differently, when
asked to complete computerised tasks. However, computer anxiety is likely to be less
of an issue for WWW surveys involving self-selected participants because participants
who are computer-anxious are unlikely to use the WWW and/or volunteer to
participate in an online survey (Davis, 1999), though this is still a sample-biasing
factor. Whether or not the computer format is compulsory or optional, and what is
being assessed, is also likely to influence the effects of computer anxiety. For
example, research has found that computer anxiety can affect the results of computer-
based (but this was non-WWW-based) assessments of cognitive function and mood
(Tseng et al., 1998) but computerised assessments of attitudes and personality have
been found to be generally equivalent to pencil-and-paper versions provided that they
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are not speeded and that they involve some kind of forced-choice response (Bartram
& Bayliss, 1984; King & Miles, 1995). One reason why cognitive tests may be
affected by computer anxiety may be that worrying uses up some of the participant's
available cognitive resources (Brosnan, 1999).
In summary, WWW samples are unrepresentative of the general population,
which leads to generalisability problems, but they may be more heterogeneous and
probably more representative than samples of university students. Participants in
WWW surveys can be recruited by the researcher via traditional and electronic means
but in many cases the participants are self-selected and may have found the survey by
accident or by searching for information on the survey topic. Surveys with self-
selected participants may provide added reassurance regarding anonymity and this
might increase participant motivation as well as self-disclosure. There is evidence to
suggest that computer anxiety can affect performance on certain computerised
assessments, particularly speeded cognitive measures, but the effects are likely to be
less of a concern when participants are self-selected. However, a sample ofnon-
computer-anxious participants is atypical of the general population.
2. Technology and the testing environment
Although a computer with internet access is necessary for participation in a WWW
survey, it is not necessarily sufficient. The hardware and software capabilities and the
speed of the Internet connection will determine whether the survey can be accessed
and how quickly the information can be transferred to the client computer (Bradley,
1999; Buchanan & Smith, 1999; Reips, 1999; Schmidt, 1997). Although WWW
surveys can have an advantage over pencil-and-paper versions in that they can be
more dynamic, can utilise multimedia capabilities (Schmidt, 1997) and can be tailored
to specific individuals, this is only beneficial if the respondent's computer has the
required specification and has a relatively fast connection; multimedia files can be
large and can take a long time to download with a slow connection. If a survey takes
too long to download a person may become impatient and decide not to participate
or, if they have to pay for the time they are connected to the internet, they may decide
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that it's not worth the costs involved (Buchanan & Smith, 1999). Thus, one must be
careful when designing WWW surveys; creating state-of-the-art WWW surveys that
utilise the latest developments may restrict one's population even further.
Computer rather than human administration has the disadvantage that the
researcher has less control over the testing environment and the participants' mental
set (Buchanan & Smith, 1999; Davis, 1999; Reips, 1999; Stanton, 1998). With a
WWW survey, the participant can effectively decide if, when and where they wish to
participate and there might be no contact with anyone involved with the research.
The researcher also has no knowledge of the state of the participant or their
environment at the time the survey was completed but it is assumed that he or she is
in an 'acceptable' environment. Some participants may be in a quiet room at home
but others may be in a noisier environment, such as an office or a computer lab
(Reips, 1996). The variable state of the participants could lead to missing data and/or
response biases. However, this same criticism could be applied to more traditional
postal surveys too. One study by Davis (1999) found no significant differences
between the mean scores on the Ruminative Responses Scale as a function ofwhether
the WWW survey was completed at home, at a campus computing site, or at an
alternative campus computing facility.
In summary, the technological requirements will restrict the population that
can be sampled using a WWW survey and also therefore the extent to which the
results can be generalised. Although with WWW administration of a questionnaire
the researcher has less control over the testing environment and participants' mental
set than if the researcher had administered it in a laboratory context, I would argue
that there is not much difference in the amount of control over WWW and postal
administration of questionnaires.
3. Data integrity and security
Completeness of responses and missing data are always a problem with surveys. One
of the potential advantages ofWWW surveys is that they can be set up to check for
missing data and/or invalid responses and the respondent can then be alerted to this
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fact. Checks can be made by the server's CGI program that deals with the data
submitted by the client computer (Schmidt, 1997; Schmidt et al., 1997; Ramos et al.,
1998). Indeed research has shown that WWW data may contain fewer missing values
than paper-and-pencil data (Stanton, 1998).
In terms ofwho is allowed to participate in a survey, the researcher can
restrict access, if desired, either by only allowing or denying access to computers with
particular identifying IP addresses and/or domain names or by requiring entry of a
password (Schmidt et al., 1997).
Data security and confidentiality is also an issue with WWW surveys. Because
of the design of the internet, it's possible that information sent from one computer to
another can be intercepted; confidentiality cannot be guaranteed unless the
information is encrypted in some way before it is sent. Once the information has
reached the server, steps to protect the data and ensure confidentiality can be taken,
such as periodically removing data received from the server and making sure that the
file permissions do not allow others to change the questionnaire file or the data files.
One potential threat to data integrity is that a malicious person could derive their own
WWW questionnaire that is designed to send data to your CGI program. Although,
this is (hopefully) unlikely, one can guard against this by designing a CGI program
that checks the origin of the HTML document that the client computer is displaying,
i.e., it checks whether the data is from the original survey or not (Schmidt, 1997).
Another potential difficulty with WWW surveys is making sure that the data
received are from different individuals; checks can be made of the WWW data
collected in order to try to identify and remove multiple submissions from the same
individuals). Multiple submissions are quite common withWWW surveys (Pasveer
& Ellard, 1998) but are usually accidental or a result of the participants' uncertainty
as to whether their data has been delivered or perhaps an expectation that they ought
to have received some form of feedback. The latter uncertainties can be reassured by
writing a CGI script that sends a message back to the participant acknowledging
receipt of their responses, and perhaps providing some form of feedback, once then-
data has been stored on the server. One way of avoiding the problem ofmultiple
submissions is to write a CGI script that will not accept multiple responses from the
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same computer (Schmidt, 1997). However, a person who was determined to bias the
results could, in theory, do so by submitting multiple responses from different
locations and different computers; this would be more difficult to detect. The
problem ofmultiple submissions is not unique to WWW surveys though; postal
surveys could also be susceptible to multiple submissions, though if they are hand¬
written, multiple submissions might be easier to detect in some instances.
Other steps can be taken withWWW surveys to try to detect and remove
multiple responses. For example, although it is hidden to the participant, web server
CGI scripts can be set up so that they record information about the data submission
and the computer from which it was sent, such as the time and the IP address and
domain name of the computer, the type ofWWW browser being used and also the
URL of the WWW page from which the data was sent (Schmidt et al., 1997). This
method of detecting potentially invalid responses has been used successfully by Smith
and Leigh (1997). The researcher has an ethical responsibility to point out to potential
participants that such information will also be recorded. Although mentioning that
such information will be recorded may act as a deterrent against deliberate attempts to
bias the results, it may also raise concerns about the anonymity of responses.
However, although the computer will not be anonymous in such circumstances, the
anonymity of the participant can still be maintained, though the researcher could, in
theory, identify a person if he or she knew where a particular computer was located
and that there was only a single user of that machine.
Tests of the equivalence of WWW versus pencil-and-paper questionnaires
Because WWW surveys are a relatively new form of research, there have been
relatively few published studies of the equivalence ofWWW versus more traditional
pencil-and-paper administration methods.
For measures with different modes ofadministration to be considered
equivalent, there should be equal mean scores, similar distributions of scores, the
measures should correlate with other variables to a similar extent, measures should
consist of the same number of factors, items should load on the same factors, and the
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factors should account for similar proportions of variance (APA, 1986; Buchanan &
Smith, 1999).
Stanton (1998) compared WWW versus pencil-and-paper versions of an
employee survey designed to explore the determinants ofperceptions of fairness in
their day-to-day interactions with their supervisors. Stanton (1998) confirmed that
the factor structure of the scale items did not differ across the two versions and that
correlations among subscales were also the same. In addition, the WWW data
contained significantly fewer missing data points and there was comparability in terms
of item variability. However, Stanton (1998) also found that pencil-and-paper
respondents scored higher on two of the scales though he concluded that this reflected
the greater heterogeneity ofWWW respondents but did not specify the nature of this.
Pasveer and Ellard (1998) compared WWW versus pencil-and-paper versions
of a measure of self-trust and found that the psychometric properties were comparable
(e.g., factor structure, internal consistency and mean scores), although the variance of
the scores was larger in the WWW samples (again this was put down to the greater
heterogeneity of the WWW respondents, e.g., in terms of age).
Buchanan and Smith (1999) also compared WWW versus pencil-and-paper
versions of a measure of self-monitoring and found that the internal consistencies
were equivalent and that the hypothesised factor structure was confirmed with both
versions (in fact the WWW version provided a better fit to the model) and there was
no significant difference between the mean scores.
Davis (1999) compared a student sample that completed a WWW-based
measure of the tendency to respond to sadness or depression with self-rumination
with three other student samples that completed a pencil-and-paper version. The
WWW sample scored significantly higher than two of the three pencil-and-paper
groups but Davis (1999) argued that this could be due to the fact that the WWW
sample were more willing to disclose personal information. Davis (1999) argued that
these differences were unlikely to be due to the effects of computer anxiety in the
WWW sample because the participants volunteered to take part in the study and
would be unlikely to do so if they were computer-anxious. In support of the use of
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WWW questionnaires, there were no differences in the internal consistency measures
for the different groups.
In conclusion, the results of the studies to date that have compared WWW
versus pencil-and-paper versions of questionnaires have found that the psychometric
properties are generally comparable. There is some indication that WWW sample
data may be more variable but this may simply be due to their greater heterogeneity
compared with student samples. Although one must always be cautious about the
equivalence ofdifferent forms ofquestionnaires, particularly if they are used for
decision-making and/or have implications for the respondents, the available evidence
suggests that WWW-based questionnaires are as reliable and valid as their pencil-and-
paper counterparts. Generalisability may be more problematic, particularly with self-
selected participants, but might be more likely than results obtained from student
samples. Thus, WWW surveys seem to be a viable alternative to pencil-and-paper
surveys, in some contexts, and also possess many additional benefits.
Chapter summary
This chapter has introduced WWW surveys and has outlined some of their potential
advantages and disadvantages. It has also discussed three of the main areas of
concern with regard to the reliability and validity ofWWW surveys: participants and
sampling, technology and the testing environment, and data integrity and security. A
review of recent studies that have compared WWW with traditional pencil-and-paper
versions of questionnaires has established that they generally appear to be comparable;
the greater variability ofWWW scores in some cases is likely to be due to differences
in the samples rather than the administration methods.
Chapter 7 will describe the methodology and results of two identical WWW
surveys conducted to look for and confirm relationships between childhood fantasy
proneness, childhood sleep-related experiences, and measures of anomalous
experiences and beliefs. The second WWW survey was conducted in order to check
the reliability of the WWW as a medium for collecting data on these variables.
Chapter 10 will describe the methodology and results of a non-WWW version of the
survey which was conducted in order to try to cross-validate the SEM findings from
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WWW surveys of the relationship between childhood
fantasy proneness, childhood
hypnagogic/hypnopompic experiences, sleep
experiences and anomalous experiences and beliefs
The purpose of these world-wide web (WWW) surveys was to investigate possible
relationships between the incidence of childhood fantasy proneness and childhood
hypnagogic/hypnopompic and sleep experiences, and the incidence of anomalous
experiences and beliefs.
The first WWW survey was exploratory and no explicit predictions were made about
the patterns and directions of any relationships; the second WWW survey attempted to
replicate and confirm the findings from the first survey, especially given the concerns that
have been raised regarding the reliability and validity ofWWW survey data, ft was hoped
that these surveys would provide support for aspects of the proposed models.
Method
Design
These surveys used a computer-presented questionnaire that was made available to users of
the world-wide web (WWW) computer network. The same questionnaire was used in both
surveys (see Appendix 1). The surveys used a correlational design to investigate
relationships among the following variables: childhood fantasy proneness, childhood sleep-
related experiences, anomalous experiences, anomalous beliefs, and social desirability.
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Pilot study
Twenty participants, who were members of the Koestler Parapsychology Unit (KPU) or
friends of the author, were asked to complete an earlier paper version of the questionnaire
and to provide feedback on any difficulties or misunderstandings experienced during this
task. In the pilot version, participants were asked to give adulthood as well as childhood
responses to the sleep-related items in Section A. The adulthood response requirement was
removed from the final version because of adverse comments received concerning the length
of time and the effort required. This omission did not affect the study aims.
The author also checked the feedback comments from the first twentyWWW
participants to ensure that there were no technical difficulties associated with completion of
the survey.
Participants
Participants were recruited via the KPU webpages (http://moebius.psy.ed.ac.uk). The
location of the survey was not actively registered with any internet search engines nor were
any hypertext links with other sites made, as far as the author is aware. Although this would
limit possible participation to a restricted WWW population, one of the benefits of this
method of recruitment was that visitors to the site would probably have some interest or
familiarity with the subject matter and would hold a range of views about it.
Participants were entirely self-selected and there were no access controls employed.
Unfortunately, the lack of a known sampling frame makes it impossible to determine the
response rate. Visitors to the KPU homepage were able to visit a section entitled
'Experiments.' Visitors could then follow a hypertext link to the 'Survey of childhood and
adulthood sleeping and waking experiences.' Those who followed this link were sent a copy
of the questionnaire (see Appendix 1) which was then displayed on their computer screen.
Those who wished to do so could go through and complete the questionnaire and submit
their responses back to the KPU server.
178
WWW survey 1
One hundred and thirty-one sets of responses were collected between 14th September and
30th November 1996. Twenty-three sets of responses were excluded: participants who were
less than 18 years of age (12 cases); participants who had submitted their responses more
than once (7 cases); and cases where there was a problem with the responses received (4
cases) e.g., if they were mostly or completely blank. Thus, only 108 of the 131 sets ofdata
collected were analysed.
There were 37 male and 69 female (2 unspecified) participants aged 18-71 years
(mean = 30.26, S.D.= 11.36). Sixty-four per cent of the participants were American, 5%
Canadian, 2% Mexican, 15% British, 7% other European, 5% other non-European and 2%
were of an unspecified nationality. Sixty-eight per cent of the participants had practised or
were practising some form ofmental discipline, exercise or self-improvement program.
Participants were presumably computer-literate to some extent and were also interested in
parapsychology since they had visited a web-site about parapsychology.
WWW survey 2
One hundred and forty-seven sets of responses were collected between 7th December 1996
and 29th March 1997. Seventeen sets of responses were excluded: participants who were
less than 18 years of age (8 cases), participants who had submitted their responses more
than once (3 cases), and cases where there was a problem with the responses received (6
cases). Thus, only 130 of the 147 sets of data were subsequently analysed.
There were 45 male and 83 female (2 unspecified) participants aged 18-68 years
(mean = 30.92, S.D.= 10.42). Sixty-five per cent of the participants were ofAmerican
nationality, 5% Canadian, 12% British, 11% other European, 6% other non-European and
1% were of an unspecified nationality. Sixty-one per cent of the participants had practised
or were practising some form ofmental discipline, exercise or self-improvement program.
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Apparatus
The computer acting as the web server is running under a Linux operating system. The
questionnaire was written in HyperText Markup Language (HTML) and used various
'forms' (e.g. radio buttons, text areas) to collect the responses. Submitted results from the
clients' computers were handled and saved to a results file by a Perl CGI script (based on a
version written by Meng Weng Wong).
Security measures
In order to help maintain the anonymity of responses, the IP address, domain name and
time/date of submission were saved to a file that was separated from the file containing the
participants' responses. This submission information was also removed from the server at
weekly intervals; this meant that anyone who might have been able to gain unauthorised
access to the responses file could not necessarily gain access to information that might help
to identify the respondents. The results file was also copied at periodic intervals of4-5
weeks. File permissions on the server were also set up to minimise the risk of unauthorised
access to the questionnaire and data files. Participants were informed that their IP address
would be recorded and that it might act as a crude indicator of possible attempts to bias the
results of the survey via multiple submissions. Participants were also informed that the data
transmission method was not secure and that there was a risk that a suitably skilled and
motivated person could potentially intercept the information during transit.
To help minimise the potential bias ofmultiple submissions, the file containing the
submission information was checked at the end of each survey. The IP addresses were
placed in numerical order and then checked for identical or similar addresses. If identical IP
addresses were detected then the responses associated with those addresses were checked;
identical or almost identical sets of responses were excluded. Similar checks and exclusions
were also made for sets of responses that had IP addresses that began with the same two or
three blocks of numbers. As can be seen from the 'Participants' section of this chapter, the
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number ofmultiple submissions was small so there were no immediately obvious attempts to
bias the results.
Survey questions
Section A Childhood sleep-related experiences.
Section A was concerned with childhood experiences that can occur just before, during or
just after a period of sleep. There were 30 main items. Participants were asked to estimate
the number of times that each experience had occurred during their childhood on a 5-point
scale: No, Once, 2-10 times, 11-20 times, More than 20 times. This ordinal scale was chosen
because I felt that it might help to minimise the potential unreliability ofparticipants'
responses. All participants' responses are likely to contain some error due to the potential
inaccuracy ofmemory for events that took place a long time ago. It was felt that asking
participants to select from a number of fairly specific alternatives might be more accurate,
overall, than asking them to estimate the exact number of times they had had the experience.
Vaguer scale items , such as 'Often', 'Frequently', 'Occasionally' were avoided because
these words may mean different things to different people.
Items relating to the following sleep-related experiences were presented in the
survey: 1) hypnagogic imagery, 2) pre-dormital sleep paralysis, 3) exploding head syndrome,
4) hypnopompic imagery, 5) post-dormital sleep paralysis, 6) dream recall, 7) dream control
1, 8) dream control 2, 9) dream vividness, 10) flying dreams, 11) falling dreams, 12) pre-
lucid dreams, 13) lucid dreams, 14) false awakenings - type 1,15) false awakenings - type 2,
16) excessive sleepiness, 17) cataplexy, 18) confusional arousal, 19) sleepwalking, 20) sleep
terrors, 21) rhythmic movement disorder, 22) sleep starts, 23) sleep talking, 24) nocturnal
leg cramps, 25) nightmares, 26) REM sleep behaviour disorder, 27) sleep bruxism, 28) sleep
enuresis, 29) primary snoring, 30) sleep choking syndrome.
Symptoms of the classified sleep disorders were based on the descriptions given in
the International Classification of Sleep Disorders (ICSD) (ASDA, 1990). The dream items
were based on those used by Palmer (1979), Blackmore (1983) and on descriptions given by
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Green and McCreery (1994). The cataplexy and excessive sleepiness items were based on
those used by Goode (1962).
Section B Childhoodfantasyproneness
The scale used was based on Myers's (1983) Children's Form (ICMIC) and the original
version of the Wilson-Barber Inventory ofChildhood Memories and Imaginings (ICMI).
The scale used in this survey employed the wording used in the children's version as much
as possible as it was considered to be better than the original. Only items that referred to the
past were selected and items relating to sleep and paranormal experiences were excluded.
The item asking about dancing classes was also excluded since the author believed that there
might be a gender response bias. Items worded "When I was younger" were changed to
"When I was a child" since the scale was to be completed by adults. Participants were
asked to give a dichotomous response of either 'True' or 'False' to each of the 15 remaining
items. The overall childhood fantasy proneness score was calculated as the total number of
'True' responses and could range from a minimum of 0 to a maximum of 15.
The alpha coefficient of reliability for surveys 1 and 2 was r = 0.77 and r = 0.75,
respectively. Kline (1993) considers the alpha coefficient to be the best index of internal
consistency for psychometric scales and recommends that it should be between 0.7-0.9.
Section C Anomalous experiences
Participants were asked to estimate the number of times that each experience had occurred
during their childhood and adulthood on a 5-point scale: No, Once, 2-10 times, 11-20 times,
More than 20 times. The items covered 4 main areas: extrasensory perception (ESP),
psychokinesis (PK), survival of bodily death, and extra-terrestrial life. There were 21 items
covering the following experiences: 1) dream ESP, 2) waking ESP, 3) psychokinesis, 4)
healing others, 5) being healed, 6) apparition/presence, 7) unexplained noises, 8)
unexplained bites, scratches, pinches, 9) communication with the dead, 10) out-of-body
experience (OBE), 11) near-death experience (NDE), 12) memories ofprevious life, 13)
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spiritual, transcendental, mystical experience, 14) deja vu, 15) seeing auras, 16) seeing with
eyes closed, 17) autoscopic phenomenon, 18) seeing strange lights/objects in the sky, 19)
seeing an unidentified flying object (UFO) at close range, 20) contact with the occupants of
a UFO, 21) having been on board a UFO.
Most of the items were based on those used by Palmer (1979); items on healing were
based on Irwin (1985b); items on seeing auras and seeing with eyes closed were based on
Alvarado and Zingrone (1994); items on NDEs were based on Ring's (1980) core experience
features; items on unexplained noises/bites/scratches/pinches were based on information on
poltergeists from Irwin (1994a); the autoscopic phenomenon item was based on a definition
by Dening and Berrios (1994); UFO items were based on types of experiences categorised
by Spanos et al. (1993). The anomalous experience scale scores, for childhood and
adulthood respectively, were calculated as the mean incidence ofexperiences for the two
time periods and could therefore range from a minimum of 1 to a maximum of 5.
The alpha coefficient of reliability for the childhood anomalous experiences scale for
surveys 1 and 2 was r = 0.85 and r = 0.89, respectively. The alpha coefficient of reliability
for the adulthood anomalous experiences scale for surveys 1 and 2 was r = 0.90 and r =
0.89, respectively.
Section D Anomalous beliefs and social desirability
The anomalous beliefs scale was based on the 18-item Australian Sheep-Goat Scale (Forced-
choice format) (Thalbourne, 1995). Seven items from this scale were used together with 13
additional items that covered similar experiences/processes covered in the anomalous
experience scale. The ASGS 3-point scale ('True', 'Uncertain', 'False') and scoring system (2,
1, 0) were used. The anomalous belief scale score was calculated as the mean of the scored
responses for the items and could range from a minimum of 0 to a maximum of 2. The alpha
coefficient of reliability for the anomalous belief scale for surveys 1 and 2 was r = 0.92.
The shortened version MC-1(10) of the Mariowe-Crowne Social Desirability scale
published by Strahan and Gerbasi (1972) was randomly interspersed amongst the anomalous
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belief items. The reason for its inclusion was to check if there was a significant positive
relationship between socially desirable response tendencies and scores on any of the other
scales. The MC-l(lO) scale has 10 items (5 positive, 5 negative). In order to preserve
continuity, these items were answered on a 3-point scale in the same way as the anomalous
belief items rather than dichotomously. However, the social desirability scale was still
scored in the manner used by Strahan and Gerbasi (1972), i.e., total number of definite
responses in the socially desirable direction, minimum 0 to 10 maximum.
The alpha coefficient of reliability for the social desirability scale for surveys 1 and 2
was r = 0.63 and r = 0.61, respectively. These values are just below the minimum criterion
value which is considered to be 0.7 (Kline, 1993).
Section E Personal details andfeedback
In this section participants were asked to type in some personal details, such as their age,
gender, and nationality, and to give feedback about the survey.
Procedure
Participants recorded their responses on the various scales by moving the on-screen pointer
to the appropriate position and pressing the button on their mouse to select it. Other
responses were entered by typing the information into the appropriate textboxes provided.
At the end, participants were provided with an on-screen button (labelled "PLEASE PRESS
HERE TO SEND IN YOUR COMPLETED RESPONSES") which sent the data to, and
stored it on the Koestler web server. Once it had been stored, each participant received an
on-screen message indicating that their responses had been recorded and indicating that they
had the right to withdraw their data at any time should they wish to do so.
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Results forWWW surveys 1 and 2
For both surveys, alpha coefficients of reliability were calculated using SPSS for Windows
6.0 and 95, respectively. Descriptive statistics were calculated using Systat for Windows
5.04 in survey 1 and SPSS for Windows in survey 2. Critical values for determining the
significance level of the Spearman correlations for survey 1 were calculated by hand using a
formula for conversion to z-scores (see Siegel & Castellan, 1988); for survey 2 the
significant levels were provided by SPSS for Windows 95.
This survey resulted in the calculation of a high number of Spearman correlation
coefficients. The problem with multiple testing is that if the same alpha level is used per test
and a large number of tests are conducted then the overall likelihood of a Type I error (i.e.,
rejecting a null hypothesis when it is true) will increase. With an a = 0.05 per test we would
expect at least one in every twenty correlation coefficients to be spuriously significant. To
try to adjust for the multiple testing problem, and to help minimise the overall error rate for
the study, a corrected alpha level per comparison (and corresponding criterion value for the
correlation coefficient) was calculated for each survey for each table ofcorrelations using
the Bonferroni adjustment technique. Thus, the original alpha level for comparison (0.05)
was divided by the number of correlation coefficients in a given table in order to give an
adjusted criterion probability value. This probability value was then divided by two for
survey 1 (because of non-directional hypotheses), the corresponding value of z was obtained
from statistical tables (Clark-Carter, 1997) and this was then used to calculate the adjusted
criterion value for Spearman's rho using the equation z = rs (square root ofn-1) (see Clark-
Carter, 1997, p. 521).
Note that the significance values in Tables 3-10 are unadjusted and usep = 0.05 per
comparison. The adjusted criterion value for Spearman's rho for Tables 6-7, 9-10, 12-13
are as follows:
Table 6 0.05/150 = 0.000333 z = 3.60 for p = 0.00032, two-tailed, rs = 0.348
Table 7 0.05/150 = 0.000333 z = 3.41 for p = 0.00032, one-tailed, rs = 0.300
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Table 9 0.05/10 = 0.005 z =
Table 10 0.05/10 = 0.005 z =
Table 12 0.05/435 = 0.0001149 z =
Table 13 0.05/435 = 0.0001149 z =
2.81 for p = 0.005, two-tailed, rs = 0.272
2.58 for p = 0.0049, one-tailed, rs = 0.227
3.87 for p = 0.0001, two-tailed, rs = 0.374
3.69 for p = 0.00011, one-tailed, rs = 0.325
Childhood hypnagogic/hypnopompic and sleep experiences
Table 4 shows that the incidence of the childhood HG experiences (i.e. imagery, exploding
head symptoms, pre-dormital sleep paralysis) reported in survey 2 was only 1.0-2.5% less
than in survey 1; the incidence of hypnopompic imagery and post-dormital sleep paralysis
was approximately 7-8% lower than in survey 1. Table 4 also shows that, in both surveys,
hypnagogic imagery was reported more frequently than either hypnopompic imagery or
exploding head symptoms. Table 4 also shows that, in survey 1, post-dormital sleep
paralysis was reported slightly more frequently than pre-dormital sleep paralysis but in
survey 2 the reverse was true.
The incidences of the majority of the childhood sleep and dream experiences
reported in survey 2 were within 1 -6% of the incidences from the previous survey.
However, the difference between the samples was greater in some cases, e.g., symptoms of
sleep terrors (65.7% vs. 80.0%), REM sleep behaviour disorder (54.6% vs. 44.4%),
rhythmic movement disorder (29.6% vs. 36.9%), excessive sleepiness (41.7% vs. 30.8%),
cataplexy (38.9% vs. 30.0%). Table 4 also shows that, in both surveys, dreams, particularly
vivid ones, were some of the most frequently reported childhood sleep experiences. Dreams
of flying and falling, pre-lucid and lucid dreams and dream control were reported by more
than two-thirds of the participants. Type 1 false awakenings were also reported by more
than two-thirds of the participants though type 2 episodes involving a tense atmosphere and
feelings of foreboding were reported by just under half. At least one frightening dream,
which had awakened the sleeper (which may be suggestive of a nightmare), was reported by
almost all of the participants; sudden awakenings from sleep accompanied by a vocal
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outburst (which may be suggestive of a sleep terror) were reported by 65-80% of the
participants.
Ofthe remaining possible symptoms ofchildhood sleep disorders, at least one
episode of sleep talking, confusional arousals or sleep starts was reported by more than
three-quarters of the participants.
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Table 4 Descriptive statistics for the childhood incidence of the various
hypnagogic and hypnopompic and sleep experiences forWWW surveys
1 and 2
Variable % at least one Mean3 SD
experience Response
WWW1 WWW2 WWW1 WWW2 WWW1 WWW
Hypnagogic imagery 76.9 75.4 3.58 3.45 1.63 1.59
Hypnopompic imagery 67.6 60.8 2.92 2.68 1.54 1.57
Exploding head symptoms 50.0 47.7 2.49 2.42 1.62 1.64
Pre-dormital sleep paralysis 46.3 45.4 2.16 2.17 1.45 1.49
Post-dormital sleep paralysis 49.1 40.8 2.25 2.11 1.47 1.45
Dream recall 98.1 98.5 4.71 4.76 0.78 0.78
Dream control 1 80.6 80.0 3.37 3.54 1.46 1.52
Dream control 2 69.4 67.7 3.01 3.01 1.57 1.64
Dream vividness 95.4 98.5 4.22 4.43 1.15 0.95
Flying dreams 77.8 81.5 3.28 3.58 1.52 1.52
Falling dreams 80.6 86.2 3.39 3.64 1.52 1.39
Pre-lucid dreams 75.0 72.3 2.91 2.86 1.44 1.43
Lucid dreams 67.6 73.8 2.77 3.13 1.48 1.55
False awakenings - type 1 71.3 70.8 2.69 2.88 1.35 1.49
False awakenings - type 2 45.4 48.5 2.09 2.32 1.38 1.55
Sleep terrors'5 65.7 80.0 2.74 3.05 1.47 1.38
Nightmares'5 93.5 96.2 3.92 4.05 1.17 1.11
REM sleep behavior disorderb 44.4 54.6 2.11 2.29 1.39 1.38
Sleep chokingb 20.4 26.2 1.50 1.58 1.10 1.09
Sleepwalking 53.7 55.4 2.20 2.33 1.31 1.39
Sleep talking 83.3 83.1 3.53 3.65 1.46 1.44
Confusional arousals 82.4 83.1 3.20 3.37 1.32 1.36
Rhythmic movement disorder 29.6 36.9 1.95 2.16 1.57 1.65
Nocturnal leg cramps 53.7 54.6 2.43 2.58 1.54 1.57
Bruxism (teethgrinding) 50.0 48.5 2.51 2.52 1.68 1.74
Enuresis (bedwetting) 47.2 51.5 2.03 2.02 1.36 1.20
Snoring 59.3 62.3 2.53 2.83 1.47 1.63
Sleep starts 79.6 81.5 3.69 3.74 1.54 1.49
Excessive sleepiness 41.7 30.8 2.05 1.83 1.38 1.36
Cataplexy 38.9 30.0 1.89 1.70 1.26 1.22
3 5-point scale: 1= No, 2= Once, 3= 2-10 times, 4= 11-20 times, 5= More than 20 times
b These items covered the main symptom of these sleep disorders. Note that agreement with these items
does not indicate a definitive diagnosis.
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Table 5 Descriptive statistics for the childhood and adulthood
anomalous experiences, anomalous beliefs, social desirability and
childhood fantasy proneness forWWW surveys 1 and 2
Variable Mean SD
Response
WWW1 WWW2 WWW1 WWW2
Childhood anomalous experiences 1.72a 1.71 0.55 0.61
Adulthood anomalous experiences 1.99a 1.92 0.68 0.66
Anomalous beliefs 1.55b 1.51 0.37 0.40
Social desirability 3.19C 3.35 2.06 1.97
Childhood fantasy proneness 8.07d 7.76 3.25 3.16
a Anomalous experiences 5-point scale: 1= No, 2= Once, 3= 2-10 times, 4= 11-20 times, 5= More than
20 times
b Anomalous beliefs 3-point scale: 0= False, 1= Uncertain, 2= True
c Social desirability: possible range = minimum 0-10 maximum
d Childhood fantasy proneness: possible range = minimum 0-15 maximum
Table 5 shows that, for both surveys 1 and 2, the number of childhood and adulthood
anomalous experiences reported was quite low; on average respondents reported no more
than a single episode. However, the mean level ofanomalous beliefs was towards the high
end of the scale. The mean childhood fantasy proneness score fell around the midpoint of
the scale. The mean social desirability score was towards the lower end of the scale, which
suggests that, on average, participants did not have a high tendency to give socially desirable
responses to questions.
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Table 6 Spearman's rho correlations between the incidence of
childhood hypnagogic/hypnopompic and sleep experiences, and the
incidence of childhood and adulthood anomalous experiences, the level
of anomalous beliefs, social desirability and childhood fantasy
proneness (WWW survey 1)
Childhood experiences Child AE Adult AE Beliefs Social des. Child FP
Hypnagogic imagery .413 *** .391 *** .239 * - .007 .256 **
Hypnopompic imagery .441 *** .364 *** .142 .109 .124
Exploding head symptoms .359 *** .347 *** .262 ** .096 .218 *
Pre-dormital sleep paralysis .374 *** .327 *** .163 .072 .249 *
Post-dormital sleep paralysis .258 ** .233 * .147 .295** - .007
Dream recall .201 * .115 - .021 .061 .099
Dream control 1 .305 ** .202 * - .029 - .037 .263 **
Dream control 2 .399 *** .233 * -. 026 .060 .233 *
Dream vividness .280 ** .257 ** - .041 - .133 .149
Flying dreams .234 * .229 * - .029 .062 .226 *
Falling dreams .304 ** .249 * .031 .066 .155
Pre-lucid dreams .315 ** .188 - .111 .045 .157
Lucid dreams .426 *** .265 ** - .024 .052 .209 *
False awakenings (type 1) .156 .129 - .013 - .120 .195 *
False awakenings (type 2) .346 *** .284 ** .151 .117 .154
Sleep terrors .398 *** .309 ** .111 .147 .154
Nightmares .285 ** .284 ** - .010 .112 .154
REM sleep behaviour disord. .272 ** .249 * - .047 - .014 .334 ***
Sleep choking .286 ** .204 * .108 - .024 .141
Sleepwalking .280 ** .249 ** . 073 - .055 .234 *
Sleep talking .237 * .141 - .136 - .147 .225 *
Confusional arousals .235 * .102 .089 - .103 .257 **
Rhythmic movement disorder .228 * .112 .024 .145 - .066
Nocturnal leg cramps .431 *** .369 *** .104 .058 .296 **
Bruxism (teethgrinding) .199 * .270 ** .132 .044 .093
Enuresis (bedwetting) - .122 - .223 * - .194 * - .159 .137
Snoring .067 .003 .015 - .216 * .219 *
Sleep starts .145 .102 - .023 .164 - .036
Excessive sleepiness .246 ** .069 .113 .075 .115
Cataplexy .282 ** .434 *** .157 .274 ** .158
* p< 0.05, ** p< 0.01, *** p< 0.001, two-tailed (these relate to the unadjusted criterion values)
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Table 7 Spearman's rho correlations between the incidence of
childhood hypnagogic/hypnopompic and sleep experiences, and the
incidence of childhood and adulthood anomalous experiences, the level
of anomalous beliefs, social desirability and childhood fantasy
proneness (WWW survey 2)
Childhood experiences Child AE Adult AE Beliefs Social des. Child FP
Hypnagogic imagery .514 *** .357 *** .174 * - .031 .156 *
Hypnopompic imagery .437 *** .432 *** .193 * - .036 .142
Exploding head symptoms .510 *** .342 *** .131 - .118 .192 *
Pre-dormital sleep paralysis .484 *** .470 *** .185 * .040 .115
Post-dormital sleep paralysis .348 *** .333 *** .053 - .044 .186 *
Dream recall .008 .069 - .012 - .122 - .017
Dream control 1 .173 * .173 * .102 .061 .246 **
Dream control 2 .186 * .188 * .061 .198 * .178 *
Dream vividness .279 ** .275 ** .171 * - .001 .264 **
Flying dreams .358 *** .355 *** .079 .049 .228 **
Falling dreams .206 * .243 * .023 - .001 .267 **
Pre-lucid dreams .241 ** .196 * .201 * .020 .393 ***
Lucid dreams .362 *** .315 *** .207 * .170 * .180 *
False awakenings (type 1) .264 ** .222 ** .154 * - .046 .363 ***
False awakenings (type 2) .317 *** .279 ** .217 ** - .099 .332 ***
Sleep terrors .348 *** .283 ** .065 - .161 * .209 **
Nightmares .278 ** .192 * .117 - .080 .312 ***
REM sleep behaviour disord. .381 *** .280 ** .067 - .057 .211 **
Sleep choking .311 *** .256 ** .045 - .092 .285 **
Sleepwalking .285 ** .175 * . 039 - .015 .147 *
Sleep talking .207 ** .208 ** . 118 - .014 .118
Confusional arousals .236 * .145 .055 - .144 .265 **
Rhythmic movement disorder .284 ** .272 ** .046 - .005 .321 ***
Nocturnal leg cramps .312 *** .218 ** .035 - .120 .146 *
Bruxism (teethgrinding) .153 * .143 .054 .051 .256 **
Enuresis (bedwetting) .146 * .314 *** .183 * .033 .217 **
Snoring .083 -.023 - .057 - .202 * .114
Sleep starts .120 .096 .074 - .108 .172 *
Excessive sleepiness .256 ** .184 * .102 - .079 .241 **
Cataplexy .436 *** .391 *** .196 * - .048 .297 ***
* p< 0.05, ** p< 0.01, *** p< 0.001, one-tailed (these relate to the unadjusted criterion values)
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Table 8 Spearman's rho correlations between childhood fantasy
proneness, the incidence of childhood hypnagogic/hypnopompic and
sleep experiences, and the incidence of childhood and adulthood
anomalous experiences, the level of anomalous beliefs
Childhood variable Child AE Adult AE Beliefs
WWW1 WWW2 WWW1 WWW2 WWW1 WWW
Hypnagogic imagery 514*** 391*** 357*** .239* .174*
Hypnopompic imagery 441*** 437*** .364*** 432*** .142 .193*
Exploding head symptoms 359*** .510*** 347*** 342*** .262** .131
Pre-dormital sleep paralysis 374*** 434*** 327*** 47Q*** .163 .185*
Post-dormital sleep paralysis .258** 343*** .233* .333*** .147 .053
Dream recall .201* .008 .115 .069 -.021 -.012
Dream control 1 .305** .173* .202* .173* -.029 .102
Dream control 2 399*** .186* .233* .188* -.026 .061
Dream vividness .280** .279** .257** .275** -.041 .171*
Flying dreams .234* .358*** .229* .355*** -.029 .079
Falling dreams .304** .206* .249* .243* .031 .023
Pre-lucid dreams .315** .241** .188 .196* -.111 .201*
Lucid dreams .426*** .362*** .265** 315*** -.024 .207**
False awakenings (type 1) .156 .264** .129 .222** -.013 .154*
False awakenings (type 2) .346*** 317*** .284** 279** .151 .217**
Sleep terrors 398*** .348*** .309** 283** .111 .065
Nightmares .285** .278** .284** .192* -.010 .117
REM sleep behaviour disord .272** 38i*** .249* .280** -.047 .067
Sleep choking .286** 31i*** .204* .256** .108 .045
Sleepwalking .280** .285** .249** .175* .073 .039
Sleep talking .237* .207** .141 .208** -.136 .118
Confusional arousals .235* .236** .102 .145* .089 .055
Rhythmic movement disord. .228* .284** .112 .272** .024 .046
Nocturnal leg cramps 431*** 312*** .369*** .218** .104 .035
Bruxism (teethgrinding) .199* .153* .270** .143 .132 .054
Enuresis (bedwetting) -.122 .146* -.223* 314*** -.194* .183*
Snoring .067 .083 .003 -.023 .015 -.057
Sleep starts .145 .120 .102 .096 -.023 .074
Excessive sleepiness .246** .256** .069 .184* .113 .102
Cataplexy .282** .436*** 434*** 391*** .157 .196*
* p< 0.05, ** p< 0.01, *** p< 0.001, WWW1 = two-tailed; WWW2 = one-tailed (these relate to the
unadjusted criterion values)
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Relationships between childhood hypnagogic/hypnopompic and sleep experiences,
anomalous experiences and anomalous beliefs
Tables 6-8 show that there was a significant positive correlation between the incidence of
childhood anomalous experiences and the incidence ofhypnagogic imagery, hypnopompic
imagery, exploding head symptoms, pre-dormital and post-dormital sleep paralysis in both
surveys. The same relationships also held for the incidence ofadulthood anomalous
experiences.
There was a significant positive correlation between the incidence of childhood
hypnagogic imagery and the level of anomalous beliefs in both surveys. However, in survey
2, there was also a significant positive correlation between the incidence of childhood
hypnopompic imagery, pre-dormital sleep paralysis and the level ofanomalous beliefs. In
survey 1, there was also a significant positive correlation between the incidence ofexploding
head symptoms and the level of anomalous beliefs.
Tables 6-8 also show that, overall, childhood sleep experiences tended to have
significant positive relationships with the incidence ofanomalous experiences but generally
did not have significant relationships with the level of anomalous beliefs.
In both surveys, there were significant positive correlations between the incidence of
anomalous experiences, during childhood or adulthood, and the incidence of a number of
childhood dream variables: dream control, dream vividness, flying, falling and lucid dreams,
type 2 false awakenings, and symptoms of nightmares and sleep terrors. In survey 1, the
incidence of childhood pre-lucid dreams and dream recall were significantly positively
correlated with the incidence of childhood anomalous experiences. In survey 2, childhood
pre-lucid dreams and type 1 false awakenings were also significantly correlated with the
incidence of both childhood and adulthood anomalous experiences.
In both surveys, the childhood incidence of symptoms of some REM sleep (SP,
nightmares, REM sleep behaviour disorder) and some arousal disorder parasomnias
(sleepwalking, sleep terrors) were related to the incidence ofboth childhood and adulthood
anomalous experiences. The incidences of the latter were also significantly related to the
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childhood incidence of symptoms of sleep choking, nocturnal leg cramps and cataplexy. In
survey 2, childhood and adulthood anomalous experiences were also significantly correlated
with childhood symptoms of sleep talking, confusional arousals, rhythmic movement
disorder, and excessive sleepiness whereas in survey 1 they were only correlated with
childhood anomalous experiences.
In survey, 1 there were no significant correlations between the childhood incidence
of sleep/dream experiences and the current level ofanomalous beliefs apart from the
incidence of enuresis which had a significant negative relationship. In survey 2, the
relationship between enuresis and anomalous beliefs was significant but positive. In survey 2
there were also significant positive correlations between the childhood incidence of dream
vividness, pre-lucid dreams, lucid dreams, false awakenings (type 1 and 2), cataplexy and the
current level ofanomalous beliefs.
Relationship with social desirability
Tables 6 and 7 show that, in survey 1, there was a significant positive correlation between
the childhood incidence ofpost-dormital sleep paralysis and the level of social desirability
but in survey 2 there were no significant correlations with the childhood incidence of any of
the hypnagogic/hypnopompic experiences.
In both surveys, there were no significant correlations between the childhood
incidence of the majority of the sleep/dream experiences and the level of social desirability.
However, in survey 1, there were significant correlations between social desirability and
snoring (negative) and cataplexy (positive); in survey 2, there were significant positive
correlations with dream control 2 and lucid dreams and negative correlations with symptoms
of sleep terrors and snoring.
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Relationship between childhood fantasy proneness and childhood
hypnagogic/hypnopompic and sleep experiences
Tables 6 and 7 show that, in both surveys, there were significant positive correlations
between the incidence of childhood hypnagogic imagery or exploding head symptoms and
the level of childhood fantasy proneness. In survey 2, there was also a significant positive
correlation with the incidence ofpost-dormital sleep paralysis whereas in survey 1 there was
a significant positive correlation with pre-dormital sleep paralysis instead.
As with survey 1, there were significant positive correlations between the level of
childhood fantasy proneness and the childhood incidence ofdream control 1 and 2, flying
dreams, lucid dreams, false awakenings (type 1), symptoms ofREM sleep behaviour
disorder, sleepwalking, symptoms ofconfusional arousals, and nocturnal leg cramps. In
survey 2, there were also significant positive correlations with dream vividness, falling
dreams, pre-lucid dreams, false awakenings (type 2), symptoms of sleep terrors, nightmares,
sleep choking, rhythmic movement disorder, bruxism, enuresis, sleep starts, excessive
sleepiness and cataplexy. In both surveys, there was no significant correlation between the
level of childhood fantasy proneness and the childhood incidence of dream recall. There
were no significant correlations between childhood fantasy proneness and the childhood
incidence ofeither sleep talking or snoring in survey 2.
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Table 9 Spearman's rho correlations between the incidence of
childhood and adulthood anomalous experiences, the level of
anomalous beliefs, social desirability and childhood fantasy proneness
(WWW survey 1).
Child AE Adult AE Beliefs Social Child FP
des.
Childhood anomalous exp.'s
Adulthood anomalous exp.'s .692 ***
Anomalous beliefs .294 ** .468 ***
Social desirability .085 .082 .008
Childhood fantasy proneness .368 *** .273 ** .138 -.253 **
* p< 0.05, ** p< 0.01, *** p< 0.001, two-tailed (These relate to the unadjusted criterion values)
Tables 9 and 10 show that in survey 1, there was a significant negative correlation between
childhood fantasy proneness and the level of social desirability; in survey 2, there was no
significant correlation.
Table 10 Spearman's rho correlations between the incidence of
childhood and adulthood anomalous experiences, the level of
anomalous beliefs, social desirability and childhood fantasy proneness
(WWW survey 2).
Child AE Adult AE Beliefs Social Child TT
des.
Childhood anomalous exp.'s
Adulthood anomalous exp.'s .667 ***
Anomalous beliefs .359 *** .546 ***
Social desirability -.017 .052 .235 **
Childhood fantasy proneness .351 *** .348 *** .151 * -.080
* p< 0.05, ** p< 0.01, *** p< 0.001, one-tailed (These relate to the unadjusted criterion values)
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Table 11 Spearman's rho correlations between the incidence of
childhood and adulthood anomalous experiences, the level of
anomalous beliefs, and social desirability.
Child AE Adult AE Beliefs
WWW1 WWW2 WWW1 WWW2 WWW1 WWW2
Childhood anomalous exp.'s
Adulthood anomalous exp.'s .692*** .667*** ——
Anomalous beliefs .294** .468*** .546*** —
Social desirability .085 - .017 .082 .052 .008 .235**
Childhood fantasy proneness .368*** 35}*** 973** .348*** .138 .151*
* p< 0.05, ** p< 0.01, *** p< 0.001, WWW1 = two-tailed; WWW2 = one-tailed
Table 11 shows that, in both surveys, there was a significant positive correlation between the
incidence of childhood and adulthood anomalous experiences. In addition, both of these
variables also had a significant positive correlation with the level of anomalous beliefs.
Table 11 also shows that childhood fantasy proneness was significantly correlated
with the incidence of both childhood, and adulthood anomalous experiences in both surveys.
In both surveys there were small positive correlations between childhood fantasy proneness
and the current level of anomalous beliefs but only the correlation in survey 2 was
significant..
There were no significant correlations between the incidence of childhood or
adulthood anomalous experiences and the level of social desirability in either survey but
there was a significant positive correlation between the current level ofanomalous beliefs
and the level of social desirability in survey 2.
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Relationships within and between childhood hypnagogic/hypnopompic and sleep
experiences
Tables 12 and 13 show that, in both surveys, there were significant positive correlations
among the childhood incidence of each of the hypnagogic/hypnopompic experiences (i.e.,
imagery, exploding head symptoms, sleep paralysis) with the exception ofbetween
hypnagogic imagery and post-dormital sleep paralysis.
In both surveys, there were significant positive intercorrelations among the childhood
incidences of each of the following variables: dream control (1 and 2), dream vividness,
flying dreams, falling dreams, pre-lucid dreams, lucid dreams, and false awakenings (type 1
and 2). In survey 1, the aforementioned variables were also significantly correlated with the
incidence of sleep talking. In survey 2, the aforementioned variables, except for dream
control, were also significantly intercorrelated with the incidence of symptoms ofnightmares
and sleep terrors.
The incidences of symptoms of the three arousal disorders (confiisional arousals,
sleepwalking, sleep terrors) were also significantly inter-correlated in both surveys.
In survey 2, there were significant positive intercorrelations among the childhood
incidence of symptoms of the following sleep-wake transition disorders: rhythmic movement
disorder, sleep starts, sleep talking, nocturnal leg cramps. These results are similar to those
from survey 1 except that in the previous sample there was no significant correlation
between the incidence of sleep starts and nocturnal leg cramps.
In survey 2, there were significant positive intercorrelations among the childhood
incidence of symptoms of the following: nightmares, pre-dormital and post-dormital sleep
paralysis, and REM sleep behaviour disorder. These results are similar to those from the
survey 1 except that in the previous sample there was no significant correlation between the
incidence of post-dormital sleep paralysis and neither nightmares nor REM sleep behaviour
disorder
In both surveys, there were significant positive intercorrelations among the childhood
incidence of symptoms of the following: sleep talking, sleepwalking, sleep terrors and
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nightmares. In the previous sample, each of these variables was also significantly correlated
with the incidence of dream vividness; in this sample, with the incidence of confusional
arousals, falling dreams, pre-lucid dreams, lucid dreams, and false awakenings (type 1 and
type 2). In both samples, the childhood incidence of symptoms of sleep talking, nightmares
and sleep terrors were all significantly correlated with the incidence of dream recall.
In both surveys, there were significant positive intercorrelations among the following
childhood variables (with the exception ofbetween lucid dreams and sleep terrors symptoms
in survey 1 and between sleep talking and hypnagogic imagery in survey 2): pre-lucid
dreams, lucid dreams, type 2 false awakenings, symptoms of sleep talking, sleep terrors and
the incidence of both hypnagogic and hypnopompic imagery. In survey 2, the incidence of
both hypnagogic and hypnopompic imagery were also significantly correlated with the
incidence of type 1 false awakenings, dream vividness, symptoms ofnightmares, REM sleep
behaviour disorder, sleep choking, sleepwalking, and sleep starts. In survey 1, the childhood
incidence of flying and falling were both significantly correlated with the incidence ofboth
hypnagogic and hypnopompic imagery but in survey 2 they were only significantly correlated
with hypnopompic imagery.
In both surveys, there were significant positive correlations between the childhood
incidence of exploding head symptoms and the incidence of dream control (1 and 2), pre-
lucid dreams, type 2 false awakenings, symptoms of sleep terrors, REM sleep behaviour
disorder, sleep choking, rhythmic movement disorder, and cataplexy. In survey 2, there
were also significant positive correlations with flying, falling and lucid dreams, symptoms of
nightmares, sleepwalking, sleep talking, confusional arousals, bruxism and excessive
sleepiness.
In both surveys, there were significant positive correlations between the childhood
incidence of sleep paralysis (either pre- or post-dormital) and the incidence ofpre-lucid
dreams, type 2 false awakenings and symptoms of sleep terrors. In addition, in survey 2,













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































incidence of type 1 false awakenings, lucid dreams, flying dreams, falling dreams, dream
control 2, symptoms of nightmares, REM sleep behaviour disorder, sleep choking, sleep
talking, confusional arousals, rhythmic movement disorder and nocturnal leg cramps.
Discussion
Although atypical of the general population and the WWW user population (e.g., GVU
Center, 1998), the demographics of the two WWW samples are very similar in terms of the
sex ratio (mostly female), age range and average age (c. 30 years), their nationalities (mostly
American) and the fact that many had been or were practising some form ofmental
discipline, exercise or self-improvement program.
The incidences of the majority of the HG/HP, dream and sleep experiences were
similar in both surveys and most estimates were within 8% ofeach other. The means and
standard deviations for these items plus the fantasy proneness, anomalous experiences,
anomalous beliefs and social desirability measures were also similar in both surveys and
there were also similar patterns of correlations across the two samples. There were also
very few cases ofmultiple submissions of responses from the same IP address. Although the
latter is a crude detector of deliberate attempts to bias the results, in my opinion a person
would have had to have been particularly well-motivated and organised to send data from
different machines (or to make it appear that they were from different machines) for two
samples. Even if they had done so it is unlikely that the results would be so similar (unless
they were responsible for all of the data submitted). The above findings suggest to me that
the WWW may have been a fairly reliable and secure method ofdata collection in this
instance.
One point to note is that the incidences of some of the sleep-related experiences
were higher than previous survey estimates. In terms ofHG and HP imagery, the WWW
survey estimates of the proportion of people who had experienced it (HG 77%, 75%; HP
68%, 61%) are within the bounds of other estimates of 61-63% (McKellar & Simpson,
1954; McKellar, 1957) or c.75% (Glicksohn, 1989; Richardson et al., 1981) for HG imagery
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and 68% for HP imagery (Richardson et al., 1981). In terms of the estimates of exploding
head symptoms, comparisons with previous estimates are problematic for two reasons, (1)
there do not appear to be any published estimates and (2) the exploding head symptoms item
is problematic and ambiguous in the way that it has been phrased, "Have you ever
experienced sensations of explosions and/or sensations of flashing lights in the head as you
are falling asleep?" Clearly a person giving a positive response to this item might only
experience flashing lights but not sensations of explosions. The reported incidences of sleep
paralysis (pre-dormital 46%, 45%; post-dormital 49%, 41%) fall within the 40-50% figure
estimated by the International Classification of Sleep Disorders (ASDA, 1990).
In terms of the childhood dream experiences, the incidences were generally high with
more than 75% of the samples reporting many of them. Previous surveys of these kinds of
dream experiences have often found that 50-60% or more of their samples have experienced
them (e.g., Blackmore, 1982b, 1983, 1984, 1986; Glicksohn, 1989; Kohr, 1980; LaBerge &
Gackenbach, 2000; Palmer, 1979; Rose & Blackmore, 1996). Some of the estimates for the
childhood sleep disorder symptoms are much higher than the ICSD estimates too, e.g., sleep
terrors, nightmares, REM sleep behaviour disorder. The first point to make is that my
surveys are dealing with reports ofpossible symptoms and not definitive diagnoses.
Diagnoses of sleep disorders can be difficult and may require a detailed history and the
ruling out ofdifferential diagnoses (see ASDA, 1990). It's possible that some sleep disorder
symptoms, such as those for sleep terrors, can be confused (by those who experience them)
with those for other disorders, such as nightmares. Another explanation for some of these
higher estimates may be that the participants self-selected themselves because of their
experience of such sleep-related phenomena and so the estimates might be accurate for such
a population; alternatively it may be, as Council et al. (1991) and Spanos et al. (1995) have
suggested, that some participants have an acquiescent response bias when it comes to
unusual experiences. If the results of the surveys were entirely due to acquiescent response
biases then we might have expected high scores on, and positive correlations among, all of
the variables. However, although the mean level of the anomalous beliefs measure and some
of the sleep-related items was high, the mean anomalous experiences and social desirability
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scores fell on the lower end of the scales. Social desirability does not seem to have had a
large overall impact as it was not significantly correlated with the majority of the variables in
the surveys, although the magnitude of the correlations may have been lowered by the
relatively poor reliability of the social desirability scale.
The results of both WWW surveys have indicated that the level of childhood fantasy
proneness and the incidences of a number of childhood hypnagogic/hypnopompic and sleep
experiences were significantly correlated with the incidence of anomalous experiences.8 The
results are more equivocal with regard to the current level of anomalous beliefs. Of the
aforementioned childhood predictor variables, only the incidence of childhood hypnagogic
imagery had a significant correlation with the current level of anomalous beliefs in both
surveys. A number of other hypnagogic/hypnopompic and dream variables had significant
positive correlations with the level of beliefs in survey 2.
However, the incidences of anomalous experiences, during childhood or adulthood,
were significantly correlated with the current level of anomalous beliefs in both surveys.
There were also significant correlations both within and between the categories of
hypnagogic/hypnopompic experiences, dream variables, and parasomnias which may suggest
the existence of a sleep-related imagery/experience factor.
Although these findings are only correlational, with relatively small to medium effect
sizes,9 and do not therefore allow any causal statements to be made, they do support the
possibility that childhood fantasy proneness and the hypnagogic/hypnopompic and sleep
states may be conducive to anomalous processes or that normal waking imager}' and/or
hypnagogic/hypnopompic and sleep experiences may be misinterpreted as being anomalous
events. The results also support the relationship between childhood fantasy proneness and
8 The anomalous experience scores could reflect experiences that occurred during one or more of the waking,
hypnagogic/ hypnopompic, or sleeping states.
' Rosenthal and Rosnow (1991) note that a correlation coefficient of 0.1 is considered to be a small effect
size and one of 0.3 to be a medium effect size. The mean correlations between the childhood incidence of
sleep/dream experiences and the incidence of anomalous experiences for surveys 1 and 2 were r = .257, r =
.249 for childhood and r = .193, r = .218 for adulthood. . The mean correlations between the childhood
incidence of hypnagogic/hypnopompic experiences and the incidence of anomalous experiences were r =
.369, r = .459 for childhood and r = .332, r = .387 for adulthood. Clearly, there are also other factors that
account for a large proportion of the variance.
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childhood sleep-related experiences. However, these relationships between fantasy
proneness, hypnagogic/hypnopompic and sleep experiences and anomalous experiences
could also be due to other variables that influence both of them. These findings also provide
some support for the theories of boundary structure (Hartmann, 1991) and transliminality
(Thalbourne & Delin, 1994).
In summary, these results provide some preliminary support for the proposed models
and have identified the need for factor analysis in order to investigate the possibility that
more general underlying factors may be underlying some of the variables measured. The
inter-relationships among the sleep-related items will be discussed briefly here but the
relationships among the variables measured will be discussed more fully (see Chapter 11)
once the SEM analyses have been conducted because this technique has the advantage of
taking the effects of other variables into account.
Inter-relationships among the sleep-related experiences
The majority of the HG/HP experience items were significantly positively intercorrelated in
both surveys. This suggests the possibility of a HG/HP experience factor. It is well-known
that HG/HP imagery can occur along with sleep paralysis (e.g., ASDA, 1990; Cheyne,
Newby-Clark, & Rueffer, 1999; Goode, 1962; Spanos et al., 1995).
Green and McCreery (1994) have proposed that there might be inter-relationships
among a number of experiences such as lucid dreams, false awakenings, OBEs and
apparitional experiences. They believe that these experiences might be 'metachoric
experiences' "in which the normal perceptual environment is entirely replaced by a
hallucinatory one." (p.56). The results of both surveys support these proposed relationships
and indicated that the following childhood sleep experiences were all significantly correlated
with each other: dream control 1 and 2, dream vividness, flying dreams, falling dreams, pre-
lucid dreams, lucid dreams, and false awakenings (both type 1 and type 2). This suggests
that there might be some kind of underlying dream factor. Previous research has also found
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that false awakenings, lucid dreams, dream control 2 (control or create) and falling dreams
are all associated with each other (Blackmore, 1983; Glicksohn, 1989; van Eeden, 1913).
The incidences of childhood pre-lucid dreams, lucid dreams, false awakenings (type
2), sleep talking and sleep terrors were all significantly correlated with the incidence of both
childhood hypnagogic and hypnopompic imagery in both surveys. Previous research has also
found that the incidences of hypnagogic and hypnopompic imagery are related to each other
and also to false awakenings, lucid dreams and attention to subjective experience
(Blackmore, 1983; Glicksohn, 1989, 1990; Spanos et al., 1995); hypnagogic imagery has
also been found to be related to dream recall and dream control (Glicksohn, 1989, 1990).
However, in both surveys, neither hypnagogic nor hypnopompic imagery was significantly
correlated with the incidence of dream recall. In survey 1, hypnagogic imagery was
significantly correlated with both forms of dream control but in survey 2 only one form of
dream control was significantly correlated with hypnopompic imagery.
The incidences of three arousal disorders (confusional arousals, sleepwalking, sleep
terrors) were all significantly inter-correlated which supports previous findings (ASDA,
1990). Episodes of confusional arousal have been reported by sufferers of sleep terrors and
sleepwalking and vice versa (ASDA, 1990). Previous studies have also found relationships
between sleepwalking and sleep talking (Fisher & Wilson, 1987; Spanos et al., 1995) and
among sleepwalking, sleep terrors and nightmares (Spanos et al., 1995; Thorpy &
Glovinsky, 1987).
The incidences of four sleep-wake transition disorders (rhythmic movement, sleep
starts, sleep talking, nocturnal leg cramps) were all significantly inter-correlated with each
other (except for sleep starts and nocturnal cramps in survey 1). Sleep talking may also be
precipitated by other sleep disorders such as sleep terrors, confusional arousals and REM
sleep behaviour disorder (ASDA, 1990).
The incidences of three parasomnias usually associated with REM (nightmares, sleep
paralysis, REM sleep behaviour disorder) were all significantly inter-correlated (except for
post-dormital sleep paralysis which did not correlate with either of the others in survey 1).
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These results support the ICSD classifications (ASDA, 1990) and also suggest the
possibility of a sleep disorder symptoms factor(s).
Ohayon et al., (1996) found that those who reported having nightmares more than
once per month were significantly more likely to report hypnagogic and/or hypnopompic
imagery. There were significant positive correlations between the frequency of childhood
hypnagogic and hypnopompic imagery and childhood nightmares in survey 2 but the
correlations were in the same direction but non-significant in survey 1. In both surveys,
there were significant positive correlations between the childhood incidence of sleep
paralysis (either pre-dormital or post-dormital) and the incidence ofpre-lucid dreams, type 2
false awakenings and symptoms of sleep terrors. Previous research has also found that false
awakenings (Green & McCreery, 1994; Rose et al., 1997) and also nightmares/night terrors
and lucid dreams/dream control are associated with reported cases of sleep paralysis (Rose
et al., 1997).
Spanos et al. (1995) found that night terror/nightmare, sleep talking/ walking, night
imagery (dream recall, vividness, HG/HP imagery) dimensions and lucid dreaming were all
significantly inter-correlated with each other but not with the frequency of sleep paralysis.
There have also been a couple of reported cases ofhypnagogic/hypnopompic-like imagery
occurring during sleepwalking episodes (Kavey & Whyte, 1993). Spanos et al. (1995) also
found that night terror/nightmare and sleep talking/walking dimensions were significantly
correlated with the intensity of sleep paralysis. In support of Spanos et al. (1995), both
surveys found significant inter-correlations among the incidence of sleep talking,
sleepwalking, sleep terrors, and nightmares. In survey 1, each of these variables was also
significantly correlated with dream vividness. In both surveys, the incidence of symptoms of
sleep talking, nightmares and sleep terrors were all significantly correlated with the incidence
ofdream recall. However, contrary to Spanos et al. (1995), the incidence of sleep terrors,
nightmares, lucid dreams and sleepwalking were significantly correlated with the incidence
ofeither or both pre- and post-dormital sleep paralysis in both surveys. Sleep talking was
also correlated with the incidence of both forms of sleep paralysis in survey 2.
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Although these results suggest that there might be underlying HG/HP, dream
experience and sleep disorder symptoms factors, such factors may not necessarily be
orthogonal. Although hypnagogic/hypnopompic and sleep imagery seem to be related to
each other to some extent, are they also related to waking imagery? Is there a waking-
sleeping imagery factor involved? In support of this hypothesis, both surveys found a
significant correlation between childhood fantasy proneness, hypnagogic imagery and a
number of dream variables.
The factor structure of these sleep-related items will be investigated in the following
chapter, along with the dimensionality of the other measures.
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Chapter 8
Factor analyses of items used in WWW surveys
1 and 2
Factor analysis of the various measures was considered to be a useful procedure for a
number of reasons: (1) apart from social desirability, the measures had been newly-
created (or adapted from existing questionnaires) for this study and the underlying
factor structure was unknown, (2) previous research has suggested that measures of
paranormal experiences/beliefs may not be unidimensional (e.g., Clarke, 1991;
Gallagher et al., 1994; Grimmer & White, 1990; Irwin, 1993a; Lawrence, 1995a,
1995b, 1998; Sparks et al., 1997; Thalbourne & Delin, 1993; Tobacyk, 1995a,
1995b), (3) there were a high number of intercorrelations among the sleep-related
items, which suggested the possibility of underlying factors.
What is factor analysis?
Factor analysis is a summarisation and data reduction technique that examines the
inter-relationships among a large number of variables (Neill, Pullig, Ross, & Black,
1999, p. 37). For a good introduction to factor analysis, I recommend Kline (1994),
Tabachnik and Fidell (1996), Hair et al. (1998) and Gorsuch (1983).
Although principal components and factor analysis (also known as principal
axis factoring) techniques differ10 11 in that the former identifies components and the
latter identifies factors, both techniques tend to be referred to as 'factor analysis'
(Kline, 1994; Tabachnik & Fidell, 1996). These factors (or latent variables) may
represent more general concepts (e.g., intelligence) which may account for the
10 Note that other factor extraction techniques are available, e.g., maximum likelihood factoring,
alpha factoring, but principal components and principal factors are the most common (Tabachnik &
Fidell, 1996, p. 662).
1' The difference between principal components and factor analysis relates to the variance that is
analysed; the former analyses variance whilst the latter analyses covariance. With principal
components analysis, all of the variance in the variables is analysed whereas with factor analysis only
shared variance is analysed i.e., the variance that each observed variable shares with the other
variables (Tabachnik and Fidell, 1996, p. 637).
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relationships among the individual variables (e.g., verbal, problem-solving ability)
which are said to load on these factors.
What is factor analysis used for?
The main uses of factor analysis are (1) to summarise patterns of correlations among
measured variables, (2) to reduce a larger set of variables into a smaller number of
factors, (3) to look at the dimensionality of a psychometric scale, and (4) to test a
theory about patterns of correlations believed to underlie a particular process or
concept (Gorsuch, 1983; Tabachnik & Fidell, 1996).
There are two main kinds of factor analysis: exploratory and confirmatory
(Kline, 1994; Tabachnik & Fidell, 1996). Exploratory factor analysis tends to be used
when there might be relationships among a number of variables and the researcher
wishes to see whether and how they could be summarised by a number of factors.
This is often useful for generating hypotheses for further research. Confirmatory
factor analysis is used to test hypotheses or theories about the structure of
relationships among observed variables.
Combination of WWW samples 1 and 2
For the present research, factor analysis was considered to be inappropriate on the
two individual WWW samples because the sample sizes were too small to give a
reliable and robust solution. It is generally suggested that the sample size needs to be
at least 200-300, though 100 might be sufficient if the factor structure is clear
(Gorsuch, 1983; Kline, 1993, 1994; Neill et al„ 1999; Tabachnik & Fidell, 1996).
Both samples of data from surveys 1 and 2 were collected in an identical
manner. Because the two individual samples had obtained similar results, in terms of
correlations, it was thought that combining the two samples together would provide a
sufficiently large overall sample that would then be more appropriate for factor
analysis. However, if heterogeneous subsamples are combined to form one large
sample, the overall correlation coefficient may be affected and may be different to that
obtained with the individual subsamples (Howell, 1987, pp. 247-248).
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Thus, before combining WWW samples 1 and 2, the means and variances for
the samples were compared and a series of nonparametric Mann-Whitney tests were
carried out on the items from the main measures (and the overall score, where
applicable) to check whether there were any significant differences. The Mann-
Whitney tests found that there were no significant differences between the two
samples on the majority of the individual items or the overall measures (i.e.,
anomalous beliefs, childhood-adulthood anomalous experiences, childhood sleep-
related experiences, childhood fantasy proneness, and social desirability) apart from
on one item concerning belief in inexplicable outbreaks of noises (U = 5718, p = .008,
2-tailed). The majority of the variances were of a similar magnitude in both samples.
There were no significant differences in age either. The proportions ofmales/females
and different nationalities were also similar in both samples. A comparison of the
participants' IP addresses from both samples indicated that there were no duplications
that might have suggested repeated participation. This suggests that the two samples
might be homogenous subsamples from the same population and thus it would be
acceptable to join them together.
Initial examination of the data
Prior to the factor analysis, a number of checks were made on the data following
recommendations made by Tabachnik & Fidell (1996, p. 705).
Sample size
Surveys 1 and 2 had 108 and 130 valid cases, respectively, thus giving a combined N
= 238. Note that nine cases were subsequently removed because ofmissing data (see
Missing data section). The ratio ofparticipants to variables should ideally be at least
3:1 (Kline, 1993, 1994) or 5:1 (Neill et al., 1999) and the ratio ofparticipants to
factors should be at least 20:1 (Arindel & van der Ende, 1985). These ratios were
satisfactory in all cases.
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Table 14 Participant:variable ratios for measures to be factor
analysed
Measure No. of items Participant:Variable Ratio3
Sleep-related 30 7.63:1
Childhood FP 15 15.27:1
Child-adulthood AE's 42 5.45:1
Anomalous beliefs 20 11.45:1
Social desirability 10 22.90:1
a based on N = 229
Table 15 Participant:factor ratios for measures to be factor
analysed
Measure No. of factors extracted Participant :Factor Ratio3
Sleep-related 3 76.3:1
Childhood FP 2 114.5:1
Child-adulthood AE's 2 114.5:1
Anomalous beliefs 2 114.5:1
Social desirability 2 114.5:1
a based on N = 229
Missing data
An inspection of the data file in EQS suggested that the missing data were reasonably
randomly distributed. The maximum number ofmissing cases on the main items was
eight. Nine cases seemed to have a lot ofmissing data and these were excluded.12
Thus, the subsequent factor analyses are based on N = 229.
Outliers
An examination ofboxplots and standardised scores (z > +/- 3.291, p < .001) for the
overall scores on the measures indicated that there were a lot ofunivariate outliers.
The outliers were not removed for a number of reasons: (1) the distributions of
anomalous experiences and beliefs in the true population may be skewed and so some
12 These exclusions were in addition to those made prior to analysis of the individual samples.
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of the outliers in the sample may be genuine, (2) deletion would result in the loss of
too many cases.
Normality
Univariate analysis revealed that the majority of the variables on each measures were
skewed or kurtotic. According to Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests (with Lilliefors
significance correction), the distributions ofall variables were significantly different
from normality (p < .001). Despite this, the variables were not transformed for the
following reasons: (1) the populations from which this sample was drawn may not
necessarily be normally-distributed, (2) transformation would make interpretation of
the measures more difficult, e.g., where the responses related to frequencies, (3) with
factor analysis, the solution may be degraded but may still be useful even if the
variables are not normally-distributed (Tabachnik & Fidell, p. 640).
Factorability ofthe correlation matrix
If a set of items is reflecting a latent variable or factor then one would expect a series
of significant intercorrelations among them. One rule of thumb used to assess the
potential factorability of a correlation matrix is to look for numerous significant
correlations greater than 0.3 (Tabachnik & Fidell, 1996, p. 641; Neill et al., 1999, p.
40). There were numerous significant intercorrelations greater than 0.3 among the
anomalous belief items, the childhood-adulthood anomalous experience items, and the
childhood sleep-related experience items. There were also significant intercorrelations
among the childhood fantasy proneness and social desirability items. It therefore
seemed worthwhile to carry out factor analyses on each of these proposed measures.
The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy was also checked for
each correlation matrix. Ideally, the measure should be greater than 0.6 for good
factor analysis (Tabachnik & Fidell, 1996, p. 642). The correlation matrix of all five
proposed measures met this criterion: anomalous beliefs .911, childhood-adulthood
anomalous experiences .807, childhood sleep-related experiences .833, childhood
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fantasy proneness .794, social desirability .681.
Multi-collinearity and singularity
In order to check for possible multi-collinearity, the correlation matrix for each scale
was checked to see if there were any extremely high intercorrelations greater than 0.8-
0.9. (Bryman & Cramer, 1997; Tabachnik & Fidell, 1996). There were two
correlations which were greater than or equal to 0.8; one between items relating to
beliefs that intelligent life-forms have visited and communicated with people here on
Earth (r = .800) and one between items relating to childhood and adulthood
experiences ofhaving been on board a UFO (r - .873)
If the determinant of the correlation matrix R and the eigenvalues associated
with some factors approach zero then multi-collinearity or singularity may be present
(Tabachnik & Fidell, 1996). If the determinant is in the region of .0001 or so, with
eigenvalues in the region of .001, there may be a problem with stability (Fidell, 1998,
personal communication).
Table 16 shows that the childhood-adulthood anomalous experience scale may
potentially have multicollinearity problems because it has a couple ofvery small
eigenvalues and the determinant of the matrix is also very small. The UFO boarding
items would seem to be the items that may lead to instability of the solution since they
have a very high correlation. It is not expected that many people would answer in the
affirmative to this item and even fewer would be expected to report more than one
experience.
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Table 16 Determinants of the matrices and smallest eigenvalues
for the measures to be factor analysed
Items Determinant Smallest eigenvalue
Anomalous beliefs 1.95x105 .132
Childhood-adulthood AE's 9.22 x 10 ~13 .0996
Childhood sleep-related experiences 4.06 x 10° .186
Childhood fantasy proneness 7.78 x 10"2 .377
Social desirability 0.414 .542
Factor analysis
Principal components analyses and scree tests (using the eigenvalue greater than 1
criterion) were carried out initially for each measure (as recommended by Kline, 1993,
p. 140) to determine the number of factors for subsequent extraction and rotation
using principal factor analysis (Kline, 1994). Missing data were replaced with the
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Figure 11 Scree plot for anomalous beliefs components

















only eigenvalues greater than 1 are shown
The scree slope (Figure 11) suggested that there were 2 major components to the
anomalous beliefmeasure that accounted for 50% of the variance (see Table 17).
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Figure 12 Scree plot for childhood/adulthood anomalous
experience components
The scree slope (Figure 12) suggested that there were 2 major components to the
measure of childhood and adulthood anomalous experiences that accounted for 35%
of the variance (see Table 18). This result suggested that 2 factors should be
extracted in the principal factor analysis. However, a slight peak around components
3-5 was noted. Orthogonally- and obliquely-rotated solutions based on the extraction
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Figure 13 Scree plot for childhood sleep-related components
The scree slope (Figure 13) suggested that there were 3 major components to the
measure ofchildhood sleep-related experiences that accounted for 37% of the
variance (see Table 19). This result suggested that 3 factors should be extracted in
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Figure 14 Scree plot for childhood fantasy proneness components
The scree slope (Figure 14) suggested that there was 1 major component, and
possibly a second component, to the measure ofchildhood fantasy proneness that
accounted for 33% of the variance (see Table 20). A second component was
extracted in the subsequent principal factor analysis because the extraction ofone or
two additional factors would not affect the analysis too much (Gorsuch, 1983; Kline,
























Tabie 2U Eigenvalues and percentage of variance for childhood
fantasy proneness components










Figure 15 Scree plot for social desirability components
The scree slope (Figure 15) suggested that there were 2 major components to the
measure of social desirability that accounted for 36% of the variance (see Table 21).
This result suggested that 2 factors should be extracted in the principal factor analysis.
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Table 21 Eigenvalues and percentage of variance for social
desirability components











only eigenvalues greater than 1 are shown
Principal factors
Principal factor analysis was used for the main analyses because it does not assume
that the measures are perfectly reliable (Bryman & Cramer, 1997), an assumption that
is rarely true especially in the social sciences (Gorsuch, p. 83, p. 124).
Both orthogonally-rotated (varimax) and obliquely-rotated (direct oblimin)
solutions were obtained (as recommended by Kline, 1994) for each measure.
Orthogonal solutions produce factors that are independent of one another, i.e., do not
correlate with each other. Oblique solutions produce factors which may be related to
each other (Kline, 1994).
Orthogonally-rotated solutions
The varimax rotated solutions indicated that there was a correlation of r = .521
between factor 1 and factor 2 for the anomalous beliefs scale, r = .503 between factor
1 and factor 2 for the childhood-adulthood anomalous experiences scale, r = .615
between factor 1 and factor 2, r = .532 between factor 1 and factor 3, and r = .416
between factor 2 and factor 3 of the childhood sleep-related experiences scale, r =
.589 between factor 1 and factor 2 of the childhood fantasy scale, and r = .697
between factor 1 and factor 2 of the social desirability scale. These findings suggested




Table 22 shows that all of the belief items loaded positively on factor 1 and negatively
on factor 2. All items loaded greater than .3 (the chosen criterion for acceptance) on
factor 1, apart from the deja vu and the belief in life on other planets item. The deja
vu item did not load sufficiently highly on either factor and should probably not be
used. The magnitude of item loadings was greater, on average, on factor 1 than on
factor 2. Belief items relating to extra-terrestrials loaded highest on factor 2. The
results suggest that the belief items could usefully be divided into two separate
factors. Factor 1 would contain all items except the deja vu and extra-terrestrial
items; factor 2 would consist of the four extra-terrestrial items.




Awareness of deceased person
















































Heal person via mind
Near-death experience
Telepathy
Outbreak of inexplicable noises
Life after death
Spiritual, mystical, transcendental experience
Deja vu
Extra-terrestrial communication with Earth
Extra-terrestrial visitation of Earth
Extra-terrestrials have allowed humans on board
Life on other planets
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Table 23 shows that the anomalous belief factors 1 and 2 are significantly and
negatively correlated with each other.
Childhood-adulthood anomalous experiences
The structure matrix (see Table 24) shows that all of the childhood-adulthood
anomalous experience items loaded greater than the criterion of .3 on factor 1 with
the exception of three of the extra-terrestrial items. The majority of the items did not
load greater than the criterion on factor 2. Six of the extra-terrestrial items loaded
greater than the criterion on factor 2 and their loadings are greater on factor 2 than on
factor 1. The results suggest that the childhood-adulthood anomalous experience
items could be usefully divided up into two factors: factor one would include all items
except for those relating to extra-terrestrial experiences, factor 2 would include items
relating to extra-terrestrials.
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Table 24 Structure matrix for anomalous experience items







Apparition/presence (adult) .681 .149
Psychokinesis (child) .657 .283
Healing others (child) .648 .249
Psychokinesis (adult) .640 .318
Memories of previous life (adult) .627 .271
Seeing auras (adult) .620 .329
Waking ESP (adult) .598 .097
OBE (adult) .596 .261
Unexplained noises (child) .596 .174
Dream ESP (adult) .585 .056
Unexplained noises (adult) .573 .214
Seeing with eyes closed (adult) .564 .130
OBE (child) .561 .202
Waking ESP (child) .560 .094
Spiritual, mystical, transcendental (adult) .553 .229
Seeing strange lights/objects in sky (child) .548 .483
Memories ofprevious life (child) .535 .270
Healing others (child) .532 .336
Dream ESP (child) .515 .057
Seeing auras (child) .514 .262
Seeing with eyes closed (child) .510 .078
Spiritual, mystical, transcendental (child) .509 .294
Communication with the dead (adult) .497 .247
Seeing strange lights/objects in sky (adult) .494 .471
Autoscopic phenomenon (adult) .484 .352
Being healed by others (adult) .476 .279
Unexplained bites, scratches, pinches (child) .458 .247
Unexplained bites, scratches, pinches (adult) .444 .251
Autoscopic phenomenon (child) .443 .342
Communication with the dead (child) .433 .268
Near-death experience (adult) .426 .424
Being healed by others (child) .406 .354
Deja vu (adult) .382 .009
Deja vu (child) .312 -.006
Contact with UFO occupants (child) .259 .781
Contact with UFO occupants (adult) .304 .743
Been on board a UFO (adult) .118 .636
Been on board a UFO (child) .102 .635
Seen a UFO at close range (child) .303 .510
Near-death experience (child) .358 .460
Seen a UFO at close range (adult) .330 .451
226










Table 25 shows that there is a significant positive correlation between factor 1 and
factor 2 of the childhood-adulthood anomalous experience items.
Childhood sleep-related experiences
Table 26 shows that there is a cluster of items loading higher than the criterion of 0.3
on each of factors 1-3. Sleep bruxism and enuresis did not load greater than the
criterion on any of the factors. The following childhood symptoms loaded highest on
factor 1: sleep terrors, sleep talking, nightmares, REM sleep behaviour disorder,
sleepwalking, confusional arousals, nocturnal leg cramps, excessive sleepiness, false
awakenings (Type 2)*, cataplexy, sleep starts*, sleep choking*, rhythmic movement
disorder, snoring, and dream recall*. Variables marked with '*' loaded greater than
0.3 on more than one factor but with a similar magnitude.
The following items loaded highest and negatively on factor 2: prelucid
dreams, lucid dreams, dream control 1, dream control 2, falling dreams, flying dreams,
vivid dreams, false awakenings (Type 1), false awakenings (Type 2)*, dream recall*.
The following items loaded highest and negatively on factor 3: hypnagogic
imagery, hypnopompic imagery, exploding head symptoms, pre-dormital sleep
paralysis, post-dormital sleep paralysis, sleep starts*, and sleep choking*.
The results suggest that the childhood sleep-related experience items could be
usefully divided up into three factors. Items that loaded greater than the criterion
with a similar magnitude on more than one factor were allocated to the factor that
seemed most appropriate at face value and according to expectations.
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Table 26 Structure matrix for childhood sleep-related experience
items following oblique (oblimin) rotation
Factor
1 2 3
Sleep terrors .720 -.286 -.419
Sleep talking .654 -.291 -.260
Nightmares .570 -.337 -.232
REM sleep behaviour disorder .558 -.179 -.342
Sleepwalking .510 -.201 -.218
Confusional arousals .495 -.354 -.127
Nocturnal leg cramps .491 -.220 -.281
False awakenings (Type 2) .481 -.457 -.421
Excessive sleepiness .453 -.280 -.246
Cataplexy .425 -.137 -.369
Sleep starts .408 -.166 -.341
Sleep choking .355 -.151 -.342
Rhythmic movement disorder .352 -.109 -.296
Primary snoring .338 -.229 -.146
Dream recall .337 -.321 -.006
Sleep bruxism .300 -.105 -.248
Lucid dreams .298 -.768 -.304
Dream control 1 .271 -.725 -.047
Dream control 2 .324 -.689 -.188
Prelucid dreams .377 -.676 -.340
Flying dreams .298 r-HIT)i* -.240
False awakenings (Type 1) .462 -.537 -.266
Falling dreams .483 -.492 -.273
Vivid dreams .425 -.492 -.142
Pre-dormital sleep paralysis .353 -.254 -.743
Flypnopompic imagery .403 -.248 -.629
Post-dormital sleep paralysis .293 -.209 -.543
Exploding head symptoms .332 -.238 -.535
Hypnagogic imagery .373 -.251 -.467
Sleep enuresis .163 -.114 -.185
Factor 1 would consist of the following childhood sleep disorder symptoms: sleep
terrors, sleep talking, nightmares, REM sleep behaviour disorder, sleepwalking,
confusional arousals, nocturnal leg cramps, excessive sleepiness, cataplexy, rhythmic
movement disorder, primary snoring.
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Factor 2 would consist of the following childhood dream items: prelucid
dreams, lucid dreams, dream control 1, dream control 2, falling dreams, flying dreams,
vivid dreams, false awakenings (Type 1), false awakenings (Type 2), dream recall.
Factor 3 would consist of the following childhood hypnagogic/ hypnopompic
items: hypnagogic imagery, hypnopompic imagery, exploding head symptoms, pre-
dormital sleep paralysis, post-dormital sleep paralysis, sleep starts, and sleep choking.
Table 27 Factor correlation matrix for childhood sleep-related
experience factors
Factor correlation matrix
Factor 1 2 3
1 1.000 -.449 -.458
2 -.449 1.000 .215
3 -.458 215 1.000
Table 27 shows that the childhood sleep-related factor 1 is significantly negatively
correlated with factors 2 and 3; factor 2 is significantly positively correlated with
factor 3.
Childhoodfantasyproneness
The structure matrix (see Table 28) shows that all of the childhood fantasy proneness
items loaded positively and greater than the criterion of .3 on factor 1, with the
exception of items 3-6. Items 1, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 11 loaded positively and greater than
the criterion on factor 2. Items 1, 4, 7, 8, 11 loaded greater than the criterion on both
factors. Item 5 did not load greater than the criterion on either factor. The results
suggest that the childhood fantasy proneness items yield only one factor that can be
used; the second factor has too few items and may consist of bloated specifics. Factor
1 would consist of items 1, 2, 7-15. There is a positive correlation between the two
factors.
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Table 28 Structure matrix for childhood fantasy proneness items
following oblique (oblimin) rotation
Item Factor
1 2
Item 7 .642 .451
Item 8 .632 .308
Item 15 .590 .064
Item 14 .587 .260
Item 13 .457 .157
Item 11 .445 .442
Item 10 .392 .150
Item 12 .380 .211
Item 9 .359 .061
Item 2 .316 .211
Item 5 .191 -.114
Item 3 .082 .496
Item 6 .221 .486
Item 1 .312 .472
Item 4 .208 .340







Table 30 shows that six out of the ten social desirability items loaded greater than the
criterion of .3 on factor 1 with the exception ofTrue 1-4. True 1, 3, 4 loaded
negatively and greater than the criterion on factor 2. False 3 also loaded negatively
on factor 2. The results suggest that the social desirability items yield only one factor
that can be used; the second factor has too few items.
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False 3 .517 -.307
False 4 .459 -.071
False 2 .441 -.173
False 5 .415 -.121
False 1 .343 -.225
True 5 .301 -.256
True 2 .256 -.248
True 3 .297 -.595
True 1 .181 -.521
True 4 .166 -.506





Reliability of proposed new scales
Item-total correlations and alpha coefficients of reliability were calculated for each
proposed new scale. The aim was to select only those items for the final version of
the new scales that had an item-total correlation greater than or equal to 0.3.
Anomalous beliefs scales
All 15 and 4 items for factors 1 and 2, respectively, met the item-total correlation
criterion. The alpha coefficients of reliability, r = .91 and r = .90, were greater than
the desired criterion value.
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Childhood and adulthood anomalous experiences scales
All 17 and 4 items for factors 1 and 2, respectively, of the childhood anomalous
experience scales met the item-total correlation criterion. The alpha coefficient of
reliability for factor 1, r = .87, was greater than the desired criterion value; the alpha
coefficient for factor 2, r = .62, was slightly below the desired value.
All 17 items for factor 1 of the adulthood anomalous experience scale met the
item-total correlation criterion. The alpha coefficient of reliability for factor 1, r =
.89, was greater than the desired criterion value; the alpha coefficient for factor 2, r =
.60, was slightly below the desired value. The alpha coefficient with the having been
on board a UFO (adult) item deleted (item-total correlation .262) was r = .63. This
item was kept in the scale in order to maintain similarity with the childhood version
and because its exclusion made little difference to the internal reliability of the scale.
Childhood sleep-related experience scales
Ten of the 11 items for factor 1 (sleep disorder symptoms) met the item-total
correlation criterion; the snoring item, r = .286, did not and was excluded. The alpha
coefficient of reliability for factor 1 with this item deleted was r = .79 which was
greater than the desired criterion value.
Nine of the 10 items for factor 2 (dream variables) met the item-total
correlation criterion; the dream recall item, r = .294, did not and was excluded. The
alpha coefficient of reliability for factor 2 with this item deleted was r = .85 which was
greater than the desired criterion value.
Six of the 7 items for factor 3 (HG/HP variables) met the item-total
correlation criterion; the sleep choking item, r = .266, did not and was excluded. The
exploding head item was also excluded because its inadvertent double-barrelled nature
meant that it did not reliably measure the frequency of exploding head symptoms.
The alpha coefficient of reliability for factor 3 with these items deleted was r = .70
which was the desired minimum criterion value.
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Childhoodfantasy proneness scale
Nine of the 11 items for factor 1 met the item-total correlation criterion; items 2 (r =
.271) and 9 (r = .286) did not and were excluded. The alpha coefficient of reliability
for factor 1 with these items deleted was r = .76 which was greater than the desired
criterion value.
Social desirability scale
Seven of the 10 items did not meet the item-total correlation criterion. The alpha
coefficient of reliability, r = .62, was below the desired criterion value.
Discussion
The results of the factor analysis suggest that belief in anomalous phenomena is a
multi-dimensional construct (Clarke, 1991; Gallagher et al., 1994; Grimmer & White,
1990; Irwin, 1993a; Lawrence, 1995a, 1995b, 1998; Sobal & Emmons, 1982; Sparks
et al., 1997; Thalbourne & Delin, 1993; Tobacyk, 1995a, 1995b) and that belief in
non-extra-terrestrial phenomena is not necessarily associated with equally strong
belief in extra-terrestrial phenomena. In fact in this case, stronger belief in non-extra-
terrestrial phenomena is associated with weaker belief in extra-terrestrial phenomena.
This finding supports the suggestion by some researchers (e.g., Irwin, 1994a;
Lawrence, 1995a) that extra-terrestrial and UFO phenomena should not be considered
to be paranormal or parapsychological. However, other researchers have suggested
that belief in extraordinary life forms is one dimension ofparanormal belief (Clarke,
1991; Tobacyk, 1988; Tobacyk & Milford, 1983). However, Tobacyk (1995b) has
more recently acknowledged that such life forms are not strictly paranormal.
There is disagreement over the actual number of dimensions underlying
paranormal belief, even within the same measure (Lawrence, 1995a, 1995b; Lawrence
& De Cicco, 1997; Lawrence et al., 1997, 1998; Tobacyk, 1995a, 1995b). This is not
at all surprising in view of the disagreement and uncertainty concerning the definition
and breadth of the constructs. This will inevitably affect the range of items included in
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a given measure and will also impact on the type and number of possible factors that
can come out of a factor analysis (Irwin, 1993a).
The anomalous experiences finding is welcome as it suggests that the structure
of the anomalous experience measure is similar to that for the anomalous beliefs
measure, which is what one would hope. Previous research has also suggested that
paranormal experience is a multi-dimensional construct (Richards, 1990; Ross &
Joshi, 1992). However, contrary to the structure of the beliefs measure, there is a
significant positive relationship between the factors. One possible explanation for this
may be that there is an underlying variable that is conducive to both kinds of
experience.
The three childhood factors identified by the factor analysis, sleep disorders
symptoms, dream experiences, and hypnagogic/hypnopompic experiences, seem to
have good face and content validity. However, one must note the dangers of
interpreting factors based only on factor loadings; this is not sufficient (Kline, 1994).
One must use cross-validation, either with new samples or by splitting the original
data set and/or the factors must be validated against external criteria (Gorsuch, 1983;
Hair et al., 1998).
Chapter 9 will demonstrate how these revised measures (non-UFO- and UFO-
related anomalous experience and beliefmeasures, childhood
hypnagogic/hypnopompic, dream and sleep disorder symptoms and modified
childhood fantasy proneness) will be incorporated into the proposed model, which will
then be tested using structural equation modelling (SEM) techniques.
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Chapter 9
Test of proposed models using structural equation
modelling (SEM) and WWW survey data
This chapter will outline the SEM procedure used to test the competing models (see
Chapter 3) that have been proposed as part of this thesis, using the combined data
from WWW surveys 1 and 2.
Preliminary examination of data
A preliminary examination of the data is important, particularly for multivariate
analyses such as SEM (Schumacker & Lomax, 1996; Tabachnik & Fidell, 1996). It is
a good idea to inspect a correlation matrix for the variables that will feature in the
model(s) to be tested. One should also check the number of cases to see how much
missing data there is and how many cases are deemed to be valid for inclusion in the
analysis. One should also check for outliers and univariate and multivariate normality
as these can lead to spurious results..
The two most commonly used model estimation techniques, maximum
likelihood (ML) and normal theory generalized least squares (GLS) both assume that:
(1) a large sample will be used; (2) the observed variables are continuous; (3) the
measured variables have a multivariate normal distribution; (4) the model estimated is
a valid one (West, Finch, & Curran, 1995). In practice, these assumptions are not
always met and, if this is the case, one must take appropriate steps, such as using
robust parameter estimation techniques, to ensure that the results can still be trusted
(West et al., 1995).
The SEM analyses were all carried out using the EQS for Windows Version
4.04 computer software (Bentler & Wu, 1993).
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a) Inspection of bivariate correlation matrix
A Pearson's correlation matrix (for the complete sample N = 229) was calculated
(using SPSS for Windows). This was examined to see if there was bivariate support
for the proposed paths in the models and to look for possible multi-collinearity and
singularity problems among the variables that might lead to problems with testing the
proposed models. Whilst it is recognised that the subsequent SEM analysis was to be
carried out on the covariance matrix and not the correlation matrix, the correlation
matrix is standardised (Pearson's r = covariancexy / sxSy) and is thus easier to interpret,
though it is only a rough guide (Ullman, 1996).
The covariance matrix was chosen as the input for the SEM because the
purpose of the SEM was to test the proposed models rather than to try to confirm
existing models; for such purposes, a covariance matrix is considered to be the most
appropriate form of input as this is the kind of input that SEM was designed to utilise
(Neilletal., 1999, p. 171).
Table 32 shows that, as expected, there were significant positive correlations
among the childhood fantasy proneness, HG/HP experience, dream experience and
sleep disorders measures. As hypothesised, these variables were nearly all
significantly positively correlated with the childhood and adulthood incidence ofboth
non-UFO-related and UFO-related anomalous experiences (with the exception of
childhood fantasy proneness and adult UFO-related experiences). The childhood and
adulthood anomalous experience variables were also significantly positively correlated
with each other and also with the current level of non-UFO-related and UFO-related
anomalous beliefs. There was also a significant positive correlation between the
current level of both non-UFO-related and UFO-related anomalous beliefs.
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Table 32 Sample correlation matrix



















.276** .569** .407** .501**
CHILD
AE2
.133* .274** ] 97** .180** .495**
ADULT
AE1
.265** .481** .357** .415** 744** 451**
ADULT
AE2
.080 .276** .221** .113 .439** .700** .488**
BELIEF 1 .122 .164* .029 .081 .329** .201** .516** .249**
BELIEF2 .004 .083 .014 .045 .211** .214** .238** .239** 494**
* p< .05, ** p< .01, two-tailed
Closer examination of the correlation matrix indicated that there were large
correlations between the childhood and adulthood anomalous experience AE1 (non-
UFO-related) measures (r = .744**) and between the childhood and adulthood
anomalous experience AE2 (UFO-related) measures (r = .700**). Because there was
almost 50% common variance between these pairs ofmeasures it was decided that
this might lead to multi-collinearity problems and it was probably safer to create a
composite score from the redundant variables (Tabachnik & Fidell, 1996, pp-84-86).
The means of the childhood and adulthood variables were calculated in order to
produce new overall AE1 and AE2 variables e.g., AE1= (CHILDAE1 +
ADULTAEl)/2. These new variables were used in all subsequent analyses.
b) sample size and missing data
Approximately 100-150 cases are considered to be a minimum for SEM (Ding,
Velicer, & Harlow, 1995). In addition, although maximum likelihood estimation
(MLE) methods can provide valid results with sample sizes of around 50, a sample
size of at least 100-150 is recommended ifMLE is to be used (Hair et al., 1998, p.
605).
Initially, there were 229 cases in the sample but only 213 cases were included
in the final analysis. Twelve cases containing univariate outliers and four further
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cases, identified by EQS as making some of the largest contributions to multivariate
kurtosis, were excluded.
Bentler and Chou (1987) recommend that five participants per variable is
sufficient for normal and elliptical distributions, and 10 per variable for other
distributions. With 213 participants and eight variables, the ratio is over 26:1.
c) level of measurement
If ordinal, rather than continuous interval, measures are used in SEM it is possible that
the relationships among them may be attenuated, particularly if the number ofpossible
values of the variables is fewer than five (West et al., 1995). Although the childhood
fantasy proneness and anomalous beliefs items have fewer than five scale points, the
overall mean value for a number of items is used in the SEM analysis. If there are at
least 20 possible values of an ordinal variable, then it has been argued that this
provides an acceptable approximation to an interval measure (Clark-Carter, 1997, p.
204).
d) outliers
The EQS software identified twelve cases containing univariate outliers (> 3 SDs
from the means) which were excluded from fiirther analysis.
e) normality of sampling distributions
Most of the SEM estimation techniques assume that there is multivariate normality
(Neill et al., 1999; Ullman, 1996) so it is obviously important to assess this prior to
analysis (Breckler, 1990). Examination ofMardia's normalised estimate of
multivariate kurtosis (= 2.95) indicated that it was significantly higher than the
standardised mean. Therefore, four cases, which were making some of the largest
contributions to this estimate, were also excluded from the analysis. With the
exclusion of these cases, Mardia's normalised estimate ofmultivariate kurtosis was
reduced to 1.53, which was considered to be more acceptable. Because the variables
238
did not meet ideal requirements in terms ofunivariate and multivariate normality, a
decision was made to use the Satorra-Bentler Scaled chi-square test statistic because
it performs well when the variables are not normally-distributed or if there is
dependence among factors and errors (Bentler, 1993; Ullman, 1996; West et al.,
1995).
Test of the proposed models
Model specification
The models that were originally postulated in Chapter 3 have been modified. The
results of the factor analysis of the measures suggested that the childhood sleep-
related experiences should be split into three factors (childhood HG/HP, dream, sleep
disorder symptoms) and that the anomalous experience and anomalous belief
measures should be split into non-UFO- and UFO-related experiences and beliefs.
Inspection of the bivariate correlation matrix raised concerns over potential multi-
collinearity problems due to the large correlations between childhood and adulthood
measures of anomalous experiences; this resulted in composite childhood/adulthood
measures of non-UFO- and UFO-related anomalous experiences being devised
instead.
Note that in all of the models:
Child FP a measure of childhood fantasy proneness
Child HGHP = a measure ofchildhood HG/HP experiences
Child Dream = a measure ofchildhood dream experiences
Child Disorders — a measure of childhood sleep disorder symptoms
AE1 a measure ofnon-UFO-related anomalous experiences
AE2 a measure ofUFO-related anomalous experiences
Beliefl a measure ofnon-UFO-related anomalous beliefs
Belief2 a measure ofUFO-related anomalous beliefs
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Figure 16 Sherwood's experiential source model of childhood
antecedents of anomalous experiences and beliefs
The key aspect of the experiential source model is that it proposes that anomalous
experiences are the cause of associated anomalous beliefs. The experiential source
model proposes that there will be significant positive relationships among the level of
childhood fantasy proneness and the childhood hypnagogic/hypnopompic, dream and
sleep disorder symptoms variables. The model also proposes that each of the
aforementioned variables will have a direct positive relationship with the incidence of
both non-UFO-related and UFO-related anomalous experiences, i.e., as each
childhood variable increases, the incidences ofnon-UFO-related and UFO-related
anomalous experiences will also increase. It also proposes that the incidence of each
measure ofanomalous experiences will have a direct positive relationship with the
current level of corresponding beliefs, i.e., as the incidence of anomalous experiences
increases, the corresponding level of befiefs will also increase. Thus, it is
hypothesised that the childhood variables will only have indirect relationships with the
current levels of anomalous beliefs via their relationships with the incidences of
anomalous experiences.
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Figure 17 Sherwood's cognitive source model of childhood
antecedents of anomalous experiences and beliefs
The cognitive source model is basically the same as the experiential source model
except that the anomalous beliefs are posited to be the cause of rather than the
consequence of their respective anomalous experiences.
241
Figure 18 Sherwood's reciprocal causation model of childhood
antecedents of anomalous experiences and beliefs
The reciprocal causation model is really a hybrid of the experiential and cognitive
source models in that it proposes that anomalous experiences can cause anomalous
beliefs and vice versa.
Model identification
There are more data points than parameters to be estimated and so the models are all
overidentified (see Chou & Bentler, 1995; Ullman, 1996).
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Estimation of parameters
The Maximum Likelihood method of estimation was chosen, as this is the one most
frequently used in SEM and because it performs well under less-than-optimal
conditions (Hoyle & Panter, 1995). The univariate and multivariate deviations from
normality meant that it was prudent to obtain Satorra-Bentler Scaled chi-square
estimates ofmodel fit along with robust standard errors. This was specified in the
METHODS^ ML, ROBUST; section of the EQS command file.
Table 33 Sample covariance matrix
FP HGHP DREAM DISORDER AEl AE2 BELIEF 1 BELIEF2
MEAN 3.502 2.795 3.133 2.636 1.937 1.151 1.575 1.304
SD 2.447 0.990 0.952 0.806 0.575 0.227 0.358 0.504
FP 5.987
HGHP 0.521 0.980
DREAM 0.795 0.364 0.907
DISORDER 0.735 0.396 0.394 0.649
AE1 0.468 0.303 0.218 0.223 0.331
AE2 0.090 0.050 0.034 0.035 0.060 0.051
BELIEF 1 0.147 0.047 0.015 0.012 0.089 0.013 0.128
BELIEF2 0.033 0.015 - 0.008 - 0.001 0.050 0.017 0.082 0.254
The determinant of the input sample covariance matrix = 0.249 x 10"3.
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Testing of model fit
Test of the experiential source model
EQS provided the following satisfactory message "PARAMETER ESTIMATES
APPEAR IN ORDER, NO SPECIAL PROBLEMS WERE ENCOUNTERED
DURING OPTIMIZATION."
a) residuals
An examination of the residual covariance matrix found that the residuals were
generally very small (average off-diagonal absolute standardised residuals = 0.0524)
and symmetrically-distributed (see Ullman, 1996).
The largest standardised residuals indicate that the relationships between non-
UFO-related and UFO-related anomalous beliefs (residual = 0.446) and between non-
UFO-related and UFO-related anomalous experiences (residual = 0.298) are not
explained adequately by the proposed model. Such large residuals can lead to a lack
of overall fit for a model (Bentler, 1993, p. 91). Standardised residuals greater than
0.4 indicate that some of the relationships are not being explained very well at all by
the model (Hu & Bentler, 1995).
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b) model chi-square
Table 34 Measures of fit for the experiential source model
Measures of fit Value df P
Independence model 431.812 28 /X.001
Model x2 97.511 12 p<.001
Satorra-Bentler Scaled x2 100.823 12 p < .00001
X2 difference test 334.301 16 pc.OOl
X2 difference test (Scaled) 330.989 16 /?<.001
Bentler-Bonett Normed Fit Index (NFI) 0.774
Bentler-Bonett Non-normed Fit Index (NNFI) 0.506
Comparative Fit Index (CFI) 0.788
The independence model chi-square value (see Table 34) indicated that, as expected,
there were significant relationships among the variables in the model. The chi-square
difference tests indicated that the hypothesised model provided a significant
improvement in fit compared to the independence model. However, the model chi-
square value showed that there was a significant difference between the data and the
proposed model which means that the model does not fit the data. The Satorra-
Bentler Scaled chi-square value was also significant and did not support the proposed
model. Three different indices of fit,14 which were all smaller than 0.9, also suggested
that the proposed model did not provide a sufficiently good fit to the data (Hoyle &
Panter, 1995).
Respecification of the experiential source model
Lawrence (personal communication, May 28, 1998) suggested that the proposed
model should allow for covariation between the residual error variables for the
anomalous experience variables and also between the residual error variables for the
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anomalous beliefs variables. This is because the largest standardised residuals were
for the anomalous beliefs and anomalous experience variables' covariances. If the
variables themselves are related, and only a small proportion of the variance in each of
these variables is accounted for by the independent variables, then it is possible that
the error terms (which reflect the amount ofunexplained variance) may also be
related. Any relationships between the error terms for the anomalous experience or
belief variables could be due to the fact that another IV(s), which was not specified in
the model and/or measurement error, accounts for the unexplained variances.
Thus, the proposed model was revised and covariances between the non-
UFO-related and UFO-related anomalous experience variable error terms (E5 and E6)
and between the non-UFO-related and UFO-related anomalous beliefs error terms (E7
and E8) were added.
Child HGHP AE1 Belief 1
Child Disorders
Child Dream AE2 Belief 2
Figure 19 Diagram of the revised experiential source model
14 The use ofmore than one adjunct index of fit is recommended (e.g., Hoyle, 1995).
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Testing of model fit
a) residuals
An examination of the residual covariance matrix found that they were generally much
smaller than before (average off-diagonal absolute standardised residuals = 0.0234)
and symmetrically-distributed, which is indicative of a better fit than the previous
version of the model. Only three residuals had an absolute magnitude greater than 0.1.
b) model chi-square
This time the model chi-square value indicated that there was no significant difference
between the data and the proposed model, which is therefore supportive of the model.
The Satorra-Bentler Scaled chi-square value is also non-significant and supportive of
the proposed model.15 However, the finding that both chi-square values are
approaching significance suggests that improvements to the model might provide a
better fit to the data. Indices of fit were greater than 0.9 which also suggests that the
proposed model provides a good fit to the data.
Table 35 Measures of fit for the revised experiential source model
Measures of fit Value df P
Independence model chi-square value 431.812 28 P <.001
Model chi-square value 17.671 10 P = 0.061
Satorra-Bentler Scaled chi-square value 18.197 10 P = 0.052
X difference test 414.141 18 P <.001
X2 difference test (Scaled) 413.615 18 P <.001
Bentler-Bonett Normed Fit Index (NFI) 0.959
Bentler-Bonett Non-normed Fit Index (NNFI) 0.947
Comparative Fit Index (CFI) 0.981
15 A useful rule of thumb suggests that a good-fitting model may be indicated when the ratio of yj to




i) Lagrange multiplier test
The Lagrange multiplier test (for adding parameters) suggested adding a path between
childhood sleep disorders and non-UFO-related anomalous beliefs (multivariate yj (1,
N=213) = 7.25, p < .01). Note that with the Lagrange multiplier test one is looking
for a significant X value as an indicator ofpotential improvement to the model fit. As
post-hoc tests can take advantage of chance or idiosyncratic features of the data
(MacCallum, 1995), a conservative criterion of/? < .01 for accepting suggested
additions was adopted (Ullman, 1996).
The Lagrange multiplier test also suggested adding seven other paths
(including direct paths between childhood fantasy proneness and the anomalous
beliefs measures) but none of these were estimated to make a significant improvement
to the model fit. For this reason, there was no point in testing a modified version of
the experiential source model with additional direct links between fantasy proneness
and anomalous beliefs, as proposed by Irwin (1992, 1993a).
Thus, the results of the SEM analysis do support an albeit slightly modified
version of the experiential source model of the childhood antecedents of anomalous
beliefs. There is no support for direct paths between childhood fantasy proneness and
measures of anomalous beliefs.
ii) Wald test
The Wald test (for dropping parameters) suggested the removal of the paths between
the childhood dream and UFO-related anomalous experiences measures (multivariate
X (1, N=213) = 0.163,/? = 0.686), the childhood sleep disorders and UFO-related
anomalous experiences measures (multivariate y (2, N=213) = 0.845,/? = 0.655), the
childhood dream and non-UFO-related anomalous experiences measures (multivariate
X (3, N=213) = 3.709, p = 0.295), and between the childhood fantasy proneness and
UFO-related anomalous experiences measures (multivariate y2 (4, N=213) = 7.395,/?
= 0.116). Note that with the Wald test one is looking for a nonsignificant y2 value as
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this means that deletion of that particular path will not lead to a significant decrease in
the fit of the model.
Table 36 Measures of fit for the revised experiential source model
with and without suggested modifications
Satorra- Bentler- Bentler-
Post hoc modification Model x2 Bentler Bonett Bonett CFI
Scaled x2 NFI NNFI
Model prior to Lagrange 17.671 18.197 0.959 0.947 0.981
and Wald suggested df= 10 df= 10
modifications p = 0.061 p = 0.052
Addition 10.222 10.211 0.976 0.991 0.997
Childhood sleep disorders to df= 9 df= 9
non-UFO-related anomalous p = 0.333 p = 0.334
beliefs
Deletion 10.410 10.239 0.976 0.997 0.999
Childhood dream experience df= 10 df= 10
to UFO-related anomalous p = 0.405 p = 0.420
experiences
Deletion 11.223 11.006 0.974 0.999 0.999
Childhood sleep disorders to df= 11 df= 11
UFO-related anomalous p - 0.425 p = 0.443
experiences
Deletion 13.995 13.848 0.968 0.988 0.995
Childhood dream experience df= 12 df= 12
to non-UFO-related X? = 0.301 p = 0.311
anomalous experiences
Deletion 17.111 16.925 0.960 0.978 0.990
Childhood fantasy df= 13 df= 13
proneness to UFO-related p = 0.194 p = 0.203
anomalous experiences
iii) Results of suggested modifications
When making post hoc modifications to models, Schumacker & Lomax (1996)
recommend changing only a single parameter at a time. Because the order in which
parameters are altered can affect the significance of the remaining parameters,
MacCallum's (1986) recommendation ofadding all suggested free parameters before
dropping some was followed.
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Table 36 shows that the addition of a direct path between the childhood sleep
disorders variable and the current level ofUFO-related anomalous beliefs provided a
much better fit to the data. This is indicated by the clearly non-significant model y2
values and the increases in the indices of fit. However, the deletion of the paths
suggested by the Wald test did not improve the fit to a great extent. In order to
minimise capitalisation of idiosyncrasies in the sample and modifying the model to fit
the data, the suggested deletions were not incorporated into the final solution.
Table 37 Values of path coefficients for the final experiential
source model
Path Unstandardised Robust Robust z p value1
path coefficient standard score
(standardised) error
Child FP-AE1 .034 (.146) .014 2.44 .0073
Child HG/HP-AE1 .211 (.364) .044 4.78 < .00002
Child dream-AE1 .067 (.112) .041 1.64 .0505
Child disorders-AEl .134 (.188) .052 2.61 .0045
Child FP-AE2 .009 (.094) .007 1.29 .0985
Child HG/HP-AE2 .037 (.160) .019 1.94 .0262
Child dream-AE2 .008 (.035) .020 0.40 .3446
Child disorders-AE2 .017 (.060) .023 0.74 .2296
AE1-Belief! .296 (.485) .039 7.60 < .00002
Child disorders-Belief! -.077 (-.177) .026 -2.93 .0034
(two-tailed)
AE2-Belie 12 .350 (.157) .150 2.33 .0099
Path Covariance Robust Robust z p value
(correlation) standard score
error
Child FP-HG/HP .521 (.215) .168 3.10 .00097
Child FP-dream .795 (.341) .160 4.96 < .00002
Child FP-disorders .735 (.373) .127 5.78 < .00002
Child HG/HP-dream .364 (.386) .067 5.41 < .00002
Child HG/HP-disorders .396 (.497) .061 6.46 < .00002
Child dream-disorders .394 (.513) .060 6.57 < .00002
E5-E6 .039 (.391) .008 5.05 < .00002
E7-E8 .068 (.431) .011 6.39 < .00002
1
























Figure 20 shows that, as predicted, there were significant positive correlations among
the childhood fantasy proneness, hypnagogic/hypnopompic, dream and sleep disorder
symptoms variables with small to medium effect sizes (.215-.513). There were also
significant positive correlations between the residual errors for the anomalous
experience (.391) and anomalous beliefmeasures (.431); these suggest that there are
other variables, not included in the model, that might influence both of these variables.
Direct relationships
As predicted, childhood fantasy proneness, hypnagogic/hypnopompic experiences and
sleep disorder symptoms were significant predictors (one-tailed) of the incidence of
non-UFO-related anomalous experiences with standardised path coefficients ranging
from 0.146 to 0.364. The magnitude of these relationships is rather small with
childhood HG/HP experiences being the most important of these predictors by far.
As the level or incidence of these childhood variables increases, the overall incidence
ofnon-UFO-related anomalous experiences also increases. The childhood dream
experiences measure did predict the incidence of non-UFO-related anomalous
experiences in the hypothesised direction but to a very small extent which was
nonetheless approaching significance {p = 0.0505). Only the childhood
hypnagogic/hypnopompic experience measure was a significant direct predictor of the
incidence ofUFO-related anomalous experiences, although the magnitude of the path
coefficient was smaller (0.160) than for the path to the non-UFO-related anomalous
experiences measure (0.364).
ft is estimated that the childhood predictors accounted for approximately 38%
of the variance in the non-UFO-related anomalous experiences measure but only
about 7% of the variance in the UFO-related anomalous experiences measure. This is
only approximate as it does not take the correlations between the residual errors into
account. Clearly, these childhood variables can account for a sizeable proportion of
the variance in the non-UFO-related anomalous experiences measure but they are not
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very useful when it comes to predicting variance in the UFO-related anomalous
experiences measure.
As predicted, the non-UFO-related and UFO-related anomalous experiences
measures were significant positive predictors of their respective beliefs. As the overall
incidence of non-UFO-related anomalous experiences increases, the belief in such
phenomena also increases; a similar relationship held for the UFO-related anomalous
experiences and beliefs. Although the magnitude of the path coefficient between the
UFO-related anomalous experiences and beliefs measures was small (0.157), the path
coefficient between the non-UFO-related measures was quite large (0.485). These
findings provide support for the experiential source basis for anomalous beliefs,
particularly where non-UFO-related phenomena are concerned.
Post hoc modifications to the original model revealed that the incidence of
childhood sleep disorders symptoms was a significant negative predictor (two-tailed)
of the level of adult belief in non-UFO-related anomalous phenomena. This means
that people who experienced more sleep disorder symptoms during their childhood
tend to report lower levels ofnon-UFO-related anomalous beliefs during adulthood,
regardless ofwhether or not they have ever experienced such anomalous experiences.
It is estimated that the predictors accounted for only 18% of the variance in
the level of adult belief in non-UFO-related phenomena and only 2% of the variance in
the level ofUFO-related beliefs. Again these are only rough estimates as they do not
take into account the correlations between the residual variances.
Clearly, this experiential source model is not very good at all at predicting
UFO-related experiences and beliefs but it is quite good at predicting non-UFO-
related experiences and beliefs.
Indirect relationships
The childhood fantasy proneness, hypnagogic/hypnopompic experience and sleep
disorders symptoms measures were also indirect predictors ofnon-UFO-related
anomalous beliefs via their association with the incidence ofnon-UFO-related
anomalous experiences. The childhood FIG/FIP experiences measure was also an
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indirect predictor ofUFO-related anomalous beliefs via its relationship with UFO-
related anomalous experiences.
Test of the cognitive source model
Model specification
Figure 21 Diagram of the cognitive source model
The cognitive source model proposes that the anomalous beliefs are the cause of
similar anomalous experiences rather than the result of them.
Testing ofmodel fit
EQS provided the following satisfactory message "PARAMETER ESTIMATES




An examination of the residual covariance matrix found that they were generally quite
small (average off-diagonal absolute standardised residuals = 0.0640) and
asymmetrically-distributed. There were six residuals with an absolute magnitude
greater than 0.1, one ofwhich, for the covariance between beliefmeasures, was
0.456. The presence of these relatively large residuals suggests that the model fit
could still be improved.
b) model chi-square
The model chi-square value (see Table 38) indicated that there was a significant
difference between the data and the proposed model, which means that the model
does not fit the data. The Satorra-Bentler Scaled chi-square value is also significant
and does not support the proposed model. The indices of fit also confirm that the
proposed model does not provide a sufficiently good fit to the data, as these indices
are all less than 0.9.
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Table 38 Measures of fit for the cognitive source model
Measures of fit Value df P
Independence model chi-square value 431.812 28 /?<.001
Model chi-square value 93.923 12 /? < .001
Satorra-Bentler Scaled chi-square value 96.4398 12 p < .00001
difference test 337.889 16 /? < .001
X difference test (Scaled) 335.3722 16 /? < .001
Bentler-Bonett Normed Fit Index (NFI) 0.782
Bentler-Bonett Non-normed Fit Index (NNFI) 0.527
Comparative Fit Index (CFI) 0.797
Post-hoc analyses
i) Lagrange multiplier test
The Lagrange multiplier test suggested adding a path between non-UFO and UFO-
related anomalous beliefs (multivariate (1, N=213) = 44.083,/? < .001).
After the addition of this path (plus allowance of covariation between the error
variances for the anomalous experience measures) the Lagrange multiplier test
suggested that the addition of a path from the childhood fantasy proneness measure to
the non-UFO-related beliefs measure (multivariate % (1, N=213) = 5.459,/? = .019)
would also improve the fit. Although the probability associated with this addition was
slightly above the conservative /?< .01 criterion that was used for accepting additions
to the experiential source model this path was still added because it was of theoretical
interest in that a similar path is proposed in Irwin's (1992, 1993a) model of the
antecedents ofparanormal belief.
ii) Wald test
The Wald test suggested the removal of the paths between the childhood dream
i • • 2
experiences and UFO-related anomalous experiences measures (multivariate % (1,
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N=213) = 0.218,/? = 0.640), the childhood sleep disorders symptoms and UFO-
related anomalous experiences measures (multivariate y2 (2, N=213) = 0.981 ,p =
0.612), the childhood fantasy proneness and UFO-related anomalous experiences
measures (multivariate y2 (3, N=213) = 3.715,p = 0.294), and between the childhood
fantasy proneness and non-UFO-related anomalous experiences measures
(multivariate y2 (4, N=213) = 5.486, p = 0.241).
iii) Results of suggested modifications
Table 39 shows that the addition of a path from the non-UFO-related to the UFO-
related anomalous beliefs measure resulted in a model that did fit the data. This is
shown by the nonsignificant model y2 and Satorra-Bentler Scaled y2 values which
mean that there is no significant difference between the data and this revised model.
The fit indices for this modified model are also greater than 0.9, which also supports
the fit of this model. The fit of the model was also improved slightly by the addition
of a path between childhood fantasy proneness and the non-UFO-related anomalous
beliefs measure.
Deletion of the paths suggested by the Wald test did not improve the fit to a
great extent (in fact, it worsened slightly according to the fit indices and the y2) and
so these paths remained in the final solution.
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Table 39 Measures of fit for the cognitive source model with and
without suggested modifications
Satorra- Bentler- Bentler-
Post hoc modification Model x2 Bentler Bonett Bonett CFI
Scaled x2 NFI NNFI
Model prior to Lagrange 93.323 96.440 0.782 0.527 0.797
and Wald suggested df= 12 df= 12
modifications pc.OOl p<.00001
Addition 11.384 11.627 0.974 0.990 0.997
Non-UFO-related to UFO- df= 10 oII<+H"O
related anomalous beliefs p = 0.328 p = 0.311
and E5-E6 covariance
Addition 4.687 5.0161 0.989 1.029 1.000
Childhood fantasy df= 8 df= 8
proneness to non-UFO- p = 0.790 p = 0.756
related anomalous beliefs
and E7-E8 covariaance
Deletion 4.938 5.1476 0.989 1.031 1.000
Childhood dream experience df= 9 df= 9
to UFO-related anomalous p = 0.840 p — 0.821
experiences
Deletion 5.870 6.0536 0.986 1.029 1.000
Childhood sleep disorders to oIIT3 O- II o
UFO-related anomalous p = 0.826 p = 0.811
experiences
Deletion 8.903 9.1195 0.979 1.013 1.00
Childhood fantasy df= 11 df= 11







EQS had problems converging on a solution with this
path deleted and had to place constraints on some of the
parameters in order to do so. EQS warned that this























Table 40 Values of path coefficients for the final cognitive source
model
Path Unstandardised Robust Robust z p value










































Robust Robust z p value
standard score
error
Child FP-HG/HP .521 (.215) .168 3.10 .00097
Child FP-dream .795 (.341) .160 4.96 < .00002
Child FP-disorders .735 (.373) .127 5.78 < .00002
Child HG/HP-dream .364 (.386) .067 5.41 < .00002
Child HG/HP-disorders .396 (.497) .061 6.46 < .00002
Child dream-disorders .394 (.513) .060 6.57 < .00002
E5-E6 .034 (.381) .007 4.85 < .00002
E7-E8 .053 (.321) .073 0.73 .2327
Associations
Figure 22 shows that, as predicted, there were significant positive correlations among
the childhood fantasy proneness, hypnagogic/hypnopompic, dream and sleep disorder
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symptoms variables. The magnitude of these correlations was identical to those in the
experiential and cognitive source models. There were also positive correlations
between the residual errors for the anomalous experience (.381) and anomalous belief
measures (.321); these suggest that there are other variables, not included in the
model, that might influence both of these variables.
Direct relationships
As predicted, childhood hypnagogic/hypnopompic experiences, dream experiences
and sleep disorder symptoms were significant positive predictors of the incidence of
non-UFO-related anomalous experiences. The path coefficient between childhood
fantasy proneness and non-UFO-related anomalous experiences was in the predicted
direction and was approaching significance (p = 0.0505). As the level or incidence of
these childhood variables increases, the overall incidence of non-UFO-related
anomalous experiences also increases. Again, only the childhood HG/HP experience
measure was a significant direct predictor (0.154) of the incidence ofUFO-related
anomalous experiences. As with the experiential source model, the magnitude of the
path coefficients was quite small (0.087-0.317) and the childhood HG/HP experience
measure was the best of the predictors. Unlike the experiential source model, the path
between childhood dream experiences and non-UFO-related anomalous experiences
(0.124) was statistically significant.
It is estimated that the childhood predictors and the respective anomalous
beliefs measure accounted for approximately 49% of the variance in the non-UFO-
related anomalous experiences measure but only about 9% of the variance in the
UFO-related anomalous experiences measure.
As predicted, the levels ofnon-UFO-related and UFO-related anomalous
beliefs were significant positive predictors of their respective experiences. As the
level of non-UFO-related anomalous beliefs increases, the overall incidence of such
experiences also increases; a similar relationship held for the UFO-related anomalous
beliefs and experiences. However, although non-UFO-related beliefs were quite a
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good predictor (0.349) of associated experiences, the same was not true for UFO-
related beliefs and experiences (0.135).
Post hoc modifications to the original model revealed that the level of
childhood fantasy proneness was a small (.167) but significant direct positive
predictor (two-tailed) of the level of adult belief in non-UFO-related anomalous
phenomena. The level ofbelief in non-UFO-related phenomena was also a small
(.160) but nonsignificant positive predictor of the level ofbelief in UFO-related
anomalous phenomena. Irwin's (1992, 1993a) model contains a similar direct path
between fantasy proneness and paranormal beliefs.
It is estimated that the predictors accounted for only 3% of the variance in the
level ofadult belief in non-UFO-related phenomena but 12% of the variance in the
level ofUFO-related beliefs.
Indirect relationships
The modified model also suggests that childhood fantasy proneness might also have
an indirect effect on the incidence of non-UFO-related anomalous experiences via its
effect on belief in non-UFO-related phenomena.
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Test of the reciprocal causation model
Model specification
Figure 23 Diagram of the reciprocal causation model
The reciprocal model proposes that the anomalous experiences cause anomalous
beliefs and vice versa.
Testing of model fit
EQS reported difficulties in estimating and converging upon a solution for the
proposed model. In order to reach a solution it had to set the variance of the UFO-
related anomalous experience measure to zero and it warned that the error variance
was linearly dependent on other variables. This is clearly indicative of a potentially
unstable and, to some extent, a forced solution. The EQS software also warned that
these test results may not be appropriate.
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a) residuals
An examination of the residual covariance matrix found that the residuals were
generally quite small (average off-diagonal absolute standardised residuals = 0.0801)
and asymmetrically-distributed, although nine of the standardised residuals were
greater than 0.1. The residual matrix left when comparing the model and the data
covariance matrices showed that the residual for the covariance between the
anomalous experiences measures and the residual for the covariance between the
anomalous beliefs measures were both greater than 0.45 which suggest that the model
was not explaining these relationships. There was a similar situation with the initial
test of the experiential source model. If the variables themselves are related, and only
a small proportion of the variance in each of these variables is accounted for by the
independent variables, then it is possible that the error terms (which reflect the
amount ofunexplained variance) may also be related. Thus, the model was respecified
and covariances between the error variances for the anomalous experiences and
anomalous beliefs measures, respectively, were allowed.
b) model chi-square
Table 41 Measures of fit for the reciprocal causation source model
Measures of fit Value df P
Independence model y2 431.812 28 p < .001
Model y2 104.739 10 P<.m
Satorra-Bentler Scaled y2 95.172 10 p<.00001
y2 difference test 327.073 18 pc.001
y2 difference test (Scaled) 336.640 18 /7C.001
Bentler-Bonett Normed Fit Index (NFI) 0.757
Bentler-Bonett Non-normed Fit Index (NNFI) 0.343
Comparative Fit Index (CFI) 0.765
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The chi-square difference tests (see Table 41) indicated that the hypothesised model
provided a significant improvement in fit compared to the independence model.
However, the model chi-square value showed that there was a significant difference
between the data and the proposed model. The Satorra-Bentler Scaled chi-square
value was also significant and did not support the proposed model. Indices of fit also
suggested that the proposed model did not provide a sufficiently good fit to the data
as these were well below 0.9.




Figure 24 Diagram of the revised reciprocal causation model
a) residuals
An examination of the residual covariance matrix for this revised reciprocal causation
model found that the residuals were very small (average off-diagonal absolute
standardised residuals = 0.0090) which is a sign of a good model fit. Only one residual
had an absolute magnitude greater than 0.1 (for covariance between childhood fantasy
proneness and non-UFO beliefs).
265
b) model chi-square
Chi-square difference tests (see Table 42) indicated that the hypothesised model
provided a significant improvement in fit compared to the independence model. The
model chi-square value indicated that there was no significant difference between the
data and the proposed model, which is therefore supportive of the model. The
Satorra-Bentler Scaled chi-square value is also non-significant and supportive of the
proposed model. The indices of fit were all greater than 0.9 which also confirms that
the revised reciprocal causation model provides a good fit to the data.
Table 42 Measures of fit for the revised reciprocal causation model
Measures of fit Value df P
Independence model chi-square value 431.812 28 P o©V
Model chi-square value 7.548 8 P = 0.4788
Satorra-Bentler Scaled chi-square value 7.626 8 P = 0.4708
X2 difference test 414.141 20 P <.001
X difference test (Scaled) 413.615 20 P <.001
Bentler-Bonett Normed Fit Index (NFI) 0.983
Bentler-Bonett Non-normed Fit Index (NNFI) 1.004
Comparative Fit Index (CFI) 1.000
Post-hoc analyses
i) Lagrange multiplier test
The Lagrange multiplier test also suggested adding a number of other paths (including
direct paths between childhood fantasy proneness and the anomalous beliefs
measures) but none of these were estimated to make a significant improvement to the
model fit. For this reason, there was no point in testing a modified version of the
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reciprocal causation model with additional direct links between fantasy proneness and
anomalous beliefs, as proposed by Irwin (1992, 1993a).
ii) Wald test
The Wald test suggested the removal of four paths: one between UFO-related beliefs
and UFO-related anomalous experiences (multivariate X N=213) = 0.154,p =
0.695); one between childhood dream experiences and UFO-related anomalous
experiences (multivariate x2 (2, N=213) = 0.312,p = 0.856); one between childhood
• • • 2
sleep disorder symptoms and UFO-related anomalous experiences (multivariate x (3,
N=213) = 0.983,p = 0.805); and one between UFO-related anomalous experiences
and UFO-related anomalous beliefs (multivariate x2 (4, N=213) = 4.122,/? = 0.390).
Table 43 Measures of fit for the revised reciprocal causation model
with and without suggested modifications
Satorra- Bentler- Bentler-
Post hoc modification Model x2 Bentler Bonett Bonett CFI
Scaled x2 NFI NNFI
Model prior to Lagrange 7.548 7.626 0.983 1.004 1.000
and Wald suggested df= 8 df= 8
modifications p = 0.4788 p = 0.4708
Deletion 7.719 7.762 0.982 1.010 1.000
UFO-related anomalous df= 9 df= 9
beliefs to UFO-related /? = 0.5629 p = 0.5583
experiences
Deletion 7.905 7.823 0.982 1.015 1.000
Childhood dream variable oIIT3 df= 10
and UFO-related anomalous /? = 0.6381 /? = 0.6461
experiences
Deletion 8.716 8.641 0.980 1.014 1.000
Childhood sleep disorders df= 11 df= 11
symptoms and UFO-related p = 0.6481 p = 0.6583
anomalous experiences
Deletion 7.755 7.939 0.980 0.983 0.995
UFO-related anomalous df= 6 df= 6
experiences and UFO- p = 0.2566 p = 0.2426
related beliefs
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iii) Results of suggested modifications
Table 43 shows that the deletion of the paths suggested by the Wald test did not
improve the fit to a great extent. In order to minimise capitalisation of idiosyncrasies
in the sample and modifying the model to fit the data, the suggested deletions were
not incorporated in the final solution.
Table 44 Values of path coefficients for the final reciprocal
causation model
Path Unstandardised Robust Robust z p value
path coefficient standard score
(standardised) error
Child FP-AE1 .025 (.105) .012 1.97 .0244
Child HG/HP-AE1 .191 (.330) .041 4.62 < .000027
Child dream-AE1 .072 (.119) .036 1.99 .0233
Child disorders-AE1 .148 (.208) .046 3.19 .00071
Child FP-AE2 .009 (.093) .007 1.26 .1038
Child HG/HP-AE2 .036 (.158) .019 1.92 .0274
Child dream-AE2 .009 (.037) .020 0.43 .3336
Child disorders-AE2 .017 (.061) .023 0.75 .2266
AEl-Beliefl .124 (.199) .061 2.02 .0217
Belief!-AE1 .380 (.237) .122 3.11 .00094
AE2-Belief2 .158 (.071) .301 0.53 .2981
Belief2-AE2 .024 (.053) .061 0.39 .3483
Path Covariance Robust Robust z p value
(correlation) standard score
error
Child FP-HG/HP .521 (.215) .168 3.10 .00097
Child FP-dream .795 (.341) .160 4.96 < .00002
Child FP-disorders .735 (.373) .127 5.78 < .00002
Child HG/HP-dream .364 (.386) .067 5.41 < .00002
Child FIG/HP-disorders .396 (.497) .061 6.46 < .00002
Child dream-disorders .394 (.513) .060 6.57 < .00002
E5-E6 .035 (.389) .007 4.94 < .00002




































Figure 25 shows that, as predicted, there were significant positive correlations among
the childhood fantasy proneness, hypnagogic/hypnopompic, dream and sleep disorder
symptoms variables. There were also significant positive correlations between the
residual errors for the anomalous experiences (0.389) and anomalous beliefs (0.451)
measures which suggest that there are additional variables, not specified in the model,
that can account for variability in both non-UFO-related and UFO-related experiences
and beliefs, respectively.
Direct relationships
As predicted, childhood fantasy proneness, hypnagogic/hypnopompic experiences,
dream experiences and sleep disorder symptoms were all significant positive
predictors (range .105-.330) of the incidence of non-UFO-related anomalous
experiences. The standardised path coefficients for the childhood predictors also
indicated that the childhood HG/HP experience measure is the best of these at
predicting the overall incidence ofnon-UFO-related anomalous experiences. Only the
childhood hypnagogic/hypnopompic experience measure was a significant but small
(.158) direct predictor of the incidence ofUFO-related anomalous experiences.
It is estimated that the childhood predictors plus the respective anomalous
beliefs measure accounted for approximately 48% of the variance in the incidence of
non-UFO-related anomalous experiences but only about 7% of the variance in the
incidence ofUFO-related anomalous experiences. This is only approximate as it does
not take the correlations between the residual errors into account. Clearly, this
reciprocal causation model is quite poor when it comes to accounting for variability in
UFO-related anomalous experiences.
As predicted, the incidence ofnon-UFO-related anomalous experiences was a
significant positive predictor (0.199) of the level of non-UFO-related beliefs and vice
versa (0.237). As the overall incidence ofnon-UFO-related anomalous experiences
increases, the belief in such phenomena also increases and vice versa. However,
270
contrary to expectations, the reciprocal paths between UFO-related anomalous
experiences and beliefs were small and nonsignificant but in the predicted direction.
It is estimated that the anomalous experience measures accounted for only
13% of the variance in the level of adult belief in non-UFO-related phenomena and
only 1% of the variance in the level ofUFO-related beliefs, respectively. Again these
are only rough estimates as they do not take into account the correlations between the
residual variances. Again, this model is much better at explaining variance relating to
non-UFO-related rather than UFO-related phenomena measures and is better at
explaining variance in non-UFO-related anomalous experiences rather than beliefs.
There is some evidence to support the revised reciprocal causation model but
it seems to only apply to non-UFO-related phenomena. However, this may be
because of the low levels ofUFO-related experience and beliefs and the low
variability of these measures within the sample; this would make it difficult for any
true relationships to show up. There is support for the reciprocal causation
hypothesis that suggests that reports ofanomalous experiences might cause
anomalous beliefs and that anomalous beliefs might also cause reports of anomalous
experiences, which supports Irwin's (1992, 1993a) model.
Indirect relationships
As predicted, the childhood fantasy proneness, hypnagogic/hypnopompic experience,
dream experiences and sleep disorder symptoms variables were also indirect
predictors of non-UFO-related anomalous beliefs via their association with the
incidence ofnon-UFO-related anomalous experiences. The indirect relationship
between childhood fantasy proneness and non-UFO-related anomalous experiences is
supportive ofLawrence's (1998; Lawrence et al., 1995). The Lagrange multiplier test
did not suggest that the fit of the model could be improved by the addition of direct
paths between the childhood fantasy proneness measure and the anomalous beliefs
measures; this does not therefore support Irwin's (1992, 1993a) model, which
postulates such direct paths.
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Because there is always a danger that particular models may only fit one particular
sample due to its unique idiosyncrasies, it is important to cross-validate the factor
structure and the fit of the model using different data samples (Hoyle & Panter, 1995;
MacCallum, 1995; MacCallum & Austin, 2000; Neill et al., 1999). As outlined in
Chapter 6, there are also concerns over the equivalence ofWWW versus more
traditional pencil-and-paper measures. Thus, a traditional pencil-and-paper survey
using the same questionnaire was also carried out (see Chapter 10). It was
anticipated that SEM analysis of this data would be able to establish whether the
models are robust enough to be confirmed and also whether the administration and
completion method may have any significant effect on the results. In order to avoid
duplication and to facilitate comparisons, the results of the SEM analyses for both
surveys will be discussed together in Chapter 11.
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Chapter 10
Factor analysis of survey items and test of
proposed models using structural equation
modelling (SEM) and traditional pencil-and-paper
survey data
This chapter will outline the details of the traditional pencil-and-paper survey plus the
results of the factor and SEM analyses that were conducted to see whether the results
from the WWW sample would be confirmed using a different questionnaire
administration and completion method.
Design
This survey used a pencil-and-paper version of the questionnaire. The questionnaire
was basically the same as the one used in both of the WWW surveys (see Appendix
1), although the instructions were modified slightly to reflect the changes in
administration and method of completion.
Participants
This survey used an opportunity sample. Student participants were recruited via
invitations made at the start of a number of undergraduate psychology classes held at
University College Northampton (UCN). UCN staffmembers were recruited via an
e-mail message that was sent to all staff. Other participants were recruited via
personal invitations from the author to friends and colleagues. In a few cases, a
participant recruited further participants from their friends or colleagues.
Three hundred and fifty copies of the questionnaire were distributed, one
hundred and fifty-one completed questionnaires were returned. This provided a 43%
response rate. Ninety-three participants were undergraduate psychology students, 45
were UCN staffmembers and 13 were friends/colleagues of the author or of some of
the participants. There were 35 male and 114 female (2 unspecified) participants aged
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18-64 years (mean = 28.77, S.D.= 10.77). Ninety-six per cent of the participants
were British, 1% other European, 1% non-European and 1% were of an unspecified
nationality. Forty-four per cent of the participants had practised or were practising
some form ofmental discipline, exercise or self-improvement program.
Survey questions
The survey questions were the same as those used in the WWW surveys with the
exception of the exploding head symptoms item which was changed from 'Elave you
ever experienced sensations of explosions and/or sensations of flashing lights in the
head as you are falling asleep?' to 'Have you ever experienced sensations of
explosions in the head as you are falling asleep?' This change was made to improve
the specificity of the question and the resulting answers.
Procedure
Questionnaires were distributed to the undergraduate students at the start of a number
ofpsychology classes and interested participants were asked to place completed
questionnaires in a sealed box placed outside the author's office. UCN staffmembers
who accepted the e-mail invitation to participate were sent a copy of the questionnaire
via the college internal mail system and they were asked to return the completed
questionnaire in the same manner or to place it in the aforementioned box. Other
participants were recruited via personal invitations from the author to friends and
colleagues. In a few cases, a participant recruited further participants from their own
friends or colleagues. In all cases, the participants filled out the questionnaire in then-
own time.
Principal factor analysis
Principal factor analyses of the childhood fantasy proneness, sleep-related experience,
anomalous experiences and anomalous belief items were conducted in order to check
whether the factor structure identified with the WWW survey data would be
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confirmed using the traditional pencil-and-paper survey data. Principal factor analysis
of the WWW survey data using orthogonal rotation (see Chapter 8) found significant
correlations among the factors and so only the obliquely rotated solutions were
interpreted. For this reason, only obliquely rotated solutions were generated and
interpreted for the traditional pencil-and-paper survey data.
Obliquely-rotated solutions
Anomalous beliefs
Table 45 shows that all of the belief items loaded positively on factors 1 and 2. All
items loaded greater than .3 (the chosen criterion for acceptance) on factor 1; the
majority of items loaded greater than .3 on factor 2 with the exception of the belief in
life after death, deja vu, NDE and spiritual/mysticaPtranscendental experience items.
Belief items relating to UFOs loaded highest on factor 2. The results confirm that the
belief items could usefully be divided into two separate factors relating to non-UFO-
related and UFO-related beliefs, respectively.
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General ESP .775 .415
Precognition .775 .384
Awareness of deceased person .756 .381
Telepathy .750 .377
Contact spirits of the dead .737 .438
Ability to see auras .704 .411
Psychokinesis .684 .470
Memories ofprevious life .674 .463
Outbreak of inexplicable noises .667 .354
Out-of-body experience .661 .315
Near-death experience .651 .283
Spiritual, mystical, transcendental experience .603 .195
Heal person via mind .597 .384
Life after death .495 .265
Deja vu .467 3.16 x 10
Life on other planets .335 .602
Extra-terrestrial visitation of Earth .504 .914
Extra-terrestrial communication with Earth .479 .939
Extra-terrestrials have allowed humans on board .419 .793





Table 46 shows that the anomalous belief factors 1 and 2 are significantly correlated
with each other to quite a large extent, although the direction of the relationship is
opposite to that obtained with the WWW survey data.
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Childhood-adulthood anomalous experiences
The structure matrix (see Table 47) shows that the majority of the non-UFO-related
childhood-adulthood anomalous experience items loaded greater than the criterion of
.3 on factor 1 with the exception of the deja vu, unexplained bites/scratches/pinches,
childhood experience ofbeing healed and childhood communication with the dead
items. Three of the eight UFO-related items could not be entered into the factor
analysis because there was no variance in the scores on these items. Four of the
remaining five UFO-related items loaded higher on factor 2 and three of these items
had loadings greater than .3. Although the factor structure is not quite so clear-cut
and some of the UFO-related items could not be included in the factor analysis of this
traditional pencil-and-paper survey data, the results do confirm that the childhood-
adulthood anomalous experience items could still be usefully divided up into two
factors: a non-UFO-related anomalous experiences factor and a UFO-related
anomalous experiences factor.
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Table 47 Structure matrix for anomalous experience items





Memories ofprevious life (adult)
OBE (child)
Communication with the dead (adult)
Spiritual, mystical, transcendental (adult)
Near-death experience (adult)
Being healed by others (adult)
Dream ESP (adult)
Apparition/presence (adult)












Memories of previous life (child)
Unexplained noises (child)
Healing others (child)
Seeing with eyes closed (child)
Unexplained noises (adult)
Deja vu (adult)
Being healed by others (child)
Communication with the dead (child)
Deja vu (child)
Unexplained bites, scratches, pinches (adult)
Unexplained bites, scratches, pinches (child)
Seeing strange lights/objects in sky (child)
Seeing strange lights/objects in sky (adult)
Seen a UFO at close range (child)
Seen a UFO at close range (adult)




















































Table 48 shows that, as with the WWW survey data, there is a significant positive
correlation between factor 1 and factor 2 of the childhood-adulthood anomalous
experience items.
Childhood sleep-related experiences
Table 49 shows that, as with the WWW survey data, there is a cluster of items loading
higher than the criterion of 0.3 on each of factors 1-3. The results suggest that the
childhood sleep-related experience items could still be usefully divided up into the
three factors suggested by the analysis of the WWW survey data: a childhood sleep
disorders symptoms factor, a childhood dream experiences factor and a childhood
HG/HP experiences factor. Although not all of the items loaded greater than .3 on
the factors suggested by the previous analysis, the overall picture supports the factor
structure obtained with the WWW survey data and so the same items will be included
in the scales for the SEM analysis with this traditional pencil-and-paper survey data.
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Table 49 Structure matrix for childhood sleep-related experience
items following oblique (oblimin) rotation
Factor
1 2 3
Hypnagogic imagery .398 .217 .506
Hypnopompic imagery .357 .204 .666
Exploding head symptoms .197 .208 .264
Pre-dormital sleep paralysis .352 .222 .410
Post-dormital sleep paralysis .381 .447 .496
Sleep starts .468 .243 .326
Dream recall .315 .228 .279
Dream control 1 .128 .667 .185
Dream control 2 .114 .527 .139
Vivid dreams .433 .342 .427
Flying dreams .223 .280 .408
Falling dreams .343 .313 .405
Prelucid dreams .207 .621 9.18 xl0":
Lucid dreams .331 .612 .367
False awakenings (Type 1) .175 .627 8.36 xlO"'
False awakenings (Type 2) .216 .590 .314
Sleep terrors .722 .309 .280
Nightmares .626 .352 .159
REM sleep behaviour disorder .564 .107 .359
Sleep choking .268 .163 .464
Sleepwalking .578 -1.73 xlO"2 .212
Sleep talking .726 .136 .350
Confiisional arousals .438 .214 .368
Rhythmic movement disorder .159 4.29 xlO"2 .609
Nocturnal leg cramps .289 .201 .180
Sleep bruxism .260 5.71 xlO"2 .235
Sleep enuresis .195 .205 -1.33 xlO"
Primary snoring .384 -4.70 xlO"2 .342
Excessive sleepiness .107 5.56 xlO"2 .295
Cataplexy .289 .140 .307
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Table 50 Factor correlation matrix for childhood sleep-related
experience factors
Factor correlation matrix













Table 50 shows that the childhood sleep-related factors are all positively correlated
with each other. This is slightly different from the WWW survey findings as the
results of that factor analysis found that factors 1 and 2 were negatively correlated.
Childhood fantasy proneness
The structure matrix (see Table 51) shows that the factor structure for the childhood
fantasy proneness items is not very clear. Unlike the WWW sample, there is no
indication that the majority of the items load more highly on one of the two factors
extracted. Fewer than halfof the items load greater than the 0.3 criterion on the two
factors which suggests that this measure may suffer from a lower reliability. Although
a clear single factor did not emerge, in the interests of attempting a replication of the
SEM results from the WWW survey, the same items as before will constitute the scale
that will be used in subsequent analyses.
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Table 51 Structure matrix for childhood fantasy proneness items
following oblique (oblimin) rotation
Item Factor
1 2
Item 1 2.84 xlO"2 .487
Item 2 4.35 xlO"2 .225
Item 3 -.212 .440
Item 4 2.62 xlO"2 .698
Item 5 .262 -.116
Item 6 .107 .531
Item 7 .398 .394
Item 8 .710 .262
Item 9 .106 .391
Item 10 .200 -1.36x10"
Item 11 8.64 xlO"2 .367
Item 12 .646 .104
Item 13 .515 9.25 xlO"'
Item 14 .398 .225
Item 15 .523 3.76 x!0":







Item-total correlations and alpha coefficients of reliability were calculated for each
proposed new scale. Details of the items which made it into the final scales are
available at the end ofChapter 8.
282
Anomalous beliefs scales
The alpha coefficients of reliability for the non-UFO-related and UFO-related beliefs
measures (r = .93 and r = .88, respectively) were greater than the desired criterion
value and were of a similar magnitude to those obtained in the WWW sample (r = .91
and r = .90, respectively).
Childhood and adulthood anomalous experiences scales
All 17 and 4 items for factors 1 (non-UFO-related) and 2 (UFO-related), respectively,
of the childhood anomalous experience scales met the item-total correlation criterion.
The alpha coefficient of reliability for factor 1, r = .83, was greater than the desired
criterion value; the alpha coefficient for factor 2, r = .15, was way below the desired
value and extremely unreliable.
All 17 items for factor 1 of the adulthood anomalous experience scale met the
item-total correlation criterion. The alpha coefficient of reliability for factor 1, r = .90
(WWW r = .89), was greater than the desired criterion value; the alpha coefficient for
factor 2, r = .18 (WWW r = .60), was slightly below the desired value. The alpha
coefficient with the having been on board a UFO (adult) item deleted (item-total
correlation .262) was r = .63. This item was kept in the scale in order to maintain
similarity with the childhood version and because its exclusion made little difference
to the internal reliability of the scale. The unreliability of the UFO-related measures is
due to the low variance of some of the items that do not therefore differentiate
between participants and there is little scope for relationships with other items or the
overall score.
Childhood sleep-related experience scales
The alpha coefficient of reliability for factor 1 (childhood sleep disorders symptoms)
was r = .73 (WWW r = .79) which was greater than the desired criterion value. The
alpha coefficient of reliability for factor 2 (childhood dream variables) was r = .79
(WWW r = .85) which was greater than the desired criterion value. The alpha
283
coefficient of reliability for factor 3 (childhood HG/HP experiences) was r = .69
(WWW r = .70) which was the desired minimum criterion value. The reliabilities
were of a similar magnitude in both samples.
Childhood fantasy proneness scale
The alpha coefficient of reliability for factor 1 was r = .62 (WWW r = .76) which was
slightly lower than the desired criterion value.
Tests of models using SEM analysis
a) Inspection of bivariate correlation matrix
Table 53 Sample correlation matrix
FP HGHP DREAM DISORDER AEI AE2 BELIEF 1 BELIEF2
FP
HGHP .337 ** —
DREAM .210 ** .452 ** —
DISORDER .260 ** .590 ** .369 ** —
AEI .294 ** .552 ** 393 ** .428 ** —
AE2 .140 * .239** .234 ** .285 ** .418 ** —
BELIEF 1 .149* .232 ** .154 * .109 .477 ** .257 ** —
BELIEF2 .141* .163 * .208 ** .117 .244 ** .212 ** 545•* —
* p< .05, ** p< .01, two-tailed
Table 53 shows that, as expected, there were significant positive correlations, of a
small to medium magnitude, among the childhood fantasy proneness, HG/HP
experience, dream experience and sleep disorders measures. As hypothesised, these
variables were all significantly positively correlated with the non-UFO-related and
UFO-related anomalous experiences measures, although the effect sizes were larger
for relationships with the non-UFO-related measure. The anomalous experience
measures were also significantly positively correlated with each other and also with
the respective measures of non-UFO-related and UFO-related anomalous beliefs.
There was also a significant positive correlation between the current level of both
non-UFO-related and UFO-related anomalous beliefs. These correlations suggest that
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it would be worthwhile to conduct a SEM analysis with the data and that none of the
correlations are high enough to cause concerns about possibility multicollinearity.
b) Sample size and missing data
Initially, there were 151 cases in the sample but only 139 cases were included in the
final SEM analysis. Twelve cases identified by EQS as making some of the largest
contributions to multivariate kurtosis, were excluded.
Bentler and Chou (1987) recommend that five participants per variable is
sufficient for normal and elliptical distributions, and 10 per variable for other
distributions. With 139 participants and eight variables, the ratio is over 17:1.
c) Normality of sampling distributions
Examination ofMardia's normalised estimate ofmultivariate kurtosis (= 134.39),
prior to the removal of the 12 cases, indicated that it was significantly higher than the
standardised mean. Therefore, 12 cases, which were making some of the largest
contributions to this estimate, were removed. With the exclusion of these cases,
Mardia's normalised estimate ofmultivariate kurtosis was reduced to 1.92, which is
no longer indicative of significant multivariate kurtosis.
Attempted confirmation of the models tested using the WWW
survey data
Model identification
As before, there are more data points than parameters to be estimated and so the
models are overidentified (see Chapter 3, p. 57; Chou & Bentler, 1995; Ullman, 1996,
p. 743) for all three models.
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Estimation of parameters
The Maximum Likelihood method of estimation was chosen again for analysis of all
three models. The univariate and multivariate deviations from normality also meant
that it was prudent to obtain Satorra-Bentler Scaled chi-square estimates ofmodel fit
along with robust standard errors.
Table 54 Sample covariance matrix
FP HGHP DREAM DISORDER AEl AE2 BELIEF! BELIEF2
MEAN 2.691 2.246 2.560 2.317 1.425 1.108 1.203 0.953
SD 1.781 0.842 0.817 0.668 0.394 0.174 0.518 0.538
FP 3.172
HGHP 0.432 0.710
DREAM 0.279 0.297 0.668
DISORDER 0.315 0.341 0.218 0.446
AE1 0.166 0.207 0.106 0.131 0.155
AE2 0.064 0.039 0.029 0.026 0.031 0.030
BELIEF 1 0.084 0.099 0.051 0.049 0.094 0.025 0.269
BELIEF2 0.101 0.075 0.081 0.057 0.069 0.031 0.172 0.289
The determinant of the input sample covariance matrix = 0.222 x 10~4.
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Testing of model fit
Test of the experiential source model
Figure 26 Diagram of the revised experiential source model
a) residuals
An examination of the residual covariance matrix found that the residuals were
generally small (average off-diagonal absolute standardised residuals = 0.0382). Six
residuals had an absolute magnitude greater than 0.1.
b) model chi-square
The model chi-square value (see Table 55) indicated that there was no significant
difference between the data and the proposed model, which is therefore supportive of
the model. The Satorra-Bentler Scaled chi-square value is also non-significant and
supportive of the proposed model. The indices of fit are all greater than 0.9, which is
also indicative of a very good fit between the model and the data. The chi-square
values and indices of fit are all very similar to the values obtained from analysis of the
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WWW survey data (see Chapter 9), which is indicative of a satisfactory replication as
far as these criteria are concerned.
Table 55 Measures of fit for the revised experiential source model
Measures of fit Value df P
Independence model chi-square value 330.864 28 P <.001
Model chi-square value 14.875 10 P = 0.1367
Satorra-Bentler Scaled chi-square value 16.536 10 P = 0.0853
X" difference test 315.989 18 P <.001
X difference test (Scaled) 314.328 18 P <.001
Bentler-Bonett Normed Fit Index (NFI) 0.955
Bentler-Bonett Non-normed Fit Index (NNFI) 0.955
Comparative Fit Index (CFI) 0.984
Post-hoc analyses
i) Lagrange multiplier test
The Lagrange multiplier test suggested adding a path between the childhood dream
experiences and the UFO-related anomalous beliefs measures (multivariate y2 (1,
N=139) = 4.941, p = .026) but this was not added as the probability of the
multivariate increment did not meet thep < .01 criterion.
Although it was not suggested by the Lagrange test with this sample, a direct
path between the childhood sleep disorder symptoms measure and the non-UFO-
related anomalous beliefs measure was suggested and supported by the analysis with
the WWW sample. This path was added to this model in order to see whether the
model would be confirmed with this traditional pencil-and-paper survey data.
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Table 56 Measures of fit for the experiential source model with and
without suggested modifications
Satorra- Bentler- Bentler-
Post hoc modification Model x2 Bentler Bonett Bonett CFI
Scaled x2 NFI NNFI
Model prior to Lagrange 14.875 16.536 0.955 0.955 0.984
and Wald suggested df- 10 df= 10
modifications p = 0.1367 p = 0.0853
Addition 12.448 13.558 0.962 0.965 0.989
Childhood sleep disorders to df= 9 df= 9
non-UFO-related anomalous X? = 0.1892 p = 0.1390
beliefs
Deletion 12.721 13.044 0.962 0.975 0.991
Childhood dream experience df= 10 CL !"+> II «—* o
to non-UFO-related p - 0.2397 p — 0.2212
anomalous experiences
Deletion 13.054 13.316 0.961 0.983 0.993
Childhood sleep disorders to df- 11 df= 10
UFO-related anomalous p = 0.2898 p = 0.2732
experiences
Deletion 13.488 13.605 0.959 0.989 0.995
Childhood fantasy df= 12 df= 12
proneness to non-UFO- p = 0.3346 p = 0.3267
related anomalous
experiences
Deletion 14.394 14.401 0.956 0.990 0.995
Childhood dream experience df= 13 df- 13
to UFO-related anomalous p = 0.3467 p = 0.3462
experiences
Deletion 16.801 16.515 0.949 0.982 0.991
Childhood fantasy df= 14 df- 14
proneness to UFO-related p = 0.2670 p = 0.2830
anomalous experiences
ii) Wald test
The Wald test suggested the removal of five paths between the childhood measures
and the anomalous experience measures. These suggested deletions included paths
between the childhood fantasy proneness and both anomalous experience measures,
the childhood dream experience and both anomalous experience measures and
289
between the childhood sleep disorder symptom and non-UFO-related anomalous
experiences measure.
iii) Results of suggested modifications
Table 56 shows that, as with the WWW sample, the addition of a direct path between
the childhood sleep disorders variable and the current level ofnon-UFO-related
anomalous beliefs provided a better fit to the data. This is indicated by the reduction
in the model x2 values and the increases in the indices of fit. However, as with the
WWW sample, the deletion of the paths suggested by the Wald test did not improve
the fit to a great extent and so the suggested deletions were not incorporated into the
final solution.
Associations
Figure 27 and Table 57 show that, as predicted and supported by the WWW survey
data, there were significant positive correlations among the childhood fantasy
proneness, hypnagogic/hypnopompic, dream and sleep disorder symptoms variables
with small to medium effect sizes (.215-.513). There were also significant positive
correlations between the residual errors for the anomalous experience (.391) and
anomalous beliefmeasures (.431); these suggest that there are other variables, not
included in the model, that might influence both of these variables. Thus, these
aspects of the revised experiential source model were satisfactorily replicated with this
traditional pencil-and-paper survey data.
Direct relationships
Figure 27 and Table 57 also show that, as predicted and supported by the WWW
survey data, childhood hypnagogic/hypnopompic experiences and sleep disorder
symptoms were significant direct predictors of the incidence of non-UFO-related
anomalous experiences with standardised path coefficients of 0.490 and 0.176,
respectively. The path between childhood fantasy proneness and non-UFO-related
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Table 57 Values of path coefficients for the final experiential
source model
Path Unstandardised Robust Robust z p value1
path coefficient standard score
(standardised) error
Child FP-AE1 .009 (.041) .016 0.57 0.2843
Child HG/HP-AE1 .229 (.490) .040 5.75 p < 0.00002
Child dream-AE1 .019 (.038) .043 0.43 0.3372
Child disorders-AEl .104 (.176) .051 2.05 0.0202
Child FP-AE2 .013 (.132) .009 1.43 0.0764
Child HG/HP-AE2 .032 (.155) .025 1.29 0.0985
Child dream-AE2 .019 (.089) .020 0.95 0.1711
Child disorders-AE2 .015 (.056) .028 0.53 0.2981
AEl-Beliefl .539 (.426) .084 6.45 p < 0.00002
Child disorders-Belief! -.088 (-.118) .047 -1.87 0.0307
AE2-Belief2 .798 (.262) .174 4.58 p < 0.00002
Path Covariance Robust Robust z p value
(correlation) standard score
error
Child FP-HG/HP .432 (.288) .175 2.47 0.0068
Child FP-dream .279 (.192) .118 2.36 0.0091
Child FP-disorders .315 (.265) .123 2.55 0.0054
Child HG/HP-dream .297 (.432) .062 4.77 p < 0.00002
Child HG/HP-disorders .341 (.605) .067 5.12 p < 0.00002
Child dream-disorders .218 (.399) .054 4.03 0.00003
E5-E6 .018 (.366) .006 3.00 0.0013
E7-E8 .131 (.557) .021 6.21 p < 0.00002
1
p values associated with z scores are taken from Table A14:l in Clark-Carter (1997, p. 566).
anomalous experiences was positive (0.041) but very small and statistically
nonsignificant which was contrary to expectation. As with the WWW survey data, the
childhood HG/HP experiences measure was the most important predictor ofnon-
UFO-related anomalous experiences although the magnitude of the path coefficient
(0.490) was much larger than that for the WWW survey data (0.364). The childhood
dream experiences measure did predict the incidence ofnon-UFO-related anomalous
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experiences in the hypothesised direction but to a very small and nonsignificant extent.
There were no statistically significant predictors of the incidence ofUFO-related
anomalous experiences. Unlike the WWW survey data, the childhood HG/HP
experiences measure was not a statistically significant predictor of the UFO-related
anomalous experiences measure, although this path was approaching significance (p =
0.0985).
It is estimated that the childhood predictors accounted for approximately 42%
of the variance in the non-UFO-related anomalous experiences measure, which is
slightly greater than the proportion for the WWW survey data (38%); these predictors
also accounted for a similar (albeit slightly greater) proportion (10%) of the variance
in the UFO-related anomalous experiences measure. These results suggest that the
proportions of variance in the anomalous experiences measures that can be explained
by this model have been satisfactorily replicated.
As predicted, the non-UFO-related and UFO-related anomalous experiences
measures were significant positive predictors of their respective beliefs. As with the
WWW survey data, the magnitude of the path coefficient between the non-UFO-
related anomalous experiences and beliefs measures (0.426) was much larger than that
between the UFO-related measures (0.262). As predicted and as supported by the
WWW survey data, these findings provide support for the experiential source basis
for anomalous beliefs, particularly where non-UFO-related phenomena are concerned.
Analysis of this sample also confirmed that the incidence ofchildhood sleep
disorders symptoms was a significant negative predictor of the level ofbelief in non-
UFO-related anomalous phenomena, albeit with only a small effect size (-0.118).
It is estimated that, as with the WWW survey data, the predictors accounted for a
similar proportion (15% vs. 18%) of the variance in the level of adult belief in non-
UFO-related phenomena and a similar, but a slightly larger, proportion (7% vs. 2%)
of the variance in the level ofUFO-related beliefs. Again these results suggest that
the proportions of variance in the anomalous beliefs measures that can be explained by
























As predicted and supported by the WWW survey data, the childhood
hypnagogic/hypnopompic experience and sleep disorders symptoms measures were
also indirect predictors ofnon-UFO-related anomalous beliefs via their association
with the incidence ofnon-UFO-related anomalous experiences.
Comparison of experiential model fit for the WWW and traditional pencil-and-
paper survey samples
In summary, the final solution of the model containing the correlated error variances
and the addition of a direct path between the childhood sleep disorders symptoms and
non-UFO-related anomalous beliefs measures provided a good and similar level of fit
in both the WWW and traditional pencil-and-paper samples. In addition, the model
accounted for similar proportions of variance in the anomalous experiences and beliefs
measures in both cases. The main difference in the solutions for the two samples is
that in the traditional pencil-and-paper sample the paths between the childhood
fantasy proneness and non-UFO-related anomalous experiences measures and
between the childhood HG/HP and UFO-related anomalous experiences measures
were statistically nonsignificant, although the magnitude of the latter path was
approaching significance. Thus, the solution obtained from analysis of the WWW
survey data seems fairly robust and a number ofparameters have been successfully
replicated in the traditional pencil-and-paper survey.
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Test of the cognitive source model
Model specification
Figure 28 Diagram of the cognitive source model
Testing ofmodel fit
a) residuals
An examination of the residual covariance matrix found that they were generally quite
large (average off-diagonal absolute standardised residuals = 0.1175). There were 12
residuals with an absolute magnitude greater than 0.1, one ofwhich, for the
covariance between beliefmeasures, was 0.616. The presence of these relatively large
residuals suggests that the model, as it is, does not provide a very good fit to the data.
b) model chi-square
As with the WWW survey data, the model chi-square value (see Table 58) indicated
that there was a significant difference between the data and the proposed model,
which means that, as implied by the large residuals, the model does not fit the data.
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The Satorra-Bentler Scaled chi-square value is also significant and does not support
the proposed model. The indices of fit also confirm that the proposed model does not
provide a sufficiently good fit to the data, as these indices are all less than 0.9. The fit
indices for this sample are also slightly lower than for the WWW sample.
Table 58 Measures of fit for the cognitive source model
Measures of fit Value df P
Independence model chi-square value 330.864 28 p<.001
Model chi-square value 92.016 12 p<.001
Satorra-Bentler Scaled chi-square value 87.965 12 p < .00001
y2 difference test 238.848 16 pc.OOl
y2 difference test (Scaled) 242.899 16 ^ < .001
Bentler-Bonett Normed Fit Index (NFI) 0.722
Bentler-Bonett Non-normed Fit Index (NNFI) 0.384
Comparative Fit Index (CFI) 0.736
Post-hoc analyses
i) Lagrange multiplier test
As with the WWW survey data, the Lagrange multiplier test suggested adding a path
between non-UFO and UFO-related anomalous beliefs (multivariate y2 (1, N=139) =
52.281, p < .001). Additional paths, including allowance of covariation between the
error variances for the anomalous experience measures and a direct path from the
childhood fantasy proneness to the non-UFO-related anomalous beliefs measure, were




The Wald test suggested the removal of the paths between the childhood dream
experiences and non-UFO-related anomalous experiences measures (multivariate %
(1, N=139) = 0.138, p = 0.710), the childhood sleep disorders symptoms and UFO-
related anomalous experiences measures (multivariate x2 (2, N=139) = 0.350,/? =
0.839), the childhood fantasy proneness and non-UFO-related anomalous experiences
measures (multivariate x2 (3, N=139) = 0.558,/? = 0.906), the childhood dream
experiences and UFO-related anomalous experiences measures (multivariate x (4,
N=139) = 0.710, p = 0.950), and between the childhood fantasy proneness and UFO-
related anomalous experiences measures (multivariate x2 (5, N=139) = 2.572,/? =
0.766).
iii) Results of suggested modifications
Table 59 shows that, as with the WWW survey data, the addition of a path from the
non-UFO-related to the UFO-related anomalous beliefs measure resulted in a model
that did fit the data well. The fit of the model was also improved slightly by the
addition of a path between childhood fantasy proneness and the non-UFO-related
anomalous beliefs measure. Table 59 also shows that versions of the model with the
suggested paths deleted did not lead to any clear improvements to the model fit and
thus, as with the WWW survey analysis, no paths were deleted in the final model
solution. One should also note that the final solution for the revised model did not
provide as good a fit to this data as it did to the WWW survey data. This is indicated
by the lower indices of fit and the higher model chi-square values for this sample.
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Table 59 Measures of fit for the cognitive source model with and
without suggested modifications
Satorra- Bentler- Bentler-
Post hoc modification Model x2 Bentler Bonett Bonett CFI
Scaled yj NFI NNFI
Model prior to Lagrange 92.016 87.965 0.722 0.384 0.736
and Wald suggested df= 12 df= 12
modifications p<.001 p<.00001
Addition 13.091 14.578 0.960 0.971 0.990
Non-UFO-related to UFO- df= 10 df= 10
related anomalous beliefs p = 0.2186 p = 0.1482
and E5-E6 covariance
Addition 11.386 12.770 0.966 0.961 0.989
Childhood fantasy df= 8 df= 8
proneness to non-UFO- = 0.1808 p = 0.1200
related anomalous beliefs
and E7-E8
Deletion 11.591 12.121 0.965 0.973 0.991
Childhood dream experience df^ 9 dfi= 9
to non-UFO-related p = 0.2373 p = 0.2066
anomalous experiences
Deletion 11.795 12.225 0.964 0.983 0.994
Childhood sleep disorders to df= 10 dfi= 10
UFO-related anomalous p = 0.2990 p = 0.2703
experiences
Deletion 12.079 12.414 0.963 0.991 0.996
Childhood dream experience df= 11 df= 11
to UFO-related anomalous p = 0.3577 p = 0.3333
experiences
Deletion 12.413 12.728 0.962 0.997 0.999
Childhood fantasy dfi= 12 dfi=12




































Child FP-AE1 .007 (.035) .014 0.54 0.2946
Child HG/HP-AE1 .197 (.439) .038 5.13 p < 0.00002
Child dream-AE1 .014 (.031) .039 0.37 0.3537
Child disorders-AE1 .104 (.184) .045 2.33 0.0099
Child FP-AE2 .012 (.120) .008 1.39 0.0823
Child HG/HP-AE2 .029 (.141) .024 1.22 0.1112
Child dream-AE2 .011 (.051) .019 0.57 0.2843
Child disorders-AE2 .011 (.043) .027 0.42 0.3372
Belief! -AE1 .244 (.335) .048 5.11 p < 0.00002
Belief2-AE2 .087 (.271) .022 3.86 0.00006
Child FP-Beliefl .026 (.091) .025 1.05 0.1469
Belief! -Belief2 1.211 (1.167) .878 1.38 0.0838
Path Covariance Robust Robust z p value
(correlation) standard score
error
Child FP-HG/HP .432 (.288) .175 2.47 0.0068
Child FP-dream .279 (.192) .118 2.36 0.0091
Child FP-disorders .315 (.265) .123 2.55 0.0054
Child HG/HP-dream .297 (.432) .062 4.77 p < 0.00002
Child HG/HP-disorders .341 (.605) .067 5.12 p < 0.00002
Child dream-disorders .218 (.399) .054 4.03 0.00003
E5-E6 .013 (.302) .005 2.70 0.0035
E7-E8 -.015 (-.576) .230 -0.67 0.2514
Associations
Figure 29 and Table 60 show that, as predicted and supported by the WWW survey
data, there were significant positive correlations among the childhood fantasy
proneness, hypnagogic/hypnopompic, dream and sleep disorder symptoms measures.
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The magnitude of these correlations was identical to those in the experiential source
model. There was also a positive correlation between the residual errors for the
anomalous experience measures (.335). However, unlike the WWW survey sample,
the error variances for the anomalous beliefs measures were negatively correlated (-
.576).
Direct relationships
As predicted and as supported by the WWW survey data, childhood
hypnagogic/hypnopompic experiences and sleep disorder symptoms were significant
positive predictors of the incidence ofnon-UFO-related anomalous experiences.
Again, the path coefficient between childhood fantasy proneness and non-UFO-
related anomalous experiences was in the predicted direction but in this case it was
definitely not approaching significance (p = 0.2946). Unlike the WWW survey data,
and contrary to expectation, the childhood dream experience measure was not a
significant predictor of the measure ofnon-UFO-related anomalous experiences; in
addition, the childhood HG/HP experiences measure was not a significant positive
predictor of the measure ofUFO-related anomalous experiences in this sample. As
with the experiential source model, the magnitude of the path coefficients was quite
small (0.031-0.439) and the childhood HG/HP experience measure was the best of the
childhood predictors.
The childhood predictors and the respective anomalous beliefs measure
accounted for almost the same (48% vs. 49%) proportion of the variance in the non-
UFO-related anomalous experiences measure and a relatively larger (15% vs. 9%)
proportion of the variance in the UFO-related anomalous experiences measure in this
sample.
As predicted, the levels of non-UFO-related and UFO-related anomalous
beliefs were significant positive predictors of their respective experiences, although
the magnitude of the UFO-related path coefficient (0.271) was twice as big as that for
the WWW sample (0.135).
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As with the WWW sample and both tests of the experiential source model, the
models are much better at explaining variance associated with non-UFO-related rather
than UFO-related measures ofanomalous experiences and beliefs.
Unlike the WWW survey data, the level of childhood fantasy proneness was a
small (.091) but nonsignificant direct positive predictor of the level of adult belief in
non-UFO-related anomalous phenomena. The level of belief in non-UFO-related
phenomena was also a nonsignificant positive predictor of the level of belief in UFO-
related anomalous phenomena.
With this sample ofdata, the final solution accounted for a smaller proportion
of the variance (1% vs. 3%) in the level of adult belief in non-UFO-related phenomena
and in the level ofUFO-related beliefs (7% vs. 12%).
Indirect relationships
The modified model suggests that childhood fantasy proneness only has an indirect
effect on the incidence ofnon-UFO-related anomalous experiences via its effect on
belief in non-UFO-related phenomena. This contradicts Irwin's (1992, 1993a)
suggestion that fantasy proneness may have a direct as well as an indirect effect on
paranormal beliefs.
Comparison of cognitive source model fit for the WWW and traditional pencil-
and-paper survey samples
In summary, the final solution of the cognitive source model, containing the correlated
error variances and the addition of a direct path between the non-UFO-related and
UFO-related anomalous beliefs measures and between the childhood fantasy
proneness and non-UFO-related anomalous beliefs measures, provided a good fit to
the data in both the WWW and traditional pencil-and-paper samples, although the fit
was slightly better for the WWW sample. In addition, the model accounted for similar
proportions of variance in the anomalous experiences and beliefs measures, with a
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slightly greater proportion of variance being accounted for in the UFO-related
measures for the traditional pencil-and-paper survey sample.
The main differences between the solutions for the WWW and traditional
pencil-and-paper samples is that in the latter the significant positive paths between the
childhood fantasy proneness and the non-UFO-related anomalous beliefs measures,
between the childhood dream experiences measure and the non-UFO-related
anomalous experience measure, between the childhood HG/HP and UFO-related
anomalous experiences measures and between the error variances for the anomalous
beliefs measures were not replicated.
Thus, although the model fit and proportions of variance accounted for have
been replicated by the traditional pencil-and-paper sample, the magnitude of some of
the individual paths within the model have not been replicated.






Figure 30 Diagram of the revised reciprocal causation model
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a) residuals
An examination of the residual covariance matrix for this revised reciprocal causation
model found that the residuals were small (average off-diagonal absolute standardised
residuals = 0.0539) which is a sign of a good model fit. Six residuals had an absolute
magnitude greater than 0.1.
b) model chi-square
The model chi-square value (see Table 61) indicated that there was no significant
difference between the data and the proposed model, which is therefore supportive of
the model. The Satorra-Bentler Scaled chi-square value is also non-significant and
supportive of the proposed model. The indices of fit were all greater than 0.9 which
also confirms that the revised reciprocal causation model provides a good fit to the
data. However, the slightly higher chi-square values and the slightly lower indices of
model fit show that the model fits the WWW survey data slightly better than it does
the traditional pencil-and-paper survey data.
Table 61 Measures of fit for the revised reciprocal causation model
Measures of fit Value df "\
Independence model chi-square value 330.864 28 p <.001
Model chi-square value 10.739 8 p = 0.2169
Satorra-Bentler Scaled chi-square value 11.804 8 p = 0.1602
X difference test 320.125 20 /7<.001
X difference test (Scaled) 319.060 20 /7<.001
Bentler-Bonett Normed Fit Index (NFI) 0.968
Bentler-Bonett Non-normed Fit Index (NNFI) 0.968
Comparative Fit Index (CFI) 0.991
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Post-hoc analyses
i) Lagrange multiplier test
The Lagrange multiplier test suggested adding a path between the childhood dream
experiences and the UFO-related anomalous beliefs measure (multivariate x2 (1,
N=139) = 4.742,/? = 0.029) but the probability of this statistic fell below the p < .01
criterion for acceptance and so this modification was not made. No additions were
made in the analysis of the WWW survey data either (apart from allowing covariances
between the error variances of the anomalous experiences and beliefs measures,
respectively).
ii) Wald test
The Wald test suggested the removal of six paths: one between the childhood dream
experiences and non-UFO-related anomalous experiences measures (multivariate x
(1, N=139) = 0.160,/? = 0.689); one between the childhood fantasy proneness and
non-UFO-related anomalous experiences measures (multivariate x2 (2, N=139) =
0.416, p = 0.812); one between the childhood sleep disorder symptoms and UFO-
related anomalous experiences measures (multivariate x (3, N=139) = 0.651,/? =
0.885); one between the childhood dream experiences and UFO-related anomalous
experiences measures (multivariate x (4, N=139) = 0.969, /? = 0.914); one between
the UFO-related anomalous experiences and UFO-related anomalous beliefs measures
(multivariate x2 (5, N=139) = 2.015,/? = 0.847); and one between the childhood
fantasy proneness and UFO-related anomalous experiences measures (multivariate x~
(6, N=139) = 4.258,/? = 0.642)
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Table 62 Measures of fit for the revised reciprocal causation model
with and without suggested modifications
Satorra- Bentler- Bentler-
Post hoc modification Model x2 Bentler Bonett Bonett CFI
Scaled % NFI NNFI
Model prior to Lagrange 10.739 11.804 0.968 0.968 0.991
and Wald suggested df= 8 df= 8
modifications p = 0.2169 p = 0.1602
Deletion 10.998 11.301 0.967 0.979 0.993
Childhood dream experience df= 9 df= 9
to non-UFO-related p = 0.2758 p = 0.2557
anomalous experiences
Deletion 11.241 11.423 0.966 0.989 0.996
Childhood sleep disorders df= 10 df= 10
symptoms to UFO-related p = 0.3391 p = 0.3255
anomalous experiences
Deletion 11.620 11.744 0.965 0.995 0.998
Childhood fantasy df= 11 df= 11
proneness to non-UFO- p = 0.3928 p = 0.3832
related anomalous
experiences
Deletion 12.122 12.111 0.963 0.999 1.000
Childhood dream experience df= 12 df = 12
to UFO-related anomalous p = 0.4360 p = 0.4368
experiences
Deletion 71.997 70.945 0.782 0.617 0.809
UFO-related anomalous df = 14 df= 14
experiences to UFO-related pc.001 p<.00001
anomalous beliefs
iii) Results of suggested modifications
Table 62 shows that the deletion of the paths suggested by the Wald test did not
improve the fit to a great extent and, in fact, worsened it slightly according to the
model chi-square values and the NFI fit index. Further deletion of the path between
the UFO-related experiences and beliefs measures resulted in a lack of fit between the
model and the data and thus there was no point in considering deleting any further
paths. Flowever, as deletion of these suggested paths did not result in any clear























Table 63 Values of path coefficients for the final reciprocal
causation model
Path Unstandardised Robust Robust z p value
path coefficient standard score
(standardised) error
Child FP-AE1 .008 (.036) .014 0.56 0.2877
Child HG/HP-AE1 .208 (.454) .037 5.56 p < .00002
Child dream-AE1 .016 (.034) .040 0.40 0.3446
Child disorders-AEl .104 (.180) .046 2.26 0.0119
Child FP-AE2 .012 (.126) .009 1.42 0.0778
Child HG/HP-AE2 .030 (.149) .024 1.26 0.1038
Child dream-AE2 .014 (.069) .019 0.76 0.2236
Child disorders-AE2 .013 (.050) .027 0.47 0.3192
AEl-Beliefl .241 (.183) .124 1.94 0.0262
Beliefl -AE1 .160 (.212) .066 2.43 0.0075
AE2-Belief2 .375 (.121) .340 1.10 0.1357
Belief2-AE2 .045 (.139) .040 1.12 0.1314
Path Covariance Robust Robust z p value
(correlation) standard score
error
Child FP-HG/HP .432 (.288) .175 2.47 0.0068
Child FP-dream .279 (.192) .118 2.36 0.0091
Child FP-disorders .315 (.265) .123 2.55 0.0054
Child HG/HP-dream .297 (.432) .062 4.77 p < .00002
Child HG/HP-disorders .341 (.605) .067 5.12 p < .00002
Child dream-disorders .218 (.399) .054 4.03 0.00003
E5-E6 .014 (.322) .005 2.77 0.0028
E7-E8 .148 (.592) .022 6.85 p < .00002
Associations
Figure 31 and Table 63 show that, as predicted, there were significant positive
correlations among the childhood fantasy proneness, hypnagogic/hypnopompic,
dream and sleep disorder symptoms measures. The magnitude of these correlations
was identical to those in the other models tested. There were also significant positive
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correlations between the residual errors for the anomalous experiences (0.322) and
anomalous beliefs (0.592) measures which suggest that there are additional variables,
not specified in the model, that can account for variability in both non-UFO-related
and UFO-related experiences and beliefs, respectively.
Direct relationships
As predicted and as supported by the WWW survey data, childhood
hypnagogic/hypnopompic experiences (0.454) and sleep disorder symptoms (0.180)
were both significant positive predictors of the non-UFO-related anomalous
experiences measure. The standardised path coefficients for the childhood predictors
also indicated that the childhood HG/HP experience measure is the best of these at
predicting the overall incidence ofnon-UFO-related anomalous experiences. Unlike
the WWW survey data, neither the childhood fantasy proneness nor the measure of
childhood dream experiences were significant positive predictors of the measure of
non-UFO-related anomalous experiences nor were they anywhere near approaching
statistical significance. None of the childhood measures were significant positive
predictors of the measure ofUFO-related anomalous experiences; with the WWW
survey data the childhood HG/HP experiences measure was.
The childhood predictors plus the respective anomalous beliefs measure
accounted for approximately the same proportion (49% vs. 48%) of the variance in
the non-UFO-related anomalous experiences measure but twice as much (14% vs.
7%) of the variance in the UFO-related anomalous experiences measure. This is only
approximate as it does not take the correlations between the residual errors into
account.
As predicted, the non-UFO-related anomalous experiences measure was a
significant positive predictor (0.183) of the level ofnon-UFO-related beliefs and vice
versa (0.212). However, contrary to expectations, the reciprocal paths between
UFO-related anomalous experiences and beliefs were small and nonsignificant but in
the predicted direction. These paths were also small and nonsignificant in the WWW
sample.
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The anomalous experience measures accounted for about the same (11% vs.
13%) of the variance in the level of adult belief in non-UFO-related phenomena as in
the WWW sample but slightly more (5% vs. 1%) of the variance in the level ofUFO-
related beliefs, respectively. Again, this model is much better at explaining variance
relating to non-UFO-related rather than UFO-related phenomena measures and is
better at explaining variance in non-UFO-related anomalous experiences rather than
beliefs.
There is support for the reciprocal causation hypothesis that suggests that
reports ofanomalous experiences might cause anomalous beliefs and that anomalous
beliefs might also cause reports of anomalous experiences, which supports Irwin's
(1992, 1993a) model. However, this only applies here to non-UFO-related measures.
Indirect relationships
As predicted and supported by the WWW survey data, the childhood
hypnagogic/hypnopompic experience and sleep disorder symptoms measures were
also indirect predictors of non-UFO-related anomalous beliefs via their association
with the incidence ofnon-UFO-related anomalous experiences. The indirect
relationship between childhood fantasy proneness and non-UFO-related anomalous
experiences is again supportive ofpart of Lawrence's (1998; Lawrence et al., 1995)
model of the childhood antecedents ofparanormal beliefs.
Comparison of reciprocal causation model fit for the WWW and traditional
pencil-and-paper survey samples
In summary, the final solution of the reciprocal causation model containing the
correlated error variances provided a good fit to the data in both the WWW and
traditional pencil-and-paper samples, although, as with the other models, the fit was
slightly better for the WWW sample. In addition, the model accounted for similar
proportions of variance in the non-UFO-related anomalous experiences and beliefs
measures but a much greater proportion of variance was accounted for in the UFO-
related measures for the traditional pencil-and-paper survey sample.
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The main differences in the solutions for the WWW and traditional pencil-and-
paper samples are that in the latter the significant positive paths between the
childhood fantasy proneness and the non-UFO-related anomalous experiences
measures, between the childhood dream experiences measure and the non-UFO-
related anomalous experience measure, and between the childhood HG/HP and UFO-
related anomalous experiences measures were not replicated.
Thus, although the model fit and proportions of variance accounted for have
been replicated by the traditional pencil-and-paper sample, the magnitude of some of
the individual paths within the model has not been replicated.
Overall comparisons of fit for the WWW and traditional pencil-and-
paper survey models
Although the original specifications did not fit the data, all of the revised versions of
the models provided a good fit to the data in both the WWW and traditional pencil-
and-paper samples (see Tables 64 & 65). Although the degree of fit was slightly
lower for the traditional pencil-and-paper survey data, the indices of fit, and to a
lesser extent, the model chi-square values were fairly similar across the two samples.
This suggests that the fit of the models was quite robust, at least for these two
samples, even though they had used different data-collection methods.
The indices of fit (NFI, NNFI, CFI) show that the revised cognitive source
(CS) and reciprocal causation (RC) models provided the best fit to the WWW survey
and traditional pencil-and-paper survey data and the levels of fit were very high (range
0.961-1.029). However, the revised experiential source (ES) model also provided a
very good fit to the data in both surveys. The chi-square measures of fit also
indicated that the CS and RC models provided the best fit to the data in both samples,
although the values were lower for the CS model than the RC model in the WWW
survey. This suggested that the CS model provided a slightly better fit, but the reverse
was true for the traditional pencil-and-paper survey, although the difference was much
smaller. The model chi-square values were slightly smaller for the WWW survey data
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than the traditional pencil-and-paper survey data, which also suggests that the models
provided a better fit to this data than the traditional pencil-and-paper data.
All of the fmal models were generally very good at explaining variance in the
non-UFO-related anomalous experiences measure but accounted for considerably
smaller proportions of variance in the UFO-related anomalous experiences measure.
In both samples, the models accounted for approximately 38-49% of the variance in
the non-UFO-related and approximately 7-15% of the variance in the UFO-related
anomalous experiences measure. The CS and RC models were the best at accounting
for variance in the anomalous experience measures in both samples. The ES and RC
models were the best at accounting for variance (c.15-18% and 11-13%, respectively)
in the non-UFO-related anomalous beliefs measure; the CS model accounted for only
1-3% in the two samples. The CS model was best at accounting for variance in the
UFO-related anomalous beliefs measure (7% and 12%) but this is not surprising given
that this model contained an additional direct path from the non-UFO- to the UFO-
related beliefs measure. The proportion of variance accounted for in the non-UFO-
related anomalous measure was closely replicated across the two samples; the
proportion for the other anomalous experiences and beliefmeasures were in the same
area but were more variable.
Overall comparison of the descriptive statistics for the WWW and
traditional pencil-and-paper surveys
Table 66 shows that the mean scores for the WWW sample were all greater than
those for the traditional pencil-and-paper sample. The variance of the scores was also
greater for the WWW sample, apart from the variance of the beliefs measures. These
differences in the variances were statistically significant for all of the measures, apart
from the UFO-related beliefs measure, according to the Levene test for equality of
variances. Mann-Whitney tests revealed that there were significant differences in the
scores for the WWW and traditional pencil-and-paper samples with the exception of
the UFO-related anomalous experiences measure, which was nevertheless







































































































































































































































Table 66 A comparison of descriptive statistics for the measures
collected via the WWW and traditional pencil-and-paper data
collection methods
Measure Mean Variance
WWW Traditional WWW Traditional
Child FP 3.50 2.69 5.99 3.17
Child HGHP 2.80 2.25 0.98 0.71
Child dream 3.13 2.56 0.91 0.67
Child sleep 2.64 2.32 0.65 0.45
disorder symptoms
Non-UFO AE 1.94 1.43 0.33 0.16
UFO AE 1.15 1.11 0.05 0.03
Non-UFO beliefs 1.58 1.20 0.13 0.27
UFO beliefs 1.30 0.95 0.25 0.29
typical scores and the variability of the scores across the two samples. This could
reflect differences in the samples and/or the differences in the survey administration
method but, in my opinion, the former is more likely to be the case.
The equivalence and explanations for the descriptive statistics, factor analysis
and SEM analysis findings using both the WWW and traditional pencil-and-paper
survey data will be discussed in Chapter 11.
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Chapter 11
Discussion of tests of proposed models using
structural equation modelling (SEM)
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the findings of the tests of the proposed
models using SEM techniques and data from the WWW and traditional pencil-and-
paper surveys and to assess the extent to which the WWW findings have been
successfully replicated using a traditional pencil-and-paper data collection technique.
The equivalence of WWW versus traditional pencil-and-paper
survey data
Before discussing these findings, it is necessary to consider what features are required
in order to demonstrate the equivalence ofmeasures across different modes of
administration. Assuming that everything apart from the mode of administration
remains constant, the variables measured should have similar measures of central
tendency and dispersion, the factor structure should be the same, and the variables
should correlate with other variables to the same extent (APA, 1986; Buchanan &
Smith, 1999). In terms of the SEM analyses, an ideal replication would result in
similar model chi-square and fit indices values, similar magnitudes for the standardised
path coefficients within the models, and similar proportions ofvariance accounted for
in the criterion variables.
The first thing to note when considering the equivalence of the results from
the WWW and traditional pencil-and-paper surveys is that not everything is equal (see
Table 66, p. 315); there are clear differences between the two samples that suggest
that they are drawn from different populations. Although this is a disadvantage in
terms of trying to establish the equivalence of the measures, if the factor structure and
the fit of the proposed models are similar with both samples then this suggests that the
findings are quite robust and generalise to more than one population. In order to
compare the equivalence ofWWW-based versus traditional pencil-and-paper
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measures empirically, one would ideally wish to conduct a repeated-measures study in
which participants completed both formats of the questionnaire in a counterbalanced
manner under identical controlled conditions. However, this would be difficult in that
one would really need two alternate forms of the measure; if one used the same
measure then the results might be affected by familiarity and/or practice as well as the
test-retest reliability of the measure itself. It is likely that such a design would prevent
the use of a representative sample from the WWW-user population because of the
practicalities of arranging for them to complete both formats under identical
conditions. However, a compromise might be to use an opportunity sample, for
example students, who would probably be able to complete both formats under similar
conditions. Alternatively, one could use an unrelated design in which one group of
participants completed a pencil-and-paper version of the questionnaire and one group
completed a WWW-version, ideally under the same controlled conditions, such as in a
laboratory. However, the difficulty with this design is that one needs to ensure that
the two groups do not differ in other ways that could affect the results. This would
be difficult to achieve if one wanted to use a sample drawn from the population of
WWW users as such a sample may have particular biases in terms of its
demographics. Although the picture is constantly changing, recent estimates suggest
that two-thirds ofWWW users are male and that they tend to be white, in their late
teens to early thirties, with above average education and socio-economic status, and
tend to be in educational, professional or managerial contexts (see Buchanan & Smith,
1999; The GVU Center, 1998; Schmidt, 1997; Stanton, 1998). However, as can be
seen below, the sex bias in the WWW sample collected in this research is atypical in
that the majority of the participants are female.
The WWW and traditional pencil-and-paper samples are similar in terms of the
range and average age of the participants and in terms of their bias towards female
participants. Possible explanations for the large proportion of female participants
might be that women have a greater interest in the paranormal and/or sleep-related
experiences or that they might be more willing to report these kinds of experiences.
There is certainly some evidence to suggest that females are generally more likely to
believe in anomalous/paranormal phenomena than males (see review by Irwin, 1993a).
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In terms of the UCN psychology student population, there is also a greater number of
females than males and this would be reflected in the sampling of such a population.
A sizeable proportion of the participants (c.65% WWW, 41% traditional pencil-and-
paper) had or were practising some form ofmental discipline, exercise or self-
improvement program. The two samples differed considerably in terms of the
nationalities of the participants; the WWW sample had a much greater range but
almost two-thirds were American and only 14% British. In contrast, 96% of the
traditional pencil-and-paper participants were British. The WWW participants are
also likely to have a greater knowledge and/or interest in parapsychology, which may
have influenced their responses to items relating to this area. Some of these
differences are likely to be a function of the different ways that the participants were
recruited; the WWW participants were all visitors to the KPU website and completed
and submitted the questionnaire electronically via a computer; the traditional pencil-
and-paper participants were mainly UCN staff or students recruited via e-mail or via
invitation in classes and all of these participants completed and submitted the
questionnaire manually. Clearly neither of these samples are representative of the
normal population and so generalisability will be limited.
Descriptive statistics for the WWW and traditional pencil-and-
paper measures
A comparison of the descriptive statistics for the measures used in the SEM analyses
shows that the WWW sample produced higher mean scores on all of the measures and
also higher variances, with the exception of the anomalous beliefs measures (see Table
66, p. 315). These differences could be due to the fact that the samples are drawn
from different populations and/or the differences in the survey administration and
completion methods. Although the descriptive statistics differ across the WWW and
traditional pencil-and-paper samples, the factor structure of the measures and the
degree ofmodel fit are reasonably well replicated; this is quite reassuring and suggests
that the results may be quite robust despite differences in the administration and
completion method and differences in the demographics of the samples. Although the
number of studies that have compared the equivalence ofWWW versus traditional
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pencil-and-paper measures is small (see Chapter 6), some previous research has also
found that there might be differences in the descriptive statistics even though the
factor structure and the internal consistencies are comparable in both samples (Davis,
1999; Pasveer & Ellard, 1998; Stanton, 1998). Another study by Buchanan and
Smith (1999) also found no differences in the factor structure or internal consistencies
but found no differences in the means either; in fact, as with my data, they found that
their model provided a better fit to the WWW sample. As Stanton (1998) and Pasveer
and Ellard (1998) correctly pointed out, these differences in the descriptive statistics
could simply reflect the greater heterogeneity within the WWW sample rather than the
differences in the administration and completion of the measures.
Principal factor analysis of survey items
Principal factor analysis with oblique rotation of the anomalous experiences and
anomalous beliefs items, with both the WWW and traditional pencil-and-paper
samples, suggested that each of these two measures ought to be split into two
separate measures relating to non-UFO and UFO-related phenomena. The alpha
coefficient of reliability for these separate anomalous beliefs measures was very good
and was approximately 0.9 in both samples. Although the reliability of the non-UFO-
related experiences measure was good (>0.8 in both samples), the reliability of the
UFO-related experiences measure was slightly below the accepted criterion on 0.7
(Kline, 1994) for the WWW sample and was very poor for the traditional pencil-and-
paper sample (<0.2). This poor reliability is likely to be a function of the small
number of items in the scale and the low variance of the scores on these items,
especially in the traditional pencil-and-paper sample.
A similar factor analysis of the childhood sleep-related items suggested that
these ought to be split into three separate measures: childhood HG/HP experiences,
childhood dream experiences, and childhood sleep disorder symptoms. The reliability
of these measures was generally greater than 0.7 in both samples, with the exception
of the childhood HG/HP measure in the traditional pencil-and-paper sample, which
had an alpha coefficient of 0.69.
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Principal factor analysis of the childhood fantasy proneness items in the WWW
survey identified one clear factor that was subsequently utilised and found to be
internally reliable (0.76). However, this factor structure was less clear in the
traditional pencil-and-paper survey and the reliability of the measure was not as high
as anticipated (0.62).
Nevertheless, generally-speaking, the factor structure of the survey items was
confirmed by the traditional pencil-and-paper survey, although the structure of the
childhood fantasy proneness was less-clear. Other studies have also found that the
factor structure and internal consistencies ofmeasures replicates across WWW and
pencil-and-paper administration methods (Buchanan & Smith, 1999; Davis, 1999;
Pasveer & Ellard, 1998; Stanton, 1998). However, the poor reliability of the UFO-
related anomalous experiences measure in the traditional pencil-and-paper sample
suggests that any of the findings relating to this measure should be treated with
extreme caution.
Tests of models using structural equation modelling (SEM)
Before interpreting the results of the SEM analyses, it is necessary to point out some
important limitations of such analyses. Firstly, one must remember that SEM is based
on an analysis of variances and covariances associated with variables within a given
model and thus, in itself, cannot indicate causality. In order to demonstrate causality,
one would need to rule out the influence of other variables and show that the cause
preceded the effect (Bullock et al., 1994). This latter point concerning the order of
cause and effect raises another problem with some SEM analyses, such as those
conducted in this thesis. Although SEM is often used to analyse cross-sectional
designs (MacCallum & Austin, 2000), the fact that all measures are taken on a single
occasion means that in reality there may not have been the necessary time lag required
for a cause to operate and an effect to appear. Although, this is a valid point, there is
a 'pseudo-time-lag' in the models being tested here in that the main predictors on one
side of the models refer to childhood experiences whereas criterion variables on the
far side of the models, i.e., the level of anomalous beliefs, refer to adulthood. Clearly,
in this instance, a longitudinal design would be preferable but it would be difficult to
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recruit the large number of child participants needed for the multivariate analysis and
still maintain enough participants for the follow-up that would have to be done in
adulthood. SEM analyses could be complemented by qualitative approaches that
analyse verbal interviews and narratives and which may gain insights into the
processes involved with the development of beliefs and how these may operate over
time. There has been very little research of this kind looking into the topic of
anomalous beliefs.
With SEM, one must also remember that a given model that fits a sample of
data should not be considered to be definitive because there may be alternative
versions of the model that provide an equivalent or even better fit to the data (see
Breckler, 1990; Bullock et al., 1994). As will be seen later, this point is nicely
illustrated by the findings of this thesis. In their review of recent applications ofSEM
in psychological research, MacCallum and Austin (2000) noted that many researchers
tend not to, or are reluctant to, consider alternative models and tend to be prejudiced
towards one particular model. However, this thesis has attempted to evaluate three
alternative models. Another point well-made by MacCallum and Austin (2000) is that
"a finding ofgood fit does not imply that a model is correct or true, but only
plausible." (p. 218). SEM is an iterative process that attempts to converge upon an
optimal solution based upon the model specified and the data available. Thus, even if
a model is found to fit a sample of data one should always attempt to cross-validate
the factor structure and the fit of the model using different data samples (Hoyle &
Panter, 1995; MacCallum, 1995; MacCallum & Austin, 2000; Neill et al., 1999).
Cross-validation is particularly important if one has made post hoc modifications to a
model, which might have capitalised on chance idiosyncrasies.
A final point to make is that, when interpreting the results of SEM one must
avoid focusing entirely on model fit and one should also consider the magnitude and
statistical significance of individual paths within the model plus the amount of
variance accounted for in the criterion variables. Just because a model fits a sample of
data it does not necessarily follow that the path coefficients within it will be large.
Moving onto the results of the SEM analyses, although the original model
specifications did not fit the data, all of the revised versions of the models provided a
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good fit to the data in both the WWW and traditional pencil-and-paper samples.
Although the degree of fit was slightly lower for the traditional pencil-and-paper
survey data, the indices of fit, and to a lesser extent, the model chi-square values were
fairly similar across the two samples. This suggests that the fit of the models was
quite robust, at least for these two samples, even though they had used different data-
collection methods.
The indices of fit (NFI, NNFI, CFI) show that the revised cognitive source
(CS) and reciprocal causation (RC) models provided the best fit to the WWW survey
and traditional pencil-and-paper survey data and the levels of fit were very high (range
0.961-1.029). However, the revised experiential source (ES) model also provided a
very good fit to the data in both surveys (range 0.962-0.997). The chi-square
measures of fit also indicated that the CS and RC models provided the best fit to the
data in both samples. Although the values were lower for the CS model than the RC
model in the WWW survey, which suggested that the CS model provided a slightly
better fit, the reverse was true for the traditional pencil-and-paper survey, although
the difference was much smaller. The model chi-square values were slightly smaller
for the WWW survey data than the traditional pencil-and-paper survey data, which
also suggests that the models provided a better fit to this data than the traditional
pencil-and-paper data.
All of the final models were generally very good at explaining variance in the
non-UFO-related anomalous experiences measure but accounted for considerably
smaller proportions of variance in the UFO-related anomalous experiences measure.
In both samples, the models accounted for approximately 38-49% of the variance in
the non-UFO-related and approximately 7-15% of the variance in the UFO-related
anomalous experiences measure. The CS and RC models were the best at accounting
for variance in the anomalous experience measures in both samples. The ES and RC
models were the best at accounting for variance (c.15-18% and 11-13%, respectively)
in the non-UFO-related anomalous beliefs measure in the two samples but the CS
model accounted for only 1-3%. The CS model was best at accounting for variance
in the UFO-related anomalous beliefs measure (7% and 12%) but this is not surprising
given that this model contained an additional direct path from the non-UFO- to the
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UFO-related beliefs measure. In summary, the proportion of variance accounted for
in the non-UFO-related anomalous measure was closely replicated across the two
samples; the proportion for the other anomalous experiences and beliefmeasures were
in the same area but were more variable.
The relationship between anomalous experiences and anomalous
beliefs
In relation to the first aim of this thesis, it is not as easy as one would have hoped to
decide whether anomalous beliefs should best be modelled as an outcome of
anomalous experiences, an antecedent of anomalous experiences, or whether the
relationship is reciprocal. This is because the final versions of all three models fit the
data well in both the WWW and traditional pencil-and-paper samples. Based upon
empirical criteria, one is inclined to favour the RC and ES models, although, of these
two, the RC model provided the better fit, accounted for greater proportions of
variance and contained the least number ofpost hoc modifications (and was therefore
the least data-driven model). This also seems theoretically sensible given that the
separate paths between experiences and beliefs are supported by the ES and CS
models. Although the CS model provided a very good fit to the data in both samples,
in both cases the fit was dependent upon the addition of a single direct path from the
non-UFO-related anomalous beliefs to the UFO-related beliefs measure which, in my
opinion, should be viewed with some caution. If such a path is of such key
importance one might have expected it to be strongly suggested by the Lagrange
multiplier test used with the other models; this was not the case. Acceptance of the
RC and ES models provides support for both Irwin's (1992, 1993a) reciprocal
causation and Lawrence's (1998; Lawrence et al., 1995) experiential source
hypotheses for the relationship between measures ofparanormal experiences and
beliefs. Although Lawrence (1998) found a good deal of support for his experiential
model using SEM analysis, he did not test a reciprocal causation version; had he done
so he might also have found that this also fitted his data.
One should note, however, that the models tested as part of this thesis did not
account for as much variance in the beliefs measures as the model tested by Lawrence;
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the RC and ES models in this thesis accounted for less than 20% of the variance in the
non-UFO-related beliefs and less than 10% of the UFO-related beliefs. Although
Lawrence's ES model included measures of paranormal rather than anomalous
experiences and beliefs, tests ofhis model with paranormal experiences as the sole
predictor of paranormal beliefs, accounted for 29% (Lawrence et al., 1995), 46%
(Lawrence, 1998, SPR survey) and 54% (Lawrence, 1998, Edinburgh survey) of the
variance in paranormal beliefs, according to my calculations. One reason for the
substantially greater proportion of variance accounted for in the SPR and Edinburgh
surveys may be that, in these analyses, Lawrence (1998) used a latent measure of
paranormal belief based upon scores on two observed paranormal belief scales.
Combining more than one measure to form a latent factor minimises the overall
measurement error thus leading to a more accurate measure; this may have provided a
greater proportion of'true;' variance to be explained. Nevertheless, there are other
factors, not specified in these models, which will account for the remainder of this
variance.
In terms of the models tested as part of this thesis, the magnitude and
statistical significance of the standardised path coefficients for the direct paths
between the anomalous experiences and beliefs measures show that in all cases the
path coefficients between the non-UFO-related measures (range .183-.485) were
greater than those between the UFO-related measures (.053-.272); in fact in the RC
model the reciprocal paths between the UFO-related measures were small and positive
but non-significant. In all cases, a higher frequency of anomalous experiences was
associated with a higher level of anomalous beliefs and vice versa. However, one
should recall that the relationships between the UFO-related measures might have
been attenuated by the small variance in the anomalous experiences measure and the
unreliability of the anomalous beliefs measure, particularly in the traditional pencil-
and-paper sample.
So how might anomalous experiences and beliefs be mutually causal? In my
opinion, experiences are likely to have a greater impact on our anomalous beliefs
when we don't really have such beliefs or, ifwe do, they are not very strong or fully-
formed. Childhood anomalous experiences that seem genuine could thus shape our
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positive beliefs in anomalous phenomena at an early age. Similarly, childhood
anomalous experiences that are shown not to be genuine could shape our disbelief in
such phenomena. Once our beliefs have been established, it is possible that they might
influence how we interpret our future life experiences. With hindsight, it seems that
trying to solve the question of the causal nature of the relationship between
anomalous experiences and beliefs using only cross-sectional and quantitative
techniques may have been somewhat overambitious. Perhaps the direction of the
relationship is dependent upon whether or not one already has well-developed beliefs
and what stage of life one is at? It is bound to be somewhat difficult to establish clear
causal directionality when using a cross-sectional design; what is needed is a
complementary qualitative approach to this question. One of the advantages of
qualitative over quantitative approaches is that they take the context into account and
can collect detailed information about how events affect people (e.g., Richardson,
1996; Smith, Harre, & Langenhove, 1995). Textual and verbal reports may also give
a clear sense of the order of events in terms of time, which may help to clarify the
direction ofpotential causality. Longitudinal measures used in a SEM analysis would
also be likely to give a clearer resolution of the nature of any potential causal
relationships between anomalous experiences and beliefs but, as mentioned earlier,
such a study would be difficult to conduct for practical reasons.
As outlined in Chapter 2, a number of surveys have found that personal
experience is one of the most common reasons that people give for holding beliefs in
anomalous or paranormal phenomena (Blackmore, 1984; Clarke, 1995; Milton,
1992). Unfortunately, what these surveys do not provide is much detail concerning
what it was about the experiences that influenced the beliefs, what the circumstances
were, and what the people's beliefs were prior to the experience. One question that
has not yet been answered, or really asked, is whether it tends to be a single
experience that has the greatest influence upon our beliefs and whether subsequent
experiences continue to reinforce them. Many studies, including those within this
thesis, assume that there is a linear relationship between experiences and beliefs, i.e.,
the more experiences you have the greater your beliefs. However, if the relationship
is not this simple and straightforward then linear modelling techniques, such as SEM,
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might give spurious results. Nevertheless, my view is that anomalous experiences can
still lead to the development and/or reinforcement of beliefs in anomalous phenomena.
Upon reflection, I am becoming increasingly convinced that perhaps we are
trying to run before we can walk when it comes to trying to explain and model the
causes ofbelief in anomalous phenomena and it is necessary to go back to basics. We
need to establish a better consensus as to what we mean by anomalous or paranormal
beliefs, what should or should not be included in measures of such beliefs and to get a
much deeper and richer understanding of the impact of anomalous experiences on a
person's life (regardless ofwhether or not they involve genuine anomalous
processes). More crucially, it is necessary to identify exactly what it is about
experiences that causes subsequent changes and how these come about. As measures
of anomalous/paranormal beliefs seem to be multidimensional, my recommendation
for helping to resolve disagreements over the scope of the measures, and to create a
practically useful measure with good ecological validity, would be to collect more
qualitative information about the types ofexperiences considered anomalous or
paranormal from a wide range ofpeople. As with the creation ofany psychometric
measure, it is a good idea to begin with a large number of items that are believed to
fully cover the domain of interest. Pilot testing and factor and item analysis can then
establish the factor structure and which items are most reliable. My suspicion is that a
number of subscales would emerge. Researchers with differing views regarding the
scope of the concept could then select those subscales that seemed valid for their
purposes.
What explanations are there for the notion that beliefs in anomalous
phenomena can cause us to report more anomalous experiences? Well, clearly there is
a requirement that such beliefs have been established and this could possibly be due, at
least in part, to personal experience. Thus, both directions of influence could affect a
person but possibly at different times in their life. If a person believes in anomalous
phenomena then they might be more likely to attribute personal experiences as being
anomalous than a person who is indifferent or one who disbelieves in such
phenomena. In addition, a person who has strong beliefs in anomalous phenomena
might be more likely to place themselves in situations in which potential anomalous
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experiences might occur; for example, they might be more likely to test their own
psychic abilities or to visit a psychic or healer or an apparently haunted location. Also,
experimental evidence from sheep-goat studies (e.g., Lawrence, 1993, 1998; Palmer,
1971) suggests that one's beliefmay affect one's performance at controlled ESP tasks
with believers tending to perform better than chance and disbelievers worse than
chance. If, as the cognitive deficits hypothesis argues (see Irwin, 1993a, 1999), one's
beliefs in anomalous phenomena are partly the result of relatively poor cognitive
abilities then it may be that it is these cognitive deficits that lead us to misinterpret
normal experiences as being anomalous rather than the beliefs per se.
There is also evidence to suggest that one's beliefs or knowledge may shape
one's experience leading to experiences that could be given an anomalous
interpretation; for example, in Chapter 2, there was a description of a case in which a
man experienced HG/HP imagery of aliens trying to insert a probe into his body after
he had seen a film about alien abductions.
Fantasy proneness, anomalous experiences and anomalous beliefs
Apart from their disagreement over the nature of the relationship between paranormal
experiences and beliefs, Irwin (1992, 1993a) and Lawrence (1998; et al., 1995) also
disagree as to the nature of the relationship between fantasy proneness and
paranormal beliefs (see Chapter 3). Although they both agree that there is an indirect
positive relationship between them, via the relationship between fantasy proneness
and paranormal experiences, Irwin (1992, 1993a) also argues for an additional direct
path between fantasy proneness and paranormal belief.
Lawrence et al. (1995) tested a simplified version of Irwin's model and found
that it did not fit the data; they also found that deletion of the direct path between
fantasy proneness and paranormal belief (plus the addition of a direct path between
childhood trauma and paranormal experiences) led to a much improved fit. In two
subsequent studies, Lawrence (1998) found that this revised and simplified version of
Irwin's model was cross-validated and provided a good fit to the data in both
samples. The simplified version of Irwin's model that did contain a direct path
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between fantasy proneness and paranormal beliefs did in fact fit the data obtained in
Lawrence's (1998) Edinburgh survey, although the fit was not as good as Lawrence's
version, which did not contain such a path. However, even though Irwin's model
provided a good fit to that sample overall, the magnitude of the fantasy proneness to
paranormal beliefs path was very small (0.041) and statistically nonsignificant. So, in
conclusion, Lawrence's' (1998) findings support models with only an indirect
relationship between fantasy proneness and paranormal beliefs via reports of
paranormal experiences.
The initial versions of the ES, CS and RC models tested in this thesis
contained a similar indirect relationship between measures ofchildhood fantasy
proneness and the non-UFO and UFO-related anomalous beliefs via their respective
measures ofanomalous experiences but they did not contain additional direct
pathways. Only in the case of the CS model did the Lagrange multiplier test suggest
that the addition of an extra direct path between childhood fantasy proneness and
measures of anomalous beliefs would lead to a significant improvement in model fit; in
the WWW sample this test suggested the addition of a direct path from the childhood
fantasy proneness to the non-UFO-related anomalous beliefs measure. Tests of the ES
and RC models, using the WWW sample, suggested the addition of direct paths to
both anomalous beliefs measures but neither of these paths was calculated to provide
a significant improvement to the fit of the model.
Although final solutions of the CS model containing the direct childhood
fantasy proneness to non-UFO-related anomalous beliefs path provided a good fit to
the data from both samples, the path coefficient for this extra path was small in both
cases and only statistically significant using the WWW survey data. In conclusion
then, the results ofmy SEM analyses support Lawrence's (1998; et al., 1995) findings
that fantasy proneness is best modelled as only having an indirect relationship with
anomalous/paranormal beliefs via its relationship with associated experiences.
What about evidence for the direct path between childhood fantasy proneness
and measures ofanomalous experiences? Versions of the ES, CS and RC models,
which contained such paths, all provided a very good fit to the data in both samples.
However, closer scrutiny of the path coefficients within these models revealed that,
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although in the predicted direction, the magnitude of the path coefficient between
childhood fantasy proneness and the measure ofUFO-related anomalous experiences
was small (.090-. 132) and nonsignificant (althoughp < .12 in all cases) in the final
versions ofall three models across both samples. Path coefficients for the direct path
between childhood fantasy proneness and the measure ofnon-UFO-related anomalous
experiences measure were all small (.035-. 146) and in the predicted direction but were
only statistically significant in the WWW sample versions of the ES and RC models.
The reason for these small and mostly nonsignificant pathways is most likely to be the
fact that the childhood fantasy proneness measure is significantly positively correlated
with the childhood measures ofHG/HP experiences and sleep disorder symptoms,
both ofwhich are significant positive predictors ofnon-UFO-related anomalous
experiences in all of the models tested. Thus, in my view, fantasy proneness most
probably would have had a significant positive relationship with the anomalous
experiences measures if the models did not contain measures of these childhood sleep-
related experiences but the trends suggest that the effects of fantasy proneness
become fairly negligible once the effects of these other variables are taken into
account. The link between fantasy proneness and FIG/HP experiences was noted by
Wilson and Barber (1983) when they originally conceptualised fantasy proneness.
The relationship between fantasy proneness and childhood sleep-related experiences
will be discussed later. Thus, the results of this research do not disconfirm previous
studies that have found links between fantasy proneness and reports of non-UFO-
related anomalous experiences (e.g., Alvarado & Zingrone, 1994; Council &ffuff,
1990; Myers & Austrin, 1985; Rao, 1992), it is just that these other studies did not
also consider the effects ofpossible covariates of fantasy proneness, such as HG/HP
experiences. Certainly in-depth interviews with Wilson and Barber's (1983) fantasy-
prone participants confirmed that many of them had experienced HG/HP as well as a
range ofparanormal experiences.
The finding that childhood fantasy proneness is not a significant predictor of
UFO-related experiences is supportive ofmost previous empirical research (e.g., Ring
& Rosing, 1990; Rodeghier, 1994; Rodeghier et al., 1991; Spanos et al., 1993) but
contradicts the results ofone retrospective study (Bartholomew et al., 1991).
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However, there is evidence that individuals who are more fantasy prone tend to report
more intense UFO-related experiences (Spanos et al., 1993). Nevertheless, one must
be careful when one is trying to interpret the findings in this thesis because there is an
important difference between these studies and the other aforementioned studies; in
the other studies at least one of the samples consisted ofpeople who had all reported
some kind ofUFO experience whereas in my studies very few people had reported
such experiences. The low variance in the UFO-related experience measure may have
attenuated the potential magnitude of the relationship with the childhood fantasy
proneness measure.
So, what are the possible explanations for the relationship between childhood
fantasy proneness and reports ofnon-UFO-related anomalous experiences? One
possibility is that the cognitive abilities associated with fantasy proneness, such as
absorption capacities, dissociative tendencies and hypnotic susceptibility, which are all
related to each other to some extent (e.g., Barrett, 1992; Council & Huff, 1990;
Kihlstrom et al., 1994; Lynn & Neufeld, 1996; Lynn & Rhue, 1988; Myers & Austrin,
1985; Rhue & Lynn, 1989, 1991; Spanos et al., 1995), might be conducive to
anomalous processes (Irwin, 1992; Lawrence et al., 1995), such as ESP or
communication with the dead. Fantasy prone individuals might also be able to enter
ASCs, such as the HG/HP states, more easily; many reports ofanomalous experiences
occur during ASCs. Another possible explanation for this relationship is that the
tendency to engage in vivid fantasising and the occasional difficulties with reality
discrimination that have been associated with fantasy proneness (e.g., Lynn & Rhue,
1988; Rhue & Lynn, 1991; Wilson & Barber, 1983) might lead to misinterpretations
of normal imaginary experiences.
Relationship between childhood fantasy proneness and childhood
sleep-related experiences
Tests of the ES, CS and RC models across both the WWW and traditional pencil-and-
paper samples revealed that, as predicted, there were significant positive
intercorrelations among the childhood fantasy proneness, HG/FIP experiences, dream
experiences and sleep disorders symptoms measures. The relationships between
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childhood fantasy proneness and the sleep-related experiences measures were
generally smaller (range r = 0.192-0.288) than the relationships among the childhood
sleep-related measures (range r = 0.399-0.605).
These results support Wilson and Barber's (1983) finding that fantasy prone
people are more likely to report HG/HP imagery and many have done so since early
childhood. As will be seen later, their suspicion that these variables may be linked to
reports ofanomalous experiences was also supported by findings in this thesis. It is
not surprising to find that childhood fantasy proneness is associated with the other
sleep-related measures either. Previous research has found that people who report
higher levels of fantasy proneness also tend to report greater dissociative tendencies
(e.g., Rauschenberger & Lynn, 1995; Rhue et al., 1995). Thus, people high in fantasy
proneness and/or dissociative tendencies might be more likely to enter dissociated
states of consciousness. It seems that such dissociated states can also occur during
and around the time of sleep (see Mahowald & Schenck, 1991) when wakefulness and
sleep stages (either REM and/or NREM) become mixed. These dissociated states can
result in experiences such as HG/HP imagery and sleep paralysis, REM sleep
behaviour disorder, lucid dreaming, night terrors and sleepwalking. Fantasy
proneness has also been found to be linked to hypnotic susceptibility (e.g., Council &
Huff, 1990; Lynn & Rhue, 1988; Rhue & Lynn, 1988, 1991; Siuta, 1990; Wilson &
Barber, 1983) and absorption (Council & Huff 1990; Lynn & Neufeld, 1996; Myers
& Austrin, 1985; Rhue & Lynn, 1989). The fact that fantasy proneness, dissociative
experiences, hypnotic susceptibility and absorption are all inter-related to some extent
and that fantasy proneness and dissociative experiences have been linked with sleep-
related experiences suggests that people with higher levels of fantasy proneness may
find it easier to enter and become absorbed in waking and sleep-related ASCs. A
number of other researchers have also noted the relationships among many of these
variables and their links with reports of anomalous experiences (e.g., Targ et al.,
2000; McClenon, 1994a; Thalbourne & Delin, 1994; Zingrone & Alvarado, 1994).
It seems to me that the correlations among the childhood fantasy proneness
and the childhood sleep-related experiences measures provide some support for new
dimensions ofpersonality, such as boundary structure (Hartmann, 1991) and
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transliminality (Thalbourne & Delin, 1994). As noted in Chapter 3, the theory behind
both of these dimensions suggests that there may be boundaries between different
states or cognitive processes or sources of information and that the permeability of
these boundaries, and therefore the ease of transfer across or through them, may differ
across people. I would argue that people who score highly on the childhood fantasy
proneness and sleep-related experiences measures are likely to have thin boundaries
and a high level of transliminality; this is worthy of investigation in the future.
Research has also found that people with thin boundaries spend a lot of time
daydreaming and fantasising, they find it easy to become absorbed in such activities
and, in some circumstances, they find it difficult to distinguish between imagination
and reality (Hartmann, 1991); these are all characteristics of the fantasy prone
personality. People with thin boundaries also seem to have more flexible divisions
between states of consciousness; for example, they report relatively slow and gradual
transitions between wakefulness and sleep and vice versa, more states that are difficult
to classify as being either waking, NREM or REM sleep, and more HG/HP imagery
(Hartmann, 1991). They also report dreams and lucid dreams that tend to be more
vivid, detailed, emotional and bizarre (Hartmann, 1991; Hartmann et al., 1998) and
more nightmares, although people who report other sleep disorders, such as sleep
apnea, periodic limb movements, bruxism or night terrors, have been found to have
thicker boundaries (Hartmann, 1991).
Fantasy proneness and absorption have recently been confirmed as being a
component of transliminality (Thalbourne et al., 1997; Thalbourne & Houran, 2000)
although measures ofdissociative experience have not. People with high
transliminality tend to report more daydreaming and greater tendencies to introspect
and to experience ASCs (Thalbourne & Houran, 2000); they are also more likely to
attribute meaning to their inner processes and mentation (Thalbourne & Delin, 1994).
Thus, in summary, it seems that people who have thin boundaries and/or high
transliminality find it easier to enter ASCs, can move fairly gradually from one state to
another and may experience mixed states of consciousness, possibly containing one or
more elements ofwakefulness, NREM or REM sleep. They tend to pay attention to
their internal state and they can experience a lot of imagery and mentation that they
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often recall and attempt to make sense of. As both thin boundaries (Richards, 1996)
and transliminality (Thalbourne & Delin, 1994; Thalbourne et al., 1997; Thalbourne &
Houran, 2000) have been correlated with measures ofparanormal experiences, it
would appear that these dimensions are conducive to reports of such experiences.
Relationship between childhood sleep-related experiences and
reports of anomalous experiences
Given that fantasy proneness and reporting HG/HP, dream experiences and some
sleep disorder symptoms seem to be closely related to the concepts of boundary
structure and transliminality, which have both been related to reports ofanomalous
experiences, one would expect the aforementioned variables to also be related to
measures ofanomalous experiences. This was the second aim of this thesis. In fact
there was strong support for some aspects of this prediction in the models tested here.
In tests ofall three models, using both the WWW and traditional pencil-and-paper
survey data, the final solutions showed that the childhood HG/HP (range .317-.490)
and sleep disorder symptoms (range .176-.219) measures were significant positive
predictors of the measure ofnon-UFO-related anomalous experiences in all cases.
The childhood HG/HP measure was also a significant positive predictor (range .154-
.160) of the UFO-related anomalous experiences measure but only for the models
tested using the WWW sample; the paths were all of a similar magnitude (.141-.155)
but non-significant, albeit in the predicted direction, in the traditional pencil-and-paper
sample. The childhood dream experiences measure was also a small significant
positive predictor of the non-UFO-related experiences measure in the CS (.124) and
RC (.119) models, and was approaching significance (p = 0.0505) in the ES (.112)
model but only for the WWW sample; this path was always in the predicted direction
(.031-.038) but nonsignificant in the traditional pencil-and-paper sample.
The question is why might people who are able to enter and move between
sleep-related ASCs quite easily report more anomalous experiences? There are two
main (and not necessarily mutually exclusive) possibilities: (1) these ASCs are
conducive to the operation ofanomalous processes or agencies; (2) features of these
states, perhaps combined with individual characteristics, may result in
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misinterpretations of experiences. This is similar to the view held by Blackmore and
Rose (1997); however, they argued more specifically that it is the potential for
contusion between reality and imagination that seems to be the key. In particular,
they cited lucid dreams, false awakenings, HG/HP imagery, and sleep paralysis as
circumstances in which there can be confusion between reality and imagination. All of
these sleep-related experiences have been associated with reports or measures of a
variety of anomalous experiences (Blackmore, 1983, 1984, 1986; Glicksohn, 1989;
Green, 1968; Green & McCreery, 1994; Gurney et al., 1886; Mavromatis, 1987;
McCreery, 1993; McClenon, 1994a; Rose & Blackmore, 1996; Rose et al., 1997;
Spanos et al., 1993; Van Eeden, 1913).
Firstly, the question ofwhy the HG/HP and sleep states might be conducive to
genuine anomalous processes or agencies will be considered. These states can share a
number of features ofwhat is considered to be a psi-conducive state (Braud & Braud,
1975; Honorton, 1977; Mavromatis, 1987); for example, conscious awareness,
physical relaxation, a reduction in sensory distraction and increased internal attention.
However, the emphasis seems to be that these conditions might facilitate detection
and recognition of the operation ofanomalous processes rather than facilitating their
operation, though the latter might also be a possibility.
Although particular patterns ofEEG brain activity seem to be associated with
the appearance ofHG/HP, REM and NREM sleep (e.g., Dement & Kleitman, 1957;
Hori et al., 1994; Stickgold & Hobson, 1994) there does not appear to be any kind of
EEG signature that marks the occurrence of experiences reported as involving
anomalous processes. There is some evidence from experimental attempts to induce
or monitor OBEs during sleep-related states that suggests that such OBEs tend to
take place during the HG state or the transition to stage 2 sleep and that these may be
associated with some unusual EEG activity and/or some flattening ofEEG activity
(Tart, 1967, 1968, 1969a; Krippner, 1996). There is also evidence to suggest that the
EEG traces ofOBErs are interrupted by briefperiods ofwakefulness (Tart, 1967,
1968, 1969a; Twemlow, 1977). However, it does not follow that this evidence is
necessarily indicative of the operation of anomalous processes.
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Some researchers (e.g., Murphy, 1966; Parker, 1975) have argued that it
might not be the ASC per se but the degree of the transition from one state to
another, or the rapidity of the transition, which is important for the emergence of
reports of anomalous experiences. Perhaps the occurrence of states that are a mixture
of sleep and wakefulness is necessary. This might be a circumstance in which there is
some contusion between reality and imagination (Blackmore & Rose, 1997). There is
a need for experimental sleep research to monitor and gain mentation reports
specifically from these mixed states rather than from the more discrete states that have
tended to be the focus of research in the past. Such an approach would enable us to
see if there is any difference in mentation between the more clear-cut states either side
of the mixed state and the mixed state itself.
Even if certain sleep-related brain activity and/or changes in states or the
appearance ofmixed states are conducive to reports of anomalous experiences,
whether genuine or not, it would seem that they are not a sufficient requirement; if
they were then many more people would be reporting anomalous experiences possibly
on a fairly regular basis. Perhaps there is an interaction between the ASC, other
characteristics of the individual, such as their level of fantasy proneness,
transliminality or boundary structure, and the environment?
Another body of literature contains theories that suggest that some sleep-
related and some anomalous experiences might be the result of interactions between
bodily processes, more specifically activity in the temporal lobes of the brain, and
environmental variables, more specifically the earth's geomagnetic field. Two
researchers who have been pioneering the investigation of links between the temporal
lobes and reports of anomalous experiences are Neppe (e.g., 1983a, 1984, 1990) and
Persinger and colleagues (e.g., Persinger, 1989; Persinger & De Sano, 1986;
Persinger & Makarec, 1987). Persinger and colleagues have also conducted a number
of studies looking at relationships between geomagnetic field activity (GMF) and the
incidence of a range ofanomalous experiences (e.g., Gearhart & Persinger, 1986;
Berger & Persinger, 1991; Persinger & Krippner, 1989; Persinger & Schaut, 1988).
Important functions of the temporal lobes, which are relevant to a discussion
of links with both anomalous experiences and normal sleep-related experiences, are
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integration ofmultimodal perceptual inputs of all kinds, the attribution ofmeaning and
emotional significance to external and internal experiences and integrating one's sense
of self (Neppe, 1990; Persinger, 1989). Thus, they seem to be involved with bringing
together and making sense of information associated with a range of sensory
modalities that can come from both internal and external sources.
Research has found that people who report a greater number of indicators of
possible anomalous temporal lobe functioning also tend to report more paranormal
and mystical experiences (Neppe, 1983, 1984, 1990; Persinger & Makarec, 1987;
Perisnger & De Sano, 1986; Persinger & Valliant, 1985). The measures of these
indicators have some validity in that they are based upon clinical features associated
with temporal lobe epilepsy patients (Neppe, 1983, 1990) and have been correlated
with temporal lobe EEG activity in non-clinical samples (Makarec & Persinger, 1987).
In my view, converging evidence for a link between temporal lobe activity,
anomalous experiences and GMF activity comes from a number of findings: (1) it
appears that epileptic seizures are more likely during periods of increased GMF
activity (Rajaram & Mitra, 1981); (2) periods of lower GMF activity have been
associated with alleged reports ofprecognitive dreams (Krippner, Vaughan, &
Spottiswoode, 2000; but not by Persinger & Schaut, 1988), spontaneous case reports
of telepathy-clairvoyance (Persinger & Schaut, 1988; Schaut & Persinger, 1985) and
experimental telepathy-clairvoyance performance (Berger & Persinger, 1991;
Persinger & Krippner, 1989); however there is also evidence to suggest that
spontaneous cases ofprecognition or post-mortem experiences are not associated
with periods of lower GMF activity (Persinger & Schaut, 1988; Schaut & Persinger,
1985). According to Krippner et al. (2000), the reason why Persinger and Schaut
failed to find such a relationship is that the dates of the precognition experiences are
unreliable, which would therefore potentially alter the associated GMF values. This
seems a reasonable explanation; (3) periods ofhigher GMF activity have been
associated with reports ofpoltergeists and hauntings (Gearhart & Persinger, 1986;
Wilkinson & Gauld, 1993), reports ofOBE-like experiences in participants with
higher temporal lobe signs (Persinger, 1995) and experimental PK (Braud & Dennis,
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1989); (4) the hourly incidence ofepileptic seizures and some psi experiences appear
to be similar with peaks occurring between 2-4am and 9-11pm (Persinger, 1989).
It has been suggested that patterns ofanomalous temporal lobe functioning
might be a trait with a continuum along which people may differ (Neppe, 1984;
Persinger & Makarec, 1993) with temporal lobe (or complex partial) epileptics falling
at one extreme. However, it is possible that the patterns of activity might only occur
at certain times (Neppe, 1984), e.g., around the time of sleep or when there is a
sudden change in GMF activity (Persinger, 1985) or within a certain range ofGMF
activity (Persinger, 1995). This idea that there may be an interaction with
environmental variables is supported by the finding that the relationship between GMF
activity and ESP task performance seems to depend upon local sidereal time (LST)
and that the relationship may only hold within a certain range of the latter variable
(Spottiswoode, 1997). LST is "the longitudinal-like astronomical correlate for the
portion of the celestial sphere that is directly overhead at the time of the viewing."
(Spottiswoode, 1997, p. 3).
Sleep and sleep-related states also seem to be related both to temporal lobe
activity and to reports ofanomalous experiences; there is also evidence to suggest
that sleep and sleep experiences might be affected by GMF activity. Persinger &
Schaut (1988) noted that the temporal lobes are particularly labile during dreaming
and suggested that they may then become susceptible to environmental factors.
Microseizures in the temporal lobes are normal and can occur regularly during REM
sleep (Stevens, 1982); more drastic and widespread temporal lobe seizures are also
more likely during sleep (Baldy-Moulinier, 1982). Temporal lobe epilepsy can disrupt
the sleep-cycle; in some cases epileptic seizures can trigger or even replace REM
sleep (Stevens, 1982). Temporal lobe patients can also suffer from sleep instability
that is evidenced by numerous awakenings and shifts between sleep stages plus they
can show increased wakefulness following sleep-onset (Baldy-Moulinier, 1982). One
might postulate from this that people with labile temporal lobes might be more likely
to experience mixed states of sleep and wakefulness, a greater degree of awareness
during REM sleep (e.g., prelucid and lucid dreams) and experiences that might be
associated with states that involve a mixture ofwakefulness and NREM or REM
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sleep, particularly during increased GMF activity. In longitudinal studies of his own
experiences, Conesa (1995, 1997) found that sleep paralysis episodes tended to occur
during periods of higher GMF activity whereas extremely vivid dreams tended to
occur during periods of lower GMF activity. Thus, it seems that the relationship
between temporal lobe activity, GMF activity, sleep states and reports ofanomalous
experiences and normal sleep-related experiences is not a simple one; there may be
interactions among them and/or there may be more than one mechanism or process
involved. As Persinger (1989) correctly pointed out, the different directions for
relationships between GMF activity and different anomalous experiences suggest that
different processes might be involved for different experiences.
Deliberate stimulation or naturally-occurring but abnormal activity (as in the
case of temporal lobe epilepsy) within the temporal lobes have also caused
experiential features that have been reported during both anomalous experiences and
normal sleep-related experiences. For example, Cook and Persinger (1997) have
found that applying weak complex magnetic fields across and through the
temporoparietal lobes can produce reports of a sense ofpresence and, in one case, a
report of an OBE-like experience. Blackmore (1994) also reported feelings of
floating during a session with Persinger in which both of her temporoparietal areas
were stimulated. Interestingly, Neppe (1983) also mentioned a case in which the
neurosurgeon Penfield (1955) induced an OBE in a temporal lobe epileptic patient by
stimulating their temporal lobes. Sensations of floating have been reported during
OBEs and NDEs (e.g., Alvarado, 1997b; Blackmore, 1982a; Green, 1968; Irwin,
1994c) as well as during normal HG/HP experiences (e.g., Isakower, 1938; Rowley et
al., 1998). A sense ofpresence has also been associated with reports ofapparitions
and crisis apparitions—plus in some cases a feeling of coldness—(e.g., Green &
McCreery, 1989; Gurney et al., 1886), some NDEs (e.g., Irwin, 1994c), the HG/HP
states (e.g., Critchley, 1955; Ohayon et al., 1996) and reports of sleep paralysis (e.g.,
Conesa, 1995; Hufford, 1982; Rose & Blackmore, 1996; Spanos et al., 1995). It is
also interesting to note that Cook and Persinger (1997) found that the nature of the
sense ofpresence seems to alter according to the pattern ofmagnetic stimulation;
burst-firing sequences tended to be associated with pleasant experiences whereas the
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Thomas pulse tended to be associated with neutral or negative experiences. The
Thomas pulse was also associated with sensations of unpleasant vibrations passing
through the body, shivering and coldness and a sense of impending death. Similar
vibrations have also been reported during the HG/HP states (Mavromatis, 1987) and
during OBEs (e.g., Harary, 1978; McCreery & Claridge, 1996a); humming or
vibrations are sometimes experienced at the beginning of alleged alien abduction
experiences too (e.g., Mack, 1994). A sense of impending death or an unpleasant
feeling that something's wrong or something bad is about to happen can also feature
in crisis apparitional experiences (e.g., Gurney et al., 1886) and Type 2 false
awakenings (e.g., Green & McCreery, 1994). Persinger (1993) has also argued that
his analyses of the content ofparanormal experiences have shown that there are many
similarities, in terms of the themes and basic phenomenology, with experiences
associated with stimulation of the temporal lobes.
The finding that different patterns ofmagnetic stimulation seem to generate
different experiences strengthens the inference of a possible causal relationship.
Persinger's explanation (e.g., Cook & Persinger, 1997) for the induced sense of
presence is that the action of the magnetic field on the temporal lobes causes
intercalation of the two hemispheres resulting in a temporary awareness of a right-
hemispheric homologue of the left hemisphere's usual sense of self, i.e., one
experiences a sense ofanother self that one might not recognise. Cook and Persinger
(1997) argued that such intercalation is more likely during REM sleep; this could
explain why a sense ofpresence is often reported during the HG/ITP states and sleep
paralysis, which seem to be associated with occasional intrusions ofREM sleep into
wakefulness or light sleep.
Having discussed the relationship between sleep-related experiences, temporal
lobe signs and anomalous experiences, and between sleep-related experiences and
fantasy proneness, it is also interesting to note that fantasy proneness also appears to
be related to temporal lobe signs (Makarec & Persinger, 1987; Persinger & De Sano,
1986; Persinger & Makarec, 1993). In my view, the notion of temporal lobe lability
and possible intercalation of the hemispheres seems to fit in with some aspects of the
boundary structure (Hartmann, 1991) and transliminality (Thalbourne & Delin, 1994)
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theories. People with thin boundaries or high transliminality might have more labile
temporal lobes that are more sensitive to stimulation, e.g., from environmental as well
as internal stimulation, and the boundaries or thresholds for connection of the
hemispheres might be lower meaning that intercalation might be more likely to occur.
If this is the case then one would predict that temporal lobe epileptics ought to report
very thin boundaries and/or a high level of transliminality; this is a prediction that is
worthy of investigation. The idea of a transient awareness of a right hemisphere
homologue of the self resulting in a sense ofpresence also fits in nicely with the
notion of transliminality in "which the contents of some preconscious (or
"unconscious" or "subliminal") region of the mind are able to cross the threshold into
consciousness (or its sense of "awareness")." (Thalbourne & Delin, 1994, p. 3).
So it seems that activity within the temporal lobes might be one possible
mechanism for the production ofboth anomalous experiences and normal sleep-
related experiences and that this might also be linked to fantasy proneness. However,
this does not tell us whether or not there are any genuine anomalous processes
involved.
As outlined in Chapter 5, some of the best (and most reliable compared with
spontaneous case reports) evidence for the conduciveness of sleep-related states to
the operation of genuine anomalous processes comes from experiments that have been
conducted under controlled conditions. Although experimental research into sleep-
related anomalous experiences has focused on certain types of anomalous
experiences, such as ESP and OBEs; I would also include psychomanteum research
because of the similarities with the HG/HP states. It seems that ESP, OBEs and
apparitions or communication with the dead are the types of anomalous experience
that occur most often during sleep-related states, which is another reason for focusing
upon them.
Having reviewed the experimental evidence for ESP occurring HG/HP and
dream states, and having been both a participant and an experimenter in three dream
ESP studies myself (Dalton et al., in press; Sherwood, Dalton et al., in press;
Sherwood, Roe et al., submitted for publication), my conclusion is that the evidence is
strongly suggestive of the operation of such a process, but not yet conclusive.
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Very few experimental studies have attempted to investigate ESP during the
naturally-occurring and self-induced HG/HP states (Braud, 1977; Gertz, 1983; White
et al., 1971); although some of these studies obtained task performance that was
significantly better than chance expectations, these studies involved small numbers of
participants and/or trials and seemed to be somewhat exploratory. There were also
some methodological problems, particularly with the Gertz (1983) study. These
aspects, coupled with the general lack ofattempts to replicate these findings, make it
more difficult to conclude that there is a reliable effect operating. Although the
evidence for a replicable, albeit small, ESP effect is much stronger if one considers the
ganzfeld research (e.g., Honorton, 1986; Bern & Elonorton, 1994; but see Hyman,
1986; Milton & Wiseman, 1999; Milton, 2000), in my view this cannot yet be counted
as evidence for the psi-conducive nature of the HG state as it is not clear whether the
ganzfeld procedure does induce a state resembling the HG state and. In fact, recent
evidence suggests that it does not (Wackermann et al., 2000).
A greater number of experimental studies have investigated whether dreams
are conducive to ESP (e.g., Braud, 1977; Child et al., 1977; Dalton et al., 2000; in
press; Kanthamani & Broughton, 1992; Sherwood et al., 1999, in press; Ullman et al.,
1989). Again, my conclusion is that the available evidence is strongly suggestive of
the operation ofESP during dreams. This is supported by the fact that a recent meta¬
analysis of the Maimonides dream ESP trials found that the overall hit rate was 63%
(MCE = 50%) with odds against chance of 75 million to one (Radin, 1997).
Unfortunately, attempts to replicate the Maimonides findings have been few
(Belvedere & Foulkes, 1971; Child, 1985; Foulkes et al., 1972; Globus et al., 1968)
and they have been relatively unsuccessful (see Van de Castle, 1977) which is one of
the most serious criticisms of the Maimonides findings (Krippner, 1991). One reason
for the lack of attempted replications is the need for a sleep laboratory and the high
costs involved with running such a study. However, recent studies using automated
free-response ESP testing systems, but no sleep laboratory, have still managed to
obtain promising results (e.g., Dalton et al., 2000, in press; Sherwood et al., in press).
There is a need for an updated meta-analysis, which includes non-Maimonides studies,
in order to see if there is overall evidence for dream ESP and whether the effect is
342
dependent upon methodological or statistical aspects of the studies. There is also a
need for more dream-ESP research, ideally using standardised protocols, to see if a
replicable effect can be demonstrated across laboratories and across researchers. One
way ofachieving this might be to encourage laboratories that have developed, or are
developing, automated ganzfeld testing systems to adapt them so that they can also be
used in dream research. In my experience of this at the KPU, such research requires
very little additional development and can be quite successful; this is something that
we are also planning to implement at University College Northampton. One problem
with dream-ESP studies to date is that, as with the investigations ofESP during
naturally-occurring HG/HP states, there tend to be fairly small numbers of trials with
small numbers ofparticipants, which suggests that the power to detect any small
effects may be fairly low. This is something that future dream ESP research also needs
to address.
Turning to OBEs, although the available evidence, both from spontaneous
cases and experimental investigations (see Chapter 5), suggests that the HG/HP and
sleep states are conducive to reports ofOBEs, this does not mean that any anomalous
processes involving the separation of some form of the self from the physical body are
necessarily involved. However, one recognises that some form ofESP might operate
during some OBEs (see Alvarado, 1982, 1997b, 2000; Blackmore, 1982a; Palmer,
1978b). The evidence presented in Chapter 5 shows that there are many similarities
between OBE and normal HG/HP experiences in terms of the conditions in which
they occur and in terms of the content of the experiences. A likely explanation for
OBEs that occur during the HG/HP states (and possibly also the sleep states) is that,
as the psychological theories ofOBEs (e.g., Blackmore, 1982a; Irwin, 1985b; Palmer,
1978b) and HG/HP imagery (see Mavromatis, 1987) suggest, normal sensory input
and/or internal imagery becomes transformed into a complex and realistic experience
in which the person maintains conscious awareness. The temporal lobes could play a
role in the integration and interpretation of these inputs (Neppe, 1990; Persinger,
1989). Perhaps one of the key requirements, in addition to a shift away from external
or internal inputs towards internal mentation (Blackmore, 1982a; Irwin, 1985b), is
that the brain is attempting to process internal and external inputs during a state of
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consciousness that may be a mixture of sleep and wakefulness. Perhaps it is this
process that disrupts one's normal sense of self and leads to confusion between
internality and externality. In my view, HG/HP OBEs could be a special form of
HG/HP imagery.
It seems to me that normal HG/HP-like imagery is also a more likely
explanation for many alleged encounters with deceased loved ones that are reported
inside psychomanteum chambers (see Arcangel, 1997; Hastings et al., 1999; Moody
with Perry, 1993; Radin & Rebman, 1996; Roll & Braun, 1995). The
psychomanteum context is possibly a good illustration of the reciprocal causation
relationship between experiences and beliefs. As outlined in Chapter 5, the features of
normal HG/HP experiences and the circumstances in which they occur are similar to
many of the features ofpsychomanteum experiences and could be interpreted as being
apparitional experiences and/or communication with the dead. Expectations
regarding what will happen in the chamber plus a strong motivation for an encounter
and a belief that it can and will occur are also likely to influence the content of the
imagery experienced.
Another possible explanation for psychomanteum experiences is that the
experient gains information about the deceased using some form of super-ESP (see
Gauld, 1977). However, it is difficult to determine whether ESP is likely, based only
on the subjective reports of the experients, because the information received tends to
be quite general and/or could be information already known by the experient. One
fairly obvious and more-controlled means of testing for possible ESP in a
psychomanteum context would be to ask participants to gain information about a
randomly-selected target during their time in the chamber. If they are able to identify
the target more frequently than chance would predict then this would provide support
for the argument that the information could have been obtained via ESP or perhaps
via communication with the dead. Another theory put forward to account for
psychomanteum experiences is that they are the result of a PK influence on the
environment by the participants (Radin & Rebman, 1996). Radin and Rebman (1996)
argue that the apparitions could be caused by short-term vortices caused by
disturbances in an equilibrium between mind, body and environment. This theory was
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based upon their discovery ofan apparent link between environmental and
participants' physiological variables during the psychomanteum sessions and an
almost significant positive correlation between a set ofphysiological variables and the
output of an RNG placed outside the chamber. However, this theory is problematic
for a number of reasons: (a) one needs to demonstrate that such an equilibrium exists
an (b) that a disturbance in it causes the apparitional experience; (c) it is not clear how
the mechanism specified would account for the individual features of the
psychomanteum experience.
Why might normal sleep-related experiences be misinterpreted as involving
anomalous processes? As my discussion ofOBEs and psychomanteum experiences
has illustrated (see Chapter 5), there are often similarities between the features of
normal sleep-related experiences, particularly HG/HP, and reports ofanomalous
experiences and they may both occur in similar circumstances. It's been argued that
HG/HP experiences may have been misinterpreted as ESP, apparitions, OBEs/NDEs,
visions ofprevious lives or other worlds, alien abductions, witchcraft or attacks by
spirits or demons etc. (Baker, 1992; Blackmore, 1996, 1998; Dahlitz & Parkes, 1993;
Green & McCreery, 1994; Hufford, 1982; Leaning, 1925; Liddon, 1967; McKellar,
1957, 1989; Spanos et al., 1993, 1995; Wilson & Barber, 1983; Wing et ah, 1994;
Zusne & Jones, 1989). Apart from similarities in content, sleep-related imagery can
be multisensory, vivid, detailed and very realistic. During sleep-related experiences
people are often in bed in a darkened room and there may be reduced sensory input,
which, according to Spanos et al. (1993), may interfere with accurate reality-testing,
which is known to be reduced during the sleep onset period (Foulkes & Vogel, 1965).
These conditions, coupled with the possibility of experiencing a mixed state of sleep
and wakefulness, could lead to confusion between imagination and reality. It seems
to me that normal HG/HP experiences are more likely to be misinterpreted than sleep
experiences because the former are more frequently associated with a simultaneous
awareness of the imagery as well as the current environment plus feelings of being
awake. Although there may be perceptions ofbeing awake (that may or may not be
genuine) during prelucid and lucid dreams and false awakenings, conscious awareness
appears to be less common during the sleep state than the HG/HP states.
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Some of the best evidence for the misinterpretation of normal HG/HP
experiences comes from reports ofOld Hag attacks (e.g., Hufford, 1982), kanashibari
(e.g., Fukuda et al., 1987) and ghost oppression attacks (Wing et al., 1994) which
have similar, if not identical features to sleep paralysis with accompanying HG/HP
imagery. Old Hag attacks are traditionally believed to be caused by a supernatural
creature, by a human in spirit form or a combination of the two (Firestone, 1978;
Hufford, 1982; Ness, 1978).; kanashibari and ghost oppression attacks are
traditionally believed to be caused by evil spirits or possession by a ghost (Fukuda et
al., 1987; Wing et al., 1994).
Other evidence illustrating the potential to misinterpret possible normal sleep-
related experiences comes from the results of the Unusual Experiences Surveys
conducted by the Roper Organization but interpreted by Hopkins et al. (1992).
Participants who reported at least four out of five so-called indicator experiences
were deemed to be possible UFO abductees. However, at least three of these
indicator experiences (paralysis, a sense of flying and unusual lights) could be
reported by a person who has normal HG/HP imagery. Stires (1993) goes even
further and argues that a person could admit to all five without needing to consider a
possible abduction scenario. Although these indicators have been reported during
alleged abductions (e.g., Mack, 1994), the validity of the Unusual Experiences
Surveys is still questionable because it is not clear that a specific set of indicators is a
valid indicator of a potential abduction (Donderi, 1994; Goertzel, 1994). Also my
own interpretation of the Roper reports suggests that a respondent could have been
identified as a potential abductee even if his/her indicator experiences had occurred on
separate occasions; this weakens their argument further.
In summary, there is evidence to suggest that the HG/HP and sleep states might
be conducive to the operation ofanomalous processes, such as ESP, but they may
also be conducive to misinterpretations of normal experiences. The results of the
SEM modelling suggest that people who report more frequent childhood HG/HP
experiences, as opposed to childhood dream experiences, are more likely to report
anomalous experiences throughout their lifetime.
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Contributions made by this thesis
This thesis has tested three competing models, based upon those of Irwin (1992,
1993a) and Lawrence (1998; Lawrence et al., 1995), in order to establish whether
anomalous beliefs should best be modelled as an outcome of anomalous experiences,
as an antecedent ofanomalous experiences, or whether the relationship is reciprocal.
The multivariate structural equation modelling approach adopted by Lawrence was
used to test these competing models and overcomes some of the problems with
previous research into the correlates of anomalous/paranormal beliefs which has
tended to be bivariate in nature. The results indicated that revised models of all three
models tested with both WWW and traditional pencil-and-paper survey data, i.e., the
experiential source (ES), cognitive source (CS), and reciprocal causation (RC), fitted
the data to an acceptable extent. However, the RC model is considered to be the best
of those tested for both theoretical and empirical reasons; this supports Irwin's rather
than Lawrence's theory. This means that reports of anomalous experiences might
lead to the development or reinforcement of anomalous beliefs and holding anomalous
beliefs might also lead to a greater propensity to report anomalous experiences. The
magnitude of these relationships is greater for non-UFO-related than UFO-related
experiences/beliefs.
This thesis has also suggested that, as Lawrence has argued, fantasy proneness
is best modelled as only having an indirect relationship with anomalous beliefs via its
relationship with measures of anomalous experiences. This finding does not support
Irwin (1992, 1993a) who argues for an additional direct relationship between fantasy
proneness and measures ofparanormal beliefs. However, although these models fit
the data, childhood fantasy proneness is not a significant positive predictor of
measures ofanomalous experiences when the effects of other predictors in the model
are taken into account. Measures of childhood HG/HP, in particular, and also sleep
disorder symptoms were found to be significant positive predictors of the measure of
non-UFO-related anomalous experiences. This supports the idea that the HG/HP
states and possible dissociated sleep states are conducive to reports of anomalous
experiences, either because the conditions facilitate the operation of anomalous
processes or lead to misinterpretations of normal sleep-related experiences.
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The measures of childhood fantasy proneness, HG/HP experiences, dream
experiences and sleep disorder symptoms, as predicted, were found to be significantly
correlated. This suggests that these people may have a tendency to experience
imagery and an enhanced capacity to enter and become absorbed in altered states of
consciousness (ASCs) and to be able to recall associated experiences. This thesis has
also noted that this provides some support for the concepts of transliminality
(Thalbourne & Delin, 1994) and boundary structure (Hartmann, 1991).
This thesis has also discussed evidence that suggests that temporal lobe brain
activity might play a role in the production of both normal sleep-related experiences
and anomalous experiences and that such experiences might also be the result of
interactions with the earth's geomagnetic fields. It is argued that the notion of
temporal lobe lability (Neppe, 1990; Persinger, 1989) and intercalation of the
hemispheres also fit in with the theories behind transliminality and boundary structure.
The finding that the factor structure of the measures and the fit of the models
and the proportion of variance accounted for were all generally replicated across two
samples of data collected via WWW and traditional pencil-and-paper survey
techniques suggests that the validity of the results is not adversely affected by the use
of the WWW administration and completion methodology. It is argued that the
differences in the descriptive statistics associated with the measures for the two
samples are likely to be due to differences in the heterogeneity and demographics of
the samples.
Suggestions for future research
1. Structural equation modelling
As the models tested did not account for all of the variance in the predicted variables,
there is a need to include other variables. Future tests of similar models might
examine the effects of including measures of transliminality and boundary structure as
well as variables identified from future qualitative research into factors that influence
the development of anomalous beliefs. Future research should continue to test
competing models and attempt to cross-validate them using different samples. If
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possible future studies should use longitudinal rather than cross-sectional designs. In
order to identify whether the models are particularly suited to certain types of
experience of beliefs, future research could also employ specific rather than global
measures of anomalous experiences and beliefs.
2. Definitions of terms and measures ofexperiences and beliefs
There is a need for more qualitative research to investigate what terms such as
'parapsychology', 'paranormal,' 'psychic,' and 'anomalous,' mean to the general
population and which phenomena they associate with them and why. The results of
this could be used to generate items that could form new measures of anomalous
experiences and beliefs that might have greater ecological validity.
3. Anomalous experiences, normal sleep-related experiences, transliminality and
boundary structure, temporal lobe signs and GMF activity
In the future, it would be useful to investigate whether transliminality and boundary
structure are empirically related to each other and also to the sleep-related
experiences included in this thesis. Given the hypothesised links between these
variables and temporal lobe signs and anomalous experiences, it is necessary to
establish whether temporal lobe epileptics report more normal HG/HP experiences,
dream experiences and sleep disorders, as well as anomalous experiences. Given the
hypothesised link between GMF activity and sleep-related experiences, there is a need
to investigate whether there is a relationship between reports ofHG/HP, dream
experiences, sleep disorders and GMF activity and whether the nature of such a
relationship is dependent upon LST.
4. The mechanisms involved with the development ofanomalous beliefs
More qualitative research is needed, for example via open-ended or semi-structured
interviews, in order to shed more light on the specific mechanism(s) by which
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anomalous experiences might lead to the development of beliefs and vice versa. It is
also necessary to find out more about the factors that can influence beliefs, such as the
views ofothers and the influence ofthe media and empirical evidence, and how the
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SURVEY OF CHILDHOOD AND




Your participation in this research would be greatly appreciated. This survey will form part ofmy
PhD thesis in Psychology at the University ofEdinburgh. The aims of this survey are:
• to assess the relative frequency of (and possible relationships between) childhood
experiences which can occur before, during and after a period of sleep.
• to assess the relative frequency of some childhood abilities such as imagining and role-
playing.
• to assess the relative frequency of (and possible relationships between) some childhood and
adulthood experiences which might be considered, by some people, to be beyond current
scientific understanding.
it is appreciated that the restricted population being sampled (i.e. individuals with access to the
WWW) will limit the extent and the accuracy of any inferences that might be made on the basis of
the data collected.
CONFIDENTIALITY
Participants should be aware that there is a small risk that a suitably skilled and motivated
individual might be able to intercept information as it is being sent from your computer to our
server.
However, once they have been stored on our server, your responses to this questionnaire will
remain completely confidential. Information about individuals will not be divulged to any other
parties nor will individuals be able to be identified in any subsequent reports.
Please note that your computer's IP address and host domain will also be recorded but in a
separate file to that containing your responses. The reason for collecting this information is that it
might give an indication ofpossible attempts to deliberately bias the results of this survey via
repeated participation.
NOTES ON COMPLETION
Please click here if you do NOT have free WWW access
For the purposes of this survey, 'childhood' and 'adulthood' will be defined as follows:
Childhood - from the age of 2 up until the age of 18.
Adulthood - from the age of 18 upwards.
Childhood experiences may be more difficult to remember than those occurring in adulthood.
Please try to give as accurate an estimate as you can. Some experiences may be relatively more
common than others and therefore not everyone will have had some or all of the experiences
listed. Ifyou are uncertain whether or not you have had a particular experience (regardless of
how others might interpret such an experience) then please answer 'No'.
The focus of this survey is on the experiences themselves rather than on the possible
interpretations of these experiences. There are no right or wrong answers in this survey.
Section A
This section is concerned with a number of different childhood experiences which can occur just
before, during or just after a period of sleep.
Please read through the following questions carefully and estimate the number of times that each
experience has occurred during your childhood. Please do not spend too long on each question.
Please use the mouse to click on the button to the right of the most appropriate response in each
case.
If a particular question does not apply to you, you may be asked to move on to another question.
For example "IF you answered 'No' THEN please go to question 2."
A small number of questions in this section will require you to type in your response in the space
provided.
1. Have you ever experienced vivid and realistic visual, auditory, tactile or other sensations as
you are falling asleep? (Do not include dreams which occur during sleep).
As a child No r Once r 2-10 times r 11-20 times r More than 20 times c
IF you answered 'No' THEN please go to question 2
a. Have these sensations ever been terrifying?
As a child No r Once r 2-10 times 11-20 times More than 20 times ^
b. Have these sensations ever been accompanied by a 'sense ofpresence' i.e. a feeling
that there is someone or something else nearby even though they cannot be seen or
heard?
As a child No r Once r 2-10 times r 11-20 times r More than 20 times r
c. Have these sensations ever been accompanied by movements ofyour body or
screams or other utterances?
As a child No r Once r 2-10 times r 11-20 times c More than 20 times r
d. Have these sensations ever been accompanied by a feeling of confusion or
disorientation?
As a child No r Once c 2-10 times 11-20 times More than 20 times r
e. What sort of sensations have you experienced as you are falling asleep?
3
3
Have you ever been temporarily unable to perform voluntary movements and/or speak as
you are falling asleep?
As a child No r Once c 2-10 times 11-20 times c More than 20 times r
IF you answered 'No' THEN please go to question 3
a. When this has occurred, have you ever felt unable to breathe?
As a child No r Once r 2-10 times r 11-20 times r More than 20 times r
b. When this has occurred, have you ever felt as if something or someone was sitting on
your chest?
As a child No r Once r 2-10 times r 11-20 times r More than 20 times r
Have you ever experienced sensations ofexplosions and/or sensations of flashing lights in
the head as you are falling asleep?
As a child No ^ Once c 2-10 times 11-20 times r More than 20 times r
IF you answered 'No* THEN please go to question 4
a. When this has occurred, has it ever been followed by a pounding heartbeat, sweating
and/or heavy breathing?
As a child No r Once c 2-10 times r 11-20 times r More than 20 times c
4. Have you ever experienced vivid and realistic visual, auditory, tactile or other sensations as
you are waking from sleep? (Do not include dreams which occur during sleep).
As a child No Once c 2-10 times 11-20 times More than 20 times c
IF you answered 'No' THEN please go to question 5
a. Have these sensations ever been terrifying?
As a child No r Once c 2-10 times c 11-20 times r More than 20 times c
b. Have these sensations ever been accompanied by a 'sense ofpresence' i.e. a feeling
that there is someone or something else nearby even though they cannot be seen or
heard?
As a child No c Once c 2-10 times c 11-20 times r More than 20 times c
c. Have these sensations ever been accompanied by actual movements ofyour body or
actual screams or other utterances?
As a child No r Once r 2-10 times 11-20 times c More than 20 times ^
d. Have these sensations ever been accompanied by a feeling of confusion or
disorientation?
As a chiid No r Once 2-10 times r 11-20 times r More than 20 times
e. What sort of sensations have you experienced as you are waking from sleep?
3
d
5. Have you ever been temporarily unable to perform voluntary movements and/or speak as
you are waking from sleep?
As a child No c Once r 2-10 times r 11-20 times c More than 20 times c
IF you answered 'No' THEN please go to question 6
a. When this has occurred, have you ever felt unable to breathe?
As a child No r Once r 2-10 times r 11-20 times r More than 20 times r
b. Wflien this has occurred, have you ever felt as if something or someone was sitting on
your chest?
As a child No c Once c 2-10 times r 11-20 times c More than 20 times r
6. Have you ever been able to remember your dreams? (Do not include images that occur
when you are only half asleep).
As a child No r Once r 2-10 times c 11-20 times r More than 20 times
7. Have you ever been able to stop a dream which you did not like or to wake yourselfup out
of it? (Do not include images that occur when you are only half asleep).
As a child No r Once r 2-10 times c 11-20 times r More than 20 times r
8. Have you ever been able to control or create a dream which you did like? (Do not include
images that occur when you are only half asleep).
As a child No r Once r 2-10 times c 11-20 times r More than 20 times r
9. Have you ever experienced dreams that you would call vivid? (Do not include images that
occur when you are only half asleep).
As a child No c Once r 2-10 limes r 11-20 limes r More than 20 times c
10. Have you ever had a dream in which you were flying? (Do not include images that occur
when you are only half asleep).
As a child No r Once r 2-10 times c 11-20 times More than 20 times
11. Have you ever had a dream in which you were falling? (Do not include images that occur
when you are only half asleep).
As a child No r Once r 2-10 times r 11-20 times r More than 20 times r
12. Have you ever had a dream in which you suspected that you were dreaming and in which
you thought about this question and/or tried to undertake various tests to determine
whether you were awake or dreaming?
As a child No c Once c 2-10 times 11 -20 times c More than 20 times r
13. Have you ever had a special sort ofdream in which you knew during the dream that you
were dreaming and felt that you possessed all ofyour waking capabilities?
As a child No r Once r 2-10 times r 11-20 times More than 20 times c
14. Have you ever felt that you have woken up only to discover later that you were only
dreaming that you had woken up?
As a child No r Once c 2-10 times 11-20 times c More than 20 times r
15. Have you ever felt that you have woken up and found the atmosphere to be stressed,
electrified or tense with a feeling of foreboding or expectancy, only to discover later that
you were only dreaming that you had woken up?
As a child No c Once r 2-10 times c 11-20 times r More than 20 times
16. Have you ever experienced hypersomnolence— sudden episodes of brief or long-lasting
sleep occurring frequently and/or inappropriately during the daytime— in spite of normally
adequate amounts ofnocturnal sleep?
As a child No c Once r 2-10 times ^ 11-20 times r More than 20 times r
17. Have you ever experienced sudden transient weakness ofmuscle groups while awake, or
sudden transient inability to speak while awake, occurring either with laughter, surprise, or
without associated event?
As a child No r Once r 2-10 times ^ 11-20 times r More than 20 times r
18. Have you ever felt disoriented or confused in terms of the time and where you are after
awakening or being awakened from sleep?
As a child No r Once r 2-10 times r 11-20 times r More than 20 times r
IF you answered 'No* THEN please go to question 19
a. Have your speech and/or your thoughts ever been severely impaired after
awakening from sleep?
As a child No r Once r 2-10 times r 11-20 times r More than 20 times c
b. Have you ever performed any inappropriate behaviour just after awakening, such
as picking up a lamp to talk when you thought that the telephone had rung?
As a child No ^ Once r 2-10 times c 11-20 times r More than 20 times
19. Have you ever sat up in bed and/or got up and walked whilst you were still asleep?
As a child No c Once r 2-10 times 11-20 times r More than 20 times c
IF you answered 'No' THEN please go to question 20
a. Have you ever been difficult to awaken during one of these episodes?
As a child No r Once r 2-10 times c 11-20 times r More than 20 times r
b. Did/do you usually remember these episodes yourself?
As a child No r Once r 2-10 times r 11-20 times r More than 20 times r
20. Have you ever suddenly awoken from sleep with a scream or a shout and experienced
bodily reactions which suggest intense fear?
As a child No r Once r 2-10 times r 11-20 times r More than 20 times r
IF you answered 'No' THEN please go to question 21
a. Have you ever had a partial or total recall of these episodes yourself?
As a child No r Once c 2-10 times r 11-20 times r More than 20 times r
b. When this has occurred, have you ever recalled any visual, auditory tactile or other
sensations?
As a child No r Once r 2-10 times r 11-20 times r More than 20 times r
c. When this has occurred, have you ever felt confused and disoriented?
As a child No c Once r 2-10 times ^ 11-20 times r More than 20 times r
21. Have you ever performed any repetitive movements, such as headbanging, bodyrocking or
rolling or humming, as you are falling asleep?
As a child No r Once r 2-10 times 11-20 times r More than 20 times
22. Have you ever experienced sudden brief tensing (or jerking) ofyour legs and possibly your
arms and/or your head as you are falling asleep?
As a child No r Once r 2-10 times r 11-20 times c More than 20 times c
IF you answered 'No' THEN please go to question 23
a. When this has occurred, has it ever been accompanied by a feeling that you were
falling?
As a child No r Once r 2-10 times r 11-20 times r More than 20 times c
23. Have you ever spoken or made sounds during your sleep without being aware of this at
the time?
As a child No r Once r 2-10 times 11-20 times r More than 20 times
24. Have you ever awoken from sleep with/because of a painful sensation ofmuscular tightness
or tension in your legs or your feet?
As a child No r Once r 2-10 times 11-20 times More than 20 times
25. Have you ever experienced a frightening dream which awakened you from your sleep?
As a child No r Once r 2-10 limes 11-20 times More than 20 times ^
IF you answered 'No' THEN please go to question 26
a. When this has occurred, have you ever been able to recall the contents of the dream?
As a child No r Once r 2-10 times r 11-20 times r More than 20 times c
b. When this has occurred, have you ever felt confused or disoriented upon awakening?
As a child No r Once r 2-10 times 11-20 times r More than 20 times r
26. Have you ever been aware, or been told, that you actually performed the movements
associated with a dream, such as running, jumping, punching or kicking, whilst you were
still dreaming?
As a child No r Once r 2-10 times c 11-20 times r More than 20 times
27. Have you ever been told, or have been aware yourself, that you grind or clench your teeth
whilst you are asleep?
As a child No r Once r 2-10 times r 11-20 times r More than 20 times r
28. Have you ever urinated involuntarily whilst you are asleep ? (Please do not include
episodes which occurred prior to the completion of toilet-training)
As a child No r Once r 2-10 times r 11-20 times r More than 20 times c
29. Have you ever been told, or have been aware yourself, that you were snoring whilst you
were asleep?
As a child No r Once 2-10 times r 11-20 times r More than 20 times <"*
30. Have you ever experienced a sudden awakening from sleep associated with a sense of
choking?
As a child No r Once r 2-10 times r 11-20 times r More than 20 times c
IF you answered 'No' THEN please go to Section B
a. When this has occurred, has it ever been accompanied by "gurgling" sounds in the
throat?
As a child No r Once r 2-10 times r 11-20 times r More than 20 times
b. When this has occurred, has it ever been accompanied by a rapid heartbeat?
As a child No r Once r 2-10 times r 11-20 times r More than 20 times r
c. When this has occurred, has it ever been accompanied by a feeling of intense anxiety?
As a child No r Once r 2-10 times r 11-20 times r More than 20 times r
d. When this has occurred, has it ever been accompanied by a sensation of impending
death?
As a child No r Once r 2-10 times r 11-20 times r More than 20 times r
Please continue on to Section B
Section B
This section is concerned with imaginative abilities and role-playing which may have been part of
your childhood.
Please read through the following statements carefully and decide whether each statement about
your childhood is either 'True' or 'False'. Please do not spend too long on each question. Please
use the mouse to click on the button to the right of the most appropriate response in each case.
31. When I was a child I believed in such beings as elves, witches, leprechauns, fairies, etc.
True c False r
32. When I was a child, I would dream or make-believe I was flying so clearly, that I felt as if I
really did fly.
True c False r
33. When I was a child, I enjoyed fairytales.
True r False r
34. When I was a child, I was very good at make-believe and imagining.
True False r
35. When I was a child, I spent time thinking about such things as the meaning of life, and
death.
True False r
36. When I was a young child (below age 8), I liked playing make-believe games such as
cowboys, school, house, etc. I liked them better than games without make-believe such as
checkers (draughts), building things, ball games, hopscotch, etc.
True r False r
37. When I was playing make-believe games as a young child, I would make believe so well
that what I pretended seemed real to me.
True r False r
38. When I was a child, I lived in a make-believe world much or most of the time.
True r False r
39. When I was a child, I believed that my doll(s) or stuffed animal(s) were alive and had
feelings (that is, they could feel hurt, lonely, happy, etc.).
True r False r
40. When I was a child, I had a pretend friend or companions such as a make-believe person,
animal, or object which I talked to, or took along with me.
True r False r
41. When 1 was a child, I would at times pretend and in some ways believe 1 was someone else
such as a prince, princess, Snow White, Peter Pan, etc.
True r False c
42. When I was a child, I was afraid at times that my pretending would become so real to me
that I would be unable to stop it.
True r False r
43. When 1 was a child, at least once, someone thought 1 was lying when I was just telling what
I was making-believe.
True r False r
44. When I was a child, I would spend at least half of the time I was awake pretending or
imagining.
True r False c
45. At times, when 1 was a child, it was hard for me to tell if something had actually happened
or if I made believe it happened.
True r False r
Please continue on to Section C
Section C
Please read through the following questions carefully and estimate the number of times that each
experience has occurred during your childhood and also during your adult life. Please do not
spend too long on each question. Please use the mouse to click on the button to the right of the
most appropriate response for 'As a child' and 'As an adult' in each case.
A small number ofquestions in this section will require you to type in your response in the space
provided.
46. Have you ever had a rather clear and specific dream which matched in detail an event
which occurred before, during, or after your dream, and which you did not know about or
did not expect at the time of the dream?
As a child No r Once 2-10 times 11-20 times More than 20 times
As an adult No r Once r 2-10 times 11-20 times More than 20 times r
47. Have you ever had, while awake, a strong feeling, impression, or "vision" that a previously
unexpected event had happened, was happening, or was going to happen, and learnt later
that you were right?
As a child No r Once 2-10 times r 11-20 times r More than 20 times
As an adult No r Once c 2-10 times 11-20 times More than 20 times c
48. Have you ever seen an object move with no "natural" or physical means ofmotion that you
could discover?
As a child No r Once c 2-10 times r 11-20 times c More than 20 times r
As an adult No r Once c 2-10 times r 11-20 times r More than 20 times ^
49. Have you ever had an experience in which you healed or appeared to heal another person
using the power of your mind alone?
As a child No Once r 2-10 times r 11-20 times More than 20 times
As an adult No c Once r 2-10 times c 11-20 times c More than 20 times r
50. Have you ever had an experience in which you were healed or appeared to be healed by
another person using the power of their mind alone?
As a child No r Once c 2-10 times c 11-20 times More than 20 times
As an adult No r Once r 2-10 times r 11-20 times r More than 20 times r
51. Have you ever had, while fully awake, a vivid impression of seeing, hearing, or being
touched by another being(s), which impression, as far as you could discover, was not due
to any physical or "natural" cause? (Please do not include here experiences of the Christ,
other religious figures or extra-terrestrials.)
As a child No c Once c 2-10 times r 11-20 times c More than 20 times r
As an adult No c Once r 2-10 times r 11-20 times r More than 20 times r
52. Have you ever experienced an outbreak of noises, such as rapping, pounding, knocking or
scratching, which was not due to any physical or "natural" cause as far as you could
discover?
As a child No r Once r 2-10 times r 11-20 times More than 20 times r
As an adult No r Once r 2-10 times c 11-20 times r More than 20 times r
53. Have you ever been bitten, scratched or pinched but could not discover any physical or
"natural" cause for the experience?
As a child No r Once r 2-10 times 11-20 times More than 20 times r
As an adult No r Once r 2-10 times r 11-20 times c More than 20 times r
54. Have you ever "communicated" with the dead or believed yourself to have been controlled
or "possessed" by a "spirit"?
As a child No r Once r 2-10 times r 11-20 times r More than 20 times r
As an adult No r Once r 2-10 times r 11-20 times r More than 20 times r
55. Have you ever had an experience in which you felt that "you" were located "outside of' or
"away from" your physical body; that is, the feeling that your consciousness or center of
awareness was at a different place than your physical body?
As a child No r Once r 2-10 times r 11-20 times r More than 20 times r
As an adult No r Once r 2-10 times c 11-20 times r More than 20 times r
56. Have you ever had a near-death-experience at a time when your life has been actually or
almost threatened?
A near-death-experience might include some of the following features: a subjective sense of
being dead, a feeling of peace, painlessness or pleasantness etc., a sense of bodily
separation, a sense ofentering a dark region, encountering a presence/hearing a voice,
taking stock of one's life, seeing or being enveloped in light, seeing beautiful colours,
entering into the light and/or encountering visible "spirits".
As a child No r Once c 2-10 times r 11-20 times r More than 20 times r
As an adult No r Once ^ 2-10 times c 11-20 times r More than 20 times r
57. Have you ever had what seems to be a "memory" of a previous lifetime? (i.e.,
reincarnation)
As a child No r Once c 2-10 times 11-20 times c More than 20 times c
As an adult No r Once r 2-10 times 11-20 times ^ More than 20 times c
58. Have you ever had a profound and deeply moving 'spiritual', 'mystical' or transcendental
experience?
As a child No c Once c 2-10 times 11-20 times r More than 20 times c
As an adult No Once r 2-10 times c 11-20 times r More than 20 times c
59. Have you ever had the strong feeling or impression that you had been some place or in the
same situation before, even though you had never actually been there before or were
experiencing the event for the first time in "real life", i.e. a sense ofdeja vu?
As a child No r Once ^ 2-10 times ^ 11-20 times More than 20 times
As an adult No r Once c 2-10 times r 11-20 times r More than 20 times c
60. Have you ever seen light or lights, or an energy field around any part of a person's body
which, as far as you could tell, were not due to "normal" or "natural" causes? (i.e., a "halo"
or "aura")
As a child No c Once c 2-10 limes 11-20 times r More than 20 times c
As an adult No r Once r 2-10 times c 11-20 times r More than 20 times r
61. Have you ever had the experience of seeming to see when your eyes were closed?
As a child No r Once c 2-10 times c 11-20 times r More than 20 times r
As an adult No r Once r 2-10 times r 11-20 times r More than 20 times r
62. Have you ever seen an image ofyourself in external space (i.e. not a reflection) which you
have viewed from within your own physical body?
As a child No r Once r 2-10 times r 11-20 times r More than 20 times r
As an adult No r Once r 2-10 times r 11-20 times r More than 20 times r
IF you answered 'No* to BOTH 'As a child' and 'As an adult', THEN please go to
question 63
a. What were you doing when this occurred?
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b. Did the image speak to you?
Yes r No r
63. Have you ever seen strange lights or objects in the sky in the distance that appeared to be
unusual or that were making unusual movements?
As a child No r Once c 2-10 times r 11-20 times r More than 20 times r
As an adult No r Once c 2-10 times r 11-20 times r More than 20 times r
64. Have you ever seen an unidentified flying object (UFO) at close range?
As a child No r Once r 2-10 times r 11-20 times c More than 20 times r
As an adult No c Once c 2-10 times r 11-20 times c More than 20 times r
65. Have you ever had some form of visual, verbal, physical or telepathic contact with the
occupants of an unidentified flying object (UFO)?
As a child No c Once ^ 2-10 times r 11-20 times r More than 20 times r
As an adult No r Once r 2-10 times r 11-20 times c More than 20 times r
66. Have you ever been on board an unidentified flying object (UFO)?
As a child No r Once r 2-10 times 11-20 times c More than 20 times
As an adult No r Once c 2-10 times r 11-20 times r More than 20 times c
Please continue on to Section D
Section D
This section is concerned with your everyday attitudes and traits and your beliefs about the
existence ofprocesses and experiences which might be beyond current scientific understanding.
Please read through the following statements and decide whether you consider each statement to
be 'True', 'Uncertain' or 'False'. Please do not spend too long on each question. Please use the
mouse to click on the button to the right of the most appropriate response in each case.
67. I believe in the existence ofESP (extrasensory perception).
True c Uncertain r False r
68. I believe it is possible to gain information about the future before it happens, in ways that
do not depend on rational prediction or normal sensory channels.
True Uncertain r False c
69. I like to gossip at times.
True Uncertain r False r
70. I believe that it is possible to gain information about the thoughts, feelings or circumstances
of another person, in a way that does not depend on rational prediction or normal sensory
channels.
True c Uncertain r False c
71. There have been occasions when I took advantage of someone.
True r Uncertain r False r
72. I believe that it is possible to send a "mental message" to another person, or in some way
influence them at a distance, by means other than the normal channels of communication.











I'm always willing to admit it when I make a mistake.
True r Uncertain r False r
I believe in the existence ofpsychokinesis (or "PK"), that is, the direct influence ofmind on
a physical system, without the mediation of any known physical energy.
True r Uncertain r False r
I believe that it is possible to heal another person via the direct influence ofmind without
the mediation ofany known physical energy.
True r Uncertain r False
I always try to practice what I preach.
True r Uncertain r False c
I believe in life after death.
True Uncertain r False r
I believe that some people can contact spirits of the dead.
True r Uncertain r False r
I sometimes try to get even rather than forgive and forget.
True r Uncertain c False c
I believe that it is possible for a deceased person to be seen, heard or felt by a living person
during their normal waking state.
True r Uncertain r False r
At times I have really insisted on having things my own way.
True r Uncertain r False r
I believe that it is possible for an outbreak of noises, such as rapping, pounding, knocking
or scratching, to occur which does not seem to be due to any physical or natural cause.
True Uncertain r False '
83. There have been occasions when I felt like smashing things.
True r Uncertain False r
84. I believe that it is possible for a person to separate their consciousness or centre of
awareness from their physical body in circumstances in which they do not perceive their life
to be in danger.
True c Uncertain r False
85. I believe that it is possible for a person to separate their consciousness or centre of
awareness from their physical body in circumstances in which their life is actually or almost
threatened.
True Uncertain r False
86. I never resent being asked to return a favor.
True c Uncertain r False r
87. I believe that it is possible for a person to recall memories of a previous lifetime (i.e.,
reincarnation).
True Uncertain c False
88. I have never been annoyed when people expressed ideas very different from my own.
True 1 Uncertain1 Falser
89. I believe that some people can have profound and deeply moving 'spiritual', 'mystical' or
transcendental experiences.
True r Uncertain c False r
90. I believe that some people can have the strong feeling or impression that they have been
some place or in the same situation before, even though they have never actually been there
before or are experiencing the event for the first time in real life.
True Uncertain c False r
91. I have never deliberately said something that hurt someone's feelings.
True r Uncertain r False r
92. I believe that some people are able to see a light or lights or an energy field around any part
of another person's body, which are not due to normal or natural causes (i.e., a halo or
aura).
True r Uncertain r False c
93. I believe that there is intelligent life on other planets.
True r Uncertain r False r
94. I believe that intelligent life-forms from other planets have visited Earth.
True r Uncertain r False ^
95. I believe that intelligent life-forms from other planets have communicated with people here
on Earth.
True c Uncertain r False
96. I believe that intelligent life-forms from other planets have allowed people from Earth on
board their vehicles.
True * Uncertain r False c
Please continue on to Section E
Section E
It would be helpful, in terms of analysing the results of this study, if respondents with similar
characteristics could be grouped together to allow additional comparisons to be made. For this
reason it would be appreciated if you could provide some additional information about yourself.
Please use the mouse to click on the button or box to the right of the most appropriate response
in each case.
A small number ofquestions in this section will require you to type in your response in the space
provided.
97. Your Sex:
Male r Female r
98. YourAge(inyears):
99. Your Nationality (e.g. British):
100. Your Level ofEducation:
Please tick the box(es) that apply
I have completed my compulsory school education. (~
I have completed school or college courses at pre-degree level. V
I have completed an undergraduate degree. !~
I have completed a master's degree or a postgraduate certificate or diploma. F
I have completed a doctoral degree. 1~~
Other qualifications (please specify)i
101. Do you/have you ever had to work shifts as part of any of your present or past jobs?
Yes c No c
a. If'Yes' please indicate when:
Iwork shifts at present I have worked shifts in the past
102. Do you travel into different time zones more than twice a year?
Yes c No r
a. If 'Yes', approximately how many times per year? I
103. Is there/has there ever been anything which has regularly caused disruptions to your
sleeping patterns?
Yes r No r
a. If'Yes', please could you describe the cause of the disruption(s) in the space below.
104. Do you suffer or have you ever suffered from any recurrent medical conditions or major
illnesses?
Yes c No r
a. If 'Yes', please could you indicate what they are in the space below.
105. Do you take or have you ever had to take any form ofprescribed medication over a
relatively long period of time?
Yes r No r
a. If'Yes', please could you indicate what it is/was in the space below.
106. Do you use any of the following substances?
a. Caffeine e.g. tea, coffee, coca-cola
Never r 1-2 times per year r 1-2 timesper month r 1-2 times a week c Daily r
b. Alcohol e.g. beer, wine, spirits (liquor)
Never r 1-2 timesper year r 1-2 timesper month r 1-2 times a week r Daily r
c. Nicotine e.g. cigarettes, cigars, pipe, chewing gum, patch
Never c 1-2 times per year r 1 -2 timesper month c 1-2 times a week r Daily r
107. Do you practise or have you ever practised any form ofmental discipline, exercise or self-
improvement program such as meditation, yoga, tai chi, aikido, relaxation exercises,
hypnosis, biofeedback or psychotherapy?
Yes r No c
a. If'Yes', please could you indicate which in the space below.
_J
J
Please continue on to the Feedback Section
Feedback Section
108. In order to improve this questionnaire for use in the future, any comments regarding
difficulties which you may have encountered whilst answering this questionnaire would be
welcomed as well as any suggestions regarding possible improvements.
Please write any comments or suggestions in the space below:
a
jj
PLEASE PRESS HERE TO SEND IN YOUR COMPLETED RESPONSES
Thank you very much for completing this questionnaire.
Ifyou would like to receive a brief summary of the results of this survey and/or you would be
interested in participating in future research, please send an e-mail to
sherwood@holyrood.ed.ac.uk or write to me at the Koestler Parapsychology Unit (see address on
KPU homepage) once you have sent in your completed responses.
Back to Koestler Parapsychology Unit (KPU) Homepage
SURVEY OF CHILDHOOD AND ADULTHOOD
SLEEPING AND WAKING EXPERIENCES
Simon Sherwood
INTRODUCTION
Your participation in this research would be greatly appreciated. This survey will form part ofmy
PhD thesis in Psychology at the University ofEdinburgh. The aims of this survey are:
• to assess the relative frequency of (and possible relationships between) childhood experiences
which can occur before, during and after a period of sleep.
• to assess the relative frequency of some childhood abilities such as imagining and role-playing.
• to assess the relative frequency of (and possible relationships between) some childhood and
adulthood experiences which might be considered, by some people, to be beyond current
scientific understanding.
CONFIDENTIALITY
Your responses to this questionnaire will remain completely confidential. Information about
individuals will not be divulged to any other parties nor will individuals be able to be identified in
any subsequent reports.
NOTES ON COMPLETION
For the purposes of this survey, 'childhood' and 'adulthood' will be defined as follows:
Childhood - from the age of 2 up until the age of 18.
Adulthood - from the age of 18 upwards.
Childhood experiences may be more difficult to remember than those occurring in adulthood. Please
try to give as accurate an estimate as you can. Some experiences may be relatively more common
than others and therefore not everyone will have had some or all of the experiences listed. Ifyou are
uncertain whether or not you have had a particular experience (regardless ofhow others might
interpret such an experience) then please answer "No1.
The focus of this survey is on the experiences themselves rather than on the possible interpretations
of these experiences. There are no right or wrong answers in this survey.
I
Section A
This section is concerned with a number of different childhood experiences which can occur just
before, during or just after a period of sleep.
Please read through the following questions carefully and estimate the number of times that each
experience has occurred during your childhood. Please do not spend too long on each question.
Please circle the most appropriate response in each case.
If a particular question does not apply to you, you may be asked to move on to another question.
For example "IF you answered 'No' THEN please go to question 2."
A small number ofquestions in this section will require you to type in your response in the space
provided.
1. Have you ever experienced vivid and realistic visual, auditory, tactile or other sensations as you
are falling asleep? (Do not include dreams which occur during sleep).
As a child No Once 2-10 times 11-20 times More than 20 times
IF you answered 'No' THEN please go to question 2
a. Have these sensations ever been terrifying?
As a child No Once 2-10 times 11-20 times More than 20 times
b. Have these sensations ever been accompanied by a 'sense ofpresence' i.e. a feeling that there
is someone or something else nearby even though they cannot be seen or heard?
As a child No Once 2-10 times 11-20 times More than 20 times
c. Have these sensations ever been accompanied by movements ofyour body or screams or
other utterances?
As a child No Once 2-10 times 11-20 times More than 20 times
d. Have these sensations ever been accompanied by a feeling of confusion or disorientation?
As a child No Once 2-10 times 11-20 times More than 20 times
e. What sort of sensations have you experienced as you are falling asleep?
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2. Have you ever been temporarily unable to perform voluntary movements and/or speak as you
are falling asleep?
As a child No Once 2-10 times 11-20 times More than 20 times
IF you answered 'No' THEN please go to question 3
a. When this has occurred, have you ever felt unable to breathe?
As a child No Once 2-10 times 11-20 times More than 20 times
b. When this has occurred, have you ever felt as if something or someone was sitting on your
chest?
As a child No Once 2-10 times 11-20 times More than 20 times
3. Have you ever experienced sensations of explosions in the head as you are falling asleep?
As a child No Once 2-10 times 11-20 times More than 20 times
IF you answered 'No' THEN please go to question 4
a. When this has occurred, has it ever been followed by a pounding heartbeat, sweating and/or
heavy breathing?
As a child No Once 2-10 times 11-20 times More than 20 times
4. Have you ever experienced vivid and realistic visual, auditory, tactile or other sensations as you
are waking from sleep? (Do not include dreams which occur during sleep).
As a child No Once 2-10 times 11-20 times More than 20 times
IF you answered 'No' THEN please go to question 5
a. Have these sensations ever been terrifying?
As a child No Once 2-10 times 11-20 times More than 20 times
b. Have these sensations ever been accompanied by a 'sense ofpresence' i.e. a feeling that
there is someone or something else nearby even though they cannot be seen or heard?
As a child No Once 2-10 times 11-20 times More than 20 times
c. Have these sensations ever been accompanied by actual movements ofyour body or actual
screams or other utterances?
As a child No Once 2-10 times 11-20 times More than 20 times
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d. Have these sensations ever been accompanied by a feeling of confusion or disorientation?
As a child No Once 2-10 times 11-20 times More than 20 times
e. What sort of sensations have you experienced as you are waking from sleep?
5. Have you ever been temporarily unable to perform voluntary movements and/or speak as you
are waking from sleep?
As a child No Once 2-10 times 11-20 times More than 20 times
IF you answered 'No' THEN please go to question 6
a. When this has occurred, have you ever felt unable to breathe?
As a child No Once 2-10 times 11-20 times More than 20 times
b. When this has occurred, have you ever felt as if something or someone was sitting on your
chest?
As a child No Once 2-10 times 11-20 times More than 20 times
6. Have you ever been able to remember your dreams? (Do not include images that occur when
you are only half asleep).
As a child No Once 2-10 times 11-20 times More than 20 times
7. Have you ever been able to stop a dream which you did not like or to wake yourself up out of
it? (Do not include images that occur when you are only half asleep).
As a child No Once 2-10 times 11-20 times More than 20 times
8. Have you ever been able to control or create a dream which you did like? (Do not include
images that occur when you are only half asleep).
As a child No Once 2-10 times 11-20 times More than 20 times
9. Have you ever experienced dreams that you would call vivid? (Do not include images that
occur when you are only half asleep).
As a child No Once 2-10 times 11-20 times More than 20 times
10. Have you ever had a dream in which you were flying? (Do not include images that occur when
you are only half asleep).
As a child No Once 2-10 times 11-20 times More than 20 times
11. Have you ever had a dream in which you were falling? (Do not include images that occur when
you are only half asleep).
As a child No Once 2-10 times 11-20 times More than 20 times
12. Have you ever had a dream in which you suspected that you were dreaming and in which you
thought about this question and/or tried to undertake various tests to determine whether you
were awake or dreaming?
As a child No Once 2-10 times 11-20 times More than 20 times
13. Have you ever had a special sort of dream in which you knew during the dream that you were
dreaming and felt that you possessed all ofyour waking capabilities?
As a child No Once 2-10 times 11-20 times More than 20 times
14. Have you ever felt that you have woken up only to discover later that you were only dreaming
that you had woken up?
As a child No Once 2-10 times 11-20 times More than 20 times
15. Have you ever felt that you have woken up and found the atmosphere to be stressed, electrified
or tense with a feeling of foreboding or expectancy, only to discover later that you were only
dreaming that you had woken up?
As a child No Once 2-10 times 11-20 times More than 20 times
16. Have you ever experienced hypersomnolence— sudden episodes ofbriefor long-lasting sleep
occurring frequently and/or inappropriately during the daytime— in spite ofnormally adequate
amounts of nocturnal sleep?
As a child No Once 2-10 times 11-20 times More than 20 times
17. Have you ever experienced sudden transient weakness ofmuscle groups while awake, or sudden
transient inability to speak while awake, occurring either with laughter, surprise, or without
associated event?
As a child No Once 2-10 times 11-20 times More than 20 times
18. Have you ever felt disoriented or confused in terms of the time and where you are after
awakening or being awakened from sleep?
As a child No Once 2-10 times 11-20 times More than 20 times
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IF you answered 'No' THEN please go to question 19
a. Have your speech and/or your thoughts ever been severely impaired after awakening from
sleep?
As a child No Once 2-10 times 11-20 times More than 20 times
b. Have you ever performed any inappropriate behaviour just after awakening, such as
picking up a lamp to talk when you thought that the telephone had rung?
As a child No Once 2-10 times 11-20 times More than 20 times
19. Have you ever sat up in bed and/or got up and walked whilst you were still asleep?
As a child No Once 2-10 times 11-20 times More than 20 times
IF you answered 'No' THEN please go to question 20
a. Have you ever been difficult to awaken during one of these episodes?
As a child No Once 2-10 times 11-20 times More than 20 times
b. Did/do you usually remember these episodes yourself?
As a child No Once 2-10 times 11-20 times More than 20 times
20. Have you ever suddenly awoken from sleep with a scream or a shout and experienced bodily
reactions which suggest intense fear?
As a child No Once 2-10 times 11-20 times More than 20 times
IF you answered 'No' THEN please go to question 21
a. Have you ever had a partial or total recall of these episodes yourself?
As a child No Once 2-10 times 11-20 times More than 20 times
b. When this has occurred, have you ever recalled any visual, auditory tactile or other
sensations?
As a child No Once 2-10 times 11-20 times More than 20 times
c. When this has occurred, have you ever felt confused and disoriented?
As a child No Once 2-10 times 11-20 times More than 20 times
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21. Have you ever performed any repetitive movements, such as headbanging, bodyrocking or
rolling or humming, as you are falling asleep?
As a child No Once 2-10 times 11-20 times More than 20 times
22. Have you ever experienced sudden brief tensing (or jerking) ofyour legs and possibly your arms
and/or your head as you are falling asleep?
As a child No Once 2-10 times 11-20 times More than 20 times
IF you answered "No' THEN please go to question 23
a. When this has occurred, has it ever been accompanied by a feeling that you were falling?
As a child No Once 2-10 times 11-20 times More than 20 times
23. Have you ever spoken or made sounds during your sleep without being aware of this at the
time?
As a child No Once 2-10 times 11-20 times More than 20 times
24. Have you ever awoken from sleep with/because of a painful sensation ofmuscular tightness or
tension in your legs or your feet?
As a child No Once 2-10 times 11-20 times More than 20 times
25. Have you ever experienced a frightening dream which awakened you from your sleep?
As a child No Once 2-10 times 11-20 times More than 20 times
IF you answered 'No' THEN please go to question 26
a. When this has occurred, have you ever been able to recall the contents of the dream?
As a child No Once 2-10 times 11-20 times More than 20 times
b. When this has occurred, have you ever felt confused or disoriented upon awakening?
As a child No Once 2-10 times 11-20 times More than 20 times
26. Have you ever been aware, or been told, that you actually performed the movements associated
with a dream, such as running, jumping, punching or kicking, whilst you were still dreaming?
As a child No Once 2-10 times 11-20 times More than 20 times
27. Have you ever been told, or have been aware yourself, that you grind or clench your teeth
whilst you are asleep?
As a child No Once 2-10 times 11-20 times More than 20 times
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28. Have you ever urinated involuntarily whilst you are asleep ? (Please do not include episodes
which occurred prior to the completion of toilet-training)
As a child No Once 2-10 times 11-20 times More than 20 times
29. Have you ever been told, or have been aware yourself, that you were snoring whilst you were
asleep?
As a child No Once 2-10 times 11-20 times More than 20 times
30. Have you ever experienced a sudden awakening from sleep associated with a sense of choking?
As a child No Once 2-10 times 11-20 times More than 20 times
IF you answered 'No' THEN please go to Section B
a. When this has occurred, has it ever been accompanied by "gurgling" sounds in the throat?
As a child No Once 2-10 times 11-20 times More than 20 times
b. When this has occurred, has it ever been accompanied by a rapid heartbeat?
As a child No Once 2-10 times 11-20 times More than 20 times
c. When this has occurred, has it ever been accompanied by a feeling of intense anxiety?
As a child No Once 2-10 times 11-20 times More than 20 times
d. When this has occurred, has it ever been accompanied by a sensation of impending death?
As a child No Once 2-10 times 11-20 times More than 20 times
Please continue on to Section B
Section B
This section is concerned with imaginative abilities and role-playing which may have been part of
your childhood.
Please read through the following statements carefully and decide whether each statement about
your childhood is either 'True' or 'False'. Please do not spend too long on each question. Please
circle the most appropriate response in each case.
31. When I was a child I believed in such beings as elves, witches, leprechauns, fairies, etc.
True False
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32. When I was a child, I would dream or make-believe I was flying so clearly, that I felt as if I
really did fly.
True False
33. When I was a child, I enjoyed fairytales.
True False
34. When I was a child, I was very good at make-believe and imagining.
True False
35. When I was a child, I spent time thinking about such things as the meaning of life, and death.
True False
36. When I was a young child (below age 8), I liked playing make-believe games such as cowboys,
school, house, etc. I liked them better than games without make-believe such as checkers
(draughts), building things, ball games, hopscotch, etc.
True False
37. When I was playing make-believe games as a young child, I would make believe so well that
what I pretended seemed real to me.
True False
38. When I was a child, I lived in a make-believe world much or most of the time.
True False
39. When I was a child, I believed that my doll(s) or stuffed animal(s) were alive and had feelings
(that is, they could feel hurt, lonely, happy, etc.).
True False
40. When I was a child, I had a pretend friend or companions such as a make-believe person,
animal, or object which I talked to, or took along with me.
True False
41. When I was a child, I would at times pretend and in some ways believe I was someone else such
as a prince, princess, Snow White, Peter Pan, etc.
True False
42. When I was a child, I was afraid at times that my pretending would become so real to me that I
would be unable to stop it.
True False
43. When I was a child, at least once, someone thought I was lying when I was just telling what I
was making-believe.
True False
44. When I was a child, I would spend at least half of the time I was awake pretending or imagining.
True False
45. At times, when I was a child, it was hard for me to tell if something had actually happened or if
I made believe it happened.
True False
Please continue on to Section C
Section C
Please read through the following questions carefully and estimate the number of times that each
experience has occurred during your childhood and also during your adult life. Please do not spend
too long on each question. Please circle the most appropriate response for 'As a child' and 'As an
adult' in each case.
A small number of questions in this section will require you to write in your response in the space
provided.
46. Have you ever had a rather clear and specific dream which matched in detail an event which
occurred before, during, or after your dream, and which you did not know about or did not
expect at the time of the dream?
As a child No Once 2-10 times 11-20 times More than 20 times
As an adult No Once 2-10 times 11-20 times More than 20 times
47. Have you ever had, while awake, a strong feeling, impression, or "vision" that a previously
unexpected event had happened, was happening, or was going to happen, and learnt later that
you were right?
As a child No Once 2-10 times 11-20 times More than 20 times
As an adult No Once 2-10 times 11-20 times More than 20 times
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48. Have you ever seen an object move with no "natural" or physical means ofmotion that you
could discover?
As a child No Once 2-10 times 11-20 times More than 20 times
As an adult No Once 2-10 times 11-20 times More than 20 times
49. Have you ever had an experience in which you healed or appeared to heal another person using
the power ofyour mind alone?
As a child No Once 2-10 times 11-20 times More than 20 times
As an adult No Once 2-10 times 11-20 times More than 20 times
50. Have you ever had an experience in which you were healed or appeared to be healed by another
person using the power of their mind alone?
As a child No Once 2-10 times 11-20 times More than 20 times
As an adult No Once 2-10 times 11-20 times More than 20 times
51. Have you ever had, while fully awake, a vivid impression of seeing, hearing, or being touched
by another being(s), which impression, as far as you could discover, was not due to any physical
or "natural" cause? (Please do not include here experiences of the Christ, other religious figures
or extra-terrestrials.)
As a child No Once 2-10 times 11-20 times More than 20 times
As an adult No Once 2-10 times 11-20 times More than 20 times
52. Have you ever experienced an outbreak ofnoises, such as rapping, pounding, knocking or
scratching, which was not due to any physical or "natural" cause as far as you could discover?
As a child No Once 2-10 times 11-20 times More than 20 times
As an adult No Once 2-10 times 11-20 times More than 20 times
53. Have you ever been bitten, scratched or pinched but could not discover any physical or
"natural" cause for the experience?
As a child No Once 2-10 times 11-20 times More than 20 times
As an adult No Once 2-10 times 11-20 times More than 20 times
54. Have you ever "communicated" with the dead or believed yourself to have been controlled or
"possessed" by a "spirit"?
As a child No Once 2-10 times 11-20 times More than 20 times
As an adult No Once 2-10 times 11-20 times More than 20 times
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55. Have you ever had an experience in which you felt that "you" were located "outside of' or
"away from" your physical body; that is, the feeling that your consciousness or center of
awareness was at a different place than your physical body?
As a child No Once 2-10 times 11-20 times More than 20 times
As an adult No Once 2-10 times 11-20 times More than 20 times
56. Have you ever had a near-death-experience at a time when your life has been actually or almost
threatened?
A near-death-experience might include some of the following features: a subjective sense of
being dead, a feeling ofpeace, painlessness or pleasantness etc., a sense of bodily separation, a
sense ofentering a dark region, encountering a presence/hearing a voice, taking stock of one's
life, seeing or being enveloped in light, seeing beautiful colours, entering into the light and/or
encountering visible "spirits".
As a child No Once 2-10 times 11-20 times More than 20 times
As an adult No Once 2-10 times 11-20 times More than 20 times
57. Have you ever had what seems to be a "memory" of a previous lifetime? (i.e., reincarnation)
As a child No Once 2-10 times 11-20 times More than 20 times
As an adult No Once 2-10 times 11-20 times More than 20 times
58. Have you ever had a profound and deeply moving 'spiritual', 'mystical' or transcendental
experience?
As a child No Once 2-10 times 11-20 times More than 20 times
As an adult No Once 2-10 times 11-20 times More than 20 times
59. Have you ever had the strong feeling or impression that you had been some place or in the same
situation before, even though you had never actually been there before or were experiencing the
event for the first time in "real life", i.e. a sense ofdeja vu?
As a child No Once 2-10 times 11-20 times More than 20 times
As an adult No Once 2-10 times 11-20 times More than 20 times
60. Have you ever seen light or lights, or an energy field around any part of a person's body which,
as far as you could tell, were not due to "normal" or "natural" causes? (i.e., a "halo" or "aura")
As a child No Once 2-10 times 11-20 times More than 20 times
As an adult No Once 2-10 times 11-20 times More than 20 times
61. Have you ever had the experience of seeming to see when your eyes were closed?
As a child No Once 2-10 times 11-20 times More than 20 times
As an adult No Once 2-10 times 11-20 times More than 20 times
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62. Have you ever seen an image ofyourself in external space (i.e. not a reflection) which you have
viewed from within your own physical body?
As a child No Once 2-10 times 11-20 times More than 20 times
As an adult No Once 2-10 times 11-20 times More than 20 times
IF you answered 'No' to BOTH 'As a child' and "As an adult'. THEN
please go to question 63
a. What were you doing when this occurred?
b. Did the image speak to you?
Yes No
63. Have you ever seen strange lights or objects in the sky in the distance that appeared to be
unusual or that were making unusual movements?
As a child No Once 2-10 times 11-20 times More than 20 times
As an adult No Once 2-10 times 11-20 times More than 20 times
64. Have you ever seen an unidentified flying object (UFO) at close range?
As a child No Once 2-10 times 11-20 times More than 20 times
As an adult No Once 2-10 times 11-20 times More than 20 times
65. Have you ever had some form of visual, verbal, physical or telepathic contact with the
occupants ofan unidentified flying object (UFO)?
As a child No Once 2-10 times 11-20 times More than 20 times
As an adult No Once 2-10 times 11-20 times More than 20 times
66. Have you ever been on board an unidentified flying object (UFO)?
As a child No Once 2-10 times 11-20 times More than 20 times
As an adult No Once 2-10 times 11-20 times More than 20 times
Please continue on to Section D
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Section D
This section is concerned with your everyday attitudes and traits and your beliefs about the existence
ofprocesses and experiences which might be beyond current scientific understanding.
Please read through the following statements and decide whether you consider each statement to be
'True', 'Uncertain' or 'False'. Please do not spend too long on each question. Please circle the
most appropriate response in each case.
67. I believe in the existence of ESP (extrasensory perception).
True Uncertain False
68. I believe it is possible to gain information about the future before it happens, in ways that do not
depend on rational prediction or normal sensory channels.
True Uncertain False
69. I like to gossip at times.
True Uncertain False
70. I believe that it is possible to gain information about the thoughts, feelings or circumstances of
another person, in a way that does not depend on rational prediction or normal sensory
channels.
True Uncertain False
71. There have been occasions when I took advantage of someone.
True Uncertain False
72. I believe that it is possible to send a "mental message" to another person, or in some way
influence them at a distance, by means other than the normal channels of communication.
True Uncertain False
73. I'm always willing to admit it when I make a mistake.
True Uncertain False
74. I believe in the existence of psychokinesis (or "PK"), that is, the direct influence ofmind on a
physical system, without the mediation of any known physical energy.
True Uncertain False
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75. I believe that it is possible to heal another person via the direct influence ofmind without the
mediation of any known physical energy.
True Uncertain False
76. I always try to practice what I preach.
True Uncertain False
77. I believe in life after death.
True Uncertain False
78. I believe that some people can contact spirits of the dead.
True Uncertain False
79. I sometimes try to get even rather than forgive and forget.
True Uncertain False
80. I believe that it is possible for a deceased person to be seen, heard or felt by a living person
during their normal waking state.
True Uncertain False
81. At times I have really insisted on having things my own way.
True Uncertain False
82. I believe that it is possible for an outbreak of noises, such as rapping, pounding, knocking or
scratching, to occur which does not seem to be due to any physical or natural cause.
True Uncertain False
83. There have been occasions when I felt like smashing things.
True Uncertain False
84. I believe that it is possible for a person to separate their consciousness or centre of awareness
from their physical body in circumstances in which they do not perceive their life to be in
danger.
True Uncertain False
85. I believe that it is possible for a person to separate their consciousness or centre of awareness
from their physical body in circumstances in which their life is actually or almost threatened.
True Uncertain False
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86. I never resent being asked to return a favor.
True Uncertain False
87. I believe that it is possible for a person to recall memories of a previous lifetime (i.e.,
reincarnation).
True Uncertain False
88. I have never been annoyed when people expressed ideas very different from my own.
True Uncertain False
89. I believe that some people can have profound and deeply moving 'spiritual', 'mystical' or
transcendental experiences.
True Uncertain False
90. I believe that some people can have the strong feeling or impression that they have been some
place or in the same situation before, even though they have never actually been there before or
are experiencing the event for the first time in real life.
True Uncertain False
91. I have never deliberately said something that hurt someone's feelings.
True Uncertain False
92. I believe that some people are able to see a fight or fights or an energy field around any part of
another person's body, which are not due to normal or natural causes (i.e., a halo or aura).
True Uncertain False
93. I believe that there is intelligent life on other planets.
True Uncertain False
94. I believe that intelligent life-forms from other planets have visited Earth.
True Uncertain False
95. I believe that intelligent life-forms from other planets have communicated with people here on
Earth.
True Uncertain False
96. I believe that intelligent life-forms from other planets have allowed people from Earth on board
their vehicles.
True Uncertain False
Please continue on to Section E
Section E
It would be helpful, in terms ofanalysing the results of this study, if respondents with similar
characteristics could be grouped together to allow additional comparisons to be made. For this
reason it would be appreciated ifyou could provide some additional information about yourself.
Please circle or tick the most appropriate response in each case.




98. Your Age (in years):
99. Your Nationality (e.g. British):
100. Your Level ofEducation:
Please tick the box(es) that apply
I have completed my compulsory school education. □
I have completed school or college courses at pre-degree level. □
I have completed an undergraduate degree. □
I have completed a master's degree or a postgraduate certificate or diploma. □
I have completed a doctoral degree. □
Other qualifications (please specify)
101. Do you/have you ever had to work shifts as part of any ofyour present or past jobs?
Yes No
a. If'Yes' please indicate when:
I work shifts at present I have worked shifts in the past
102. Do you travel into different time zones more than twice a year?
Yes No
a. If 'Yes', approximately how many times per year?
17
103. Is there/has there ever been anything which has regularly caused disruptions to your sleeping
patterns?
Yes No
a. If'Yes', please could you describe the cause of the disruption(s) in the space below.
104. Do you suffer or have you ever suffered from any recurrent medical conditions or major
illnesses?
Yes No
a. If'Yes', please could you indicate what they are in the space below.
105. Do you take or have you ever had to take any form ofprescribed medication over a relatively
long period of time?
Yes No
a. If'Yes', please could you indicate what it is/was in the space below.
106. Do you use any of the following substances?
a. Caffeine e.g. tea, coffee, coca-cola
Never 1-2 times peryear 1-2 times per month 1-2 times a week Daily
b. Alcohol e.g. beer, wine, spirits (liquor)
Never 1-2 times per year 1-2 times per month 1-2 times a week Daily
c. Nicotine e.g. cigarettes, cigars, pipe, chewing gum, patch
Never 1-2 times peryear 1-2 times per month 1-2 times a week Daily
107. Do you practise or have you ever practised any form ofmental discipline, exercise or self-
improvement program such as meditation, yoga, tai chi, aikido, relaxation exercises, hypnosis,
biofeedback or psychotherapy?
Yes No
a. If'Yes', please could you indicate which in the space below.
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Please continue on to the Feedback Section
Feedback Section
108. In order to improve this questionnaire for use in the future, any comments regarding
difficulties which you may have encountered whilst answering this questionnaire would be
welcomed as well as any suggestions regarding possible improvements.
Please write any comments or suggestions in the space below:
Thank you very much for completing this questionnaire.
If you would like to receive a brief summary of the results of this survey and/or you would be
interested in participating in future research, please send an e-mail to
Simon.Sherwood@northampton.ac.uk once you have sent in your completed responses.
Please place your completed questionnaire in the box provided outside my office (F18b).
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Dream Clairvoyance Study II Using Dynamic
Video-Clips: Investigation of Consensus Voting
Judging Procedures and Target Emotionality
Simon J. Sherwood,1 2 Kathy Dalton,1 Fiona Steinkamp,1 and Caroline Watt1
Thispartial replication study investigatedwhether individual versus small group consensus
target judging procedures, and/or the emotionality of dynamic target video clips, would
affect the frequency of correct identification of the target in a free-response dream ESP
study. Two people located in Edinburgh (Scotland) and a third person located in Derby
(England) acted both as experimenters and as participants and slept at their respective
homes. On each ofthe 28 trial nights, a randomly-selected video clip was shown repeatedly
between 3.00-4.30 am. The following morning the participants viewed four video clips
(i.e., 3 decoys plus the target) and then judged the correspondences between the clips and
records of their dream mentation. The Edinburgh participants obtained a greater number
ofdirect hits using consensus as opposed to individualjudgements. A discussion consensus
procedure was marginally more successful than a more objective consensus procedure (12
hits, p = .0294, ES(h) — 0.38 vs. 11 hits, p= .0679, ES(h) — 0.30). Participants, both as a
group and as individuals, obtained a greater proportion ofdirect hits when the target was
emotionally negative than when it was either positive or neutral.
KEY WORDS: extrasensory perception; parapsychology; emotionality; consensus voting.
INTRODUCTION
According to a recent definition, "Parapsychology is the scientific study of experiences
which, if they are as they seem to be, are in principle outside the realm of human capabilities
as presently conceived by conventional scientists" (Irwin, 1999, p. 1). Parapsychologists
typically study three broad domains of experiences: extrasensory perception (ESP), psy¬
chokinesis (PK), and phenomena that relate to the question of survival of bodily death.
The generic term 'psi phenomena', introduced by Wiesner, (cited by Irwin, 1999, p. 8) is
sometimes used to refer to ESP and PK phenomena.
This study was concerned with an investigation of evidence forESP (more specifically,
clairvoyance) during dreams. What do we mean by ESP? As defined by Irwin (1999,
1 Department of Psychology, The University of Edinburgh, Scotland. UK.
-Correspondence should be directed to Simon Sherwood. Division of Psychology, University College Northamp¬
ton. Park Campus, Boughton Green Road, Northampton NN2 7AL, UK; e-mail: simon.sherwood@northampton.
ac.uk.
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p. 6), "An extrasensory experience is one in which it appears that the experient's mind
has acquired information directly, that is, seemingly without either the mediation of the
recognized human senses or the processes of logical inference." ESP can be further classified
according to the source or the temporal reference of the information: telepathy (information
obtained from another person), clairvoyance (information about events or objects obtained
from the environment), precognition (information about future events), and retrocognition
(information about past events).
A largeproportion, estimated to be 33-65% (Van de Castle, 1977), ofspontaneous cases
of extrasensory perception (ESP) have been reported during dreams (e.g., Gurney, Myers,
& Podmore, 1886). As it is difficult to predict and to have control over when spontaneous
ESP experiences are going to occur and to whom, parapsychologists have tried to develop
experimental conditions that will facilitate the operation ofESP and help to rule out normal
methods of communication.
Some experimental research has found that dreams (e.g., Braud, 1977; Child,
Kanthamani, & Sweeney, 1977; Dalton, Steinkamp, & Sherwood, in press; Kanthamani,
Khilji, & Rustomji-Kerns, 1989; Kanthamani & Khilji, 1990; Kanthamani & Broughton,
1992; Ullman, Krippner, with Vaughan, 1989; Van de Castle, 1971) and hypnagogic/
hypnopompic imagery (Braud, 1977; Gertz, 1983; White, Krippner, Ullman, & Honorton,
1971) seem to be conducive to ESP.
TheMaimonides dream studies (Ullman et al., 1989), whichmainly investigated dream
telepathy, are undoubtedly the mostwell known andmost successful (Child, 1985). A recent
meta-analysis of 450 Maimonides dream telepathy sessions found the overall hit rate to be
63% (mean chance expectation (MCE) = 50%) with odds against chance of 75 million
to one (Radin, 1997). Attempted replications of the Maimonides dream studies have not
been so successful, though the conditions surrounding these attempts may not have been
particularly conducive (see Van de Castle, 1977).
Dynamic Targets
The dreamESP studies represented amove away from the early forced-choicemethods,
pioneered by the Rhines, towards free-response methods. With forced-choice methods, each
response by the participant is confined to a fixed and limited numberof alternatives (e.g., one
of five different Zener card symbols); with free-response methods, the participant is free to
givemore detailed responses in as many different ways as they wish (seeMilton&Wiseman,
1997, Palmer, 1986a). Most dream ESP studies have used static target materials, such as art
prints or slides, though some studies have usedmore dynamic targetmaterials such as projec¬
tor slides with an accompanying soundtrack, a person performing mimes, or films/videos.
Other free-response ESP research has suggested that dynamic and multi-sensory targets
might be more conducive to ESP than static targets (Dalton & Utts, 1995; Delanoy, 1989;
Honorton, Berger, Varvoglis,Quant, Derr, Schecter, & Ferrari, 1990). Both this, and also our
previous dream study, used dynamic video clips with accompanying soundtracks as targets.
Emotionality of Targets
Spontaneous cases of dream ESP often feature information about close relatives or
friends and/or depict negative life events (Ullman et al., 1989; Van de Castle, 1977).
However, although some literature and anecdotal observations suggest that emotional targets
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are believed to be better than non-emotional targets (e.g., Cavanna, & Servadio, 1964 cited
by Delanoy, 1988; Dalton, 1997a; Ullman et al., 1989; Van de Castle, 1977; Watt, 1989),
the experimental findings are equivocal (Delanoy, 1988, 1989).
Evidence from some experimental studies ofESP suggests that emotional target mate¬
rials are more conducive than neutral materials (Bierman, 1995, 1997; Moss & Gengerelli,
1968 cited by Gelade & Harvie, 1975; Johnson, 1971; Radin, 1997; Williams & Duke,
1979); other studies suggest that neutral targets may be more conducive than emotional
(Sondow, Braud, & Barker, 1981).
Moreover, it is not clear whether positive or negative emotional targets are more psi-
conducive as studies that have compared these target qualities have also produced conflicting
results (Delanoy, 1989). Some studies have discovered that positive materials seem to have
a larger effect than negative materials (Dalton, 1997b; Johnson, 1971; Johnson & Nordbeck
cited by Johnson, 1971; Radin, 1997; Williams & Duke, 1979); others have found the
opposite (Dalton, personal communication, November 18, 1998; Dalton et al., in press;
Krippner & Zeichner, 1974); or no significant difference (Eisenberg & Donderi, 1979 cited
by Delanoy, 1988; Sondow et al., 1981). The studies cited here, which found that negative
targets were superior to positive, were all dream, as opposed to waking or ganzfeld, ESP
studies. Thus, it seems that, with dream ESP, negative targets might be particularly likely
to be identified correctly.
In both this and our previous study, all of the video clips in the target pool had been
rated by independent judges and classified as being either positive, negative or neutral in
terms of their emotional content. This study attempted to address the emotionality question
by comparing the direct hit rate (i.e., the number of times the target clip was correctly iden¬
tified) for positive, negative and emotionally neutral target video clips. More specifically, it
was hypothesized that the group would score significantly higher than the mean chance ex¬
pectation (i.e., the number of times we would expect the target clip to be correctly identified
simply by chance) when the targets were negative. This was in keeping with the finding of
a similar study carried out at Edinburgh that involved testing for dream clairvoyance using
dynamic video targets and a consensus judging procedure (Dalton et al., in press).
Small Group Participation and Consensus Judgement Procedures
Some studies have used majority-vote or pooled rating/ranking procedures in order
to try to maximise ESP performance (Fiske & West, 1956, 1957; Kennedy, 1979; Ryzl,
1966;Taetzsch, 1962;Thouless, 1960—cited by Carpenter, 1991; Braud, 1977; Kanthamani
et al., 1989; Kanthamani & Khilji, 1990). With these consensus judgement procedures, the
responses from a number of individuals are combined to give a single judgement as to the
identity of the target on a given trial.
Carpenter (1995) has been using group consensus judgements ofthe contents of regular
quasi-psychotherapeutic group meetings as a method of facilitating ESP. Ullman (1989)
has also been conducting exploratory research with small groups to see if their dreams are
conducive to ESP. Our previous dream ESP study, using a consensus vote judging procedure
that involved three participants, found that this method yielded a higher numberofdirect hits
than individual judgements (Dalton et al., in press).3 In our previous study, the consensus
'
I lalton (personal communication, November 18. 1998) reported an attempted replication of this first study by
students at the University ofCalifornia-Davis (Dalton, Novotny, Sickafoose, Burrone, & Phillips, in preparation).
At the end of the 16 trials, the group (4 participants) scored significantly higher than chance using an objective
consensus judging method; as individuals their scores were non-significant.
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rankings were based upon the sum of the individual rankings for each trial. In this study, our
aim was to expand upon our original finding and to explore whether a consensus judgement
based upon a subjective discussion of each individual's judgements would be more or less
successful than determining the consensus purely on the basis of a more objective summing
of individual rankings.
To summarize, this study was a replication and extension ofour previous study (Dalton
et al., in press). This study was slightly different to the previous one in that there were two
consensus judging methods (involving the judgements of two rather than three participants);
the third participant was situated in a remote location; there were slightly fewer trials (28 vs.
32); there was a smaller target pool (72 vs. 100 clips); the timing schedule for the judging
sessions was more variable.
The aim was to investigate whether dream (and also hypnagogic/hypnopompic im¬
agery) clairvoyance might be possible. Further aims were to investigate whether individual
versus small group consensus judging procedures and/or the emotionality of the dynamic
target video clips would influence task performance.
Hypotheses for the Present Study
H( The direct hit rate for the discussion consensus judging method would be significantly
higher than the mean chance expectation.
H2 The direct hit rate for the negative emotion targets would be significantly higher than
the mean chance expectation.
H3 The direct hit rate for judgements attributed to hypnagogic or hypnopompic imagery
would be significantly higher than the mean chance expectation.4
We also planned to explore whether (1) there would be a difference between the
direct hit rates for two consensus judging procedures, i.e., discussion consensus and ob¬
jective consensus; (2) the consensus direct hit rates would be higher than the individual's
hit rates; (3) the direct hit rates would differ according to the emotionality of the tar¬
get; (4) a participant who had obtained a significant direct hit rate in a previous dream




This study used a clairvoyance design (i.e., no sender) although possible precognition
could not be ruled out. Twenty-eight trials were prespecified as part of a repeated measures
design. There was one pilot trial on the 4th September 1997. Two trials during the course of
the study had to be aborted.5 The pilot and the aborted trials were not included in the analysis.
The experimental trials were carried out between 14th September and 13th December 1997.
4Note that in the end this hypothesis could not be tested due to the lack ofhypnagogic/hypnopompic data collected.
5On the first occasion, the experimenter discovered that the computer program had not been able to complete its task
of showing the target clip because both VCR's had been switched off. On the second occasion, an experimenter
error meant that the computer program moved onto the judging sequence before the four possible video clips had
been shown.
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Typically, there were 2-3 trials per week, depending on the availability of the laboratory
space and the participants.
The independent variables were (1) the judging procedure used (discussion consen¬
sus, objective consensus, individual) and (2) the emotionality of the target clips (positive,
negative, neutral). There were two different participant locations, approximately 220 miles
apart: Edinburgh, Scotland (SS, FS); Derby, England (KD).
The dependent variables were (1) the accuracy classification per trial (a direct hit or a
miss), and (2) the dream-mentation-video-clip correspondence ranking (1-4) per trial.
Experimenters and Participants
Three of the authors (SS, KD, FS) acted both as experimenters and as participants.
The fourth author (CW) collated and stored the remote participant's (KD) dream mentation
and judgements and a copy of the computer printout for each trial. CW also checked the
raw data and the statistical analyses.
All three participants typically report that they experience more than one dream per
night on a regular basis. Typically, the participants reported 2-4 different dreams per night
on trial nights.
Apparatus
The computer-controlled free-response testing system within the Koestler Parapsy¬
chology Unit (KPU) can be used under a variety of experimental designs. For more details
of the equipment, the laboratory, and security measures, see, for example, Dalton et al. (in
press), Dalton (1997b) or Dalton, Morris, Delanoy, Radin, Taylor, & Wiseman (1994).
Pseudo-Random Number Generator
Following recommendations for the reporting of randomisation methods (Milton &
Wiseman, 1997), the target pool and the target clip within the selected pool for each trial
were determined using a pseudo-random number generator (pseudo-RNG). The pseudo-
RNG was a computer algorithm. The program used the RANDOMIZE TIMER command
to generate a seed number for the random number function, RND. Initially, the computer
program generated a random number to determine which of the 18 pools of clips would be
used for the forthcoming trial; a second random number determined which of the four clips
within the selected target pool would be the target clip. The computer program also utilised
this procedure to determine the order of presentation of the video clips for the judging
process.
Global tests of the randomness of the pseudo-RNG output generated by this method
on the same equipment have been carried out in the past at periodic intervals and have not
revealed any significant deviations from the expected distribution (Dalton, 1997b). Global
tests of the random number output for selection of the target pool (1-18) and the target
clip (1-4) were also carried out after the data for this study had been collected. A chi-
square goodness of fit test (carried out on Microsoft Excel for Windows 95 version 7.0
using the CHITEST function) found that neither of these series deviated from the expected
distribution to a significant extent.
226 Sherwood, Dalton, Steinkamp, and Watt
Target Materials
This study used 18 separate target pools each containing four video clips taken from
films, TV programmes, and cartoons. Thus, the target clip on any given trial was one
out of a possible 72 video clips. Each video clip was one minute in duration and had an
accompanying soundtrack. This set of target clips has been used in a previous sender/no
sender ganzfeld study (Morris, Dalton, Delanoy, & Watt, 1995). The remote participant had
a duplicate set of video clips that were viewed on her home VCR and television set.
One of the authors (KD) had previously had the 72 video clips viewed and categorised
in terms of its emotionality (i.e. positive, negative, neutral) by three independent judges (see
Dalton, 1997b). There were 24 positive, 26 negative, and 22 neutral video clips according
to these three judges.
Procedure
Selection andDisplaying ofthe Target Video Clip
Prior to each trial, the dream study computer program was set up by one of the Edin¬
burgh experimenters; this required a password (known only to SS, FS or KD). The experi¬
menters set up 14 trials each on a mostly alternate basis.
The computer created a file on the hard disk in which the details of the trial would be
recorded. Note that this file could not be accessed by the experimenter without disrupting
the experimental set-up. The experimenter was therefore blind as to which pool of target
clips and which target clip had been selected for the forthcoming trial.
The randomly-selected target clip was later shown a total of20 times between approx¬
imately 3.00-4.30 am on a television monitor and stereo headphones in a locked room.
Recording ofDream Mentation
During each trial night the participants slept at their respective homes and wrote down
the contents of any dreams or hypnagogic or hypnopompic imagery that they could recall,
either throughout the night or the following morning.
Judging Procedures
Edinburgh Participants. The following morning, the two participants (SS, FS) came
into the KPU experimental suite with their hand-written dream mentation reports.
The name of each video clip in the selected target pool appeared on the computer
monitor in turn and each clip was then displayed on the TV monitor.6 Once the names and
order of the four video clipswere known, the experimenter telephoned the remote participant
f>From trial 3 inclusive onwards, the television monitor remained switched off until alter the order of the video
clips in the target pool had been communicated to the remote participant. In trials 1 and 2, the TV monitor
was switched on at the beginning which meant that the participants viewed each of the four clips before the
order of clips had been communicated to the remote participant. The experimenters recognised the possibility
that they might inadvertently communicate cues about the correspondence between clip contents and their own
dream mentation during the telephone conversation with the remote participant and thus changed the procedure
accordingly.
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and communicated this information to her. The Edinburgh participants then watched each
of the video clips in the computer-designated order while reviewing their dream mentation.
Participants were allowed to view any or all of the clips again.
Individual judging procedure. Each individual then gave a rating of 1-99 to each
clip ('99' indicating a perfect correspondence) to indicate how closely each clip corre¬
sponded with their dream mentation. The clips were then placed in rank order, based on
these ratings, with a rank of "1" being given to the clip with the highest correspondence to
the dream mentation, "2" to the next highest correspondence and so on. Thus, the lower the
rank assigned to the clip, the higher the correspondence with the dream mentation and the
higher the expectation that it was the actual target. The participants then swapped their dream
reports with each other (without having discussed or having mentioned their own dream
mentation) and performed a similar rating and ranking procedure on each other's mentation.
Note that participants' judgements of their own mentation were recorded separately so that
they were blind as to the other participant's judgements at this stage. Participants were not
permitted to go back and alter their own judgements.
Discussion consensus judging procedure. Having read and judged the corre¬
spondence between each other's dream mentation and the four video clips, the Edinburgh
participants then discussed their mentations until they had reached a consensus regarding
which clip they considered to be the target. This was known as the "discussion consensus"
judging procedure.
Objective consensus judging procedure. Each individual's correspondence rat¬
ings and rankings were then collated and entered onto a record sheet (by SS) and checked
by FS. The total sum of the ranks given to each individual clip (based on both participants'
judgements of their own and each other's mentation) was calculated. The lowest sum of
ranks was given a rank of "1", the next lowest a rank of "2" and so on. This was known as
the "objective consensus" judging procedure. If there were any ties to the sums of ranks, the
sum of the ratings was calculated for each tie and the highest sum of ratings was allocated
the lower rank. If the sums of ratings tied, the range ofratings was calculated and the smaller
range was given the lower rank. The objective consensus rankings were then entered into the
computer. The individual ratings and rankings, the discussion consensus and the objective
consensus rankings were recorded by hand on the record sheet.
Remote Participant. In themorning, the remote participant typed her dream mentation
into an e-mail message which was sent to CW; this was carried out before KD was informed
of the names of the clips for the trial. Once she had been informed of the names and the
order of the video clips by the experimenter, the remote participant viewed each one in the
designated order. The remote participant was free to watch each clip more than once if she
wished to do so. She then followed the same individual rating and ranking procedure as
the Edinburgh participants. Once the judging procedure had been completed, the remote
participant entered her ratings and rankings into an e-mail that was then sent to CW. Thus,
the remote participant kept a hand-written and a hard disk copy of her mentation, ratings
and rankings.
Once the Edinburgh participants" objective consensus rankings had been entered into
the computer, the experimenter telephoned the remote participant and checked that she had
completed her judging and had e-mailed a copy of her mentation and judgements to CW.7
7Although the remote participant also verbally informed the experimenter of her rankings of the four clips prior
to the target being revealed, this was not actually recorded by the experimenter.
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The experimenter then instructed the computer to show which of the video clips had been
the target, while on the phone to the remote participant, so that all three participants obtained
feedback regarding their performance simultaneously.
Once the trial was completed, the experimenter instructed the computer to save the
trial data to a floppy disk and also to print out three hard copies of the trial datable that were
stored in different locations. The remote participant's dream mentation and judgements
were kept in the form of e-mail messages that were stored in CW's e-mail account. These
e-mail messages were printed out as they came in.
Statistical Analysis
A table of raw data for the individual and consensus judging methods was produced
from the experimental record sheets and the printouts of the remote participant's judgements
by the first author (SS). SS also noted which experimenter had set up each trial, the name of
the target clip and the emotionality of the target clip. This raw data table was checked against
a similar table produced by KD. The trial by trial raw data records from the remote and
the Edinburgh participants, the exact binomial probabilities, effect size calculations, sum of
ranks analyses and global tests of randomness for the pseudo-RNG were double-checked
by CW.
We have seen already how holistic judgements regarding which of the possible target
alternatives most closely resembles a participant's mentation can involve interval (i.e.,
ratings), ordinal (ranking), or nominal (direct hit or miss) scoring (see Palmer, 1986b). Our
study planned to analyse the direct hit rates, although, as noted later, we made a post hoc
decision to also analyse the ordinal scoring.
Pre-planned Analyses
The critical ratio (CR) test, which is usually used to calculate the probability of gaining
at least a given numberofdirect hits (assuming the null hypothesis is true), was not used as it
is not recommended if up (number of trials x probability of a direct hit—where p — .25) is
less than 10 (Palmer, 1986b, p. 148). Instead, the exact binomial probabilities for obtaining
at least a given number of direct hits were calculated using the BINOMIST function of
Microsoft Excel for Windows 95 version 7.0.
In terms of calculating the effect size, previous studies, including our own, have used
Cohen's h (Cohen, 1977) to index the difference between two proportions (or hit rates).
Calculations of Cohen's h and its 95% confidence limits were carried out by hand (by SS)
using the formulae given by Rosenthal and Rosnow (1991, p. 449).
Post-hoc Analyses
A sum of ranks analysis might be a more sensitive measure of ESP performance than
direct hits because it uses more information per trial (Milton, 1997). An inconclusive review
of ganzfeld studies found that sums of ranks did outperform direct hits measures in terms
of deviations from chance and effect sizes but not to a significant degree (Milton, 1997).
A sum of ranks analysis was also carried out (Palmer, 1986b) in this study because it may
facilitate further consideration of this issue.
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The authors also decided to investigate a possible relationship between dream ESP
performance and the earth's geomagnetic field (GMF) as they had done in a previous study
(Dalton et al., in press). The reason for this analysis was that a number of recent studies have
found that ESP (e.g., Berger & Persinger, 1991; Persinger, 1985) and dream ESP (Persinger
& Krippner, 1989) seem to be more likely when the earth's geomagnetic field (GMF) is
relatively low. Our previous study had found a small but non-significant relationship in the
predicted direction (rs = 0.224).
The daily average antipodal (Aa) index, which is the average change in global GMF
from midnight to midnight on the day in question, was selected as the GMF index. A
Spearman's rho correlation coefficientwas calculated for the relationship between the GMF
index and each of the objective-consensus and individual target rankings.
RESULTS
Group Versus Individual Judging Procedures
Table I shows that using the discussion consensus judging procedure, the Edinburgh
participants scored 12 direct hits during the 28 trials (direct hit rate = .43 or 43% whereas
mean chance expectation (MCE) — .25 or 25%). This is significantly higher than the mean
chance expectation (exact binomial p — .0294 for >12 direct hits, ES(7;)= 0.38, 95%
C.l.(h) — 0.00-0.75). The objective consensus judging procedure yielded 11 direct hits
during the 28 trials (direct hit rate — .39 or 39%) which is approaching a significant de¬
viation from the mean chance expectation (exact binomial p = .0679 for >11 direct hits,
ES(/i) = 0.30, 95% C.I.(/i)= —0.10-0.66). Thus, our hypothesis Hi that the group would
perform significantly better than the mean chance expectation using the discussion consen¬
sus judging procedure, was supported.
Table I also shows that the two Edinburgh participants both scored 7 direct hits during
the 28 trials (direct hit rate = .25 or 25%, MCE — .25 or 25%) which is clearly not higher
than chance expectations (exact binomial p — .5721 for >7 direct hits, ES(/z) — 0.00, 95%
C.I.(h)= —0.44-0.34). The remote participant scored higher than the Edinburgh partici¬
pants and obtained 9 direct hits during the 28 trials (direct hit rate = .32 or 32%) which
is also non-significant (exact binomial p — .2499 for >9 direct hits, ES(fi) —0.16, 95%
C.I.(fi) = -0.25-0.50).
The Edinburgh participants obtained a greater number of direct hits by using their
group judgements than by using their own individual judgements. The discussion consensus
Table I. Number of Direct Hits and Distribution of Ranks Assigned to the Target Clips by the
Edinburgh Participants (Both as a Group and as Individuals) and by the Remote Participant
Correspondence rankings
Row total
1 2 3 4 (sum of ranks)
Expected 7 7 7 7 28 (70)
Discussion consensus 12 — —. — —
Objective consensus 11 5 8 4 28 (61)
Edin. (SS) 7 13 4 4 28 (61)
Edin. (FS) 7 8 8 5 28 (67)
Remote 9 7 3 9 28 (68)
Note. A rank of 1 = a direct hit.
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Table II. Number and Proportion of Direct Hits by Emotionality of the Target
Clips and Individual Versus Consensus Judging Procedures
Emotionality of the target clips
Positive Negative Neutral Row total
Discussion consensus 6 (37.5%) 5 (62.5%) 1 (25.0%) 12
Objective consensus 5(31.3%) 5 (62.5%) 1 (25.0%) 11
Edinburgh (SS) 4 (25.0%) 3 (37.5%) 0 (—) 7
Edinburgh (FS) 2 (12.5%) 5 (62.5%) 0(-) 7
Remote (KD) 4 (25.0%) 4 (50.0%) 1 (25.0%) 9
procedure also yielded a marginally greater number of direct hits than the objective con¬
sensus procedure.
Post hoc sum of ranks analyses (Palmer, 1986b, p. 148) gave the following results:
objective consensus (CR(z) — 1.44, p — .0749, one-tailed); Edinburgh participant (SS)
(CR(z) = 1.44, p = .0749, one-tailed); Edinburgh participant (FS) (CR(z) = 0.42, p —
.3372, one-tailed); remote participant (KD) (CR(z) = 0.25, p = .4013, one-tailed). These
results show that, as with the nominal hit/miss scoring method, the objective consensus
procedure yielded a result that was approaching a significant deviation from the chance
expectation. Using the sum of ranks analysis, the Edinburgh participants" performance
appeared to be slighdy better than it did using the nominal scoring method; however, the
remote participant's performance appeared to be slightly worse using the nominal scoring
method. All individual performances were still non-significant using the sum of ranks
analysis method.
Emotionality of the Target Clips
The majority of the target clips in the study were emotional, either positive (57.1%)
or negative (28.6%). Table II shows that, both as a group and as individuals, participants
obtained a greater proportion of direct hits when the target was negative than when it was
either positive or neutral.8 The direct hit rate for negative emotion targets was significantly
higher than the mean chance expectation for both group judging methods and for one of the
individuals (FS) (exact binomial p = .0273 for >5 direct hits, ES(h) — 0.79,95% C.l.(h) =
0.09-1.69) which partially supports H2. The direct hit-rates for the positive emotion targets
were all non-significant.
Relationship with the Earth's Geomagnetic Field
The results of the post hoc analysis were non-significant and indicated that the correla¬
tions between the global Aa index and target rankings were as follows (all two-tailed): group
objective consensus rs — —.327, p — .090; Edinburgh participant (SS) rs = —.163, p —
.407; Edinburgh participant (FS) rs = —.013, p = .947; remote participant (KD) rs =
.075, p = .706. Thus, the Edinburgh participants, both as a group and as individuals,
8We did not plan to test for significant differences between the hit rates for the positive, negative and neutral
targets; it would not have been wise to do so given that the random selection process meant that the total number
of each target type selected could not be guaranteed to be the same.
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demonstrated a negative relationship between GMF and dream-ESP target rankings, i.e.,
as the Earth's geomagnetic field increased the dream-ESP performance increased. The
remote participant demonstrated a small positive relationship. The relationships were all
non-significant, although the relationship for the objective-consensus judging method was
approaching significance.
DISCUSSION
Contrary to our previous study (Dalton et al., in press), the results of this dream ESP
study found that only the group consensus judging procedures yielded a performance, in
terms of number of direct hits, that was greater than chance expectations to a significant
(discussion consensus, p — .0294, ES(h) — 0.38), or approaching significant (objective
consensus, p — .0679, ES(/i) = 0.30), extent. IfESP was operating in this study, the effect
size was small; a value of h — 0.20 is considered to be a small effect, h = 0.50, a medium
effect size (Rosenthal & Rosnow, 1991). The effect sizes for the group consensus judging
methods were slightly smaller in this study (discussion ES(/z) = .38, objective ES(/z) = .30)
than in the previous study (ES(/z) = .46). However, this may in part be due to the fact
thai in lliis study the consensus judging procedure involved only two as opposed to three
participants.
Further exploration of the data revealed that, as individuals, neither the Edinburgh
participants nor the remote participant scored significantly higher than chance expectations
in terms of the number of direct hits. In the previous study two of the participants scored
significantly better than chance expectations (p = .038). The group consensus judgements
obtained a greater numberofdirect hits than the individual judgements which is a replication
ofourprevious findings (Dalton et al., in press). The discussion consensus judging procedure
also obtained amarginally greater number ofdirect hits than the objective consensus judging
procedure.
Both the individual and the consensus judgements obtained a greater number of direct
hits when the targets were emotional as opposed to neutral; more specifically, performance
was best when the targets were negative. Our previous study also found that the group
performance was best when the targets were negative (Dalton et al., in press).
A post hoc sum of ranks analysis also found that the objective consensus and individual
scores did not reach significance, although the probabilities of the Edinburgh participant
scores were much closer to the criterion level for significance using this technique. This
provides some support for previous research that has suggested that a sum of ranks analysis
may be more sensitive and may yield greater deviations from chance and larger effect sizes
(Milton, 1997).
Group Versus Individual Judging Procedures
This study provides some limited support for the occurrence of ESP during dreams
but it seems that information received by more than one person was required in order
to make judgements that were more accurate than chance expectations. However, in our
previous study, two of the participants did score significantly better than chance expectations
(p = .038, ES(/z) = 0.33). The fact that we obtained a smaller effect size in this study using
consensus judging methods with two rather than three participants may suggest that judging
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accuracy may increase as a function of the number of contributing judgements. Further
exploration of this issue is warranted. Our finding that consensus judging procedures might
be conducive to ESP, perhapsmore so than individual procedures, supports previous findings
for both dream ESP (e.g., Braud, 1977; Dalton et al., in press; Kanthamani et al., 1989;
Kanthamani & Khilji, 1990) and waking ESP (e.g., Fiske & West, 1956, 1957; Kennedy,
1979).
As we had obtained significant results using a consensus judging procedure in our
previous study, we had decided to compare two different consensus judging methods as
part of this study. There did not appear to be much advantage to be gained by discussing
possible target-mentation correspondences in order to reach a consensus as opposed to
determining the consensus simply by pooling the independent individual judgements. While
an objective consensus procedure could easily be used for either hit/miss or rank ordering
scoring methods, the discussion consensus procedure takes much longer and is much more
difficult.
So, why might group judgements be more successful than individual judgements? If
ESP has a relatively weak effect then a combination of extrasensorially perceived informa¬
tion relating to the same target from more than one person may be required in order to boost
the accuracy of target judgements to a significant level. However, looking at the success of
a judging procedure that involves a single overall consensus call per trial, based on several
individuals, is different from looking at the number of hits per trial based on the individual
calls of several individuals per trial. In the latter case, the overall score may be partially due
to a stacking effect. If more than one call is made per trial then the likelihood of a hit is
increased because there is more than one chance of getting it correct. It must be recognised
that our overall results may also have been partially biased by the stacking effect because
we reported both individual and group performance, which are not independent.
Emotionality of the Target Clips
Participants tended to perform more successfully with emotional as opposed to neutral
targets which supports some previous research (e.g., Bierman, 1995, 1997; Dalton et al., in
press; Moss & Gingerelli, 1968; Radin, 1997; Williams & Duke, 1979) but not all. Other
studies have suggested that neutral targets may be more conducive than emotional (Sondow
etal., 1981).
The fact that participants tended to perform better with negative as opposed to positive
targets supports our previous dream ESP study (Dalton et al., in press) but is in contrast to
other findings from ganzfeld, presentiment and other ESP studies (Dalton, 1997b; Johnson,
1971; Radin, 1997; Williams & Duke, 1979). However, our findings regarding the emo¬
tionality of the target material should be treated with caution for the following reasons: (1)
the comparison is based on a small number of trials, (2) the different types of target emo¬
tionality were not expected or observed to appear an equal number of times throughout the
study because they were not counterbalanced across the target pools, (3) the emotionality
categorizations were determined by a small number of independent judges—it is not known
whether the participants' categorizations would have been in agreement,9 (4) perhaps there
'There is some evidence that judges can agree on ratings of target content. As part of an exploration of the
characteristics of free-response ESP target video clips. Delanoy and Solfvin (1996) found a high degree of inter-
rater agreement on Pleasant-Unpleasant and Distressing-Relaxing dimensions. This was based on the ratings of
10 judges.
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was a participant response bias towards selecting negative clips as being the target. As
Delanoy (1988, p. 238) points out, there are likely to be some individual differences in what
is considered to be positive, negative or neutral in terms of emodonality.
So, why might sleep, and also emotional target material, be conducive to dream ESP?
In evolutionary terms, some organisms are likely to be at risk while they are asleep. It
has been suggested that the periodical appearance of REM sleep and dreams provides a
vigilance mechanism, which is oriented to the present and the future, and also an anticipatory
arousal mechanism which counteracts these risks (Tolaas, 1986; Ullman, 1990). The dream
vigilance mechanism would come into operation during each sleep cycle and would result
in awakening, (if a potential threat was identified and was considered to be of sufficient
importance) or a continuation of the sleep cycle and a return to non-REM sleep. There
might be an ESP component within this mechanism which monitors information which is
distant in terms of space and time (Ullman, 1986). It has further been suggested that, as
society has developed, the dream vigilance mechanism has become focused on potential
psychological rather than physical dangers and, in particular, to events which might disrupt
connections with significant others (Ullman, 1986). Dreams might also attempt to address
"areas of unresolved conflict" (Ullman et al., 1989, p. 175); more specifically, dream ESP
might serve particular psychodynamic needs (Eisenbud, 1963a, cited by Rush, 1986, p. 64).
The idea is that, by reviewing earlier (and possibly distant or future) events as part of a
dream, the dreamer may identify events or information that were somehow related to the
development of the conflict(s) or thatmight offer possible resolutions (Ullman et al., 1989).
Evidence for this suggested explanation comes from the fact that a number of spontaneous
cases of ESP, often involving dreams, have been reported by clients undergoing some form
of psychotherapy (e.g., Ehrenwald, 1977a; Eisenbud, 1970; Ullman, 1959, 1975, all cited
by Rush, 1986).
If these suggested explanations are correct, it would explain why many spontaneous
cases of dream ESP feature emotionally-close persons and negative life events. It would
also explain why negative target materials may be more conducive to dream ESP in the
laboratory than positive or neutral materials.
Relationship With the Earth's Geomagnetic Field
The negative relationship between theGMF index and the group's objective-consensus
target rankings (rs = —.353) was in the opposite direction to the relationship obtained in a
previous Edinburgh dream-ESP study (rs = .224). The finding in this study is also contraiy
to previous research which has found that dream ESP is more likely when the Earth's
geomagnetic field is lower (e.g., Persinger & Krippner, 1989).
However, recent research suggests that the relationship between GMF and free-
response ESP performance may depend on the Local Sidereal Time (LST) at the time
of the trials (Spottiswoode, 1997). As Spottiswoode (1997, p. 3) describes it, LST is "the
longitudinal-like astronomical coordinate for the portion of the celestial sphere that is di¬
rectly overhead at the time of the viewing." Spottiswoode (1997) found a large increase in
the magnitude of the correlation between a GMF index and the anomalous cognition effect
at approximately 13 hours LST. The correlation was found to be effectively zero outside of
the 11.2-14.8 hours LST range. This LST factor may explain the discrepancy between this
and our previous study. However, further analysis was not carried out because of the diffi¬
culty of determining the "psi window" i.e., the period during which the ESP was believed
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to be taking place. If ESP was operating, we do not know whether information about the
identity of the target was obtained from the computer file or from the VCR or from the TV
monitor that was showing the video clips; nor do we know exactly when any ESP might
have been operating. It was felt that this imprecision and ambiguity would not allow any
accurate or meaningful conclusions to be drawn from further analysis involving LST.
Another difficulty faced by parapsychologists is that of trying to establish the source
ofpsi. Although the assumption is that any effect is caused by the participants, it is possible
that any psi might be, to some extent, due to others, such as an experimenter effect (e.g.,
Kennedy & Taddonio, 1976; Palmer, 1997; Schmeidler, 1997, all cited by Irwin, 1999,
p. 85).
Conclusion
This study was a fairly successful replication of our previous dream ESP study
(Dalton et al., in press); consensus judging procedures and emotional (particularly neg¬
ative) target video clips were associated with greater success in an ESP task. However,
the effect sizes for the small group judging were slightly lower in this study (discussion
ES(h) — .38, objective ES(/t) = .30) than in the previous study (ES(/z) — .46). While ef¬
fect sizes for individual judgements were also much lower in this study, the group direct
hit rates per emotional target type were of a similar magnitude. Possible reasons for these
differences, apart from the procedural differences and the use of a different target pool,
may be that in this study the schedule for the judging periods was more variable and in¬
volved earlier morning meetings (sometimes around 7 am) due to increased demands on
the laboratory facilities. Another contributing feature may have been a lack of novelty or a
change in the group dynamics. However, one of the positive aspects of this study, from the
group participants' perspective at least, was that it maintained a relaxed and fairly informal
atmosphere, features which have been found to be conducive in other small group dream
ESP research (Ullman, 1989). It seems that home-based dream ESP research may continue
to be a fruitful endeavour, particularly if it utilises emotional dynamic target material and
consensus judging procedures.
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Abstract: This report presents a dream GESP experiment involving consensus vote
within a group setting and dynamic video clips as target material. Three participants took
part in a 32 trial dream-psi study using the automated free-response testing system at the
University ofEdinburgh. Target stimuli were randomly selected in groups of four from a
pool of 100 video clips and the designated target for that trial shown at approximately
3am at the Koestler Chair Parapsychology Laboratory on trial nights. Each participant
dreamed remotely at home and came to the laboratory the following morning for the
judging sequence. A rank of 1 to the actual target was considered a 'direct hit', all other
ranks were considered a 'miss'.
Study hypotheses were: 1) the direct hit rate for the group would significantly
exceed MCE (.25); 2) the direct hit rate for individuals would significantly exceed MCE;
3) there would be a better overall direct hit rate for the group than for individuals, and;
4) there would be a positive correlation between low geomagnetic activity and ranking of
the target for the group (i.e., as GMF increases, psi performance decreases).
Overall group hitting was significant with 15 direct hits for 32 trials, (p = .006,
ES(h) = .46, (Cohen, 1977)). Two of the three participants also obtained independent
significant scoring, both achieving 13 direct hits in 32 trials, which is significant for each
at p = .038, ES(h) = .33. The third participant obtained 9 hits out of 32 trials, putting
those results at close to chance, p = .41, ES(h) = .07. An analysis of the relationship (i.e.
psi success and low geomagnetic activity) between the group's psi-dream target rankings
and the global aa indices was in the predicted direction but not significant at rho = .224.
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Introduction
Research into altered states has indicated that they may be conducive to psi (e.g.,
Braud, 1977; Honorton, 1977; Tart, 1969). There is extensive literature on two such
altered states - the Ganzfeld and the dream state - and their inherent conduciveness for
the reception and recognition of psi information (e.g., Honorton, 1992; Kanthamani,
Khilji, and Rustomji-Kerns, 1989; Kanthamani and Khilji, 1990; Morris, Dalton, Delanoy
& Watt, 1995; Morris, Cunningham, McAlpine & Taylor 1993; Schlitz & Honorton,
1992; Strauch, 1970). The Ganzfeld procedure is a form of sensory deprivation involving
deep relaxation techniques and it is a direct offspring of the dream research conducted at
Maimonides Dream Laboratory. Within parapsychology, the Ganzfeld technique is
typically used to facilitate an inwardly directed altered state, similar to the dream state,
and is currently used to facilitate the elicitation ofpsi in the laboratory. The dream state
is typically associated with the activation of a built-in, biologically regulated mechanism
that periodically, throughout the night, initiates a state ofhigh cortical activation inducing
the altered state experienced subjectively as dream consciousness. This state is
accompanied by bursts of rapid conjugate eye movements (REM), and is believed to be
the deepest state of sleep.
Anecdotal and clinical reports concerning psi in the dream state are numerous and
have been reported throughout written history (e.g., Freud, 1953; Rhine, 1961). Of
research conducted to test the occurrence ofpsi in dreams, the experimentally-based
research conducted at the Maimonides Dream Laboratory stands out as some of the most
successful and well known in parapsychology (Ullman & Krippner with Vaughan, 1973;
1989). This research attempted to elicit the acquisition of information by psi in dreams
under carefully controlled laboratory conditions. An independent evaluation by Child
(1985) of the Maimonides research yielded very high statistically significant results: the
combined outcome ofall series for both blind judges' and subjects' ratings was significant
at p = .001 (one-tailed).
The basic design of the Maimonides dream studies was to place an agent or
sender in an acoustically isolated room. The sender would then attempt to transmit
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telepathically a randomly selected target picture (generally from a pool of either eight or
twelve art prints) to a sleeping subject in another room. The subject's sleep was
monitored by electroencephalograph (EEG) in order to gauge the best time to awaken
them for dream reports. They would typically be awakened by the experimenter towards
the end of a REM cycle and asked to report their dreams, which the experimenter
recorded. These dreams were later transcribed for blind judging, with judges asked to
review a range of targets and then assign ranks (with a 'one' usually designating a first
place choice, etc.) according to how well the transcribed dreams matched each possible
target material. Although the studies at Maimonides were mainly designated as
experiments in telepathy, it is possible that the percipient may have been picking up on
the target clairvoyantly, without the mediation of the agent's thoughts or efforts. Thus
these studies might more appropriately be considered experiments in general ESP, or
GESP. Because we are unable to rule out the possibility of either clairvoyance or
precognition operating in the present study, we have used the term general extrasensory
perception, or GESP, for this study.
Exact replications of the Maimonides dream-psi experiments were attempted at
only two other dream laboratories - the University ofWyoming and the Boston School of
Medicine. The two Wyoming experiments yielded results approximately at chance level -
slightly below in one study (Belvedere & Foulkes, 1971), and slightly above in the other
(Foulkes, Belvedere, Masters, Houston, Krippner, Honorton & Ullman, 1972). The
Boston School ofMedicine's attempt at replication produced results that, while not
significantly positive, moved the researchers to state that "further conservatively designed
research does seem indicated because of these findings" (Globus, Knapp, Skinner &
Healy, 1968, p. 365).
Other replication attempts, conducted without the benefit of the facilities of a
sleep laboratory, have reported results that encourage further exploration of the dream
state as one conducive to the reception ofpsi information. Three studies conducted by
Braud (1976) used slides developed at Maimonides for use in their dream research.
Although Braud's first study - in which he himself acted as agent for 50 subjects - yielded
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suggestive but not significant results for the majority vote scores (p < .06, two-tailed),
the majority of his subjects were people he did not know well. He then decided to limit
the participant pool to people with whom he felt some connection. In the subsequent two
studies, ten close friends took part with Braud again acting as agent. The combined
results for the majority vote scores for these studies were highly significant at p < .001,
two-tailed.
A study by Van de Castle (1971) involved the morning recall of dreams. Seventy
members of a youth camp were percipients for a four night series, in which a member of
staff acted as agent and the target material consisted ofpools of five different colored
magazine pictures. A different set ofpictures was involved each night, and the campers
individually viewed and ranked them the following morning. This study was quite
successful, with overall significant results, p < .002 (one-tailed).
In a comparison of the Ganzfeld and the dream state using static targets,
Kanthamani & Broughton (1993) reported above chance results for both states, but at a
significant level for the dream state (p < .005, one-tailed). As altered states, the Ganzfeld
and the dream state are similar in that they both make use ofphysical and mental
relaxation, sensory isolation and inwardly directed attention. In addition, they are both
concerned with 'free-response' subject material. It is possible that the use of dynamic
targets in dream-psi research, such as video clips which more closely mimic real life
material, rather than the use of static targets, such as art prints, may add to the ability of
the participant to retrieve the target material.
These studies, and several others, offer encouraging evidence that incorporation
of distant stimuli into dreams can be demonstrated under good experimental conditions.
The possibility of dreams being used as a psi acquisition mechanism clearly merits careful
attention from experimentalists who wish to explore this area but who are without
recourse to the facilities of a formal dream laboratory. It was with these considerations in
mind that the current study was devised.
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Dynamic Targets
The majority of dream research in the past has made use of either art prints, (e.g.,
Child, Kanthamani & Sweeney, 1976; Foulkes et al., 1972), or ofprojector slides, often
with accompanying sound (e.g., Braud, 1976; Krippner, Honorton, Ullman, Masters &
Houston, 1971). One study by Hall (1967), cited by Van de Castle, employed miming by
the sender. A study by Honorton, Ullman and Krippner (1975) involved a comparison of
extrasensory and pre-sleep influences on dreams. Target stimuli were four brief films,
two designated as emotional and two as neutral. Forty sender / receiver pairs, generally
friends, were involved. On extrasensory nights, the sender would watch a film while the
receiver was asleep and the receiver attempted to dream about the film. On the pre-sleep
nights, the receivers themselves watched a film before falling asleep. Significant
incorporation occurred on pre-sleep nights but not on the ESP nights. However, field
independent subjects, as measured by the Frame and Rod Test and the Embedded Figures
Test, obtained a significantly higher correspondence score in the ESP condition for the
emotional films than for the neutral films (P = .008), but a similar difference was not
found for these same subjects in the pre-sleep condition. Additionally, research in the
Ganzfeld technique has indicated that dynamic targets, or video clips, may be the best
type of target material for research into altered states and psi (Dalton & Utts, 1995;
Honorton, Berger, Varvoglis, Quant, Derr, Schechter & Ferrari, 1990). This may be
because video clips are closer to simulating real life. They involve color, sound, emotion
and motion, and are typically thematically based, with this theme being reinforced
throughout the duration of the video clip. Van de Castle (1977), himself a participant in
several dream studies, strongly recommended that the target stimuli used in dream
research be emotionally compelling and diversified. Based on the significant findings of
current Ganzfeld work using dynamic targets (Bierman, 1995; Broughton & Alexander,
1995; Morris, Dalton, Delanoy & Watt, 1995), this study also made use of video clips as
targets.
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Consensus Vote
The majority vote technique used by Braud (1976) in his dream research, as well
as the typical blind judging procedure employed by most dream studies, led us to
speculate on the outcome of a consensus vote on any one night's dream material for the
group. It was felt that if psi acquisition did occur in the dream state for all three
participants, then a common theme, item, or pattern might emerge throughout the nights'
dreams for all participants combined. A common theme that might otherwise be missed
by the individual while ranking how well the targets corresponded with that persons'
dreams might be picked by the group as a whole. The judging procedure used by
Carpenter (1987) for reaching a consensus vote in a group setting was adapted as the
basis of the judging procedure for this study.
Geomagnetic Influences
There has been increasing evidence over the last decade to suggest that there may
be a relationship between fluctuations in the earth's geomagnetic field (GMF) and ESP.
This relationship associates periods of relative quiescence in the GMF with enhanced psi
perception (e.g., Arango & Persinger, 1988; Berger & Persinger, 1991; Dalton &
Stevens, 1996; Persinger, 1985, 1987). As Persinger (1989) provides a sizeable review
of this evidence, it will not be covered in depth here. For further discussion and debate
on the same topic see Hubbard & May (1986) and Wilkinson & Gauld (1993).
Persinger and Krippner (1989) reported that higher scoring for dream ESP in the
Maimonides experiments tended to occur on days of low GMF activity, relative to the
surrounding days, as did Tart (1988) in his study of geomagnetic effects on GESP.
Persinger and Krippner (1989) also found that when geomagnetic activity around the
time of the strongest experimental telepathic dreams was compared to the geomagnetic
activity around the time of the spontaneous telepathic dreams from the Gurney, Myers
and Podmore (1886) collection, very similar (statistically indistinguishable) temporal
patterns were observed. For the purposes of this study, it was decided to examine the
state of the GMF during the 24-hour period in which the dream trial occurred. The daily
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average antipodal (aa) index was chosen as the GMF measure. The aa index provides a
daily measure of the mean change in the global GMF and is one of the most frequently
used to assess the ESP-GMF relationship. Geomagnetic indices were retrieved for each
day on which a dream-psi session was conducted, from January 11 to March 16, 1996,
after all sessions had been completed. The geomagnetic analysis was conducted
specifically after all data was collected to avoid the possibility that knowledge of
geomagnetic parameters during the experiment might bias experimenters' expectations of
individual sessions.
Hypotheses
Based on our understanding of the previous dream-psi literature, we predicted
that: 1) the direct hit rate for the group would significantly exceed mean chance
expectation (MCE = .25); 2) that the direct hit rate for the individuals in the study would
significantly exceed MCE; 3) that the overall direct hit rate would be better for the group
than for the individuals involved (although given the small number of trials this effect
would have to be very large to detect statistically); and, 4) that there would be a positive
correlation between low GMF activity and psi hitting for the group. A rank of one
assigned to the actual target would be considered a direct hit, all other ranks
(2, 3, or 4) were considered misses. Study length was pre-specified at 32 trials, and all p
values are one-tailed unless otherwise specified.
METHOD
The dream-psi study was conducted from January 11 to March 16, 1996. The
three authors who served as the participants for this study are part of the Koestler Chair
laboratory. Each reported having good dream recall and imagery, and a positive attitude
toward GESP in the dream state. Strauch (1977) indicates that openness and willingness
to share personal dream material in a safe environment is necessary to the success of
dream-psi experimentation, and Van de Castle (1977) states that successful dream-psi
percipients have generally been described as being 'open' or 'frank'. All three participants
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strove to maintain an open, yet confidential atmosphere amongst themselves throughout
the dream study.
Participants dreamed remotely at home, writing their dreams down as they awoke
spontaneously throughout the night or in the morning. The following morning they
brought their hand-written dream records into the laboratory with them for comparison to
the four target possibilities. Participants who did not consciously recall their dreams of
the previous night were still asked to view and judge the target material on the premise
that, as everyone dreams several times a night whether they remember it or not, they may
still react subconsciously to the correct target material, even if that reaction was only a
'feeling' that one of the four possibilities was the correct target. Each participant chose
one of three methods of obtaining the target material during their dream cycles: 1)
Experimenter A chose 'Lucidity', in which the dreamer becomes aware that they are
dreaming at some point during the dream. The participant would first attempt to become
lucid and then during this lucid period would request, in the dream state, that they be
shown the target information. 2) Experimenter B chose 'Conscious Volition', in which
the participant, before falling asleep on even numbered trials, would consciously 'will'
that night's trial to be a success for the group or, before falling asleep on odd numbered
nights, would consciously 'will' that night's trial to be a success especially for that
participant. 3) Experimenter C chose 'Waking After 'Target' Dream', in which the
participant attempts to awaken during the night only after having the dream that contains
the target material for that night's clip. Although the amount of recalled dream imagery
varied from trial to trial and between individuals as well, participants overall averaged 3.4
dreams a night. Hereafter, participants will be referred to as experimenter A (Lucidity),
experimenter B (Volition), or experimenter C (Waking).
Equipment
The free-response testing system at the University ofEdinburgh is designed to be
used under a variety of experimental designs. It is a computer based system that provides
automatic data recording, highly effective shielding against sensory cues, and resistance
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to both subject and intentional experimenter bias. This automated free response testing
system can easily be tailored to produce a variety of different experimental conditions, to
explore those that work best in general, or best for specific participant populations. It
can also vary conditions in accordance with the design ofprocess-oriented studies and
recently was used in a series of automated Ganzfeld research (Dalton, 1997, Morris et al.,
1995). The program is run on a 33MHz 80386DX computer, equipped with a 210 MB
fixed disk, 8 MB DRAM, four RS 232 serial ports, an 80387 numeric coprocessor, a
super VGA monitor and a printer. The target presentation system involves two
PC/VCRs, both frame-accurate NTSC videocassette recorders equipped with an RS 232
serial interface. The target pool consists of 100 different video clips, all exactly a minute
long within a fraction of a second, and divided into 25 groups of four. For each trial in
this study, one group of four clips was randomly chosen by the computer as the target
pool for that trial, then one of the four clips was randomly chosen as the actual target for
that trial, and each target selection took place with replacement. As this target pool is
also currently being used in automated Ganzfeld research at the University ofEdinburgh,
the video tapes are never rewound to the beginning of the tape, but start up where the
tape stopped at the end of the last session. In addition, an opaque cover, completely
covered with black electrical tape, has been inserted inside the metal cover of the VCR
itself, obscuring all digital information regarding tape characteristics. The target and
judging video tapes are locked into the two separate VCRs via a specially designed metal
housing unit, with a uniquely numbered brittle plastic security tab. This also renders the
front control panels inaccessible, as these are completely enclosed by the metal housing
unit for the VCRs. All VCR functions are controlled by computer software, and video,
audio and computer graphics are routed to the appropriate rooms (experimenter, sender,
or receiver), through computer control. The VCRs have been placed in a separate non-
adjoining, sound attenuated room in the experimental suite. This room is accessed only
through two back to back doors and video tape movement sounds cannot be heard
outside of this room. Other equipment includes a NTSC video monitor and a stereo
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audio amplifier in the Target and Judging rooms. A layout of the rooms involved in this
study is shown in Appendix 1.
The free-response program itself runs under a combination ofMicrosoft Quick
Basic 4.5 and Windows 3.1 /DOS 5, and is passworded - unless the experimenter has
knowledge of the correct password he or she cannot run the program, and this password
was known only to the three experimenters. The program produces a datafile during
each session which is stored to both the hard drive and a floppy disk, and is sent for
immediate printout to the printer at session conclusion. All target presentations, VCR
video and audio signals, as well as computer graphics, are computer-controlled. For
additional information on the security measures involved, as well as additional
information on laboratory layout, see Dalton, Morris, Delanoy, Radin, Taylor & Wiseman
(1994).
Procedure
A simplified GESP design was used for this experiment in contrast to the
telepathy design of the Maimonides research. As each experimenter also acted as
participant in this study, it was decided to alternate who set up the computer program for
each night's trial. Experimenters A and B set up the program eleven times each and
experimenter C set up the program ten times. The following is an outline of the steps
involved in setting up the computer program for each night's trial.
The experimenter for the trial would activate the dream study computer program
to randomly select a one minute video clip to be played that night. The experimenter did
not know which clip the computer had selected. The experimenter would then set the
appropriate time for the one minute clip to be shown. This was predetermined to be for
approximately 3am each trial. The experimenter would then enter the appropriate
password and series number. The computer initiates a datafile for that session at this
point. The experimenter is prompted by the computer to enter their initials and the trial
number. At this point, the experimenter would also set the number of times the clip
would be shown, pre-specified at 20, and how long to wait between showings of the clip,
10
Dalton, Steinkamp, Sherwood - Dream GESP
pre-specified for two minutes. In this way, the clip would be shown 20 times between the
hours of 3am and 4am.
Next, the experimenter would verify that all appropriate levels and controls were
in their default settings in case any trials from other studies that day had disrupted those
settings. She/he would then go to the target room and turn on the TV monitor and stereo
audio amplifier. The lights in the room were then turned off, the door to this room closed
and locked for the duration of the trial, and the key returned to its secured location.
Upon leaving for the night the experimenter also locked the door to the experimental
suite.
The following morning, the three experimenters would come in with their hand¬
written dream records and meet in the experimental suite to proceed with the session
judging. The judging procedure used by Carpenter (1987) for reaching a consensus vote
in a group setting was used as the basis for the judging procedure in this study and went
as follows: The experimenter for that trial would make sure that the monitor and sound
was on in the judging room for the judging session. The other two participants would
then enter and take seats, and the experimenter would signal the computer to begin the
review of the four possible target choices. The four possible target clips were viewed by
the participants, and participants were then given the opportunity to view any of the four
again. Participants then individually judged each clip by assigning it a rank of 1 -4(1
representing the greatest degree of correspondence with dream imagery), and giving each
possible clip a rating between 1 - 99 (first choice getting the highest rating). Ratings and
ranks were hand noted by each participant on their dream report sheets, considered final
for the individuals and not subject to change after the sharing aloud of dream material.
After each participant had written down their final ratings and ranks, each would
share their night's dreams and report the rating and rank they had assigned to each clip,
which the experimenter for that trial would write down on the session record sheet. The
ranks for each clip were then added up and the clip with the lowest score given first
place, the next lowest given second place, and so on. In the eventuality of ties, the
ratings were added up and the clip with the highest rating was given the rank in question,
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with the lower rating taking the next rank. In the eventuality of a tie between ratings, the
variance in ratings was taken into account. It was reasoned that a tighter variance would
indicate a greater consensus on that target, and thus the clip with the lower variance
received the lower of the remaining ranks. Group ranks and ratings were double checked
by one of the other participants and then the experimenter for that trial entered the group
data into the computer. As soon as this judging sequence was completed, the computer
stored the group's experimental data both to disk and to hard drive and then revealed the
target. Session data was then sent to the printer for multiple printout, and the
experimenter was prompted to close out the session. It should be noted that no feedback
regarding the target was given until the computer stored the judging data to disk. This
disk was stored with the study file, and produced before each trial.
The automated free-response program records session data not only to the hard
drive at the end of the session, but also to diskette throughout the session. Immediately
after each session, as soon as the computer has recorded the session as completed,
multiple copies of the session datafile were printed out for distribution to the appropriate
parties. One session record went to a staff member of the Koestler Chair who was not
involved with the study, one went to Experimenter C for independent storage and safe
keeping, and one was included in the session file and placed in a filing cabinet in
Experimenter A's office. The session records on computer disk were compared to
printouts in the experimenters' possession and those of the Koestler Chair staffmember
for discrepancies before any data were analyzed. All three experimenters were required
to sign the hand-written session record of target ratings and ranks for both the group and
the individuals at the end of each session. This was then attached to the session printout
along with the hand-written dream records and included in the study file with the
computer print-out.
Results
The first hypothesis for this study - that the direct hit rate for the group would
exceed MCE - was confirmed. There were 15 direct hits for the group in 32 trials, which
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is significant at p = .006, ES(h) = .46 (Cohen, 1977). (All p values are one-tailed unless
otherwise specified). For completeness, the distribution of ranks for the group is shown
in Table 1.
Table 1: Distribution ofRanks for Group
Rank 1 2 3 4
Obtained 15 11 4 2
Expected 8 8 8 8
The second hypothesis - that the direct hit rate for the individuals in the study
would exceed MCE - was partially confirmed. Two of the three participants achieved hit
rates that exceeded chance, both with 13 hits in 32 trials, which is significant at p = .038
for each, ES(h) = .33. One experimenter achieved 9 hits in 32 trials, which is close to
chance, p = .41, ES(h) = .07. For completeness, the distribution of ranks by participant is
shown in Table 2. It must be noted here that due to the possibility of a stacking effect
these results cannot be considered to be independent of each other, or of the result in
Hypothesis 1.
Table 2: Distribution ofRanks by Individual
Rank 1 2 3 4
Experimenter A 13 10 6 3
Experimenter B 9 12 5 6
Experimenter C 13 9 6 4
Expected 8 8 8 8
For the third hypothesis - that the overall direct hit rate would be better for the
group than for the individuals involved - the evidence was in the correct direction. Given
the small number of trials for this study this effect would have to have been very large for
us to detect statistically, but the group obtained 15 hits out of 32 trials, while the
averaged individual hit rate was 11.67 hits.
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The fourth hypothesis - that there would be a positive correlation between low
GMF and psi hitting for the group - while in the predicted direction, was not significantly
supported. A nonparametric correlation (Spearman) was used to examine GMF aa values
because it could not be assumed that these values were normally distributed. The
relationship (i.e. group ranks and low global geomagnetic activity) between the group's
psi-dream target rankings and the global aa indices was not significant, although in the
predicted direction, at rho = .224.
Examples of Target /Mentation Correspondences
In this section we present some examples of correspondences between targets and
dream mentation. In each case we will give a description of the target first followed by
the participant's dream report. While conclusions cannot be drawn from qualitative data,
it does constitute the raw material upon which the objective statistical data is based and
may provide important insights concerning the underlying process. These examples are
excerpts from the dream reports of the participants, identified by them as providing the
basis for rating the target first. We have edited these sections for purpose of illustration
in this paper. They are not submitted for any evidential value.
Target 91, Early Man. From the film 2001. This clip depicts a group ofman-like
ape creatures, who awaken in a sheltered rocky overhang to find an obelisk in their midst.
The obelisk begins making a loud high-pitched noise and the ape-men become frightened.
They begin frenzied jumping around, making threatening moves towards and away from
the obelisk.
Trial #4, Experimenter A, Rank 1. "Dreamt of people trying to hide from other
people. This seemed to be mixed up with people having very short, very fine fur, and I
seemed to keep hearing someone saying 'people have skin, not fur'. I kept thinking of
monkeys."
Target 88, Beast. From the film Legend. This clip shows a red skinned man with
horns, black hps, fangs and cats eyes stepping out of a mirror. He speaks mockingly
about dreams and love, and in the closing scene he grins and then laughs wickedly.
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Trial #6, Experimenter B, Rank 1. "Dreamt of a man with a severely burnt or
maimed face. There was a close up ofhis lips as he tried to speak. His mouth seemed
normal, but there was a green spot on his Up. This made him seem like an alien."
Target 71, Space Ships. From the film Star Wars. This clip is a compilation of
scenes throughout the Star Wars movie showing various types of spacecraft flying and
manoeuvring, some near large planets or through 'warp holes'.
Trial #5, Experimenter C, Rank 1. "Saw a saucer-shaped, silver metallic UFO fly
over me, bank over some trees and then fly back over me."
Discussion
The significant success rate (47%, p = .006) of the group in correctly selecting the
target replicates the success of the Maimonides dream studies, albeit without the benefit
of the facilities of a formal dream laboratory. This is in keeping with several small scale
studies done without the use ofextensive sleep laboratories that supported the more
convincing Maimonides work (Child, 1985). The indication of a slightly higher level of
success for the group as compared to the individual may indicate that dream-psi may
often occur at such a low level that it is missed by the individual, whereas a sharing of
dream mentation within a group setting allows for the manifestation of common themes,
patterns, or items. This leads us to recommend the continued exploration of consensus
vote in the judging sequence of dream research.
However, we must speculate on the nature ofwhy group judgements might be
more successful than individual judgements. IfESP is a relatively weak effect then a
combination ofextrasensorially perceived information relating to the same target from
more than one person may be required in order to boost the accuracy of target
judgements to a significant level. However, looking at the success of a judging procedure
which involves a single overall consensus call per trial, based on the consensus of several
individuals, is different from looking at the number of hits per trial based on the individual
calls of several participants per trial. In the latter case, the overall score may be partially
due to a stacking effect. In this respect, our overall results may also have been partially
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biased by the stacking effect since we reported both individual and group performance
which are not independent.
Contrary to previous literature, our expectation of significant psi hitting during
times of low GMF was not supported (rho. = .224). However, it was in the predicted
direction and we plan to continue to explore this particular variable in future dream
studies. The significant success rate for two of the participants (p =.038 each) in this
study continues to point to the richness of the dream state as a vehicle for enhancing psi
acquisition for the individual. The different methods chosen as an approach to facilitating
dream-psi success by each individual met with varying degrees of success, and some
speculation is called for on why this might be so.
Lucidity, in which the dreamer becomes aware that they are dreaming at some
point during the dream, was the approach chosen by experimenter A in order to facilitate
the acquisition of target information in the dream state. The participant would first
attempt to become lucid, by means of a pre-sleep suggestion, and after having achieved
the lucid state, the participant would then request while in the dream state that they be
shown the target information. This approach is considered to have worked fairly well,
with experimenter A having three lucid dreams during the course of the study, and
correctly choosing the target twice due to the information received in these dreams. In
one such dream, upon becoming lucid the experimenter stepped through a door into a
sunny parking lot in which a group of tough-looking teenage boys were hanging out, all
wearing sunglasses. The dream target for the following day involved a helicopter chase
scene with James Bond in which all of the 'bad guys' wore sunglasses against the glare of
the sun. Additionally, experimenter B also experienced a lucid dream during the course
of the study. Upon asking to be shown the target material, the experimenter began flying
uncontrollably around the room, twisting and turning. The following day, experimenter
B correctly chose the clip 'Flying Nannies', depicting a scene from 'Mary Poppins' which
focuses on the other nannies getting blown away by a high wind, twisting and turning
uncontrollably, as Mary Poppins arrives to take the post. Therefore, for an overall total
of four lucid dreams during the study, three of them contained highly accurate target
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material. This approach was considered to be a success, if somewhat limited by the
ability of the dreamer to become lucid at will.
Experimenter B chose the approach of'conscious volition' in order to facilitate the
acquisition of psi information in the dream state. In order to assist both the group and
their self in succeeding in the goal of scoring above MCE for the study, experimenter B
decided to alternate the conscious aim for each trial. Thus, on odd numbered trials
experimenter B consciously willed, before going to sleep, to dream about the target
during the night and to successfully guess the right target in the morning. On even
numbered trials experimenter B consciously willed for the group to dream successfully
about the target and for the group to select the target correctly the following day.
Experimenter B felt that wishing for the group's success would also enable experimenter
B to do well on those trials, as it would involve both a release ofpressure to succeed and
less ego involvement. However, experimenter B's personal results were at chance level,
as were the differences between willing for self and willing for group. Table 3 shows that
both group and individual did marginally, but not significantly, better on trials for which
experimenter B had willed the group to succeed. It is felt that due to the low number of
trials no conclusions can be drawn about this method. Also, when viewing these results it
should be kept in mind that the analyses presented here and in the following pages are
post hoc, and not adjusted for multiple analyses.
Table 3: Results of Conscious Willing for Group or for Self
Group Hits Individual's Hits
Hoping for Self 6 4
Hoping for Group 9 5
Experimenter C chose a 'waking after the target dream' approach, which also
involved self-suggestion prior to sleep onset, but in a process-oriented manner. The
experimenter silently repeated the following suggestion two to three times immediately
prior to sleep:
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When I fall asleep tonight I will dream and my dreams will relate to the target imagery. 1 will
wake up after the dream which relates to the target and I will recall the contents of this dream.
There is some evidence, often anecdotal, that some individuals can employ
strategies which enable them to awaken at a pre-selected time. Empson (1993) cites a
study which found that individuals who claimed to be able to awaken at pre-selected
times were able to achieve this with considerable accuracy. It was hoped that this pre-
sleep suggestion might be able to achieve awakening at the desired time. This strategy
seems to have had some success: on eight of the thirteen nights on which experimenter C
got an individual hit, they (experimenter C ) also awoke during the night and recalled
aspects of a target related dream. However, on one occasion experimenter C achieved a
hit despite not awakening during the night and not recalling the contents ofany dreams.
An expansion of this strategy might involve a more specific suggestion, or physically
awakening the sleeper via an alarm either during or after the time period when the target
clip is being shown.
Due to unforeseen time constraints a decision was made, during the course of the
study, to compare informally whether the spacing between dream trials would have any
effect upon the acquisition of psi in the dream state for the three participants. Thus, the
first 16 trials of the study were compared to the last sixteen trials as a transition in the
spacing of the trial nights occurred then. The first sixteen trials involved having only two,
or at most three, dream trials in a single week. The second sixteen trials of the study
involved having five, or at most six, dream trials in a single week. Statistically, this did
not seem to impact the group's ability to select the target correctly, with 8 direct hits in
the first 16 trials and 7 direct hits in the last 16 trials. However, as can be seen from
Table 4, it did have an impact on the individual responses, with experimenter A's hit rate
dropping slightly, experimenter B's hit rate improving slightly, and the largest impact
occurring for experimenter C, whose direct hit rate dropped from 10 in the first 16 trials
to 3 in the last 16 trials. Additionally, the group experienced three of the seven hits for
the last 16 trials in the last three trials of the study. The pattern of hits and misses for the
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last 16 trials reveals a terminal salience effect often found in other psi research (Rhine,
1941).






Experimenter A 8 5
Experimenter B 4 5
Experimenter C 10 3
During the course of the study, the authors felt it may be possible they were
picking up better on targets containing a threatening aspect, or conveying a negative
impact. Some researchers have suggested that a certain amount of vigilance takes place
in the dream state (Tolaas, 1986; Ullman, 1986, 1990), a continued unconscious scanning
ofour environment in order to monitor any possible threats, physical or psychological, to
our well-being. Ganzfeld studies exploring the impact of the emotionality of the target
stimuli (Bierman, 1995) seem to indicate that video clips with either a high negative or
positive content are better target material, and Krippner (1975) suggested that emotional
stimuli are more effective in dreams than in non-dream experiments. Three independent
blind judges rated the emotional impact of each of the 100 targets in the dream study
pool by assigning either a positive impact, a negative impact or as being neutral. This
evaluation revealed a total of 35 emotionally positive targets, 32 emotionally negative and
33 emotionally neutral targets comprising the study pool. The total number ofdirect hits
in the study was 15 in 32 trials. When these fifteen targets are broken down into then-
emotionality categories we see the percentage of each category in this study (Table 5).
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Table 5: Percentage ofHits by Target Type (Total hits =15)
Positive Targets Negative Targets Neutral Targets
Hits 4 8 3
% ofTotal Hits 4/ 15 = 26.6% 8/15 — 53.3% 3/15-20%
This table shows that in fact the majority of hits were on negative targets - but
was this due to a preponderance of negative targets within the target pool itself? To
answer this question we looked at how often a particular type of target was chosen in
terms of its availability within the target pool of 100, i.e., there were 35 positive clips
available for selection as targets within the pool of 100, 32 negative clips available for
selection as targets, and so on (see Table 6).
Table 6: Target Type Availability Within Pool
Positive Targets Negative Targets Neutral Targets
Target Type Availability 35 32 33
Times Selected As Target 9 13 10
% ofCategory 25.7% 40.6% 30.3%
Direct Hit 4 8 3
% ofDirect Hits 4 / 9 = 44% 8/13 = 61% 3 /10 = 30%
Table 6 shows that amost 41% of the targets selected by the computer for the
study contained a negative or threatening aspect. But, were the experimenters actually
picking up better on these types of targets? Table 6 also shows both the number of times
a target from each category was selected by the computer as the target, and the number
of times it was correctly chosen by the group as the target. The percentage of times each
target was correctly chosen is also shown.
As can be seen from the last two rows in Table 6, the experimenters seemed to be
quite successful in getting 8 direct hits out of the 13 times a negative clip was the actual
target, for a 61% hit rate, p = .006. This is followed by the positive targets with 4 direct
hits out of 9 presentations (hit rate 44%, p = . 16), with the neutral targets having the
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poorest response rate of 3 hits in 10 presentations (30%, p = .47). These tables support
both the feelings of the researchers in that they were picking up better on targets having a
negative or threatening aspect, as well as the previous literature on emotional stimuli and
vigilance in the dream state.
Based upon interest expressed at the initial presentation of this paper, a sum of
ranks (SOR) analyses has been performed to allow the results from this study to be more
easily compared to other similar work. This analysis yielded SOR = 57, z = 3.58, ES =
.63. This is similar to the types of effect size that has been seen in remote viewing work
(May, Utts, Humphrey, Luke, Frivold and Trask, 1990; May, Spottiswoode & James,
1994), and there has been some speculation as to whether the richness of the dream state
might be comparable to the task of remote viewing in one's sleep.
While the consensus vote technique seemed to work fairly well for us as a group,
there were some concerns over the possibility that participants may have picked up verbal
or non-verbal cues during the viewing period as to possible correspondences in other
participants dreams. This may have lead to a conscious or unconscious influence in
subsequent ratings. Also, on sharing the dream material it sometimes appeared as if there
were a recurrent theme in each of them. This led us to speculate whether it would have
been better to confer as a group on the judging, rather than statistically, which target we
wished to select as a group choice. However, it was decided that this type of approach
may be a difficult strategy to employ due to either personality characteristics or personal
convictions (concerning the correct target) adversely affecting a fair vote.
The level of success in this study would seem to indicate that conducting dream-
psi research in the privacy of the participant's home is a viable proposition. Participants
who may view the confines of the laboratory as restrictive or the social setting of the
laboratory uncomfortable, might find the idea ofparticipating in a formal psi experiment
from the comfort of their own home very appealing. Robinson (1982) has detailed the
importance of participants having choices in how they participate in psi experimentation
and has also summarized the psychological literature on choice and perceived control.
This literature shows that ifparticipants feel (perceive) that they have control when
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performing different types of tasks, their performance will improve. Dream research
conducted with participants dreaming at home could allow them to select the best night
for their participation, their approach to acquisition of the dream-psi material, to decide
how that material is revealed to the experimenter, and even to determine the time of day
that they wish to come into the laboratory for the judging session. This type of research,
conducted with the participant operating from the comfort and security of their own
home (Delanoy, Watt, Morris & Wiseman, 1993), reduces the expense of dream-psi
research, eliminating the need for expensive laboratory sleep monitoring equipment.
Additionally, in many cases the time involved for the experimenter is greatly reduced.
The orientation time for a dream study is minimal, and questionnaires or forms can be
filled out at home and returned upon arrival for the judging session. The judging session
itself takes minimal time, with the judging process for the three experimenters in this
study taking approximately 30 to 45 minutes per session. This may conceivably be less
with a single participant.
Although this study was relatively small, with only three participants taking part in
32 trials, the overall significant scoring was very encouraging and seems to suggest that
dream research, conducted without the use of laboratory sleep monitoring equipment,
remains a vital and worthwhile area of investigation. In this study the target was selected
by the computer at time of the initiation of the VCRs but not actually shown until later in
the night. Thus, ifone dreamt about the target clip at lam but the target clip was not
shown until 3am, this makes it impossible to rule out clairvoyance over precognition,
since the target clip has already been determined. A future study could involve selection
of the target immediately prior to playback, enabling a clearer distinction between
precognitive and clairvoyant dreams. Additionally, where possible a telepathic design
should be considered, as the use of a sender may engender a feeling ofmore personal psi
interactions for the participant and may result in higher scoring rates, or a clearer
manifestation of dream-psi imagery. This appears particularly so with the use ofdynamic
targets, which more closely mimic real life situations. It is hoped that future dream-psi
studies conducted by other researchers will make use of dynamic targets, with
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participation taking place outside the confines of the laboratory, in order to replicate the
results presented here. It is our feeling that dream research continues to be a promising
technique for experimental study of the ESP question.
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